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Abstract 
This thesis develops a theoretical-interpretive scheme, a Critical Realist 
Activity Theory (CRAT). It is argued that learning is a passage through 
the dialectic, the logic of emancipation and for self-emancipation. The 
structure of CRAT follows the 1M-5A Bhaskarian dialectical schema to 
show how the theories of Collaborative Learning, Cooperative Learning, 
Supplemental Instruction, and Activity Theory (AT) function in a plu-
ralist sense to account for the main critical realist categories of reality 
— 1M: learning as product (non-identity), 2E: learning as process (neg-
ativity), 3L: learning as process-in-product (totality), 4D: learning as 
product-in-process (transformative agency), and 5A: learning as eman-
cipatory intentionality (reflexivity). In particular, CRAT engages the 
basic tenets of Critical Realism to provide a philosophical foundation 
and simultaneously, a resolution to various dualisms that AT suffers 
from. An immanent critique of AT, as a method of argumentation, is 
particularly effective for this purpose since it involves taking a theory 
and its claims about the world and using them to show that the the-
ory is inconsistent with itself. Then CRAT goes on to show, at the 
level of omissive critique, that a key element that is absent from the 
historical development of the activity-theoretical approach and explains 
its dualisms is the omission of a critique of empiricism, i.e., a critique 
of Humean philosophy. Thereafter, CRAT goes on from the immanent 
and omissive critiques, a step further with an explanatory critique as a 
means by which to reincorporate the absent element in AT in order to 
reclaim and strengthen our perception of emancipatory human praxis. 
The result from cementing this tradition in a critical realist philosophy 
is a move through dialectical learning. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Personal background 
Allow me to start at the beginning. I was probably "conceived without sin" during 
a night of great passion, when a couple of attractive juveniles acted on instinct; at 
least, this is what I want to imagine. Now, let us visualize my mother's attitude, as 
a typical Hegelian Beautiful Soul, who was a teenager when she found out that she 
was pregnant with me—something that she repeatedly tried to terminate, but alas, 
the embryo hung on—so she was unhappily caught in her predicament. My father, 
an orthodox Marxist, who was a little older when this shocking, life-changing news 
arrived, unsurprisingly ignored this immediate responsibility, waving the flag of what 
seemed to be the grand social cause of the late 1970s. It is too easy to speculate as 
to how my father chose to reference Lenin and his leftist ideals by naming me Iskra; 
instead, I like to think that it stood for the possibility of something new (created by 
two, yet belonging to no one). However, this event was something highly traumatic 
that would disrupt the rest of both of my parents' lives. They knew very well 
that since they could not just get rid of "it" due to dubious religious and parental 
injunctions, they had to embrace "it". To cut a long story short, my parents were 
forced into marriage only a few months after I was born; they tried to get along, 
but failed, or rather, succeeded, because what they had created, which had abruptly 
brought them together, also served to liberate them when they finally separated. 
I begin with this story not only to provide a personal background, but because it 
portrays a particular universality. Let us consider my mother as a metaphor for the 
acceptance of fate (e.g., the Hegelian Unhappy Consciousness), and my father as a 
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metaphor for the application of orthodox Marxian theory (e.g., as having the belief 
that there is a historical development or linear evolution of society in the direction 
of communism). Together, they create the following logic, which is a central and 
recurrent theme in this thesis: a potentiality that pulsates in all of us, or following 
my parents, a spark of liberation and a desire for emancipation, which is how I see 
our individual drive for learning. 
In general, my research interests revolve around understanding, solving, and 
positing problems. In particular, I am interested in the investigation of structures 
such as reality, mathematics, learning and language to apprehend various problems 
or reality. In the educational field, I start with an intuition that learning is a cause 
of change and with the general feeling that it must be a process that goes on all the 
time to fulfill the desires, hopes, and dreams inscribed in the very fabric of being. In 
this sense, we can relate to the basic idea that once we have learned, we realize that 
there is always something new to be learned — the academic journey of a lifetime. 
I began my academic journey through higher education with the study of math-
ematics, which led me to doctoral studies in the intersection of philosophy of science 
and education, mainly because I perceived a gap between what learning was for 
me and the pragmatic slogans that resonated throughout my teaching and learning 
experiences, such as, "encourage women to pursue science and mathematics". Of 
course, I agree with such slogans, especially when replacing the word "women" with 
"each other", but my main problem is that they indicate that we live in world in 
which we need to advertise it, which, in my opinion, is simply inadmissible. In other 
words, if we take the slogan as an imperative, then it obviously legitimates a back-
ground of societal hierarchy and inequality', and if we take it as a suggestion, then 
it sounds ridiculous. Consequently, all of these experiences amounted to a certain 
imbalance or apprehension — a yearning for the structure of learning — because I 
saw the world differently. 
1I am referring to what Marx called "right of inequality, in its contents, like every right" 
(Marx, 1891/1972a, p. 530) that takes activity or labor as the (bourgeois) equal standard. What is 
implied in this right is a background of societal hierarchy and inequality that recognizes that while 
each individual is endowed with different creativity or productive capacity as his or her natural 
privilege, it ignores, for instance, social-class differences. Then the application of this natural 
right (or privilege) consists in setting up an equal standard by which to measure the creative 
capacity of naturally different individuals. This equal standard becomes then a natural right that 
justifies, as Orwell (1945/1955, p. 144) puts it: "ALL [INDIVIDUALS] ARE EQUAL BUT 
SOME [INDIVIDUALS] ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS", because from such equal 
viewpoint, an individual is then inherently superior to another as evidenced in what he or she 
produces. 
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Aside from these intuitive, causal, and wish fulfillment elements of learning, we 
find that there are other aspects that can be developed further. I am referring 
to what Bhaskar (2008b, p. 165) terms "the components of action". Following 
Bhaskarian dialectics, these components can be correlated with four realms. The 
1M or conative domain shelters our will and includes our desires, wants, needs, and 
motivations to produce our dispositions. The 2E or cognitive domain contains our 
discursive knowledge in which beliefs (thoughts or un-thoughts) are exerted, in part, 
by curiosity or our desires, wants, and needs. For example, while the conative level 
pushes the individual (e.g., our will, desire, or want), the cognitive level points the 
individual in the direction that he or she should follow when a push is acted on, 
so that desire and belief, conative and cognitive, form a couple. We also need to 
consider the 3L or affective domain that is responsible for issuing our emotions, 
moods, sentiments, and values. Then we have a realm that most philosophers tend 
to leave out, 4D, which is divided into the 4Da: intrinsic and the 4Db: extrinsic 
categories. The first category is the 4Da: these are the intrinsic aspects, which 
is itself composed of two parts: the (1) competences (capacities for actions) and 
the (2) expressive or stylistic features of action — capacities of actual performance 
that are always performed in a certain style, emphasizing the role of aesthetics 
and bodily gestures. The second category is the 4Db: extrinsic conditions, which 
involve a spectrum of various structures, resources, and so on, ranging from those 
necessitated by the social system to opportunities and circumstances. 
All of these components of action constitute our causal powers as learners, but we 
need to keep in mind that any flourishing action must include competences (e.g., our 
practical knowledge, skills, wisdom, and tacit knowledge) and access to facilities 
e.g., resources and a contingent domain of possibilities. It is important to highlight 
that all of these components of action, 4D>3L>2E>1M1, are first learned and are 
also subject to further learning and development. The significance of these domains 
is that learning does not just apply to the 2E (cognitive domain) — e.g., the domain 
of our beliefs; we also learn at the levels of values, desires, and so on. These four 
domains are illustrated in the following model. 
We can easily imagine that we are constantly learning to reproduce reality with-
out even knowing it; or in Marxian terms, if the point (of learning) is to change it, 
then in either case, we presuppose a structure for reality itself. For me, the discovery 
1The reader is referred to the glossary for symbols. 
3 
Adapted from Bhaskar (2008b, p. 165). 
1. Introduction 
4 
THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
1. Introduction 
of critical realism (CR) is synonymous with finding a structure for conceptualizing 
learning. In short, CR provides me with theoretical coordinates by which to put into 
action its claim that it serves as under-laborer for the sciences. Only after putting 
CR to work was I able to (1) restructure, in retrospect, previous conceptions of 
learning and (2) create this complete argument, which involves the following: 
the production of something new; but since whatever is already implic-
itly or potentially in what was there before, i.e. what already was (cf 
Solomon: "there is nothing new under the sun"), what is created is al-
ways a new synthesis of the new and old, of the manifest and un-manifest, 
of the ephemeral and the eternal. But what is created also transcends, 
surpasses, negates, (i.e. absents and transforms) what is already there. 
What is negated is not what was implicit, involved, enfolded or ingredi-
ent as a potential in what pre-existed it. It emerges, consisting in the 
supra-imposition of a transcendent cause upon an immanent ground, 
taking shape, form. It becomes objective (is made), standing in its own 
right, and what has been created, shaped or formed, and made or objec-
tified in this way, then returns, reflecting back the intentionality of its 
maker, whose intentionality it either fulfills or not. Insofar as it does not 
fulfill the intentionality of the maker, insofar as it does not reflect back 
on the creator then its stands as an unfulfilled task; so that every action 
returns in one way of another to its agent, either confirming or discon-
firming the purity and fulfillment of the agent's intention. (Bhaskar, 
2002b, pp. 105-106) 
This is what creativity means! Furthermore, on a theoretical level, the examples 
that I use throughout the thesis are non-Platonic vehicles that serve to effectively 
render a point as overabundance in reality, just as I do with my opening story. More 
precisely, I use CR to develop a theoretical-interpretative scheme, Critical Realist 
Activity Theory (CRAT), in which I take the Bhaskarian four-fold polysemy (see 
Table 1.1, p. 12) to propose that each of its moments functions in our conceptual-
ization of learning against dualist and reductionist forms of argumentation in order 
to give a pluralist, more complete explanation of learning dynamics. CRAT uses 
critical hermeneutics that does not attempt to simply assign meaning to phenom-
ena; rather, it sees a relationship between the learner and the world that he or she 
5 
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is studying. In short, the dual nature of CRAT means that I actually learn from the 
very thing that I am investigating. In this precise sense, this stance is a very humble 
position that is oriented to the self-emancipation of individuals through learning. 
1.2 What is CRAT? 
CRAT is a theoretical-interpretative scheme of the conceptualization of learning. 
It is a full argument that makes use of the idea of learning as a passage through 
the Bhaskarian dialectical process: "in dialectic, to be is to be able to become" 
(Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 167) from self-emancipation or emancipatory intentionality > 
transformative praxis > open expansive transformation or dialectical sublation > 
process > to product. In fact, CRAT is a form of double hermeneutics for the 
investigation of the dynamics of learning, i.e., theory as an interpretive scheme and 
vice versa, meaning that the investigator is necessarily part of the process as an 
engaged agent, which entails that there is no "God's eye view" of the investigation. 
In double hermeneutics, the passage through the dialectic is necessarily changed in 
the object of investigation; in a reversal, this passage is the very investigation of the 
object itself that opens up the possibility of change in the investigator as a form of 
self-emancipation. 
To motivate CRAT, I investigate four contemporary learning theories: collabora-
tive learning (CL), cooperative learning (Coop), supplemental instruction (SI), and 
activity theory (AT). I argue that each of the four theories works, in a pluralistic 
sense, to provide a more complete explanation of learning as a passage through the 
dialectic. In particular, AT openly recognizes a set of dualisms that it is not able to 
resolve. CRAT is able to identify the source of these dualisms and, in the following 
manner, I argue that CR can be employed to resolve it. 
• First, CRAT argues that CR can resolve various dualisms from which AT 
suffers and identify their source, namely, in their failure to adequately engage 
in a critique of empiricism, and especially, a critique of the philosophy of Hume. 
• Second, it argues that CR can also give a superior account of the historical 
development of concepts that are very important for AT, including the concept 
of contradiction. AT takes its starting point in the philosophies of Kant (which 
implicitly presupposes Hume), Hegel, and Marx. Furthermore, CR critiques 
Hume, Kant, Hegel, and elements in Marx. 
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• Third, CRAT argues that CR also situates the critique of Hegel and Marx in 
terms of the trajectory of Western philosophy. CR takes this trajectory back to 
the ancient Greeks and takes it forward through the analytical and dialectical 
wings of Western philosophy. Thus, CR can situate the historical development 
of Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Marx in a very comprehensive critique of Western 
philosophy. 
Next, I build these different levels of the Bhaskarian polysemy, i.e., 1M: learning 
as product, 2E: learning as process, 3L: learning as process-in-product, to 4D: learn-
ing as product-in-process, to provide a new dialectical conceptualization of learning, 
which is further supplemented by an account of the philosophy of Meta-Reality 
(PMR) at the individual level with 5A: learning as emancipatory intentionality. 
One of the strengths of PMR lies in its further deepening of ontology and the causal 
relations between philosophy and society. Although this thesis only conceptualizes 
five levels, PMR can be employed to thematize two further levels, i.e., 6R: learning 
as re-enchantment and 7Z/A: learning as the unification of splits, which involves 
the priority of identity over difference and unity over split, levels that I purposefully 
leave open for the future continuation of this project. It is important to acknowledge 
that this thesis can be further developed to conceptualize learning from 1M to 7Z/A 
because, if there is a basic sense in which unification or unity is primary or more 
essential than split, then we are looking at a possible argument for the resolution of 
conflicts. 
The significance of CRAT is that it critiques previous learning theories. Thus, 
the guiding research question for this thesis is as follows: what has been left out 
from a particular conceptualization of learning? Moreover, CRAT has the potential 
to question theories that have articulated what tends to account for an implicit, 
"natural" way of looking at learning and knowledge, such as the aforementioned 
slogan, "encourage young girls to study mathematics and science" , via the prob-
lematization of what appear to be common-sensical stances in order to offer a more 
inclusive account of learning. In CR terms, its importance may be summed up as 
"a prelude to problematizing the problem itself" (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 167). 
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1.3 Three-fold motivation for CRAT 
The first motivation of this thesis is derived from a review of the literature about 
the third generation of AT, also called Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT), 
where we can find that Engestrom (1999) himself, who is its main author, notices 
parallels with CR and particularly with the Transformational Model of Social Ac-
tivity (TMSA) or the idea that we are already thrown into a social structure that 
we did not create, but that has real effects on us. The TMSA denotes a crucial 
temporal differentiation in which social structure pre-exists agency. However, what 
I am trying to do with CRAT is more general. I am proposing to ground AT in a 
CR philosophy in order to transcend its well-known dualisms. It is well accepted by 
the AT community that there are certain theoretical problems that it has not been 
able to resolve and Table 4.3, p. 95 summarizes some of the well-known aporias of 
AT and how I propose that CR can effectively solve them. 
We can immediately ask the following: why does AT suffer from these di-
chotomies in the first place? The manifestations of dichotomies in AT function 
as signaling devices that point to the fact that something is wrong with it, namely, 
an implicit ontology that results in a de-agentification of learning that simply can-
not be ignored. This question leads me to articulate two further motivations for 
developing an ontological-grounded theory of activity. 
Against de-agentification, CR re-vindicates ontology and with it, agency. Thus, 
the second motivation for this thesis is to argue that CR can also give a superior 
account of the historical development of concepts that are very important for AT, 
such as learning by expansive transformation, via critiques of Hume, Kant, Hegel, 
and elements of Marx. 
I want to highlight that my point is not to defend the orthodox traditions that 
characterize the idealism of Hegel or the materialism of Marx as all-embracing philo-
sophical systems, but rather, to recognize their limitations with the arsenal provided 
by CR. This vantage point allows us to critique traditional doctrines on the basis 
of their incapability to conceive human reality as a phenomenon that also includes 
falsity and illusion, which, in my case, is very important because it opens a space 
for critique, especially the immanent or explanatory critical development of theory. 
Thus, the third motivation for this thesis is to move away from traditional in-
terpretations of Hegel and Marx, to understand their limitations, and see why their 
dialectics, as critiqued and developed by CR, are nevertheless still important for a 
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new conceptualization of learning. To this aim, I argue that CR can situate the 
Hegelian-Marxian dialectic, which is simultaneously important for third-generation 
AT, in a very comprehensive critique of Western philosophy, in retrospect, from the 
ancient Greeks, and looking forward to both the analytical and dialectical branches 
of Western philosophy. 
1.4 Polysemy argumentative outline: learning is a 
passage through the dialectic 
Through CRAT, I provide a conceptualization of learning that is tantamount to the 
Bhaskarian dialectic itself, and for this reason, I organize the argument of this thesis 
in the form of a four-fold polysemy. I also employ one of the three ontological levels 
of the PMR to conceptualize learning as emancipatory praxis, and to trace the path 
of future research. 
In Chapter 2, p. 15, I conceptualize 1M: learning as product. I argue that 
this level manifests its own lack, i.e., an element that has been left out from the 
conception of learning, but one that is already inscribed in a need to account for 
processes. To this end, I review the corpus of literature on three learning theories: 
CL > SI > Coop and their applications, consisting of the use of small-group schemes 
in education, where learning as product refers to research outcomes that show that 
these schemes improve aspects of each of the four (a) cognitive, (0) conative, (-y) 
affective, and (8) expressive-performative domains across various settings and group 
characteristics — e.g., group composition, size, subject matter, etc. However, these 
outcomes also display their own lack, namely, of process, which is a large element 
that these theories are aware they have omitted. 
Then I investigate 2E: learning as process. At this level, I argue that learn-
ing always involves an apprehension of incompleteness, which refers to an element 
of negativity or the Bhaskarian notion of absence. For this level, I use the same 
corpus of literature as in 1M, but 2E: learning as process refers to various types 
of experiences that are typically captured by narratives, patterns of conversations, 
and other qualitative methods. Such research mainly indicates the ways in which 
small-group schemes help to foster, for example, the construction of mutual consent 
among group members. 
In Chapters 3, p. 34 and 4, p. 70, I investigate 3L: learning as process-in-product. 
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To this end, I first explain the historical development of AT. An immanent critique 
reveals the theoretical dualisms of AT and then lays the foundation for an omissive 
critique via the identification of the main source that is causing such dualisms; that 
is, it leads me both to identify that AT lacks a critique of Humean philosophy and 
classical empiricism and to identity some elements of TINA formation by which AT 
implicitly pre-supposes CR in terms of its praxis. At this level, I argue that the 
Engestromian notion of learning as expansive transformation, which in its perfect 
form yields a dialectical sublation, can be adapted to better conceptualize learn-
ing as process-in-product by emphasizing open systems. In addition, 3L remains 
incomplete until we determine some action or practice at the next level. 
In particular, in Chapter 4, p. 70, I present a literature review on the theoretical 
research across three generations of AT and the empirical applications of AT ac-
cording to the mathematics educational community. First, empirical investigations 
indicate the following. 
• While educational research agendas and educational contexts can be organized 
in terms of what I call a nested mathematics-educational activity system, I 
argue that CR can offer a philosophical grounding by which to see this nested 
system as part of a more inclusive laminated system of educational contexts. 
• The use of AT categories (e.g., subject, instrument, object, division of labor, 
rules, community) is forced into reality by means of what I call a fill-the-
bucket approach. From the CR viewpoint, I argue that this approach reveals 
a deep misunderstanding of the nature of reality itself, a Kantianism that 
collapses the nature of the reality (ontology) into the knowledge of reality 
itself (epistemology); or to put it in CR terms, the mathematics educational 
community commits an epistemic fallacy. 
• There are two types of contradictions (e.g., primary or inbuilt and secondary 
when a new component is introduced into the system) that disturb the dynam-
ics of their respective educational systems. I argue that these contradictions 
appear as the very signaling devices, indicating that something is wrong with 
the theory (absence or apprehension of incompleteness) in what the previous 
level 2E has conceptualized. More specifically, I am not just arguing for a 
further theoretical level; rather, I argue for the need to attend to the next 
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level precisely because the absence is causing contradictions, indicating that 
something is wrong with the theory. 
Second, theoretical investigations indicate that activity theorists are very well 
aware of the dualisms within this theory and are actively seeking to resolve them. 
Therefore, I am proposing that basic CR can do so more effectively. 
In Chapters 5-7, I investigate 4D: learning as product-in-process. At this level, 
I argue for learning as transformative praxis, including emancipatory praxis. With 
this intent, I explain basic CR. The purpose of this initial part is to introduce the 
Bhaskarian philosophical system, i.e., to introduce a transformative element that 
requires putting CR to work, and to simultaneously argue that it can resolve not 
just the activity-theoretical dualisms, but also other dualisms that are important 
for (social) learning theory in general, with an argument that re-vindicates ontology 
as irreducible and distinct from epistemology. 
Then Chapter 6, p. 183 is an appendix to Chapter 5, in which I review some of the 
applications of CR. I argue for ontological, methodological, and practical reasons in 
grounding the conception of interdisciplinary activity in the philosophical substance 
of CR against actualist, reductionist, and mono-disciplinary forms of argumentation. 
I am treating this chapter (Chapter 6) as an appendix to Chapter 5 because the key 
issues that it addresses stem from the tenets of basic CR. 
In Chapter 7, p. 220, I explain DCR to illustrate the argument for further deep-
ening ontology. I argue for a new conceptualization of learning in terms of a passage 
through the Bhaskarian dialectic. At this level, my intention is not to embrace 
but to transcend the orthodox Hegel-Marx dialectic and its notion of contradiction, 
which is also important for AT, via a Bhaskarian critique of both the analytical and 
dialectical branches of Western philosophy. 
Chapter 8, p. 276 treats the Bhaskarian level of 5A: reflexivity. Hence, it is fitting 
that at this level, I engage in a reflection and conclusion of CRAT. To conceptualize 
this stratum according to CRAT, my main concern is the forms of practices that 
lead to emancipation as the main goal of education. Thus, I engage some aspects of 
the PMR in order to develop 5A: learning as an emancipatory intentionality. I argue 
that although learning is a passage through the Bhaskarian dialectic 1M to 4D, we 
need both a deep ontology (being) and 5A: reflexivity to stress that (1) learning 
(as emancipation) cannot be forced on an individual, but needs to be a means of 
self-emancipation, and (2) learning is the unfolding of what is enfolded within each 
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individual. Simultaneously, PMR opens a window for me to continue to investigate 
learning at other levels; specifically, I use some elements of PMR to open up an 
investigative path for future development, 6R: learning as re-enchanted and 7Z/A: 
learning as unification over splits, beyond this thesis. To conclude, I offer some 
implications of what is developed here as a CRAT. 
Table 1.1: CRAT argument: learning as a passage 
through the dialectic 
Causal-axiological chain 
5-fold polysemy Ontological 	 conceptualiza- 
tion of irreducible elements 
Developed in: 
1M: Non- 
identity 
product learning as product chapter 2 
2E: 
Negativity 
process learning as process chapters 3 and 4 
3L: 	 Open 
totality 
process-in-product learning as open expansive 
transformation 	 leading 	 to 
dialectical sublation 
chapter 5 and its 
appendix 
4D: Trans- 
formative 
agency 
product-in-process learning as transformative 
praxis 
chapter 7 
5A: 
Reflexivity 
inwardness learning 	 as 	 emancipatory 
intentionality 
chapter 8 
Guiding research question is: what has been left out from learning theory? 
Corpus of data 
1M review of small-group learning theories and their applications in the 
context of mainly higher education CL > SI > Coop 
2E review of historical development of AT and its application in the 
context of mathematics education 
3L/4D engagement with CR: tenets of basic CR and dialectical CR 
5A engagement with some elements of the philosophy of meta-reality 
Continued on next page 
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Table 1.1 — Continued from previous page 
Methods 
1M quantitative, quantitative and mixed methods 
2E mainly interventionist and mixed methods 
3L/4D/5A 
applied CR, laminated system on the grounds of maximizing unity-
theoretical comprehensiveness 
CRAT argument at each level 
1M 
It is argued that this level manifests its own lack, i.e., an element 
that has been left out from the conception of learning as a product, 
but one that is already inscribed in a need to account for processes 
2E 
It is argued that learning always involves an apprehension of incom-
pleteness, which refers to an element of negativity or the Bhaskarian 
notion of absence 
3L 
It is argued for an open expansive transformation, which, in its 
perfect form, yields a dialectical sublation, as an incomplete until 
praxis in 4D, which is grounded on the notion of Bhaskarian open 
totality 
4D/5A It is argued for learning as the Bhaskarian transformative praxis 
including emancipatory praxis 
CRAT ontology recognizes all moments of learning 
1M 
at this level, we are concerned with the product (e.g., in terms 
of statistical outcomes, the use of small-group schemes foster e.g., 
achievement across various settings and group characteristics 
2E 
at this level, we are concerned with the process (e.g., narratives 
show that experiences in small-group schemes foster aspects of 
the (a) cognitive, (13) conative, (7) affective, and (6) expressive-
performative domains 
3L 
a key characteristic is open expansive transformation, as an ideal 
form of dialectical sublation when talking about process-in-
product as a possibility of knowledge as a growing totality 
Continued on next page 
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Table 1.1 — Continued from previous page 
4D 
at this point, product-in-process, we need practice, in particular, 
self-emancipatory practice, which is not imposed, but discovered by 
putting knowledge to work 
5A 
at this level, there are two key ideas: (1) learning as emancipation 
cannot be imposed on any individual and (2) learning is the unfold-
ing of what is enfolded; and education occurs because individuals 
bring about its realization 
Adapted from Hartwig (2007a, p. 10). 
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Hermeneutical research of 
small-group schemes 
If these concepts have a meaning at all, they mean, first, that the notion 
of structure has a structure'. 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a hermeneutical investigation of small-group schemes in higher ed-
ucation in order to construct the initial moments 1M: learning as product and 2E: 
learning as process of a dialectical conceptualization of learning. The focal point 
of this hermeneutical inquiry is, metaphorically speaking, equivalent to a queen's 
gambit in chess as a necessary opening movement of the game. It is the initial move 
that establishes the structure of the first moment 1M: learning as product, but it 
is also conditional for any causal explanation or act of emancipation. Following 
'In Levi-Strauss' Structural Anthropology (Vol. I) (1963, p. 276) the notion of structure appears 
tautological; however, what is implicit in the tautology of structure is its substance. Using CR, 
we know that the world is such that it necessitates a structure for its intelligibility. In CR terms, 
structure is part of the domain of the real in a stratified world. The structures provide the problems 
to be considered in the realm of substance (ontology). In this manner, CR allow us to vindicate this 
Levi-Straussian view of structure, in which our main concern is not to explain how contemporary 
structures (e.g. social relations) are the result of the old pre-existing substance, but to rediscover 
the vestiges of substance that otherwise remain unintelligible. This reversal does not lead to the 
understanding of the structures and thus the quote as a meaningless tautology; instead, it gives an 
asymmetrical relation that prioritizes the possibilities of the transformation of the structure that 
is contingent on the foundations provided by the substance (see Robinsonian notion of substance 
on p. 218). 
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Bhaskar's (1994) notion of hermeneutics, this chapter needs to be understood as a 
synchronic or snapshot view of the world, a necessary initial act of interpretations . 
Hermeneutics is thus the necessary starting point for any explanation, 
and a fortiori emancipatory human science. (Bhaskar, 1994, p. 79) 
Thus, this opening move begins with the nature of small-groups schemes and the 
relevance of their causal efficacy for education in general. 
Following Jaques' (2001) conceptualization, small-group schemes appear in a 
variety of sizes, compositions, and across various contexts; however, such schemes 
contain the following set of general characteristics. 
Perception Participants are aware that they belong to the group. 
Needs and/or wants Participants join the group in the belief that it satisfies some 
individual need or want. 
Shared aims Participants have ideas, aims, or expectations that bind them to-
gether. 
Interdependence Participants are affected by events that affect others in the 
group. 
Social organization Participants act as a social unit with shared rules, norms, 
powers, emotional relationships, and status. Participants influence others by 
means of communicating. 
Interaction Participants influence others by means of communicating. 
Cohesiveness Participants want to remain in the group in order to contribute to 
its well-being, aims, emotional status, and activities. 
Membership Two or more participants interacting for longer than a few minutes 
constitute a group. 
'For Bhaskar (1994), hermeneutics is not just the art of textual interpretation, but also a 
process of four different cycles: 1) an exploratory inquiry, 2) communication (assumed and overt 
meaning), 3) exploration into the environment or culture of the communicating participants, and 
4) exploration of textual objects; however, these cycles are also subject to recursive revisions at a 
meta-hermeneutic level. 
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What have collaborative learning (CL), supplemental instruction (SI), and cooper-
ative learning (Coop) research been doing in practice; that is, in their application 
of small-group schemes, but to accept a critical realist view (see Figure 1.1, p. 4). 
For this reason, I use Jaques' definition and the four components of action: (a) 
cognitive, (,3) conative, ('y) affective, and (S) expressive-performative domains to 
organize the application of three learning theories—CL, SI, and Coop—in order to 
build 1M: learning as product or outcome and then as 2E: learning as process. Such 
findings suggest that the application of these theories to small-group schemes in 
higher education (and some in compulsory education) appear to work across various 
domains of the Bhaskarian components of action, as shown below. 
Table 2.1: The application of CL, SI, Coop theories ac-
cording to Bhaskarian components of actions 
Theory (a) cognitive (0) conative ('y) affective (S) 	 expressive- 
performative 
Findings 
' 
knowledge, 
skills, 	 and 
academic 
achievement 
positive 
self-esteem, 
positive 
	 dis- 
position, 
motivation, 
attitude, 
and 
	 behav- 
for 	 towards 
a 	 particu- 
lar 	 subject 
matter 
intellectual 
solidarity 
(struggle) 
as 	 seen 	 in 
interpersonal 
bonds, shared 
obligations, 
and support- 
ive, 	 inclusive 
relationships 
elaborate 	 feed- 
back and expla- 
nations; 	 various 
types of asym- 
metries 	 and 
matryoshka 	 (or 
nested) view of 
knowledge 
	
in 
practice. 	 (This 
perspective 	 is 
discussed 	 in 
page 31). 
CL Derry et al. (2000) 
SI Karsenty (2009) 
Continued on next page 
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Table 2.1 — Continued from previous page 
Theory (a) (,3) (2') ((5) 
Oates, 	 Paterson, 	 Reilly, 
and 	 Statham, 	 (2005); 
Blanc, DeBuhr, and Mar- 
tin 	 (1983); 	 Houston 	 and 
Lazenbatt (1996) 
Coop Sahlber and Berry (2002) 
Springer, 	 Stanne, 	 and 
Donovan 	 (1999); 	 Slavin 
(1980); Colbeck, Campbell 
and Bjorklund (2000); Lou, 
Abrami, 	 and 	 d'Apollonia 
(2001); Lou et al. (1996) 
Webb 	 (1991); 
Stokoe 	 (2000); 
Munger (1996) 
Benwell and Stokoe (2002) 
In the first part of this dialectic, 1M: learning as product, I show that quantitative, 
qualitative, and mixed-method research from the application of CL, SI, and Coop 
reveals that small-groups schemes are significantly more effective instructional tech-
niques than merely lectures. Indeed, small-group schemes improve aspects concern-
ing (a) cognitive and performative domains (e.g., knowledge, skills, and academic 
achievement) and (3) conative domain (e.g., positive disposition, motivation, atti-
tude, behavior towards a particular subject matter). In order to answer the guiding 
question: what has been left out from a particular conceptualization of learning? I 
argue that this conceptualization of learning explicitly omits the process, the ele-
ment for developing a product, and implicitly includes it, in terms of the need to 
account for the process that is felt out, either in terms of historical backgrounds, 
narratives, discursive patterns, or other methodologies. 
Then the second part, 2E: learning as process, accounts for the "lack" in 1M. 
However, this inclusion does not mean a dead-end attainment of a conceptualization 
of learning. Rather, I argue that learning is always consequent upon an apprehension 
of incompleteness based on the Bhaskarian notion of absence (non-being). I show 
that, although quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-method research shows that 
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small-group schemes are effective in improving aspects of (a) cognitive (0) conative 
domains, and in further fostering aspects of the (-y) affective domain (e.g., the in-
tellectual solidarity among members of the group) and (5) expressive-performative 
domain (e.g., increase of elaborative knowledge in practice) all is not positive. Aside 
from the positive processes that foster (a), (0), ('y) and (5), we have other types 
of negative processes driven by contradictions (I discuss negative processes in sec-
tion 4.3, p. 86). The gap between positive and negative, for example, is discernible 
to us through the signaling device of contradiction (or double bind), arising from 
incompleteness, or through seeking to remedy incompleteness without contradiction. 
2.2 Three theories of learning in collaboration 
2.2.1 Collaborative learning 
Collaborative learning (CL) is perhaps the most recurrent approach in the educa-
tional literature concerned with learning in small groups. In broad terms, CL is 
an all-embracing term under which we can find other small-group methods, such as 
cooperative learning (Coop) and supplementary instruction (SI). Smith and Mac-
Gregor (1992, p. 9) explain: 
"Collaborative learning" is an umbrella term for a variety of educational 
approaches involving joint intellectual effort by students, or students 
and teachers together. Usually, students are working in groups of two 
or more, mutually searching for understanding, solutions, or meanings, 
or creating a product. Collaborative learning activities vary widely, but 
most center on students' exploration or application of the course mate-
rial, not simply the teacher's presentation, or explication of it. 
I use the inclusion > (greater-than sign), as such CL > SI > Coop, to emphasize 
that CL is the all-embracing theoretical framework that contains SI and Coop. 
The CL approach assumes that learning is an active, constructive, and purposeful 
process that depends on contextual conditions and learners' diverse perspectives. 
The main rationale for implementing CL is to reach consensus among students 
and instructors in order to encourage civil responsibilities that ultimately benefit a 
democratic society. In particular, Light and Cox (2001, p. 115) argue that in higher 
education, CL small-group schemes are not simply alternatives or supplements to 
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lectures, but important learning experiences where undergraduates and instructors 
come together for an opportunity to explore and change conceptions, away from, 
as they argue, the "purgatory" of large lectures. Thus, applications of small-group 
learning theories are worth investigating in their own right. 
The application of CL theory shows that small-group schemes improve learning 
products or outcomes. For example, Derry et al. (2000) applied CL theories to a new 
statistics course for the undergraduate curriculum at the University of Wisconsin 
in Madison. The study shows how CL groups improve (a) cognitive domain, par-
ticularly students' ability to reason about statistics; however, an inherent problem 
of grouping is that some students see these schemes as a burden. A major conflict 
stems from the discrepancy between two types of educational goals: (1) the goal 
of some students who want to understand, and (2) the goal of other students as 
consumers who just want a "rapid career entry, efficient credentialing, and strong 
performance on standardized tests" (ibid., p. 786). On the one hand, the product 
or outcome of this implementation of CL theory reveals that small-group schemes 
are vehicles to improved academic skills. On the other hand, such an approach also 
reveals conflicts and, in particular, shows that there is an omitted element from this 
conceptualization of learning dynamics; namely the process, as illustrated in their 
reflection. 
Our interpretation of that [CL] theory in practice involved situating 
much of the instruction in our class within authentic social problem-
solving activities related to students' career goals. What we failed to 
realize is that "conventional" instruction comes with a long history of 
having been situated within powerful cultural contexts that may tend to 
work against the aims of refor 	in-based instruction. (Derry et al., 2000, 
p. 767, emphasis added). 
This study exemplifies the logic of product (or outcome) because in their reflection, 
the authors admit to having failed to account for the process as the context of 
instruction. Using this example, I aim to illustrate that, although products or 
outcomes constitute an important synchronic or snapshot perspective of reality to 
articulate a conception of learning, the very moment learning is conceptualized this 
way, it presupposes the process, which it does not explicitly articulate or completely 
theorize—which it therefore "lacks". In the words of Derry et al. (2000, p. 767), such 
products always come with their own "long history". In this sense, the first level in 
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our conceptualization of learning, 1M: learning as product includes, as the outcome 
of learning dynamics is always product plus the omitted or "lacking" element, the 
need to account for the process. Other similar approaches that fall under the CL 
rubric and that are relevant to conceptualizing 1M: learning as product, and then 
2E: processes are supplemental instruction (SI), and cooperative learning (Coop). 
2.2.2 Supplemental instruction 
Supplemental instruction (SI) was based on CL theory in the late 1970's at the 
University of Missouri in Kansas City (Blanc, DeBuhr, and Martin, 1980). Devel-
oped by Deanna Martin, the approach aimed to reduce dropout rates by offering 
tutoring services to advanced undergraduates to students who were at risk of failing 
their classes. Although SI was initially designed for students in the health sci-
ences, its successful application was extended to other subjects in the sciences and 
arts; across institutions, it became a cost-effective alternative to one-to-one tutor-
ing, which was made financially inapplicable by budgetary constraints. According 
to Topping (1996), over 300 US institutions and more than 15 universities in the 
UK are now doing training in this approach or in other related approaches, such as 
Coop and peer tutoring. 
The very word "supplemental" in the SI title presupposes that there is something 
systemically lacking that needs to be remedied. Once again, we have the logic 
of product; however, what exactly needs supplementation? Karsenty (2009) gives 
an example of non-professional tutoring as a supplemental strategy to raise low-
achievement in mathematics at a secondary school in Israel. This supplementation, 
aside from improving aspects of (a) cognitive, (0) conative domains as seen in 
increments of level of achievement and attitudes toward the subject matter, also 
revealed positive outcomes in (7) affective domain, in terms of shared obligations 
between non-professional tutors and tutees. This phenomenon extends to higher 
education institutions where we encounter a culture of remedial mathematic tutorials 
designed to reach ethnic minorities with academic "deficiencies". The introduction 
of Treisman's (1985) model, designed at the University of California in Berkeley, 
exemplifies the shift in perspective that moved "deficiencies" from minority students 
and expanded the parameters to include a culture of honors programs. This model 
of undergraduate tutorials was significant because it was more inclusive; it aimed 
to explicitly affect the (-y) affective domain by attracting all students that could 
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benefit from problem-solving instructions with expert tutors, such as lecturers or 
doctoral candidates. Later, variations of this model spread to other departments of 
mathematics in the US under diverse names such as peer-tutoring or peer-teaching 
programs, as elaborated below. 
Although the idea of peer tutoring is traced back as far as the ancient Greeks, 
Topping's (1996) literature review provides a topology of ten layers, which can be 
reduced to the following three general headings. 
Tutor-tutee role There is a clear distinction between the job of tutor and that 
of students, e.g., these roles can range from various types of tutoring groups, 
ability, years of study, role continuity, and characteristics of tutors and tutees. 
Curriculum content concentration Peer tutoring is organized, meaning that 
there exists an object, project, or outline that is set by the institution and 
which works as guide to facilitate and delineate the scope of subject matter to 
be covered or already covered in lectures. 
Guided interaction Tutors undergo training by some institution or university on 
the type of structure of interaction, educational material, and ethical consid-
erations, which tutors and tutees have relative freedom to modify, e.g., there 
are allocations for specific place and times for tutorials. 
As a substantive review of different types of peer tutoring, this study indicates their 
effectiveness in terms of learning outcomes or gains in (a) cognitive domain in terms 
of achievement, but remains skeptical about the long-term cognitive impact of these 
schemes on tutors and tutees' abilities and transferring skills. 
For example, Houston and Lazenbatt (1996) report a peer-tutoring study of a 
first-year mathematical module in the UK. This evidence shows a clash between stu-
dents' goals of collaboration and completion; specifically, (although outcomes show 
that small groups promote autonomous learning and achievement) some students are 
reluctant to accept peer-assessment and are perceived as immature or unaccustomed 
to engage in such work. 
These reactions can be explained by an understandable nervousness in 
the face of innovation. Since the majority of students have spent their 
learning lives in a system which promotes competition, several clearly 
found difficulty in adjusting to a new system where yesterday's competi-
tors become today's collaborators. (ibid., p. 259). 
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Thus, the main point is not that it is evident that in peer-tutoring schemes there is 
a discrepancy between collaboration and competition, which proves consistent with 
previous conceptualizations of learning as outcomes. Rather, this differentiation 
illustrates that an element, which in this case is collaboration, has been left out 
but is simultaneously inscribed into a learning system that has mainly promoted 
competition in the past, as the authors suggest. 
In a peer-teaching related study, Oates et al. (2005), argue for the implementation 
of small-group tutorials in departments of mathematics, as their effective outcomes 
demonstrate positive performances from students as well as from tutors, many of 
whom are working as prospective teachers in a mathematics diploma course. Their 
perception of outcomes in peer-tutoring schemes follows the slogans of "learning 
by teaching [and] to teach is to learn twice" (ibid., p. 733). In other words, the 
moment of conceptualizing a product (of learning) already presupposes a process 
(of teaching). Such small-group schemes are shown to be mutually beneficial to 
tutors and students, which also support the view that underneath learning products 
are inscribed processes as students gain practice with mathematical concepts and 
procedures, and are ways for tutors to develop insights concerning whether or not 
to pursue a teaching career. 
2.2.3 Cooperative learning 
Johnson and Johnson (1999) define cooperative learning as an approach based on 
Smith and MacGregor's (1992) CL, which is a model for small groups of two to 
four students working and supporting each other with the purpose of accomplishing 
a shared goal. Coop refers to "classroom techniques in which students work on 
learning activities in small groups and receive rewards or recognition based on their 
group's performance" (Slavin, 1980, p. 315). There are five basic elements that are 
needed for cooperative groups. 
Positive interdependence The establishment of a "mutual learning goal" be-
tween all members of the group (Johnson & Johnson, 1999, p. 71). 
Individual accountability The responsibility of each of the two to four members 
in the group, i.e., each member is assessed and overall results are also given 
to the group. 
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Face-to-face promotive interaction Verbal interactions such as assisting, en-
couraging, supporting, praising, but also includes nonverbal interaction such 
as body or face expressions. 
Social skills Aptitudes that must be taught; interpersonal skills are such partic-
ular abilities as trust-building skills, leadership, communication, and conflict-
management, to name a few. 
Group-processing A reflection on the group performance by engaging each mem-
ber to identify and solve the problems that prevent the group from working 
effectively. 
The following section illustrates how various quantitative studies based on Coop 
techniques show how small groups improve (a) cognitive domain (e.g., knowledge, 
skills, gains in academic achievement) and (0) conative domain (disposition, posi-
tive attitudes toward the subject matter) from meta-analysis studies in compulsory 
education and from grouping students in science, technology, engineering, and math-
ematics (STEM) programs. 
2.3 1M: learning as product 
In 1M, I investigate learning as a product. I refer to quantitative and mixed method-
ological research that examines (a) cognitive and (0) conative domains in terms of 
students' academic achievement as measured by examinations and positive attitudes 
as products of learning. These studies are generally quantitative in nature and range 
across various STEM courses. The purpose of this initial conceptualization of learn-
ing as product is to show that it lacks learning as process, and this is a constitutive 
element of the very investigation and highlights a need for further research. 
Sahlberg and Berry (2002) for instance, highlight three general products of the 
application of Coop theory to small-group schemes in the context of compulsory 
mathematics. 
[First] small-group learning... will bring about at least equal academic 
achievement among all students... [when] compared to more traditional 
methods of teaching... [Second]... working in pairs (as a form of small 
group) may be particularly effective in learning mathematics... [Third] 
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small groups are especially powerful in developing mathematical problem-
solving skills in school. The role of higher quality interaction and more 
constructive activities together with increased time-on-task may well ex-
plain why this seems to be the case. (ibid., pp. 90-91). 
Such products remain consistent since the application of Coop theory in the 1980s. 
Slavin's (1980) meta-analysis is one of the earliest comprehensive reviews that re-
port that Coop groups are significantly better mechanisms to improve (a) cognitive 
domain in terms of academic achievement (as measured by examinations) over tra-
ditional classroom techniques. These groups also impact the (0) conative domain 
in terms of concept identification, judgment, analysis of problem, decision-making 
beliefs, self-esteem, and a like for the subject matter, including the (-y) affective 
domain, as they promote a consistent effect on mutual consent. However, we see 
that what is missing from the Coop conception of learning as outcomes is already 
inscribed in the need for a further level, as articulated by Slavin in the following 
statement: 
the next steps in research on cooperative learning should be directed 
at explicating the conditions under which these techniques can maxi-
mally influence student outcomes ... Research on cooperative learning 
techniques represents an unusual event in the history of educational re-
search. The techniques arose out of social psychological theory... there 
is a need for further [processes such as] investigations of interactions, 
limitations, and extensions of findings, but the basic model has been 
validated in classroom settings. (Slavin, 1980, pp. 338-339) 
In other words, such reflections reveal an awareness of the need for further research 
into the conditions for outcomes, interaction, extensions, and limitations, i.e., the 
processes behind such effective products. 
Similar products are reported in Lou, Abrami and d'Apollonia's (2001) meta-
analysis of 122 studies of small-group schemes versus individual learning with com-
puter technology (CT). They show that such schemes foster (a) cognitive domain 
(e.g., the gains in achievement when comparing small groups and individualized 
settings). The key problem is to find the variables that affect social settings and 
the optimal conditions for effective small group learning. Their findings are con-
sistent with a study by Lou, et al. (1996), who also found a positive effect on 
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achievement. For instance, low-ability students benefited from being in heteroge-
neous ability groups, medium-ability students benefited from homogeneous ability 
groups, and there was no significant difference in the group homogeneity for high-
ability students. On average there was a small but positive effect in terms of social 
context on students' individual achievement compared with a moderate effect on 
group task achievement. In addition, results suggest that small groups gain more 
CT knowledge than students who work individually, but we also see that students 
completed tasks faster and got more help from teachers when working individu-
ally than in groups. Colbeck, Campbell, and Bjorklund's (2000) analysis of STEM 
groups also reveals that an important outcome is related to the benefit of (,3) cona-
tive domain (e.g., students' social cognition, self-esteem, verbal interaction, usage of 
appropriate strategies, and positive attitudes toward work). Moreover, when inves-
tigating the difference in products between small group and whole-class instruction, 
and also among homogeneous and heterogeneous groups, Lou et al. (1996), acknowl-
edge that their investigation is just an initial state: 
now that we have moved closer to determining whether within-class 
grouping is effective, when it is effective, and with whom it is effective, 
it is time to devote greater energy to understanding why it is effective. 
We hope this review sets the stage for such inquiry. (Lou et al., 1996, 
p. 451) 
To paraphrase the above quotation, the authors' call to understand the reasons 
why we see such products as a second step or moment in the conceptualization of 
learning, or what I have termed, 2M: learning as process. 
In undergraduate STEM programs, we encounter analogous products. For ex-
ample, Springer, Stanne and Donovan's (1999) meta-analysis report advances in the 
(0) conative domain as students' attitudes became more favorable toward the sub-
ject matter when they spent more time working in groups. However, these outcomes 
also show their own void, a major element that the theory takes for granted, but 
one that is suggested for future conceptions of learning, as exemplified in the quote: 
Much work remains to move beyond a "black box" approach and to 
gain a greater understanding of how and why small-group learning [or 
tutorials] is effective... Perhaps the most important component of future 
analyzes is the need for more detailed descriptions of small-group pro-
cesses or procedures by investigators or instructors who report research 
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on the effects of their work. (Springer, Stanne, & Donovan, 1999, p. 41, 
emphasis added). 
Good, Mulryan and McCaslin (1992, p. 165) concur with such small-group products 
and with the need to investigate what has been omitted or left out by making an 
explicit "call for programmatic research on small-group processes" in the particular 
context of compulsory level mathematics. 
The move from 1M: learning as product (or outcome) to 2E: learning as process 
requires that we see the importance of the Bhaskarian notion of absence or non-
being: the element that has been left out, or in the case of learning, the things 
that we do not know that simultaneously drive the dialectic of learning forward to 
register in some problematic or contradictory form, as in the need for processes, 
which I associate with next 2E level of process. 
2.4 2E: learning as process 
In 2E, I investigate learning as process. I refer primarily to qualitative research 
studies that inquire into students' perspectives, verbal interactions, and narratives 
as processes. The purpose of this second move in the conceptualization of learning as 
a process is to stress that learning always involves an apprehension of incompleteness, 
which refers to an element of negativity or the Bhaskarian notion of absence or non-
being. 
In principle, we can distinguish between two types of processes: (1) processes 
driven by contradictions (e.g., research is illustrated by the application of AT in 
mathematics education in section 4.3, p. 86) and (2) a purely positive process that 
is developing but not as a result of being generated by contradictions—e.g., the re-
search that small-group schemes are effective teaching techniques to gain (a) cogni-
tive domain (e.g., knowledge, skills) and (0) conative domain (positive dispositions, 
attitudes, behaviors). In addition, this section further shows that small-group pro-
cesses encourage progress at the level of (7) affective domain (e.g., in terms of the 
intellectual solidarity and related forms of solidarities such as ephemeral or lasting 
friendships among members of the group) and (6) expressive-performative domain 
(e.g., in terms of various elaborative ways to apply knowledge). The difference 
between these two types of processes concerns whether such apprehension of incom-
pleteness is brought into being by contradictions or whether we are acute enough 
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to be aware of incompleteness of knowledge and concerned to remedy it without 
the spur of contradiction. More specifically, what is here called an apprehension of 
incompleteness refers to the idea that even in (2) the case when we can learn by ad-
vancing without contradictions; we still recognize that there is something more to be 
learned. In this sense, learning is a never-ending process. In both of these types of 
processes, namely (1) the case when there is a gap or delay in learning generated by 
encountering contradictions or some other form of acute negativity, and (2) the case 
that we learn without contradictions by experiencing a joy in learning, we see that 
there can be other reasons, such as having an obsession for diligence and discovery. 
In principle, we always encounter an apprehension of incompleteness because when 
we learn something, we are always effectively rectifying an absence or an error in 
our pre-existing knowledge! At a purely theoretical level, we may account for all 
particular cases that regard learning as complete, as a totality. However, we still 
want to explore the boundaries of learning to investigate if there are structures that 
we can identify or apply to other domains. For example, 
(a) learning without contradiction generates positive diligence either as a type of 
joy in discovery or a type of obsession. This diligence is a type of continuous 
flow of uninterrupted production. 
(b) learning with contradiction is the case of coexistence of these two, which gen-
erates tension, problems or some other form of acute negativity. 
(c) contradiction without learning is the case when there is a contradiction without 
resolution in learning, which generates a delay and it tends to stimulate more 
contradictions that produce others, a proliferation of contradiction. 
(d) no contradiction and no learning is the theoretical starting point, a type of 
"Big Bang" point or a Bhaskarian un-thought space'. 
In general, we have an asymmetry2 in all these elements denoting a gap, even in the 
case of (a) a purely positive sense, so that we can see that once we learn something 
1This un-thought space refers to the idea of retroactively positing the learning process because 
"nothing new ever comes from thought (of from the past or future), it always comes from un-
thought (now), from a space between, behind or beyond thoughts (in the present). It always 
comes from a suspension of thinking, or a moment of supramental consciousness erupted in space 
in the discursive process of thought" (Bhaskar, 2002c, p. 105). 
2For list of the main asymmetries, the reader is referred to Appendix B on page 289. 
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there is always a new element, (i.e., something more to be learned), and thus when 
I mean that learning always involves this apprehension of incompleteness, I am 
referring to such a gap, or what Bhaskar (2008b) calls absence. 
To further illustrate this point, I consider the Bhaskarian exposition of the his-
tory of scientific revolutions as an example of this dialectical process of learning, 
which requires that we see the importance of absence in what is here conceptualized 
in terms of an apprehension of incompleteness. At the time of a great scientific 
revolution there is a very distinct phenomenon that occurs as follows: normally a 
new theory will be able to explain almost everything that an old theory could not 
explain and some even more. However, in the case of science, (and perhaps even 
more so in the case of art, literature, etc.) often a new theory changes the terms of 
understanding so drastically that it ceases to be interested in some other aspects of 
what an old theory explained or appeared to explain. An example of this drastic 
change is the seventeenth-century scientific revolution headed by Newton, because 
it revolutionized our perspective of physics and mathematics. However, there were 
elements of reality in which science cease to be interested, such as the role of in-
tuition in everyday life and lay practices of healing, which according to Bhaskar 
(2008b), is a point already made by Hegel in Phenomenology. In general, we can 
argue that the history of great scientific discoveries is not an unadulterated gain; 
but in fact, we lose some aspects of our conception of reality with new theories. 
This loss of valuable content is what Bhaskar (2008a, p. 195) calls "Kuhn-loss" , 
after the sociologist of science Thomas Kuhn', who Bhaskar nevertheless criticizes 
for exaggerating this phenomena, and for the way he presents it without an explicit 
ontological realm separate from knowledge. Such realm of knowledge without an 
explicit ontology results in: 
neither transformation nor discursive intelligence, but an archetypal, in-
tuitive understanding constructing its world in a single synthetic act. 
(Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 258) 
However, in a theoretically perfect form of learning, what Bhaskar (2008b) calls 
dialectical subletion (Aufheben) we would not leave out, suppress, or forget anything. 
For example, the loss of content or "Kuhn-loss" is something that disconnects from 
what we previously knew. When we are studying statistics, for instance, we might 
11n Kuhn's The structure of scientific revolutions (1962/1996). 
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forget how to take derivatives. Another example of "Kuhn-loss" is the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989, in which people in the Eastern Bloc thought that they were 
gaining a ticket to freedom, but at the same time arguably, they lost elements of 
security, healthcare, and education (these are all aspects of positive freedom; so that 
these people did not perceive the sum or balance of the freedoms they were also losing 
in gaining aspects of political and economic liberties). With the dawn of modernity, 
we see that capitalism works very effectively to dissolve such traditional ties, such 
as bonds of friendship, solidarity, and so forth, but also from this dissolution, a new 
form of solidarity and struggle needs to emerge. 
At this point, I refer back to the application of the CL > SI > Coop theories to 
show how these new forms of consent and understanding can emerge from research 
into the level of 2E: process. As we have seen, research into small-group schemes 
shows effective outcomes in terms of gains in the (a) cognitive and (0) conative 
domains, and research into various processes mainly shows gains in the ('y) affective 
and the (6) expressive-performative domains. For example, Webb's (1991) quantita-
tive review of empirical research shows correlations between verbal interactions and 
student achievement in small groups of mathematics students at compulsory levels. 
From a Coop viewpoint, Webb argues that knowledge of processes is needed to un-
derstand why positive effects, such as increases in achievement, have been reported 
in the research. Her correlation analysis indicates that there are certain desired types 
of verbal interactions. For instance, the types of interactions that give elaborative 
explanations, detailed rationale, causes, motives behind a topic, and comprehensive 
feedback, as opposed to other types of exchanges such as non-descriptive verbal 
assessments that range from a simple "bad" mark to a "good" mark. Thus, the 
(6) expressive-performative domain plays a role in which elaborative feedback con-
tributes positively to learning processes, while non-descriptive verbal assessments 
and no feedback at all contribute negatively to learning processes. 
Exemplifying the logic of 2E: process, Smagorinsky and Fly (1993, p. 169) argue 
that "most research on the effectiveness of small group has examined the products of 
group work rather than the discourse that takes place with the group". This study 
examines patterns of talk in various Coop groups following an initiation-response-
feedback modelled after Sinclair and Coulthard (1975). The finding reveal similar 
learning processes that affect the (6) expressive-performative because they show a 
dependent relationship between instructor's engagement, clarification, elaboration 
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of the explanation of procedures and discussions, and the way in which students are 
able to reproduce verbal feedback among other their peers in small groups. Along 
similar argumentative lines, Benwell and Stokoe (2002) report that university tuto-
rials have a positive effect in the (5) expressive-performative domain by means of 
identifying the underlying pattern. Such pattern, in general, increases in the type of 
verbal comprehensiveness during an interaction, e.g., from an opening or welcoming 
remark, a clarification of task, a negotiation of knowledge that is common to both 
parties, and the elaborative feedback about the task under scrutiny. In fact, Ben-
well (1999) encapsulates this increasing pattern as a key characteristic of tutorial 
interactions with the analogy of a Russian matryoshka doll, because the pattern 
goes from a general introductory topic to more refined topics that require more 
elaborative feedback in the context of SI small groups. In the context of English 
university tutorials, Munger (1996) reports on a close examination of akin nesting-
like dynamics during interaction, and shows that (-y) affective domain is impacted 
by means of the tutor-tutee roles, which are not rigid, but rather constantly bat-
tling against the construction of their own institutionally set identities in a type of 
struggle of intellects. In a later study, Benwell and Stokoe (2002) continue to report 
on the impact of small groups in different university context in the (8) expressive-
performative domain. The study identifies that discursive patterns involve a shift 
in the asymmetrical interactional dynamics between the tutor-tutee dyads and the 
"power that is institutionally invested in the roles of the tutor means that rules of 
politeness that would otherwise hold in interaction between equals are, in context, 
suspended" (Benwell & Stokoe, 2002, p. 435). Thus we see that research into learn-
ing processes is mainly concerned with patterns of verbal interactions between the 
asymmetrical relations of tutor and tutee(s), which tend to be characterized as the 
nesting of topics from general to more specific ones; however what is most important 
is not the pattern per se, but the irreducibility of the asymmetry (of knowledge, age, 
institutionally invested roles, and so on) of the tutor-tutee dyad. Such irreducibility 
is important because it opens a space for debate, mutual consent, struggle of intel-
lects, academic solidarity, and understanding of the parties involved, which affect 
both (-y) affective and (5) expressive-performative domains. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
In particular, this hermeneutical investigation of small-group schemes reports on the 
applications of CL, SI, and Coop theories to conceptualize the following levels in 
the dialectic of learning, 1M: learning as product (or outcome) and 2M: learning as 
process. The application of these theories shows that small-group schemes contribute 
to foster aspects of the: 
(a) cognitive domain The findings that appear to affect this domain include the 
improvement of levels (rates, etc.) of achievement, various types of knowl-
edge and skills when comparing small groups and individualized setting, large 
lectures, computer-aided setting, and so on. 
(,3) conative domain The findings that suggest an impact in this domain include 
positive attitudes such as an increased confidence and self-esteem, and a liking 
for the subject matter. 
(-y) affective domain The various tutor-tutee asymmetrical roles, academic strug-
gles, agreements, consent, and solidarity among members of the group are 
typical findings in this domain. 
(8) expressive-performative domain The findings that impact the affective do-
main refer to the application of knowledge in terms of elaborative explanations 
and feedback, which tend to follow a nested or matryoshka-like pattern from 
the general to the specific topic. 
I have argued that at the 1M stratum of this conceptualization of learning as prod-
uct manifests its own "lack", which is an element that has been left out from the 
conception of learning, but one that needs to be account for, which is the next stra-
tum of process. Further, an important idea is the transition from 1M to 2E, which 
requires the Bhaskarian notion of absence or non-being. Although this 2E stratum 
is essentially a dialectical process in which incompleteness or some other problem in 
existing knowledge is shown to generate contradictions and other forms of inadequa-
cies, which are resolved by a more complete understanding; that is, in terms of the 
growth and development of learning in pupils, we see that a possible problem with 
this level can emerge if we follow an orthodox branch of Hegelian-Marxian thought, 
which would assume that we could not have learning without contradictions. In 
contrast, CR asserts that it is possible. 
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Moreover, I have argued that 2E always involves an apprehension of incomplete-
ness. Such apprehension generates (1) negative processes, such as contradictions, 
dilemmas, and problems (I report on these types of processes, driven by contradic-
tions, in section 4.3, p. 86). It is also possible to see (2) positive processes in the case 
that the response is not to wait for a contradiction but to realize that our theory 
or understanding is likely to be incomplete, so that there is a step taken to a more 
expansive standpoint. 
In the next chapter, I engage with the historical development of another con-
temporary learning theory, Activity Theory (AT), and thus with the move from 2M: 
learning as process to 3L: learning process-in-product. 
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Historical development of activity 
theory 
History is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets its inexorable 
limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its "ruses" turn 
into grisly and ironic reversals of their overt intention. But this History 
can be apprehended only through its effects, and never directly as some 
reified force. This is indeed the ultimate sense in which History as ground 
and untranscendable horizon needs no particular justification: we may 
be sure that its alienating necessities will not forget us, however much 
we might prefer to ignore them'. 
3.1 Introduction 
An effective explanation of Activity Theory (AT) is a hermeneutic task that be-
gins with an examination of its philosophical roots and then traces its development 
through three generations. This investigation has three parts. First, (1) an im-
manent critique' shows the problems within this theory. A historical account of 
1The notion of History is adopted for this chapter here is taken from Jameson's The political 
unconscious: Narrative as a socially symbolic act (1983, p. 88). 
2Following Bhaskar (2009), the distinction between meta-critiques (MC1) and meta-critique2 
(MC2) is as follows: while MCi, see Figure 6.1 on p. 217, is directed at the identification of 
ills, absences, constraints, or incompleteness, MC2 is directed at the explanation of the identified 
ills, absences, etc., such that if it finds a theory that is defective, then MC2 is directed toward 
explaining the reasons that cause the social reproduction of such false theory. MC2 is a totalizing 
argument (logical or transcendental) for a Bhaskarian explanatory critique, i.e., a critique of facts 
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three generations of AT reveals that (la) several theoretical dualisms were present 
from the onset; and (lb) further that an implicit ontology allows activity theorists 
to presuppose Critical Realism (CR) in practice. I claim that the development of 
AT is marked by an attempt to resolve contradictions, which are a signaling devise 
pointing to the need for some theoretical expansion. In particular, the enhancements 
to the unit of analysis, the analytic lens from which learning is perceived, are evi-
dence of the attempts to resolve contradictions. Such attempts to mend theoretical 
dualisms function with what I term as patches because they are mechanisms that 
sustain gaps in practice. Each of the three patches works as (a) an enhancement 
of the theory in response to contradictions or signaling devices from the previous 
generation of AT; however, (b) a patch is only partially unsuccessful in resolving 
dualisms, so that after a period of time, it reveal aporias, contradictions, and so 
on, hence signaling the need for further developments. (c) A patch also generates 
in practice inconsistent TINA formations' when are applied. Indeed, (d) the patch 
itself is a type of TINA formation because theorists are committed to sustain it 
through the history of AT. Then, this immanent critique leads to (2) an omissive 
critique (or meta-critiques, MC1) of AT. This critique identifies the omitted element 
(or absence) that is causing the theoretical dualisms of AT; namely, the omission of 
a critique of Humean philosophy and classical empiricism. After effectively isolating 
and values. In this sense, we find that the identification of absences is prior to their explanation. 
In other words, explanatory critique is logically contained in their identification, MC2 >MC1. The 
idea of immanent critique, a type of MC1, involves taking what a theory is and its claims about the 
world and using it to show that it does not get what it wants. From this perspective, we identify 
an inconsistency between theory and practice. The classic Bhaskarian example that perfectly 
illustrates this logic is to refer to Hume, who argued that there are no good grounds for preferring 
to leave a building by the second-floor window rather than by the ground-floor door, but yet Hume 
always left such building by the ground-floor door. This example shows a theory-practice gap or 
contradiction. In other words, we do not externally bring our grounds to the theory, but instead 
we look at what the theory or the theorist wants to achieve, and then show the impossibility of 
achieving it, in the way that it sets out to do this. Any critique needs to include a moment of 
immanent critique; but of course, e.g., omissive critique or the Achilles' Heel critique (AH), a type 
of MC1, in which we want to find a weak point of a theoretical edifice. Thus, if we have independent 
reasons for thinking that a theory about the world is false, then we have another form of critique 
of a purely factual account of the world to an evaluative account of the world in which we come to 
see that the world is false, wrong, upside down, absent, or negative. In turn, a negative account of 
the world is the motivation to search for a transformative theory, which will allow us to transform 
the world. 
1In CR terms, TINA is an acronym for the Thatcherian slogan "there is no alternative" 
(Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 113), but does not mean that one follows Thatcherism. This logic refers 
to an unavoidable necessity for defense, and security mechanisms, formations, and connections 
that reinforce theoretical dualisms in the form of practicing a false theory. 
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and explaining the source of theoretical dualisms within AT, I propose a resolution; 
namely, the grounding of AT in a critical realist philosophy. However, a superior 
theory is necessary to rectify dualisms, thus I engage in a (3) proto-explanatory cri-
tique (or proto meta-critique2, MC2 by utilizing some of the elements of basic and 
dialectical CR (which are subsequently developed in Chapters 5 and 7, respectively). 
In addition, this chapter thematizes 3L: learning as process-in-product as the 
next level of a dialectical conceptualization of learning. To this purpose, I argue 
that the Engestromian conception of learning via expansive transformation needs 
re-conceptualization on the ground of open systems or realms (e.g., the social world) 
where Humean constant conjunctions do not occur. I suggest that the open form of 
expansive transformations yields a dialectical sublation in perfect form, a level that 
necessitates a further level 4D as transformative praxis. In this context, I discuss 
forms of intervention and the Vygotskian idea of the zone of proximal development 
(ZPD). 
3.2 Philosophical origins of AT 
Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT, hereafter AT), also referred to as third-
generation AT is inspired by two main strands (Engestrom & Miettinen, 1999). It 
is crucial to highlight the fact that the first strand is the philosophical trajectory 
that begins with Kant and Hegel, and is followed by Marx and Engels, but omits 
any discussion of Hume or Humean empiricism. In particular, AT omits to critique 
the Humean legacy to Kant. The problem with this omission is that if we are not 
critical of Humean classical empiricism, then we commit the error that Kant made. 
Activity Theory has its threefold historical origins in classical German 
philosophy (from Kant to Hegel), in the writings of Marx and Engels 
and in the Soviet Russian cultural-historical psychology of Vygotsky, 
Leont'ev, and Luria. (Engestrom, 1999, pp. 19-20). 
The absence of a critique of the philosophy of Hume, as we shall see towards the 
end of this chapter, is the ultimate cause of numerous theoretical dualisms within 
AT. 
The second strand is the development of AT by the three main proponents of 
the Soviet school of psychology: L. Vygotsky, A. Leont'ev, and A. Luria. The initial 
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activity-theoretical approach has philosophical roots in Kant, but Hegel is particu-
larly important because, as AT authors claim, he was the first philosopher to point 
out that the development of human knowledge fuses history with the socioeconomic 
conditions of people in natural environments. 
After Hegel, the meaning of "activity" (or tatigkeit in German) shifts from doing 
or acting in the world to discovering in the very act of doing why we act. Later, in 
Marxism, tatigkeit becomes the transformative character of labor, the basic feature 
of all human activity. A key Marxist idea is that activity or labor is not only 
performed to transform nature, society, or some other object, but in the process 
of transforming such objects humans themselves are cognitively transformed under 
existing material conditions. Hardcastle (2009, p. 184) articulates essentially the 
same shift as follows. 
This is an important consideration in connection with shifts in the mean-
ing of the term "activity". For Herder and von Humboldt "activity" 
(Energeia) speaks of a Promethean, dynamic, constitutive sense of self-
creative processes. Von Humboldt talks about an interactive dynamic 
between man and his world. Indeed, the German thinker moved beyond 
the Cartesian separation of mind and body towards a social view of indi-
viduation through "acts of conjoining ( Verbindung) with others". Marx 
inherited these ideas, but he was critical of the philosophical idealism 
they represented. Subsequently, especially in Marxist-Leninist theory, 
the meaning of "activity" was inflected towards a notion of "labour" 
and the material conditions of human productivity. 
This shift in the conceptualization of activity brings with it problems to those un-
familiar with classical German philosophy or Soviet psychology. Schurig (1998), for 
example, explains that a common error with the English translation of tatigkeit is 
the tendency to emphasize our activities as simply actions, omitting the conceptual 
richness behind the German word, which has an emancipatory character. 
How can activity (tatigkeit) be emancipatory? To provide an answer, it is nec-
essary to understand the concept's origin by distinguishing between two models: 
activity as epistemological structure and as tenet of explanation, both of which de-
rive from the Soviet school of psychology. The first model conceptualizes activity 
as an epistemological structure, a view presupposes that activity is object-oriented 
labor, as opposed to inherently random—e.g., as in the case of our individualistic 
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urges, innate free will, or self-determination. In this sense, the investigation of labor 
is assumed to be purposefully oriented towards the achievement of a motive or object 
of activity, which includes unknown motivations like in children's play or ill-defined 
wants as in our responses to global warming. The second model conceptualizes ac-
tivity as a tenet of explanation. This view presupposes that activity is goal-oriented 
labor that emphasizes the types of sequential actions that are typically carried out 
to complete a short-term goal via a sequence of planned tasks with clear beginnings 
and ends in some specific context. 
The main difference between these two perceptions of activity is that the first 
model, activity as epistemological structure, investigates human labor that is ori-
ented towards the transformative mode in which that very labor is produced and 
thereby climaxing in the creation of some new object or outcome. In contrast, in 
the second model, activity as explanatory principle, investigates labor by means of 
distinguishing one type from all other types (e.g., doing mathematical labor is differ-
ent from performing a ballet, or writing a novel, a sonnet, etc.), without necessarily 
inquiring into the transformative mode in which labor is produced. This apparent 
tautology of activity as concept to explain itself is indicative of the irreducibility 
of human labor to a series of types of particular activities. These two conceptions 
of activity further dichotomize the activity-theoretical community, but Engestrom 
(1999, p. 27) insists that 
the concept of activity may be understood either as a principle of expla-
nation or as an object of study [epistemological structure]. Ever since 
that distinction was made, it has been used in various discussions for 
various purposes... [the] idea was not to create another dichotomy, in 
the ensuing discussions this distinction has often frozen into such a fixed 
opposition. 
In AT, the idea of mediation plays a key role to synthesize the Cartesian divisions 
between such models of activity that favor object-oriented labor (in the epistemic-
structural sense) and the model of activity (as an explanatory principle) that favors 
goal-directed labor. 
However, one of the problems with AT is that despite the fact that the idea of 
mediation unites different perceptions of activity, dualisms remain within it. En-
gestri5m (1999, p. 29), highlights the role of mediation, as "not a merely psychological 
idea [but also as] an idea that breaks down the Cartesian walls that isolate the in- 
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dividual from the culture and the society" . Thus, the idea of mediation is aimed to 
resolve dualisms; however, it only patches them temporarily by mending them, thus 
allowing dualisms to exist in practice. Engestrom, himself is aware of such mending, 
and articulates this aporia, as follows: 
merely proclaiming that activity is a superior level of analysis does not 
help... it is not at all clear that those who use the concept of activity 
actually are able to overcome the individualistic and ahistorical biases 
inherent in theories of action. (Engestrom, 1999, p. 23). 
Along the same lines, Foot (2002) also articulates such problem. However, she 
interprets it as a problem of the English translation of the concept of tatigkeit 
(which translates to activity) and other important notions such as gegenstand and 
objekt (both of which translate to object). The meaning of these terms is, according 
to Foot, simplified from its original roots in German (or Russian) philosophies, 
which tend to strip them from their philosophical and historical substance. The 
intelligibility of such conceptions, as she suggests, requires that we think of each 
concept as two sides of the same coin—i.e., in terms of a material entity in the 
world and as a socially constructed notion. The problem with Foot's interpretation 
is that it does not explain the cause of AT dualisms; it merely displaces it as a 
problem of meaning lost in translation. 
Engestrom and Escalante (1996) concur with the idea that there is a problem 
of language translation and argue that to properly discern the meaning of these 
terms, it is necessary to conceptualize them against the totality of a context. For 
example, in order to see what type of role the object of activity is performing (i.e., as 
a mediator of our labor or activity, object, or as the thing that undergoes a change, 
gegenstand) we need to place it against a "constellation" of other things that requires 
us to make reference to the way in which six components of the activity system (e.g., 
subject, object, community, rules, division of labor, and object) are bound together. 
The analogy of a constellation helps us to illustrate the idea of mediation in the form 
of the relational connectedness between all six components of the activity system 
(Figure 3.3, p. 53). The Big Dipper, for example, is a constellation of seven stars 
and the intelligibility of its location in the night sky requires us to make reference 
to the way each of its stars is connected together as a totality. Such a network of 
interconnected stars forms its "material makeup" , which makes it possible for us to 
see its distinctive figure. In this manner, we can see how these mediating relations 
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work to form the totalizing background. In AT, the analogy of a constellation of 
stars works in parallel to understand the totality that makes up the network of six 
components of the activity system. The meaning of each of its six components, like 
stars in a constellation, is revealed to us by reference to the totality of its mediating 
network. 
There is nothing in the material makeup of an object as such that would 
determine which one it is: object or tool. The constellation of the ac-
tivity determines the place and meaning of the object. (Engestrom & 
Escalante, 1996, pp. 361-362). 
It is precisely the idea of mediation that is a hallmark to understand the meaning 
of the object of activity by reference to all other relations between components. 
In this sense, we do not impose meaning on the AT components, (cf. as in the 
case of Kantian categories) but meaning is brought to light by the interconnected 
totality. Thus, AT begins with the idea to unify Cartesian-based models of activity 
with components, in the Kantian categorical sense (i.e., the perception of activity 
as epistemological structure and explanatory principle). Nonetheless, AT departs 
from Kant with the idea of mediation between its categories to produce a relational 
connectedness view of activity by reference to its constellation or totality. 
Moreover, one of the most important ideas in the activity-theoretic approach 
stems form insights in Marx and Engels for whom at the core of human activity we 
find labor as production. However, activity in the productive sense entails a change 
in living material conditions, in the very mode or circumstances of production, and 
thus a change in the mode of individuals' circumstances of production signifying a 
revolutionary, creative, and self-changing practice in which an individual not only 
produces conditions necessary for life, but at the same time and under these par-
ticular conditions, she or he produces herself or himself. In this manner activity 
(tatigkeit) in AT obtains its potentially emancipatory character. 
Although many writers have contributed to the development of such concepts, 
the focus here is on the second strand that inspired Engestrom (1987) to develop AT. 
This strand refers to the seminal work of three main authors: Soviet psychologists 
L. Vygotsky, A.N. Leont'ev, and A. Luria, whose theses are the building blocks 
from which other contributions stem. In what follows, I trace the evolution of 
AT through history in order to understand what Engestrom (2001) calls first- and 
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second-generations AT. I will begin with the work of Vygotsky and follow this with 
an examination of his two main collaborators. 
3.3 The first generation of AT: socio-cultural learn-
ing 
Lev S. Vygotsky is one of the architects of first-generation AT (1978; 1981a; 1981b; 
1981c). A. Leont'ev (1977; 1978; 1979) and other collaborators such as A. Luria 
(Vygotsky and Luria, 1994) develop second-generation AT. Considering the back-
ground of Soviet Russia, we can easily imagine that Vygotsky and collaborators were 
particularly influenced by Marx's idea of instruments of labor in order to create the 
idea of mediation via psychological instruments (or tools). 
An instrument of labour is a thing, or a complex of things, which the 
laborer interposes between himself and the subject of his labor, and 
which serves as the conductor of his activity. (Marx, 1887/1992, p. 125). 
To paraphrase the above, we have a triad between the individual, the object that 
undergoes transformation, and inserted between these two we find the Mandan in-
strument of labor. Such influence under the particular historical conditions of the 
time may have helped Vygotsky to introduce a new model to explain human be-
haviors in terms of a triad of components (see Figure 3.1, p. 42). This epistemic 
structure is a unit of analysis composed of a triad of interdependent components: 
subject, psychological tool, and object, which depict "the mediated act" (Engestrom, 
2001, p. 134). The subject refers to the individual. The psychological tool acts as 
the mediator of cognitive and behavioral activity. Examples of Vygotskian psycho-
logical tools are the means—such as language, sign systems, mnemonic techniques, 
and procedures for decision-making—by which to change subjects and their condi-
tions to accomplish the object of activity or the object that can be anything in the 
environment of the subject (e.g., raw materials) to be transformed. 
Kozulin's Psychological tools: a sociocultural approach to education (1998) is a 
book dedicated to the role of this Vygotskian concept to compare differences in lan-
guage and cognitive development across immigrant populations. Its main argument 
focuses on psychological tools as aids in the transformation of "the unmediated in-
teraction of a human being with the world in mediated interaction" (ibid., p. 4). 
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Adopted from Engestrom (2001, p. 134). 
According to Kozulin, the Vygotskian psychological tools, the mediating interme-
diaries or means to communicate with others, play a significant analytical role to 
illustrate cross-cultural differences of how individuals master behavior, language, 
and other cognitive processes from external sources (e.g., culture, society, etc) as 
the internalization of such processes, which occur together with the development 
of the individual. In fact, Kuzolin describes a process of socialization about the 
affirmation of hegemonic culture, against the atomization of other non-hegemonic 
(in this case immigrant) cultures. The socio-cultural narratives that employ English 
vernacular and its proliferation into popular culture, both of which have been ap-
propriated as a way of speech by a hegemonic middle class, is a clear example of 
socialization. 
In contrast, Hardcastle (2009) while not denying that the German philosophers 
had an influence on the Vygotskian idea of psychological tools, argues that others 
philosophers of the Enlightenment are its main source, and traces the historical 
trajectory of such ideas in philosophy. According to Hardcastle, the problem first 
initiates not as a problem of language or cognition, rather with a rooted concern in 
"the origin and nature of knowledge" (ibid., p. 185, emphasis added). Two main 
sources in the philosophy of language conceptualize the epistemological role that 
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signs systems play in order to help us access that knowledge: (1) the Locke and 
Condillac link and (2) the Herder and von Humbold link. From the first link, we 
begin with a Cartesian split between cognition (e.g., ideas, thoughts, etc.) and 
sign systems. Particularly, in the Lockean sense, words are seen as "vehicles" that 
transport cognition trapped in them, and signification is an essential precondition 
for consciousness to have emerged, along with the production of signs, which are 
assumed to play a key role in the development of our mental "faculties" following 
a gradient from a lower to a higher level of functioning. The Achilles' heel of the 
Locke and Condillac link is the Sisyphean language problem: how does our language 
emerge in the first place? 
By considering the ontology of the sign, the Herder and von Humbold-link ap-
pears to offer a solution. From this view, there is change in the temporal element, 
i.e., we see a priority of cognition over signs, and signification along with cognition 
come together as a unit, as two sides of the same coin. The great achievement 
of the Herder and von Humbold link is also its Achilles' heel. From this perspec-
tive, the Sisyphean language problem is not actually resolved, but mended with von 
Humbold's tautology: 
No matter how natural it seems to suppose a progressive development 
of language, its invention could only take place all at once. Man is only 
human through language; but in order to invent language, man would 
have to be already human. (von Humbold cited in Hardcastle, 2009, 
p. 192) 
This Humboldian tautology means that the Sisyphean language problem is ontolog-
ically open. The Herder and von Humbold link paves the way for an epistemological 
resolution via the Saussurean total system'. Hardcastle proceeds to argue that the 
1I take the notion of a Saussureian total system from Jameson's The prison-house of language 
(1974) where he argues that Saussure's originality derives from the question that seeks to under-
stand where in history can we find the adequate point of departure in order to study language. One 
of the main contributions to the study of language made by Saussure is to conceive it as a "total 
structure": a system that is complete with all its elements at every present moment. Saussure 
designated this structure with the name "synchronic system" in which language as a system is 
complete meaning: "a perpetual present with all the possibilities of meaning implicit in its every 
moment" (ibid., p. 6). This system denotes the connected distinction between synchrony over 
diachrony, which is illustrated with the paper metaphor: if one side of the page denotes synchrony 
(the historical phenomena that is external to language such as contingent accidents, etc.) and the 
other side of the page denotes diachrony (the internal phenomena such as immigration patterns 
that cause the rules of language to change), then the primacy of synchronic-over-diachronic idea 
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Vygotskian idea of mediation via psychological tools is indebted to the philosophical 
links (1) and (2) as its main sources. However, what is important about Hardcastle's 
study is that he traces this Vygotskian idea of philosophical tools to the beginning 
in the nature of knowledge, which can also be articulated as "the central paradox of 
science" (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 30) or the idea that there are two sides to knowledge: 
one side created by human beings and the other independent of them. 
At this point, we can return to the Cartesian division between different con-
ceptions of activity, which is patched via the idea of mediation by psychological 
tools, which is in fact a problem traceable to the nature of knowledge. On the 
one hand, Kozulin (1996) claims that Vygotsky used the word tatigkeit to suggest 
that "socially meaningful activity may serve as an explanatory principle in regard to 
and be considered as a generator of human consciousness" (p. 99, emphasis added), 
which reverses the order (the external-social is prior to the internal-individual ac-
tivity) in order to restore the notion of consciousness to Pavlovian-like reflexology 
research. Thus, Kozulin's interpretation activity (as a tenet of explanation, in which 
the tautological statement that activity explains activity itself reveals its ontological 
irreducible character) coincides with the model that favors goal-directed activity or 
labor. On the other hand, Wertsch (1981, p. 10) points out that Vygotsky did not 
write specifically about the concept of activity. Rather, Wertsch states, Vygotsky 
develops the "mediated act" , an epistemological structure denoted by a triangular 
unit of analysis, by which to conceptualize and explain human behavior in a medi-
ated relation to its social-cultural environment (see Figure 3.1, p. 42). Thus, Wertsch 
agrees that the view of activity is not only a principle of explanation but also as 
an epistemological structure, which favors both the investigation of object-oriented 
and goal-directed labor. The crucial idea that temporarily mends such Cartesian 
denotes a total system. The implication of the Saussurian total system is "that you can see only as 
much as your model permits you to see; that 'methodological starting point' does more than simply 
reveal, it actually creates, the object of study" (opt cit., p. 14, emphasis added). For example, 
my theory of reality effectively permits me to study it, but it does not exhaust it. In education, 
this notion is advantageous because such an epistemological point of departure as a Jamesonian 
perpetual present is the best place to study not just language but any object. In CR terms, this 
place is the uncertainly of our "ground state", which requires that we are open to possibilities 
and adjustments of change in the present meaning that we must transcend, what Bhaskar (2002b, 
p. 105) terms "axiological contradiction", which entails living in anxiety about a future that we 
do not know, or nostalgia about the past. However, we need to recognize that the achievement of 
the Saussurian "total system" is also its own Achilles' heel precisely because as a methodological 
(epistemological) total system it does not exhaust reality. It ignores the ontological; in turn, com-
mitting what in CR terms in known as the "epistemic fallacy", i.e., the reduction of ontology to 
epistemology alone (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 28). 
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splits is mediation via psychological tools because it posits process socialization, 
i.e., a two-way flow of internalization of social-cultural stimuli (e.g., the different 
regulatory way of behaving in society) and externalization via production (which is 
never equal to what is internalized resulting in an asymmetry), as I explain in what 
follows. 
3.3.1 Externalization and internalization 
Perhaps the most recognizable achievement of the Soviet School of Psychology is the 
process of externalization and internalization, which is summarized by Vygotsky's 
(1978, p. 57, emphasis added) famous dictum: 
Any function in the child's cultural development appears twice, or on two 
planes. First it appears between people as interpsychological category 
and then within the child as an intrapsychological category... Any higher 
mental function necessarily goes through an external stage in its devel-
opment because it is necessarily a social function... Any higher mental 
function was external because it was social at some point before becoming 
an internal, truly mental function. 
The externalization and internalization process is a dual movement from an ex-
ternal to internal state. The external state refers to what is obtained from the 
social and cultural environment. The internal state of this process appears as the 
means by which the individual has been influenced by cultural surroundings. Then, 
the individual externalizes those means, in order to influence others. For example, 
while Wertsch's (1981) interpretation of Vygotskian activity (as both epistemological 
structure and explanatory principle) sees the externalization-internalization move-
ment mainly as a regulator of behavior, Kuzolin's (1996) interpretation sees this 
process as mainly a generator of consciousness. In either case, these two inter-
pretations add to further our understanding of socio-cultural theory because they 
represent two different but non-conflicting views of activity, or two sides of the same 
coin. However, these perspectives do not help us to answer the guiding question 
of this thesis: what has been left out from Vygotskian socio-cultural theory? To 
provide an answer, it is necessary to take this argument to a position where we can 
see what is omitted from the Vygotskian internalization-externalization process via 
a philosophical CR vantage point. 
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In reality, the Vygotskian internalization-externalization idea falls within one of 
the four dimensions, a space of social relations, of the Bhaskarian social cube (see 
Figure 4.4, p. 107). This cubic conception of all social life represents "a cubic flow, 
differentiated into analytically discrete moments, [which are] rhythmically processual 
and phasic to the core" (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 146). From a CR perspective, Vygotsky 
only deals at the level of social interaction between agents, while omitting other 
levels, such as concept of social structure, material exchanges or transactions with 
nature, or the stratification of human embodied stratified personality, which are 
three other dimensions of the ways we interact with the world. 
3.4 The second generation of AT: the realist struc-
ture of activity 
Kozulin (1996) narrates the early history of what Engestrom calls second generation 
of Activity Theory (AT). While first-generation AT is inspired by Vygotsky, who 
worked in Moscow until his death in 1934, the second generation was inspired by 
the work of A. Leont'ev and other of his students who continued his research in 
Kharkov. The Kharkovian group was active from about 1934 to 1960. During this 
Stalinist period, Kozulin highlights the prevailing pressure to produce a psychology 
for the Soviets that is closely derived from Marx, Engels, and Lenin. From 1930 to 
1950, Vygotsky's writings were blacklisted due to his associations with the West, 
while Leonti'ev's theory of activity, as the dean of Moscow's University Psycholog-
ical Institute, became the doctrine for Soviet psychology until about 1970. After 
Stalinism, critics of AT began to emerge in part due to the re-circulation of Vygot-
skian texts. Zinchenko (1985), for example, criticizes Vygotsky for reducing aspects 
of individual's memory to a process of socialization, i.e., to only internal and exter-
nal functions. In CR terms, what Zinchenko's criticism refers to, is the idea that 
Vygotsky lacks a concept of an embodied, stratified, and differentiated personality, 
although this critique is not articulated in such precise critical realist terms. Es-
sentially, Zinchenko identifies a similar conclusion, i.e., that the Vygotskian view of 
activity lacks one of the dimensions of the Bhaskarian social cube (see Figure 4.4, 
p. 107). 
Leont'ev's The development of mind (1979, p. 223) is a key contribution to the 
theory of activity. It conceptualizes activity as a structure that is composed of three 
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different levels or distinct units of analysis, activity, actions, and operations: 
the structure of activity as the action's conditions and as the operations 
meeting these conditions is realized differently... the motives of the ac-
tivity are realized differently still. 
For Leont'ev, each of these units or levels is identified by the specific psychological 
function at which it is directed. In other words, concepts always appear in a relation 
with something in the world, as opposed to a Kantian imposed categorization of the 
world with concepts. Wertsch (1981) gives an explanation of Leont'ev's units as a 
hierarchical activity structure (see Figure 3.2, p. 47). The top of the hierarchical 
Adapted from Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman (1998, p. 29). 
structure is composed of activities, which are directed to achieve collective motives. 
In the middle are actions, which are directed to achieve individual goals, and at the 
bottom are instrumental operations, which are identified by the (material) conditions 
in which they are carried out. 
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According to Kozulin (1996) and Koschmann, Kuutti and Hickman (1998), 
Leont'ev sets out the task of developing a theory to explain how the development 
of consciousness occurring in an individual is the result of entering the world into 
a system of already established social relations. These social relations are the con-
ditions of life that explain both content and motivation of the individual's activity. 
For Leont'ev, the pre-existing condition of content and motivation give the indi-
vidual bearings, as she or he develops obligations as a member of a society. This 
epistemological structure of activity aims to explain three related sub-tasks: 
(1) To elaborate relationships that unite motor activity with psychological processes 
(e.g., doings and motivations). 
(2) To identify and distinguish between a collective and interpersonal motive of the 
individual in a sociocultural context. 
(3) To identify the leading or main activities (and associated motivations) across 
the life span of individuals and how these relate to psychological processes. 
In order to accomplish those tasks, Leont'ev constructs a concept of activity that 
is grounded in reality. In other words, Leont'ev's activity, according to Blunden's 
(2009) interpretation, is neither a simple epistemological structure nor explanatory 
principle, but the general notion of the nature of reality that underlies activity. 
Blunden is referring to the idea that to understand the nature of activity, it must 
necessarily follow a structure in order to access it, to understand it. Thus, Leont'ev's 
theory of activity is a realist one because it conceives nature of activity in terms of 
its structural character and social relations. To show the hierarchical character of 
activity, it is worth quoting Leont'ev extensively. 
For man to take on the function of a beater it is necessary for his actions 
to have a relation that connects their result with the outcome of the 
collective activity; it is necessary for this relation to be subjectively 
reflected by him so that it becomes 'existent for him'; it is necessary 
in other words for the sense of his action to be revealed to him, to 
be comprehended by him... The different activities are distinguished by 
their motives. The concept of activity is necessarily bound up with 
the concept of motive. There is no such thing as activity without a 
motive... The basic "components" of separate human activities are the 
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actions that realize them... action as the process that corresponds to the 
notion of the result which must be achieved, that is, the process which 
obeys a conscious goal ... Historically, the appearance in activity of goal-
oriented action processes was the result of the emergence of a society 
based on labor... But the simplest technical division of labor that arises 
in this process necessarily leads to the emergence of intermediate, partial 
results, which are achieved by individual participation in the collective 
labor activity, but which in themselves cannot satisfy the need of each 
participant. This need is satisfied not by the "intermediate" results, but 
by the share of the product of the total activity that each receives thanks 
to the relationships between the participants arising in the process of 
labor, that is, the social relations. (Leont'ev, 1979, pp. 109-408). 
This famous primeval-hunt example illustrates key differences between the first and 
second generation of AT. This differentiation refers to a collective (or group) activ-
ity to achieve a shared motive (e.g., the big hunt with assumed benefits for each 
member of the community) and the particular individual action (e.g., to lure the 
prey into captivity) caused by the division of labor. A key difference between Vy-
gotsky and Leont'ev's generations is the distinction of collective versus individual 
activity as unit of analysis. In other words, Leont'ev tries to theorize the activity 
that is performed in a collective or group via division of labor (or the study of col-
lectivism) versus the activity that is performed individually via psychological tools 
or other means (or the study of individualism). His theory of activity is an early 
attempt to grapple with the dichotomy between (methodological) collectivism and 
(methodological) individualism (which is elaborated in section 5.8, p. 142). 
However, one may ask, how does this new insight answer the guiding question: 
what has been left out from Leont'evian theory of activity? It is easy to suggest 
that the problem with the second generation of AT is that Leont'ev misinterprets or 
simply disregards the instruction of his teacher Vygotsky, as Kuzolin (1996, p. 29) 
seems to argue: 
what was missing from Leontiev's model was precisely the stratum of 
culture, emphasized by Vygotsky and neglected by his followers, which 
could provide a link between individual action and the social system that 
gives its meaning. 
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Kozulin's interpretation is like reducing Stalinism to a simple misinterpretation (or 
neglect) of Marxian-Leninists theory in practice, when in fact, the analysis of both 
phenomena requires more attention. Thus, the problem with Kozulin's "resolution" 
is that it assumes that Vygotskian socio-cultural theory is essentially complete and 
that there are no problems with it, but as I have seen in the preceding paragraphs, 
it is possible to show via the Bhaskarian social cube, the incomplete dimensions 
of the Vygotskian thesis. I want to accentuate that Leont'ev's theory of activity 
is not simply an advancement of the first generation of AT; rather, we need to 
interpreted it as an attempt to resolve a problem that was there from the start. In 
second-generation AT, we see that Leont'ev expands the unit of analysis because 
elements in Vygotskian socio-cultural theory are omitted, such as the conception of 
the social structure. It is Leont've's move to account for the social structure that 
simultaneously brings to light the tacit problem of collectivism versus individualism. 
Following Kozulin's argument, we find that there are three reasons from the move 
from first to second-generation AT: (1) ideological, (2) scientific, and (3) erroneous 
understandings of the original Vygotskian ideas: 
[1] Ideological caution, [2] honest scientific disagreement, and also [3] 
a misunderstanding of certain of Vygotsky's ideas all were intricately 
interwoven in the phenomenon that later became known as Leontiev's 
theory of activity. (Kozulin, 1996, p. 112). 
However, even if these three suggestions hold (or not); i.e., even if one is able to pro-
vide substantive evidence for such claims, they would still lack explanatory power 
by missing what is really important about Leontiev's theory. From this vantage 
viewpoint, we can provide a more complete interpretation of the passage from first 
to second generation of AT. To this aim, we need to understand that Leont'ev's the-
oretical work became part of AT not only because he added the division of labor, but 
in doing so, he started to grapple with one of the most important problems of AT, 
and of social theory in general, i.e., the problem between collectivism and individu-
alism. In this manner, we can see that even if (3) Leont'ev misunderstood the ideas 
of Vygotsky or had any other (2) scientific disagreement, his theory was an upgrade 
to the original Vygotskian thesis that patch it temporarily. Now, to understand (1) 
the ideological caution of the Leont'evian research program in Stalinist Russia and 
afterwards, let us resort to the structure of activity (see Figure 3.2, p. 47). For 
instance, let us assume that at the level of activity we have the collective, repre- 
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sented by the Russian population. This level is associated with its motive, which is 
a socialist state. Then at the level of actions we have each particular individual and 
each action associated with its goal to contribute to the overall collective motive. 
At the level of operations, we have the existing economic and ideological conditions. 
We can imagine that it made perfect sense for Leont'ev to inquire into the relation-
ships between these three levels. This research program seems sensible for Stalinist 
Russia because there was a motive of socialism associated with an existing socialist 
state apparatus. The same can be said about, for instance, the possibility of such 
research program in the UK where there is a motive of democracy in an existing 
democracy. 
Now, let us assume a perfect harmony between all levels (the economic and 
ideological sector, particular individuals' goals as reflected in their actions, and 
collective as the socialist state machinery). On the assumption of non-dualism 
between all these levels, we have the historical record that the Stalinist system 
still managed to break from the inside. (Much like the liberal market in our western 
democracies, or say, the historical record of UK democracy breaking from the inside 
as evidenced by the 2011 riots). The point I want to illustrate with this example is 
that there was already a problem with the system from its beginning in sociocultural 
theory, which the Leont'evian theory of activity only manages to patch. 
One may ask: what is a patch? It is a mechanism, marked out from the general 
by a particular characterization, that works to mend gaps or weak points thereby 
strengthening them in practice. Patching is much like upgrading one's computing 
operating system, we can think of second and third generations of AT as upgrades 
to the system, i.e., the theory of learning, each of which is aimed to not only solve 
the bugs of its predecessor, but also adds new applications, while simultaneously 
generating its own problems. This idea of a patch is itself also an example of the 
Bhaskarian TINA because what these different versions of the units of analysis try 
to do is to mend fissures within the theory itself, and thus allowing it to continue 
in practice. To support this claim, I draw upon Daniels' (2004, p. 123) argument 
that the individual-collective dualism that differentiates preceding units of analysis 
is progressed with Engestrom's expanded, unit of analysis or activity system in order 
to "enable an examination of systems of activity at the macro-level of the collective 
and the community in preference to a micro-level concentration on the individual 
actor or agent operating with tools" and with it, the creation of third-generation 
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AT is born, or another patch to the series of accumulating dualisms. 
3.5 The third generation of AT: learning as ex-
pansive transformation 
Yrji5 Engestrom is the main developer of third-generation AT, based on the classics 
of Germanic philosophy: Kant, Hegel, Marx, and the three most recognized figures 
of the Soviet School of Psychology, Vygotsky, Leont'ev and Luria. The evolution of 
AT does not remain static; in fact, EngestrOm (2008a) presents the review of the 
literature presented by Roth and Lee (2007) where they indicate how research in 
AT, in different fields, has risen from 1980 to 2005 and it is open to the possibility 
of a fourth generation. Engestrom (2001, p. 133) argues for five tenets of this third 
generation: (1) activity system, (2) muti-voicedness, (3) contradictions, (4) historic-
ity, and (5) the possibility for expansion in learning, or what he calls "expansive 
transformation". These principles are interdependent with each other, i.e., each one 
of them connected and depended on each other, which I outline as follows. 
Activity System The triangular array or activity system (see Figure 3.3, p. 53) 
refers to the structure and its three-fold characterization: collective, instrument-
mediated, and object-oriented feature of the activity system. AT uses the con-
cept of activity system to refer to a structure of interconnected components 
(object, subject, tools, rules, community, and division of labor). The activity 
system is the analytic lens or main analytic unit by which learning is under-
stood. The activity system has three main characteristics. First, the activity 
system is collective, which refers to relations that exist between two or more 
individuals that are seen as connected networks that "realize and reproduce 
themselves by generating actions and operations" (Engestrom, 2001, p. 136). 
Second, the activity system is object-oriented, which means that is purpose-
fully and intentionally driven towards an object (or objective or motive) of 
activity. Third, the activity system is tool-mediated, which implies that it 
uses instruments or tools (both concepts and any other mechanical tools) for 
the purposes of obtaining its objectives. 
Muti-voicedness From an AT perspective, the notion of multi-voicedness means 
to emphasize the distinction of voice, interests, perspectives, multiplicity of 
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Adopted from Engestrom (2001, p. 135). 
points of view of individuals or groups of individuals. For example, individuals 
always bring with them their life history and different perspectives, which could 
represent a source of conflict, but also a demand for negotiation, translation, 
and tolerance. 
Historicity The term historicity in AT, refers to the long periods or stretches of 
times that is takes for transformation to occur. Historicity is mainly under-
stood against the background of the activity system; at the local level with its 
own practices, theories, and tools that have shaped its local organization of 
the activity system. The understanding of local history is the understanding 
of the accumulation of its concepts, means, and practices through time. 
Contradiction The concept of contradiction is, in my opinion, the hallmark of 
AT. Such contradictions are "sources of change and development" (Engestrom, 
2001, p. 137). AT makes the distinction between simple conflicts and/or prob-
lems and contradictions. According to AT, contradictions are, "historically 
accumulating structural tensions within and between activity systems" (ibid., 
p. 137). It highlights that a chief primary source of contradictions in a capital-
ist society is between the values obtained for a commodity and/or service (the 
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exchange value) and the utility of that commodity or service (its use value). 
According to AT, this chief contradiction pervades the six components (object, 
subject, tools, rules, community, and division of labor) of the activity system. 
Contradictions always exist in activity systems and the attempts to resolve 
them may lead to innovation. A secondary type of contradiction that always 
pervades in AT is when an element from the outside is adopted into it—e.g., 
the adoption of new technology, the learning of a new language, and so on. 
Secondary contradictions are important not only because they are generators 
of problems, conflicts, and disturbances that come from an external source 
to the internal activity systems, but they also bring with them attempts to 
innovate, change, and resolve those contradictions. 
Learning as expansive transformation The concept of expansive transforma-
tion in learning (or learning by expanding) is employed to denote change in 
the activity system (Engestrom, 2001, p. 133). Because the activity system 
is assumed to undertake a process that takes a long cycle of change or trans-
formation, then during these long cycles, contradictions are accumulated and 
then aggravated. For instance, when an individual starts to question the grav-
ity of a given situation, the self-reflexive questioning of the status quo or the 
pre-established norms or rules, and begins to deviate in order to break from the 
set of established connections. According to AT, an expansive process of trans-
formation can effectively occur when an object of activity is re-conceptualized, 
i.e., the object of activity is perceived under a different light, which turns it 
into a new object. This re-conceptualization serves a double-purpose: (1) to 
furnish individuals with means (conceptual and material forms) by which to 
transform their own life, and once individuals are equipped with such means, 
it can (2) open up a space for collectives to move towards the possibility for a 
resolution of contradictions (double-binds). 
Engestrom (1987) finds the elements that are missing in the previous two genera-
tions and tries to account for the gaps in order to construct a new activity-theoretical 
approach summarized with the above five principles. The result is reconciliation of 
both Vygotskian psychological tools, which highlight the externalization and in-
ternalization processes, and a Leont'evian theoretical concern with the motive of 
a community and their division of labor because "the simplest technical division 
of labor... necessarily leads to the emergence of... partial results... , but which in 
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themselves cannot satisfy the need of each participant' . Thus, we see that the 
five principles of third-generation AT are, like software patches, the upgrade to the 
existing problems of the previous two generations. 
From, a critical realist viewpoint, my main point is to bring to light what is 
self-evident in every passage from one generation of AT to the next. A key point 
of this interpretation is that each unit of analysis, i.e., the analytic lens at which 
learning is perceived, is a harbinger which is necessitated because there is a systemic 
problem within the theory itself that is signaled by its various dualisms. The differ-
ent units of analysis are the signaling elements that overtly illustrate the upgrades 
needed to fix problems within the theory itself. First-generation AT uses Wertsch's 
(1981, p. 20) "tool-mediated action", a triad of components that remains centered 
on the methodological analysis of the individual. A closely related unit of analysis 
that tries to account for the omission of community is Lave and Wenger's Situated 
Learning: legitimate peripheral participation (1991, p. 32) another type of socio-
cultural theory, which focuses on a "community of practice": a network of closely 
related and depended social activities in which learning is viewed as the progressive 
peripheral shift of the community from novices to masters. In second-generation AT, 
we see that Leont'ev-inspired theory tries to overcome the methodological limitation 
that focuses on the individual by articulating a collective activity with reference to 
a division of labor that exists within a given community. However, a dualism is 
brought to light, namely the analysis of the individual versus the analysis of collec-
tives. Then third-generation Engestromian AT, as developed in terms of the above 
five principles, accounts for and tries to overcome the limitations of previous two 
generations, but it remains a theoretical open project for investigation. In fact, the 
third generation of Activity Theory needs to develop conceptual tools to 
understand dialogue, multiple perspectives, and networks of interacting 
activity systems. (Engestrom, 2001, p. 135). 
Sawyer (2002) identifies that although all socio-cultural theories agree that individ-
uals and collectives cannot be studied in isolation, but with reference to their social 
context and practices, they differ in their claims about separability (e.g., the claim 
that collectives and individuals have different properties) or inseparability—e.g., the 
claim that collectives and individuals cannot be methodologically distinguished from 
'See Leont'ev's (1979) quote on p. 49. 
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each other. Thus, Sawyer argues that these theories differ in the way they try to 
grapple, once again, with the central paradox of scientific knowledge (see the dis-
cussion on p. 43). Third-generation AT provides various important concepts that 
other generations lacked, for example, the notion of contradiction (double bind) and 
the notion of learning via an expansive transformation. As we have seen, all ver-
sions of activity theory are patches, not only because they are developed into more 
comprehensive conceptual apparatuses to the conceptualization of learning, but also 
because in their practice they maintain crucial dualisms that stem from its philo-
sophical roots. In this manner, third-generation AT conceptualizes learning with 
the idea of expansive transformation, which is important for CR not only because it 
provides us with a better notion of learning that its predecessors, but also because 
as its antecedent notions it needs to be "fixed". In what follows, I undertake these 
two tasks: first, I provide an answer to the question, why does AT suffer from these 
dualisms in the first place? Second, I mend the Engestromian notion of expansive 
transformation assisted from the philosophical vantage point of CR, which is aimed 
to produce the conceptualization of 3L: learning as process-in-product. 
3.5.1 AT's implicit ontology 
The reason why third generation of AT suffers from dualisms in the first place is that 
it does not provide a critique of classical empiricism, i.e., a critique of Humean phi-
losophy, as part of its historical development. According to Engestrom (1999), the 
historical evolution of AT starts with a passage from Kant to Hegel, to Marx. Next, 
it goes into a Vygotskian-inspired first generation of AT, which is subsequently con-
tinued by a second generation as part of the Soviet School of Psychology. Nowhere, 
however, in its classical formation do we find any mention of Humean philosophy, 
i.e., classical empiricism. 
I claim that it is because AT fails to provide a critique of Hume and empiricism 
that we see many of its inconsistencies in its classic roots in German philosophy to 
the present. The result of this crucial omission is a key reason for the accumulation of 
theoretical splits. This omission is especially important because Hume is responsible 
for providing the classical and most coherent form of empiricism, which provides the 
ontological baseline for the philosophies of Kant and Hegel, and to an extent also of 
Marx and Marxism. To put it in CR terms, Kant committed the epistemic fallacy, 
i.e., he did not mind the gap between ontology and epistemology. Kant uncritically 
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accepted (and so inherited) the Humean ontology of empirical realism (which is 
structured around the Humean theory of casual laws). Since then, most philosophy 
in the tradition of Kant, Hegel, and classical German philosophy has attempted to 
mend dualisms on the basis of that Humean ontology. In other words, with a patch, 
we are not able to see what the gap (or problem) underneath is, until we critique 
the ontology. This critique means that we have to show what is wrong with Hume 
and Kant's criticism of ontology. 
Indeed, the legacy of Hume can be summed up by two central shibboleths of 
orthodox analytical philosophy: the doctrines of (1) Humean theory of causal laws 
and (2) Hume's law: F -,4 V. (1) The first doctrine is a Humean theory of causal 
laws, which states that causal laws are simply "constant conjunctions" of atomistic 
events or merely empirical regularities (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 57). However, this actu-
alist perspective overlooks that empirical invariances normally need to be produced 
under experimentally controlled conditions, and are extremely rare outside of them. 
Following Bhaskar's A Realist Theory of Science (2008a), first published in 1975, 
who shows how this doctrine underpins the entire orthodox philosophy of science, we 
can show how the Humean theory of causality underpins a theory of explanation, i.e., 
a deductivist model, which is contemporarily known as the deductive-nomological 
or Popper-Hempel explanatory theory (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 119-126). Other theo-
ries, including a theory of prediction of events, a theory of a symmetry between 
explanations and predictions, a theory of the explanation of laws by theories, and 
so on, consequently follow from it. This deductivist schemal is important because it 
Adopted form Bhaskar (1994, p. 54). 
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underpins the structure of orthodox analytical philosophy of science, which informs 
mainstream accounts of knowledge and epistemology. It is the Humean theory of 
causality, a theory of causally defining an implicit ontology that lays the grounds 
for these theories of explanation, prediction and falsification that inform orthodox 
epistemology. Thus, we see the damaging consequences of a Humean account of 
the world, which is simply wrong because laws cannot be interpreted as empirical 
generalizations or constant conjunctions, but must be rather seen as tendencies of 
mechanism or structures which are normally out of phase with patterns of events. 
The critique of these two Humean-based doctrines is crucial for a non-empiricist 
account of all sciences; specifically, my criticism in the sublation of AT under CR 
stems from the first point of actualism. Aside from these central shibboleths we 
also find other problems such as that reasons for actions are detached from our 
causes, i.e., the denial that our reasons can be causes is the denial or our intentional 
causality, which leads to the de-agentification position, and goes together with a 
denial of the view that consciousness as a non-reducible emergent power of our 
material brain, which in CR is denoted with the term Synchronic Emergence Powers 
Materialism (SEPM). Therefore, the philosophical development of AT carries with it 
an implicit ontology that is unable to sustain its own theory. We see a symptomatic 
result of such implicit ontology in the form of theoretical splits that should (and 
to some extend do) signal to the activity-theoretic community the need to find a 
resolution. In section 4.4, p. 93, I develop such a resolution by arguing that the 
philosophy of CR provides an ontological essence that resolves not only AT dualism, 
but problems prevalent in social science. 
I turn now to the conceptualization of 3L: learning as process-in-product; how-
ever, before going into learning, it is important to keep in mind that education and 
1More specifically, in A Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar (2008a) gives a number of theories 
in the Appendix: Orthodox Philosophy of Science and the Implications of Open Systems that 
depart, in the sense of that they stem from this deductivist model: if we can deduce from an initial 
set of conditions, C1... Ck, and all the L1... Lk which are constant conjunctions of atomistic events 
or empirical regularities, then we can know the event, E. Initially, the L's give rise to and also 
underpin the Human theory of causality. Then, we have a theory of the explanation of events, but 
with it, we can also have a theory of predictions of events because if we know the initial conditions 
C's before, then we can see how the event E is going to occur. Subsequently, we have a theory of 
the asymmetry between explanation and prediction. A theory of how we can explain laws follows 
because we have explained E in terms of other higher order universal laws, then in terms of theories 
that are understood. What follows from this is a theory of a reduction of sciences, and then theories 
of what is scientific vs. unscientific, which ends with theory of direct or indirect corroborations or 
falsifications of actual (or possible) counter-instances. 
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educational context occur in open systems, i.e., dimensions where Humean constant 
conjunctions (of events) do not occur. In terms of learning, the consequence of 
an implicit ontology, and what is crucial for this investigation, is that AT cannot 
explicitly locate learning as a self-emancipation pulse that is an intrinsic part of 
the individual; rather it posits learning as a potentiality of actions of a group of 
people. More specifically, learning in AT is expansive transformation, i.e., "col-
lectively generated as a solution to the double bind potentially embedded in the 
everyday actions" (Engestrom, 1987, The zone of proximal development, para. 16). 
The problem with this conceptualization, once again, is that learning is displaced 
to a superstructure position of collectives or groups rather than the individual; in 
other words, in AT learning is not fully articulated as an unfolding self-emancipating 
process or pulse that is enfolded in the individual. Rather we see it only as an effect, 
a symptom, or a manifestation of an invisible structure that generates it. To put in 
Bhaskarian terms, we need a better theory of reality; we need something more than 
third-generation AT to bring the concept of learning down from its superstructural 
position in order to re-conceptualize it, re-inscribe it as emancipatory practice and 
as this pulsating core of each individual. 
3.6 3L: learning as process-in-product 
At 3L: learning as process-in-product, I am concerned with those processes that 
are either generated on the basis of contradictions or that are generated by them-
selves. In particular, third-generation AT is important because its employs a key 
characterization of learning as articulated by the Engestromian idea of expansive 
transformation (also known as "learning by expanding"), which is described as fol-
lows. 
A full cycle of expansive transformation may be understood as a collec-
tive journey through the zone of proximal development of the activity: 
it is the distance between the present everyday actions of the individuals 
and the historically new form of the societal activity. (Engestrom, 1987, 
p. 137). 
The notion of learning as expansive transformation already conceptualizes all the 
previous levels in 1M: learning as product, e.g., the outcomes of activity, including 
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2M: learning as process because processes are effects that arises out of the concep-
tualization of contradictions and leaves a space open, i.e., learning as a potential 
for expansion. Engestrom (2008b, p. 27) argues that such expansive potential is 
"best discovered by means of interventions which open up the zone of proximal 
development of the activity system" . 
This expansive transformation is understood not only at the individual level but 
as a collective journey that starts at the level where individual actions are not lim-
ited to the situation in which they are bounded, but as the events that do not have 
momentary impact, but each individual action has impact and is impacted by the 
wider society. Expansive transformation as learning is the possibility that individu-
als can radically transform their previous mode of activity into something new with 
the aid of, but not limited to, interventions. In this manner, we have seen that 
AT provides a conceptualization of learning as a potential for expansion precisely 
because it moves beyond learning as products and learning as processes. The next 
step is to see how the idea of expansive learning can be seen as learning as 3M: 
process-in-product. In what follows, I take the idea of expansive learning as an in-
complete form of dialectical sublation, but it is also based on the development of the 
transformational model of social activity (TMSA), which is a point of commonality 
between AT and CR. 
However, in order to create something new out of this conception to fit CRAT we 
need to "fix it" by taking the following steps. First, we start with Brown's (2009) 
"learning environment" , where we take the idea that education and educational 
contexts always occur in open systems, hence I reframe the above Engestromian 
concept as open expansive transformation to emphasize the open-systemic and lam-
inar paradigms. Second, we take this notion of open expansive transformation and 
juxtapose it with the Bhaskarian idea of dialectical sublation also in theory, in order 
to realize that the former is an ideal form of the latter. 
In Bhaskarian dialectics the idea of dialectical sublation refers to as a complete 
passage through the dialectic, in other words, it is "a dialectical result or outcome 
of a dialectical process (which then becomes the starting point in a new process, 
recursively); or as the process itself' (Hartwig, 2007h, p. 449). As a first step, I 
turn to an understanding of Engestriiimian dialectics, which is a logical process of 
expansion that is designed as a developmental research project, and I also identify 
what is missing in this logic. In short, open expansive transformation in its perfect 
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form, yields a dialectical sublation, which is certainly incomplete until we reach some 
action or praxis in 4D. 
Let us contrast the Hegelian and Bhaskarian dialectic in order to further illumi-
nate this third level of 3L: learning as process-in-product level. As we shall see, the 
Bhaskarian dialectic is not totally preservative; while the Hegelian dialectical sub-
lation (Aufheburn) is preservative as in "threefold meaning to cancel, preserve and 
transcend" (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 404). For Hegel, the process of dialectical learning 
as a totality is a closed structure where the outcome is a reconciliation of contra-
dictions in thought. For Bhaskar, the process of dialectical learning as a totality is 
an open structure, in which a product is recursively a point to start a new process. 
Nonetheless, Hegel's preservative sublation of totality "truth is the whole, the whole 
is a process and this process is reason" (Hegel cited in Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 22) affords 
us an ontological view of our world. 
We can begin to justify this 3L: learning as process-in-product level by imagining 
that a learner is in a constraint-free, real-sense, non-dualistic, egoless, state of being, 
a Bhaskarian ground state. 
Our ground states are intrinsically fields of possibilities, some of which 
must be actualized, but which, and in what form, depends upon what 
other forces and bodies, charges and constraints there are in the field of 
their actualization, which field out embodied personality and its context. 
(Bhaskar, 2002d, p. 86). 
Then, all of the sudden something clicks and there is a moment of eureka. This 
eureka-instance is the point of discovery, which is typically followed by fantastic 
progress without any contradictions. Certainly, we may conceive learning without 
contradiction, but this is not in the category of 2E: negativity where contradictions 
and problems are involved. Learning without contradictions can be associated with 
the following 3L as a possibility of knowledge as a growing totality leading to dialec-
tical sublation, which is a possible part of the joy of knowledge as a real experience. 
Thus, 3L: learning as open expansive transformation leading to dialectical sublation 
is a point where we need something else, we need practice. In particular, the move 
from learning as process-in-product to product-in-process requires a further level 
4D: learning as product-in-process or transformative praxis. However before going 
into this level it is important to identify the means by which AT engages with inter-
ventions as a means of praxis that can be open to transformation with the notion of 
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zone of proximal development (ZPD). In what follows, I explain how, the notions of 
mediating interventions and ZPD are in AT and how we can incorporate these terms 
under a CR philosophy, and thus under a CRAT conceptualization of learning. 
3.7 Interventions and ZPD 
The activity-theoretical approach developed as part of the Center for Research on 
Activity, Development, and Learning (CRADLE) argues for interventions in order to 
resolve contradictions. Interventions not only focus on an linear evolutionary view 
of how an individual develops into what she or he is; it also takes into account how 
real-world objects and structures (e.g., activity systems) are newly created and have 
been created by individuals, i.e. how activity systems are developed continuously. 
Because we are no longer dealing with a single dimension or a linear learning process, 
AT argues for interventionist approaches in order to include a second dimension 
that allows for a conceptualization of learning in both horizontal and vertical planes 
as a transformative expansion. Thus, two notions are important to highlight in 
developmental research: (I) the method of interventions and (II) the Vygotskian 
idea of zone of proximal development (ZPD). 
(I) Methodologically, AT emphasizes the distinction between a linear interven-
tion and a re-mediating intervention. A linear intervention is modeled by experi-
ments that are typically conducted in fields such as medicine, epidemiology, agri-
culture, and more recently in randomized control trials in education as the "gold 
standard" adopted by the US Department of Education (Engestr8m, 2008a). For 
instance, if a piece of research wants to test whether a particular measure (e.g., a 
drug or educational reform) is effective on a given population, the measure is ran-
domly assigned to experimental conditions. Next, the measure is monitored and 
compared to see if there are significant differences between a control group (e.g., a 
population that is given a placebo) and experimental group—e.g., a population that 
is given the measure to be tested. The key idea is that with a linear intervention, the 
researcher knows the desired effect of transformation as measured by the outcome 
that the researcher wants to implement. Such interventions lead to the paradox of 
the search: if something is known, then there is no reason to search for it, and if 
something is unknown, then we do not realize that we need to search for it. From 
an AT perspective, there is a concern to search for an unknown, which is to question 
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what is possible. On the other hand, a re-mediated intervention involves a transfor-
mation from something that is already known or a pre-defined object to something 
unexpected or newly created, which is a move in knowledge from stabilization to the 
possibility of invention. This process is reflective in the sense that a transformation 
involves the move from what is known to what is possible to create. 
In radical transformations aimed at the creation of qualitatively new 
patterns of activity, opening up and blending existing categories are not 
enough. What is needed is re-mediation by new theoretical concepts that 
serve as "germ cells" for expanded horizons of possibilities. (Engestrom, 
2008a, p. 12). 
The method by which interventions take place in Engestromian AT is based on the 
work of G. Holzkamp and may take three analytic phases: (1) object-historical re-
search, (2) theory-historical research, and (3) actual-empirical research. However, 
Engestrom and Kerosuo (2007) explain that AT is mainly about but not completely 
restricted to re-mediated interventions, and that it is also a framework for obser-
vational and historical studies. Longitudinal interventionist investigation, as they 
argue, remains the main approach by which to study agency, creations, inventions, 
or what is known as the process of externalization (as discussed in section 3.3.1, 
p. 45) by the following set of three methodological rules: 
(1) Object-historical research The researcher needs to follow or trace the object 
(or objects) of activity in their context of temporal/socio-spatial courses of 
development. The aim is to identify secondary contradictions that give rise 
to a new transitional phase, and to analyze the continuous developmental 
phases, a process called periodization of objects or structures such as, e.g., 
activity systems. 
(2) Theory-historical research The researcher needs to develop epistemic struc-
tures: theories, models, and knowledge to give the object (or objects) a means 
of communications, a voice, by involving the subject of activity who are indi-
viduals, agents, participants, clients, users, and so on. This voice serves as a 
common platform to share a dialogue by which the object surfaces, acquires 
visibility, articulation, and thus can be negotiated. 
(3) Actual-empirical research The researcher needs to expand the object (or 
objects) by means of organizing interventions. These interventions can be 
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sessions, spaces to hold dialogue, assignments, or other arrangements where 
the subjects of activity can construct new objects, such as concepts, models, or 
instruments to serve their aims and perhaps resolve contradictions. This part 
is important because (1) and (2) are insufficient in the application of research. 
Whereas the Bhaskarian dialectic is a four-part movement from 1M to 4D, this 
three-part analysis of object-theory-actual research refers to Engestromian dialectic 
or "the logic of expansion... An expansion is essentially a social and practical pro-
cess, having to do with collectives of people reconstructing their material practice" 
(Engestrom 1987, Dialectics of substance, para. 20). The main purpose of this En-
gestromian dialectical analysis is to deal with inner contradictions (double binds) in 
activity systems and in the logic of such contradictory structures. A second aim is to 
furnish participants with the newly created structures, i.e., new means, instruments, 
language, conceptual models, and so on, by which individuals themselves can resolve 
double binds. In short, this three-part interventionist method functions to bring to 
light systemic contradictions and thus make participants aware them, which can 
be collectively reformulated in terms of a double bind or "essential dilemma that 
cannot be resolved through separate individual actions alone but in which joint 
co-operative actions can push a historically new form of activity into emergence" 
(Engestrom's, 1987, How the new is generated, para. 5). The main point about the 
AT interventionist approach is that an implicit ontology allows it to presuppose CR 
in practice. 
Once again, I want to highlight that in third generation of AT there is a danger 
of over-exaggerating contradictions and falling into an orthodox Marxian view of 
reality. In contrast, what I want to show with the help of CR is that contradictions 
are a real and prevalent case in science, but also that there are numerous other 
ways' in which absence and incompleteness can take a challenging form. 
(II) An equality important part in developmental research is the notion of zone 
of proximal development (ZPD) because it points to another implication of the En-
gestromian logic of expansion. Originally, ZPD was drafted from the original thesis 
of Vygotsky (1978) but Engestrom (2001, p. 137) gives it an additional dimension. 
It is the distance between the present everyday actions of the individuals 
'In Appendix A on p. 287, I make reference to the Appendix: Explaining Philosophies in 
Bhaskar's Plato, etc. (1994) where we find a list of oppositional notions other than contradic-
tions, which are negative and responsible for causing challenges end up rendering transformation 
ultimately unsustainable and thus are the "backbone" of ideologies. 
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and the historically new form of the societal activity that can be collec-
tively generated as a solution to the double bind potentially embedded 
in the everyday actions. 
The concept of ZPD is used to further illustrate expansive transformation as learn-
ing. From an AT view, this concept is differentiated from the original Vygotskian 
notion, which denotes the theoretical distance that a novice needs to reach, usu-
ally with the help of a more knowable other, in order to achieve development in a 
progressive manner. 
Although Wood, Bruner and Ross (1976, p. 91) do not make reference to the Vy-
gotskian thesis, the scaffolding metaphor that they employed has been appropriated 
in the educational literature to illustrate the notion of ZPD. In short, scaffolding as 
a process consists "essentially of the adult controlling those elements of the task that 
are initially beyond the learners' capacity". In compulsory mathematics education, 
this metaphor tends to convey the idea of how a tutor enables students to move 
up a scaffold, i.e., to solve problems or tasks that would otherwise be beyond their 
reach (see, e.g., Goos, 2004; Hardman, 2005; Ozmantar and Monaghan, 2005). The-
oretically, if the ZPD distance between a more knowledgeable tutor and the novice 
learner is theoretically closed (or surpassed) at one stage of development, then learn-
ing is claimed to have been achieved and the learner can advance to the next stage 
of development. Hence, we have a problem when a learning process is scaffolded, as 
it were, in a vertical manner from a one level to a higher level of development, in 
that 
one cannot always know that a child [student] is in fact simply ig-
noring a suggestion, whether, he is systematically misunderstanding or 
what... Where the human tutor excels or errs, of course, is in being able 
to generate hypothesis about the learner's hypotheses and often to con-
verge on the learner is so crucial to the transactional natural of tutoring. 
(Wood, Bruner & Ross, 1976, p. 99). 
In this manner, the problem with scaffolding adequately illustrates the need for 
a two-way, "transactional" process of tutorials, what is known as externalization 
and internalization (as discussed in section 3.3.1, p. 45), which is what the original 
Vygotskian thesis was concerned with. 
AT does not restrict the view of learning to a vertical dimension in the closing 
or crossing of the ZPD distance, but it includes a horizontal dimension. Although 
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Engestrom (1987) uses the original ZPD terminology, he does not interpret it as a 
distance that needs to be reached or closed by the individual in order to progress. 
From an AT perspective, ZPD is a dimension in which collectives, i.e., the social 
relations between individuals, can explore and dwell in. 
What Engestromian ZPD is effectively conveying is that this zone exists between 
the present and the future, so that it starts in the present in daily actions that have 
an impact in the future. However, as we can see, the Engestromian ZPD lacks 
reference to the past, what is in Jamesonian terms the historical absent cause and 
in Baskarian terms the notion of absence or non-being (elaborated in section 7.4, 
p. 224). While the Vygotskian ZPD can theoretically be closed (or surpassed) as a 
novice moves closer from a centered novice position to a peripheral knowledgeable 
position, the Engestromian ZPD remains theoretically open (i.e., the present can-
not catch up with the future), but the gap is the possibility of co-operation between 
individuals so that double-binds or contradictions can be resolved. In the present, 
the Engestromian zone is a dimension that is never empty, but a place that indi-
viduals inherit with invested interests, histories, and boundaries as others occupied 
it in the past. The ZPD is the journey into a collective potential or temporary 
resolution in everyday praxis to what are double-bind problems. In short, the ZPD 
is a move towards something that is possible, a journey that is required in order to 
go beyond the present conflicting state. This journey may lead to something new, 
which Engestrom (1987) calls expansive transformation as learning, a new collective 
understanding of this dimension, but as new understanding at the same time can 
potentially create new conflicts. From this view, learners achieve a new level of 
knowing when conflicting boundaries, which are always present in this zone, begin 
to collide. In this manner, the metaphor of expansion also occurs, as it were, in a 
horizontal manner that moves away from old conflicts towards new ones. 
From a CR viewpoint, the notion of ZPD as developed by AT is also very im-
portant because it allows us to re-conceptualize knowledge, as an attempt to solve 
the central paradox of scientific knowledge (see discussion on p. 43 and p. 56). In 
CR, the dimension of knowledge (epistemology) is always different from ontology. 
In terms of the individual learning who is working with a more knowledgeable other, 
in the Vygotskian sense, CR allows us to see individual knowledge as a virtue that 
is part of us, but also as a something that we ourselves need to produce in our 
creativity. This CR view of knowledge is utterly different from other conceptions of 
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knowledge, such as the reified theories that see knowledge as facts, information, etc. 
Following the distinction between ontology and epistemology and Bhaskarian 
dialectics, we can make four key distinctions related to knowledge by passing through 
four movements, in what we can call the quadruplicity of episteme: 
1M: data At this level we have a simple product, e.g., the facts available in all 
forms of archival material. 
2E: information This is the level of process, which entails a group of data and 
facts of information about a topic, e.g., the networks of facts that we obtain 
doing a search on the Internet. 
3L: knowledge At this level, process-in-product, involves the understanding of 
mechanisms or structures that produce and explain 2E: information, and or-
ders the 1M: data that we have available, e.g., the theory of gravity, the 
periodic table of elements, and so on. 
4D: wisdom This is the level of product-in-process, or the integration of knowledge 
of the mechanism or structure with our values, practices, and life generally. 
Wisdom is a unity of theory and practice that is reflected in our knowledge 
with the correct values. 
In our present state, we are at the levels of 1M and 2E, so that we need to make 
further steps to the level of understanding generating mechanisms and structures, 
and finally wisdom. The notion of ZPD in AT does not allow us to see the enormous 
differentiation between 2E and 3L. In other words, in our society what tends to pass 
for knowledge is actually data. For instance, data that is available through the 
Internet, the media, and institutions of education. I want to stress that this CR 
is a very humble position because it questions what tends to account for learning, 
a move equated with information. CR allows us to conceptualize knowledge in 
a radical manner: knowledge is ontological, is an irreducible part of being or in 
Bhaskarian: knowledge is not only of being, but it is being! 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the historical development of Activity Theory as having ori-
gins in Germanic philosophy and subsequently evolving through (1) first, the phi- 
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losophy of Kant, Hegel, and Marx and (2) three generations of the Soviet School 
of Psychology. The purpose of this chapter is to show that every passage in the 
historical development of AT, from first-generation AT to the next, is a harbinger 
analogous to an upgrade of a preceding generation necessitated because there is a 
systemic problem within the theory itself that is signaled by the contradictions and 
problems it generates. And that requires remedying by the enhancements provided 
by each successor or partial resolution. This partial resolution leads to attempts to 
enhance the theory, as evidence in three unit of analysis. The cause of the prob-
lem, the various activity-theoretical dualisms, is the omission of a critique classical 
empiricism, most systematically expressed in the philosophy of Hume, which is the 
ontological baseline for Kant, Hegel, and Marx, and subsequently the three genera-
tions of AT. 
Nonetheless, AT provides a conception of learning as expansive transformation 
that is very useful after a few amendments. Engestromian dialectics refers to a 
logical process of expansion; we can re-conceptualize it as an instance of a perfect 
dialectical sublation. Whereas the Hegelian dialectical sublation yields a closed 
structure of reality, for Bhaskar it is the opposite. The Bhaskarian 3M: product-
in-process gives us the key characterization of an open reality, a totality that does 
not stop there but necessitates a further level 4D: learning as product-in-process 
(transformative praxis). 
Although it is important to understand the historical foundations behind AT 
concepts, it is equally important to understand their application, i.e., how these 
concepts have been operationalizedl and theoretical problems. In the next chapter, 
I review theoretical and empirical literature on AT. In reviewing the empirical lit-
erature, I focus on the field of mathematics education that ranges from compulsory 
levels to higher education, but mainly the latter, in order to answer the following 
question: 
(1) Since contradictions are the diving source of activity systems, how does the 
mathematics educational research community operationalize concepts of ac-
tivity systems and contradictions? 
(2) Since the third-generation AT is an evolving framework subject to further de-
velopments, what are the current theoretical problems or dualisms of AT? Or 
1Following Wengraf (2001), the idea of operationalization refers to making inferences and de-
cisions that are required when linking concepts to empirical data. 
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to phrase it in the terms of guiding questions: what has been left out from 
AT? 
I shall address (1) empirical research and (2) theoretical research by exemplifying 
AT from the viewpoint of Critical Realism (CR). 
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Applications and theoretical 
dualisms of activity theory 
True universalists are not those who preach global tolerance of differ-
ences and all-encompassing unity, but those who engage in a passionate 
struggle for the assertion of the Truth which compels them'. 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a literature review on empirical research associated with the 
applications of Activity Theory (AT) in the field of mathematics education in order 
to provide examples of 2E: learning as process; in particular of those processes driven 
by contradictions (double binds). Then, theoretical research associated with three 
generations of AT identifies various dualisms within it. First, however, the argument 
for 2E follows in three parts: 
• After organizing empirical investigations according to what I call nested mathematics-
educational activity system (see Figure 4.1, p. 72), I argue that Critical Real-
ism (CR) provides a philosophical grounding through which we can conceptu-
alize this particular nested system as part of a more inclusive Bhaskarian lami-
nated system or the idea that "different levels necessary for the understanding 
of the result may be conceived as interacting in coalescing" (Bhaskar, 2010, 
p. 5) in educational contexts. 
iThis idea of true universalists is taken from Zilek's Carl Schmitt in the age of post-politics 
(1999, p. 35). 
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• In particular, the operationalization of the six categories (e.g., object, subject, 
instruments, object, division of labor, and rules) of the activity systems, ac-
cording to the mathematics-educational community, is accomplished by means 
of what I call a fill-the-bucket approach. From a CR viewpoint, I argue that 
this method reveals a Kantianism, a deep misunderstanding of the nature of 
reality itself since empty buckets stand for categories about being (ontology) 
that are "filled" with sense-experience data that reflect how reality is imposed 
to fit the buckets with a best-fit rationale from the perspective of the researcher 
(epistemology). From a CR viewpoint, this Kantianism yields the epistemic 
fallacy, the collapse of ontology to epistemology (Bhaskar, 2008a). 
• Moreover, evidence about contradiction identification in mathematics educa-
tion suggests that there are primary (or inbuilt) and secondary contradictions 
(when a new component is introduced into the system), which in turn disturb 
the dynamics of their respective educational systems. These contradictions 
may be seen as signaling devices revealing that their corresponding activity 
systems are in crises, and so incomplete equivalent to what is conceptualized 
as an apprehension of incompleteness in section 2.4, p. 28—a state in which 
processes driven by contradictions necessitate a continuous process of what 
Engestrom (2001) calls learning as expansive transformation. 
Second, the argument for a CR resolution to dualisms of AT is summarized with 
Table 4.3, p. 95. 
4.2 Applications of AT according to empirical re-
search in mathematics education 
The application of an activity-theoretical framework in various disciplines usually 
takes the form of case studies; they vary from pure observational studies to historical 
research to the interventionist approach, advocated by Engestrom (1987). In the 
particular discipline of mathematics education, empirical research into AT shows us 
that the activity system is situated within three different levels depending on mi-
cro, institutional, and cultural-historical educational contexts of study. In order to 
visualize the nested nature of such levels of activity, I have organized them in terms 
of three concentric circles or nested mathematics-educational activity system (see 
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Figure 4.1, p. 72). The micro-relational, institutional, and socio-cultural-historical 
Figure 4.1: Nested mathematics-educational activity system 
Socio-cutural-historical level 
Societal stratum 
Institutional level 
Normative stratum, e.g., school, work, 
worshiping settings, etc. 
Micro-relational 
level 
instruments 
subject 	 object 
division 
community 
of labor 
Pedagogic practices between various 
types of relations e.g., teacher and 
student(s), parent and child, small 
groups, classroom relations, etc. 7, 
levels of the nested mathematics-educational activity system provide us with a strat-
ification that summarizes how this particular research community understands ed-
ucational contexts in general. However, in order to expand our perspective beyond 
this nested model, one can argue that CR allow us to conceive these levels as part 
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of a larger type of laminated system (Bhaskar, 2008b), what I term an open learn-
ing environment (see Table 4.1, p. 75) by following Brown's (2009) notion of how 
mathematics-educational contexts and other educational contexts in general can be 
conceptualized. The most salient point is that any educational context must be un-
derstood in terms of laminated systems, which expresses the idea that all phenomena 
need to be analyzed in terms of non-fusing elements and irreducible ontological levels 
that make up the totality of significant mechanisms required for their explanation. 
Brown (2009, p. 6) develops the idea of a "learning environment" , which in CR 
terms is an example of a mixed laminated system consisting of these irreducible 
layers in the discipline of educational studies into which mathematics-educational 
research falls. He argues for such an open-systemic view of reality in terms this idea: 
[it is] not as a process grounded in empiricist or idealist conception of 
knowledge, but as emergent from the ontology: a phenomenon emergent 
from an ensemble of causal mechanisms... the learning environment is 
more than merely the location of learning as it is commonly construed. It 
is the total set of circumstances that enable and constrain learning: the 
totality of causal powers, ways of acting, tendencies, and susceptibilities 
whether or not they are exercised as events, and events whether or not 
they are experienced by actors or agents in the learning environment. 
(ibid., pp. 6-20). 
This ontological spin is directed at the educational community so that it might move 
beyond objectivist (including behaviorist) and instructionalist perspectives that are 
idealized and foregrounded in contemporary learning theories. On the one hand, 
objectivism is a positivist-infused idea that sees learning in terms of a one-way 
transmission of facts from teacher to pupil. For example, objectivism sees learners 
like sponges, in terms of being passive recipients that soak the benefits of instruction. 
A close relative of this approach is behaviorism; the idea perceives learning as being 
homologous with ways of behaving that can potentially be trained by stimuli such 
as routines, rewards, self-discipline, and punishment. Thus, we see that behaviorism 
equates learning, as with Pavlov's dog, with ways of behaving as something that can 
be trained via stimuli. To simplify, while the objectivist is concerned with questions 
such as: what materials, academic curriculum, practical skills, and behavioral norms 
among others, are being taught in institutions, the behaviorist asks: how are such 
materials being taught? The application of CR to education, according to Brown, 
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allows us draw upon elements of these two main approaches in order to shift from 
closed and one-dimensional theories of learning. 
A common problem between objectivism and behaviorism lies in the closeness 
of the conception of learning that they employed—particularly in the idea that 
learning can be controlled under experimental type conditions. In other words, if 
learning is effectively a closed system, then it can be encapsulated within intuitional 
settings that are responsible for delivering outcomes; it can be replicated on the 
assumption of homogeneity of knowledge acquisition and a uniform access to educa-
tional resources, and it can be relied upon to deliver a desired maximized cognitive 
and behavioral outcome via curriculum and other teaching materials. A problem 
emerges when the outcomes do not go as planned; for example, when the curriculum 
is not a guide to promote, learning, but a rubric to be ticked off. In this manner, 
objectivism and behaviorism see a problem, as opposed to a consequence, in the 
unintended outcomes that result from applying a closed-systemic theory of learning. 
On the other hand, instructionalism is an embodiment of social-constructivist 
principles that view learning as a mental construction of knowledge acquisition 
through social and linguistic meanings. This approach is concerned with provid-
ing conditions so that learners can construct and bring out their inner (mental) 
creativity, intellect, potential, and so on. A problem with instructionalism lies in its 
one-dimensional view of learning where meaning is constructed without depth, and 
for this reason it cannot account for the variability of individual interpretation or 
reference to something outside meaning or language itself. In other words, it lacks 
criteria by which to judge a mental state over another different one and a way to 
support references to real objects and factual statements such as broadly accepted 
scientific and mathematical knowledge. From this views learners are constructors 
of their knowledge via linguistic meanings and social interactions; this paradigm is 
epitomized with Sfard's (2008, p. 81) conception of learning where she fuses two 
dimensions with "commognition", a neologism that homologizes cognition with an 
"individualized version of (interpersonal) communication". To simplify, given that 
we speak and not the world, an instructionalist asks: for whom and what purpose 
is the material being taught? Or methodologically, the instructionalist asks: what 
communicative activity or "patterned, collective doings" (ibid, p. 157) are identified 
in interaction? Such questions reflect an underlying pragmatism. The other side of 
this type of linguistic paradigm is what Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, p. 63) 
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refer to as an analysis of the various ways of talking and perceiving by asking: how 
are "questions of power linked with questions of ideology"? Some examples of such 
questions inquire into who are the beneficiaries (or not) from what is being taught, 
who and how is control over production, consumption, distribution of a commodity 
or service being exerted, just to list a few. 
To transcend these perspectives, I put forward a mixed laminated system, fit 
for open systems that enables us to identify and relate the various mechanisms, at 
different levels of reality, which enable and constraint learning. The notion of mixed 
laminated system refers to a mixture of levels from the other Bhaskarian four types 
of laminated systems, i.e., the (ontological) level, (social) planar, (social) scalar, and 
the emergent spatio-temporality (see section 6.3.3, p. 195). This mixture does not 
mean that the levels are uniformly or linear with respect to size—e.g., the physical 
level is not necessarily smaller than the biological one; in fact, some of the levels are 
not scalar and some do not have a physical location, e.g., the moral/political level. 
The key idea when constructing a laminated system is that there is no a priori way 
in which reality produces complexity, hence the building of a laminated does not 
follow a particular ordered fashion for formation of its levels; rather, its formation 
is in direct relation to one's explanatory concerns and the reality that determinate 
them. This laminated system is paraphrased and amplified from Brown's "learning 
environment" with an explanatory concern for a very important level that denotes 
the socio-economic relations (which Brown's original idea leaves out) as shown Table 
4.1, p. 75. 
Table 4.1: Open learning environment in education—a 
mixed laminated system 
Stratum Description 
micro- 
relational 
level 
it takes into account various type of pedagogical relationships 
such as pupil-pupil, pupils-educators, pupil-administrators, 
educators-administrators relationships in terms of their mor-
phogenetic transformations, and stratified characteristics in 
order to give a wider explanatory mechanism for the poten-
tial of knowledge. 
Continued on next page 
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Table 4.1 - Continued from previous page 
Stratum Description 
laminar and 
emergent 
level 
it highlights a range of multi-causal mechanisms that operate 
at various strata in an interactive manner to determine the 
conditions for learning, but also learning as emergent from 
such conditions, which cannot be collapsed to any single stra-
tum or cannot be predicted to a definite outcome. 
normative 
level 
it accounts for the non-homogeneity in individual meaning 
production caused by the input of the curriculum and other 
materials. 
socio- 
cultural- 
historical 
level 
this level is concerned with relations between individual pupils 
and groups (or collectives). It includes the group dynamics of 
pedagogical relations, classrooms, etc, and extends to parental 
cultural and educational beliefs. 
socio- 
economic 
level 
this level is concerned with the social and economic material 
relations that exist between pupils and their families. It is not 
limited to economic relations, but other asymmetries such as 
ethnic and gender relations. At this level, we see the effects of 
the social structure in the classroom and in all other learning 
environments. We cannot implicitly adopt the view that soci-
ety ends where the classroom begins, for certainly, the social 
structure runs through it. The wealth of families is an enor-
mous factor that impact all other layers of learning, which is 
facilitated, to put it in Bourdieuian terms, by social, cultural 
and economic forms of capital; For instance, the simple fact 
that a pupil has a private room to study as opposed to the 
family kitchen table makes us aware of this systemic impact. 
psychological 
level 
it includes the learners' psychology, e.g., attitudes, motiva-
tions, confidence, maturity, and so on. 
Continued on next page 
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Table 4.1 - Continued from previous page 
Stratum Description 
biological 
level 
it is concerned with the spectrum of conditions for the essen-
tial support of growth of pupils. This level sees whether learn-
ers range from a state of nourishment to hungriness, alertness 
to distractedness, vision-and-hearing health to disease. Hence 
it gives a general range from a state of wellness to illness. 
physical 
level 
it deals with the physical structure and spatial layout of an 
educational institution such as a classroom, e.g., it looks to see 
whether the environment has adequate lighting, heat, desks, 
etc. 
open 	 or 
quasi-closed 
system only 
it emphasizes the variability and individuality of learning and 
a multiplicity of mechanisms operating in pupils' response to 
the educational input (e.g., curriculum, assessments, etc.) it 
might be quasi-closed in the sense that the curriculum is cen-
tralized with little option for student's decision, but it cannot 
be deterministic or prescriptive. 
Continued on next page 
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Table 4.1 - Continued from previous page 
Stratum Description 
moral- this stratum is partially normative because it entails direct 
political decision-making actions that explicitly reflect what is to be 
level learned and taught in educational institutions; thus, it de-
picts what is expected from pupils, teachers, and administra-
tors even when the outcomes reflect unintended consequences. 
The moral-political position is not just a philosophical stance, 
but it is the space of ideological debate about values in edu-
cation that correlate with particular teaching approaches and 
curriculum preference. For example, while western democra-
cies value open-ended classroom discussions, negotiable ap-
proaches, multiculturalism in educational setting, etc., the 
other side of this coin shows that their philosophical stance 
is rooted on ruthless pragmatism as evidenced by the spe-
cific aim of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM) educational programs, which reflects utilitarian prin-
ciples that interest national security, liberal market economy, 
competition, and a globalization of non-local cultures via an 
appropriation and adaptation of local ones, etc. 
Adapted and expanded from Brown (2009, p. 23). 
However, we cannot help but wonder why Brown (2009, p. 23) omitted an important 
level, and hence the problem with this laminated system is that it leaves out a socio-
economic level, which I have included as a way to amplify the important notion of an 
open learning environment. This stratum is particularly important to be accounted 
for in education because it implies that we must see society and its inequalities as 
running through the world of classrooms, so that they do not stop at the school 
gates, but enter through them. 
After seeing how the nested mathematics-educational activity system is a sub-
set of a more inclusive open learning environment, I show how the mathematics-
educational research community operationalizes the activity system. In this sense, 
Hardman (2005), Ho (2007), and Zevenbergen and Lerman (2007) operationalize 
the micro-relational level of the nested mathematics-educational activity system in 
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terms of local interactions of pedagogical practices1 between teachers and students in 
the classroom or computer laboratory. Fitzsimons (2005a, 2005b), Goodchild and 
Jaworski (2005), Roth (2003), and Williams, Wake, and Boreham (2001) include 
manager-laborer pedagogical practices in various workplaces. Beswick, Watson, and 
De Geest (2007) and Venkat and Adler (2008) operationalize the institutional level 
of the nested system by looking at departments of mathematics. Flavell (2004) 
includes investigation across schools, and Lim and Hang (2003) adds the entire min-
istry of education. At the cultural-historical level, we have what Kanes (2001), 
for instance, operationalizes as conceptions such as the notion of numeracy. For 
Jurdak and Shahin (2001), and Jurdak (2006), the activity system is taken to be 
problem-solving theories. Thus, the activity system, as operationalized by mathe-
matics education, reveals a three-layer stratification of education, namely as in the 
levels of Figure 4.1, p. 72. 
In particular, the operationalization of the six components of the activity system 
(subject, object, instruments, rules, community, and division of labor) in mathematics-
educational research literature, elicits the "bucket"-metaphor employed by Barab, 
Evans and Beak (2004) who conducted a comprehensive review of the literature on 
the applications of AT in the field of technology and communication studies. Below, I 
show how a similar fill-the-bucket approach appears in the mathematics-educational 
research literature: 
the researcher then mines collected data to determine the content that 
they view as constituting a particular component of the triangle with the 
goal of developing a triangular characterizing of activity. These compo-
nents ... [are] used as "buckets" for arranging data collected from needs 
and task analyses, evaluations, and research. (ibid., p. 207). 
The bucket-metaphor is used to describe how each of the components serves as a 
label and a container to be filled with sense-experience data that the researcher 
extracts from the investigation. Each bucket is labeled with the name of one of the 
1I use the term pedagogic practices in a Bernsteinian sense, i.e., these practices are relationships 
that are not confined to educational institutions between a teacher and a pupil or parents and 
children, but in a wider sense they are asymmetries "those practices between doctor and patient, 
the relationships between psychiatrist and the so-called mentally ill, the relationships between 
architects and planners. In other words, the notion of pedagogic practice... [is] a fundamental 
social context through which cultural reproduction-production takes place" (Bernstein, 2000, p. 
3). 
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six components that constitute the activity system and is allocated data according to 
the perspective of the researcher on the grounds of best-fit purposes for a particular 
category. For instance, a bucket with the label of instruments tends to be filled with 
data that have been categorized by the researcher to describe instruments such as 
computers. 
Jonassen and Rohrer-Murphy (1999, p. 62) suggest a six-step fill-the-bucket ap-
proach that they call a social-constructivist method to extract and fit data into each 
of the six categories as a way to apply AT to educational studies and to design or 
construct what they term "constructivist learning environments" (CLEs) based on 
the rationale that AT agrees with social-constructivists" assumptions about learning 
because 
the assumptions of activity theory are very consonant with those of con-
structivism, situated learning, distributed cognitions, case-based reason-
ing, social cognition, and everyday cognition that underlie CLEs. (ibid., 
p. 62). 
From a social-constructivist perspective, learning always occurs in the context where 
meaningful activity occurs as the learner makes the gradual centripetal step from 
novice toward a center position that is occupied by the community of experts; thus, 
the activity system (as context) is a crucial element to take into account when 
designing instruction, in part, because it includes both categories for the subject 
(or novice learner) and the community (of experts). The importance of context is 
clearly conveyed with the following quote. 
Activity cannot be understood or analyzed outside the context in which 
it occurs. So when analyzing human activity, we must examine not only 
the kinds of activities that people engage in but also who is engaging 
in that activity, what their goals and intentions are, what objects or 
products result from the activity, the rules and norms that circumscribe 
that activity, and the larger community in which the activity occurs. 
(opt. cit., p. 62, emphasis added). 
In order to create the CLEs, each of the components of the activity system represents 
an empty bucket that stands for a category to be investigated with the answers to 
a set of questions. I paraphrase the CLEs six-step interrogative method as follows. 
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1. Clarification of the aim of the activity system(s) To explain what the con-
text is, this step answers questions such as what are the conflicts, problems, 
situations, settings, communications, tasks, conditions, within which local in-
teraction occurs. 
2. Analysis of context To understand the subjects' motivations, this step an-
swers questions such as what expectations, beliefs, motivations, and objectives 
contribute to the overall dynamics under investigation, and who sets those ob-
jectives? 
3. Definition of each component of the activity system To decompose the con-
text, this level answers questions such as who stands for the subject and com-
munity. For each motivation, what are the observed actions, goals, and oper-
ations? For whom are they performed? 
4. Definition and analysis of each mediator in the activity system To an-
swer: what are the rules, physical instruments (machines, for example), cogni-
tive instruments (signs systems, procedures, formalisms, methods, laws), and 
divisions of labor or tasks? What is the role of mediators? 
5. Analysis of the context To assess perceived contradictions, this level answers 
questions such as what are the shared beliefs, assumption, theories, and meth-
ods of the group. Are tasks dictated or allowed to emerge within the group? 
How are groups working toward the main object? 
6. Analysis of the dynamics of the context To formulate a description and as-
sessment of how each of the components affects the entire dynamics, this step 
answers questions such as what are the conductors of change. What interre-
lationships between components exist and how are they changing with time? 
In order to show how this fill-the-bucket method functions, suppose that in step 
one, I clarify the purpose of my investigation as the Arab Revolutions within the 
context of the events in Tunisia and Egypt (activity system). Then, according to so-
cial constructivism and other learning theories', I cannot understand or analyze the 
'Other theories that share similar assumptions are: Vygotskian-inspired sociocultural theories 
such as Lave and Wenger's (1991) situated learning including, Rogoff and Lave's (1984) everyday 
cognition theory, the behaviorist approach of Bandura's (1969) social (cognitive)-learning theory, 
Aamodt and Plaza's (1994) summary of the retrieval, re-utilization, revision, and retainment of 
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Arab Revolution outsize its own context because "theories that are not associated 
with activity have no meaning" (Jonassen and Rohrer-Murphy, 1999, p. 68). From 
this view, the detachment between theories (mind) and activity (body) renders it 
meaningless since these "learning theories claim that learning occurs only in the 
context of meaningful activity, [hence] it is important to analyze the activity and 
the context as part of the instructional design process" (ibid., p. 62). However, it 
does not follow that the Arab revolutions cease to exist or are meaningless outside 
my theories of learning about it. The construction of concepts, models, or theories 
rightly depends on society and the context in which it unfolds; however, the cate-
gorical error of these learning theories is to conceive that objects of investigation are 
meaningless or do not exists outside the social construction of reality; for example, 
there is much more to the Arab Revolution than the conceptual models and theories 
that we are able to design about it. 
Consider another example to illustrate the inadequacy with the fill-the-bucket 
approach. Suppose that Marie Curie had been born in Mexico as opposed to Poland. 
We can speculate that today we would have mexiconium as opposed to plutonium in 
the periodic table; however, this speculative change does not mean that the causal 
effects of radioactivity are not out there in reality. Causality does not cease to exist 
when our theories do. If we did not exist in the world, then it does not follow that 
the category of, say radioactive chemical elements, would cease to exist with us. 
First, the example illustrates that our categorization of the world is assumed, so 
that the task of scientific investigations is to discover such independent pre-existing 
categories. Second, the example illustrates that our categorization depends on the 
constructions of words, concepts, theories, contexts, activities, systems, models, and 
more used to describe reality; however, categories do not exhaust reality itself. From 
a CR perspective, this categorization of reality is crucial because the designation of 
erroneous, mystified, or illusory categories of reality (as well as accurate ones) is, in 
fact, the "backbone" of ideologies (Bhaskar, 2009). 
I want to stress that in reality, categories are not empty buckets waiting to 
be filled with sense-experience data. If we simply use these buckets as labels and 
containers for events or phenomena in the world, then we are imposing categorization 
on reality, when in fact we have the reverse. From a CR viewpoint, we find it possible 
to construct real categories about reality because reality is, in fact, differentiated and 
learning to problem-solving theory, which is a theory recognized with the name of Case-Based 
Reasoning, and also Distributed Cognition theory as explained by Rogers and Ellis (1994). 
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structured in such a way, and not just because we are able to construct categories 
on the grounds of a best-fit purpose. 
People have a misunderstanding of the nature of categories, they think, 
like Kant that categories are things we impose on reality; but to the 
critical realist, the transcendental realist, the categories, if they are real 
are constitutive of reality itself. That is, causality is no schema we 
impose on reality; it is actually out there... Ideology is a categorically 
confused reality. It is real but it is false. This is a possibility in social 
reality. The true nature of social reality is there... it is fine to have an 
interpretation which is distinct from those categories, or to have a very 
radical interpretation, but the question is can you leave it out?... if you 
adapt a purely Kantian interpretative approach, is that you are failing 
to satisfy the reflexive criterion of philosophy, which is the capacity to 
situate and to sustain your own content you own condition of possibility 
of being. (Bhaskar, 2002a, pp. 54-78) 
The immediate question that follows is: how does the CR categories and the Kantian 
categories relate to the historical development of the activity-theoretical approach? 
We may recall that AT has ancestry in the philosophy of Kant whose view of the cat-
egorization of reality is particularly important for this thesis. Following Bhaskar's 
(2009) reading of Kant, we see that a Kantian category is one that cannot be pene-
trated, understood, or transcended because it is "locked" in its own enclosure as a 
"thing-in-itself'. According to Bhaskar, we can recognize a Kantianism if the cate-
gories of methods, models, and theories yield the truth about the nature of reality 
(or the idea of epistemic relativity), as opposed to categories of real things denoting 
the limits of our reality, (or the idea of ontological realism). From a CR perspective, 
the intelligibility of reality does not depart from a list of "locked" categories that 
cannot be understood or empty buckets waiting to be filled. Rather, reality must be 
such that it necessitates categorization in order to be accessed effectively. On the 
one hand, if we fail to posit a difference between real categories and the philosophical 
ways we talk about categorization, then we are committing a Kantian error. On the 
other hand, if we completely ignore a crucial category of reality such as the omission 
of a dimension of nature in some vulgar forms of Marxism or the omission of the 
social structure in Vygotskian socio-cultural theory, then we are unable to sustain 
unity between our theory and practice. 
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In what follows, I show how the mathematics-educational community has drawn 
upon AT by means of an imposed categorization parallel to Barab, Evans and Beak's 
(2004) buckets-metaphor, which yields a Kantianism. I focus only on the micro 
level of the classroom to illustrate how the components of AT are used as "buckets" 
according to the mathematics research community, resulting in the epistemic fallacy. 
4.2.1 The empty bucket of the subject 
Jonassen and Rohrer-Murphy (1999) regard the subject component as an analyti-
cal anchor to construct the entire activity system. According to Engestrom (1987), 
the subject is defined as an individual or individuals involved in the activity sys-
tem under investigation. In student-centered mathematics, educational research, 
Flavell (2001), Jurdak (2006), Williams, Wake and Boreham (2001), and Zurita and 
Nussbaum (2007) conceptualize the subject components as individual students or 
groups of students ranging from primary to university level. In teacher-centered 
investigations, Hardman (2005, 2007) and Jaworski (2003) regard the subject as the 
educator or educator-researcher. For Fitzsimons (2005a, 2005b), Roth (2003), and 
Venkat and Adler (2008), who study the micro context of workplaces, the subject 
bucket tends to be filled with educational worker(s) such as numeracy coordinators, 
mathematicians, and administrators to name a few. 
4.2.2 The empty bucket of the object 
Kaptelinin (2005, p. 5) argues that the object of activity that tends to go into the 
empty bucket of the same name is "the 'ultimate reason' behind various behav-
iors of individuals, groups, or organizations". The object as "sense-maker" bucket 
in mathematics-educational investigations tends to pertain to long-term goals such 
as improving teaching, learning mathematical practices, or developing the motiva-
tion and technical skills of students in Hardman (2005, 2007), Kanes (2001), and 
Venkat and Adler's (2008) teacher-centered investigations. In student-centered in-
vestigations such as those conducted by Flavell (2001), Jaworski (2003), Jurdak 
(2006), Roth, (2003), Williams, Wake, and Boreham (2001), and Zurita and Nuss-
baum (2007), we encounter the view that this bucket tends to be filled with data 
that describes short-term goals—e.g., practicing algorithms, preparing for formative 
assessment, or solving assigned mathematical problems. 
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4.2.3 The empty bucket of instruments 
Kuutti (1996, p. 14) explains that the empty bucket of instruments (or tools) tends 
to be filled with "anything used in the transformation process, including both mate-
rial tools and tools for thinking". In mathematics-educational investigations, Jurdak 
(2006), Roth (2003), and Williams, Wake and Boreham (2001) fill this bucket with 
data that shows how psychological tools such as language or mnemonic techniques 
help in the transformation of behavior. Coupland and Crawford (2006) and the 
investigations of Groves and Dale (2005) fill the instrument's bucket with data doc-
umenting how mechanical tools like calculators and mathematics software aid in the 
transformation of the environment. Others like Hardman (2005) and Zevenbergen 
and Lerman (2007) use a combination of both types of instruments. 
4.2.4 The empty bucket of the community 
For Engestrom (1996), the community is composed of the relations between subjects 
and other individuals that are brought together by a shared object usually orga-
nized to meet at a common place and time. In mathematics-educational research, 
Hardman (2005) and Jurdak (2006) fill the community's bucket with a teacher and 
students in a typical classroom. In a larger macro context, Flavell (2001) uses data 
that includes families, friends, other educational officials, and industry workers to fill 
this bucket, and others such as Venkat and Adler (2008) include policy makers. The 
community binds individuals together through socially implicit and explicit rules 
and a division of labor among its members. 
4.2.5 The empty bucket of rules 
Engestrom (1998) argues that rules represent norms, conventions, or social traditions 
that are established by the community to govern its members. In particular, rules for 
Yackel, Rasmussen, and King (2000, p. 458), in the mathematics classroom, are those 
"sociomathematical norms" that set permissible or impermissible behavior in order 
to regulate the community's argumentation and opportunities for discussion in the 
classroom. Examples of data that go into the implicit-rules bucket are Hardman's 
(2005) rule of raising one's hand, asking for permission to speak, as opposed to 
shouting out, and Jurdak's (2006) rule to speak in English as a mandated language 
of classroom communication. Jaworski (2003) and Jaworski and Potari (2009) fill 
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the explicit-rule bucket with assessments, curriculum protocols, and algorithms, 
while Kanes (2001) adds teachers' probing and questioning, Williams, Wake, and 
Boreham, (2001) include writing in the correct genre, and Flavell (2001) and Venkat 
and Adler (2008) extend the explicit rules to whole class groupings by ability. 
4.2.6 The empty bucket of division of labor 
For Engestrom (1987), the division of labor component refers to the splitting-up of 
human labor among members of the community depending on vertical and horizon-
tal dimensions. The horizontal dimension refers to negotiations of basic tasks and 
responsibilities between the community's members. Asymmetrical relations of au-
thority and responsibility define the vertical dimension. Hardman (2005), Jaworski, 
(2003), Jurdak (2006), Flavell (2001) and Jaworski and Pot ari (2009), provide ev-
idence that fill the division-of-labor bucket with the assignation of task, interven-
tions, collaborative agreements, validation of solutions, and hierarchies of author-
ity ranging from students and teachers to educational coordinators and curriculum 
managers. 
After we have seen how the mathematics-educational research community com-
mits a Kantianism that is revealed when these six categories of the activity system 
are imposed in reality by treating each of them as empty buckets to be filled with 
sense-experience data, I now turn to what Barab, Evans, and Beak (2004) call "gap 
analysis", or the process that employs the activity system for purposes of identify-
ing contradictions (double binds), dysfunctions, and conflicts within mathematics-
educational research. 
4.3 Engestrom on contradiction: driving trans-
formation of activity systems 
The concept of contradiction in AT is the source driving development and change 
of a central activity under investigation (Engestrom, 2001). This concept is directly 
influenced by the Marxian analysis of the capitalist system and the Il'enkovian anal-
ysis of the dialectical system, where the commodity is a key "contradictory unit of 
use value and exchange value" (Engestrom & Miettinen, 1999, p. 5). From its Marx-
ian roots, the activity system is analogous to a capitalist mode of production since 
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it is conceptualized to be in a contradictory state, in a type of perpetual crises that 
renders its normal functioning invisible. In order to resolve its systemic contradic-
tions, this system needs to be in a constant state of expansion and rejuvenation, 
which is the reason that contradictions are seen as "the driving force of change and 
development in activity systems" (Engestrom, 2001, p. 135). Theoretically, it fol-
lows that attempts to overcome contradictions are critical to generating change in 
a system. 
Contradictions in AT are always present, although not always perceivable. They 
should not be conceptualized as everyday solvable problems; rather their resolution 
can lead to transformation. Contradictions in AT differ from a "common-sense" 
understanding of the word in that they are long term and systemic formations that 
occur within systems. 
Contradictions are fundamental tensions and misalignments in the struc-
ture that typically manifest themselves as problems, ruptures, and break-
downs in the functioning of the activity system. (Virkkunen & Kuutti, 
2000, p. 302). 
Engestrom (1987) argues for four levels of contradictions (see Figure 4.2, p. 88). In 
Engestrom's schema, inner or primary contradictions occur within each of the com-
ponents, and secondary contradictions occur between the components of a central 
activity system. If there are two or more activity systems, a tertiary contradiction 
could also occur between the object of activity in a central activity and the object 
of "culturally more advanced" activities. A quaternary contradiction may occur 
between the central activity and neighboring activities. 
According to the mathematics-educational community, the potential of this con-
cept lies in the identification of areas of conflict, which could serve as possible places 
for intervention and change. However, we need to keep in mind that while contradic-
tion identification is important in order the make explicit the paradoxical nature of 
a particular problem, there is also a danger in that we may incorrectly perceive con-
tradictions as ubiquitous. I turn now to analyze the types of contradictions that are 
identified in the mathematics-educational literature utilizing Engestrom's four-level 
approach. 
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Adapted from Engestrom (1987, Inner contradictions of human activity, para. 18). 
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4.3.1 Contradiction identification: secondary contradictions 
in mathematics education 
Research on the identification of contradictions falls into two overall categories: 
studies that introduce a new instrument and studies that introduce a new object into 
the activity system. Both illustrate that the introduction of a new instrument or new 
object from the outside into the central activity system disrupts the dynamics among 
components creating secondary contradictions, and between micro and institutional 
levels creating tertiary contradictions. 
In empirical studies where an instrument was introduced to the central activity, 
researchers have mainly identified secondary contradictions between the components 
of an activity system. Focusing on the micro context of the mathematics classroom, 
Zevenbergen and Lerman (2007) found that the introduction of interactive white-
boards as instruments produced secondary contradictions. The teacher or subject 
of activity, for example, expressed these secondary contradictions as conflicts in 
time-management between the time dedicated for the lesson and the time needed 
to have the technology ready. In a similar study, Hardman (2005) found analogous 
contradictions across the contexts of the mathematics classroom and he computer 
laboratory. 
Other secondary contradictions between components are echoed in the studies 
that use AT to analyze the introduction of a new object into the activity system. 
For instance, Goodchild and Jaworski (2005, p. 46) use an activity system located 
at the institutional level (a), to describe contradictions between 
the stated desire to be part of the project community [object] yet an ap-
parent distancing of themselves [the mathematics teachers] from sharing 
the responsibilities of the community [mathematics teachers and univer-
sity researchers] as a whole [division of labor]. 
Venkat and Adler (2008) advance contradiction identification by adding tensions be-
tween the actions of two different subjects (numeracy coordinators) in two different 
mathematics departments (two interacting activity systems). In theory, these sub-
jects have a common object (KS3 national policy); but in practice, they implement 
the national policy in different ways. In turn, these studies show that secondary 
contradictions are inconsistencies between theory and practice, which were possible 
to identify by looking between the components of a single level in what I have termed 
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the nested mathematical-educational activity system. 
Contradiction identification that results from the analysis of a micro activity sys-
tem such as a classroom nested within broader institutional activity systems such 
as a ministry of education is exemplified by Lim and Hang (2003) who pointed the 
way to mathematics-educational researchers in a study about integrating technology 
(ICT) in schools. For instance, the object of the classroom to provide students with 
"higher order skills" in ICT is differentiated from the object of the school and the 
ministry of education, which is to increase school ranking by improving examina-
tion results. Although this study is not situated in the mathematics classroom, it 
offers an exemplary analysis of tertiary contradictions that appear across the three 
micro, institutional, and societal levels. In this manner, we have seen how nested 
mathematics-educational activity system based on the applications of the activity 
system in mathematics education from the literature review influence each other in 
terms of contradiction identification. 
4.3.2 Contradiction identification: primary contradictions 
in the transfer between school and work mathematics 
In the previously stated literature review conducted by Barab, Evans and Beak 
(2004) on the applications of AT to technology and communication studies, the 
authors show that another way to carry out contradiction identification is by "gap 
analysis" because this type of research aims to close the gaps that exist when moving 
from one educational context to a different one. The term "gap analysis" refers to 
analysis in two different settings; it is also evident in the educational literature aimed 
at investigating the mathematics required for competence in the workplace. This 
particular set of research investigates "the gap" between college mathematics and 
the mathematics needed in the workplace. 
In the "gap analysis" of the transfer from school to work, Roth (2003), Williams 
and Wake (2007), and Williams, Wake and Boreham (2001) examine how mathe-
matics curriculum copes with the demands of the workforce market. These types 
of studies are important because contradictions are not identified in terms of com-
ponents, as in the research reviewed in the previous section; instead, the subject 
"embodies the contradictions of the two systems, as do we all in general when we 
cross barriers" (Williams, Wake & Boreham, 2001, p. 79). In other words, a primary 
contradiction is always present; it is built-in, which is usually phrased in terms of the 
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subject having a double way of knowing mathematics. The theoretical mathemat-
ics learned in school and the practical mathematics learned at the workplace form 
this double knowledge. In these studies, there is a default or internal contradiction 
that is built-in as part of the subject when she enters the new environment of the 
activity system of a new workplace or a new situation. In these types of studies, 
contradiction identification of subject-related internal contradictions is purposefully 
done to give recommendations aimed at changing the mathematics curriculum to 
resemble the needs of workplaces. Shore and Wright's (1999) analysis of Neo-liberal 
marketization of higher education in the field of anthropological studies reveals simi-
lar results in which such recommendations, e.g., changes the curriculum, admissions 
requirements, and so on, goes together with the rationale to produce an employable 
workforce for a market that is able to compete in global capitalism. In such cases, 
market-like mechanisms are able to audit institutions of higher education according 
to recommendations of workplaces and markets. 
Overview of the AT applications according to mathematics-educational empirical 
research The reviewed body of literature points to a distinction between the method-
ology by the mathematics-educational community and the interventionist approach 
indented by Engestrom (1987). I focus on how the mathematics-educational com-
munity has implemented the concepts of contradiction and the activity system. The 
evidence presented here suggests that the activity system has can be model as a 
nested mathematics-educational activity system, which is in turn a subset a type of 
mixed laminated system, an open learning environment. 
The mathematics-educational community identifies primary (or within a system) 
and secondary (between the components of a systems) contradictions, summarized 
below: 
(1) Introduction of a new instrument: the introduction of technology such as the 
case when a teacher or student experiences problems with a whiteboard or 
calculators, gives rise to a paradox that while new technology is designed to 
facilitate pedagogies, its initial implementation is a slow process that tends 
to create chaos since it requires training, necessitates accelerated instruction, 
and thus tends to produce time-management conflicts. 
(2) Introduction of a new object: the adoption of a new school policy (as the new 
object) often appears as a discrepancy between what is theoretically concep-
tualized as the object and the different ways in which the members of the 
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community (who share this object) actually implement it or carry it out in 
practice. 
(3) The transfer to a new context or situation: when a student transfers from 
applying mathematics in college to applying mathematics in the workplace, 
the move can generate a primary or inner contradiction in cases where there 
is a need to re-learn practical aspects of college mathematics at work, even if 
a student is theoretically proficient. 
The corpus of this empirical research into contradiction identification gives us an 
example of what I have conceptualized as 2E: learning as process using Bhaskarian 
dialectics in section 2.4, p. 27. The processes identified in (1), (2), and (3) are 
examples in the literature of an apprehension of incompleteness since contradictions 
or some other form of acute negativity generates them; they are also the reason why 
Engestrom conceptualizes learning in terms of the activity system as a continuous 
process of expansion, what he calls "the expansive learning approach" (Engestrom, 
1996, p. 168). The importance of the identification of contradictions is that it makes 
us aware that we cannot follow two paths simultaneously. In colloquial language, 
this double bind refers to the one cannot have-one's-cake-and-eat-it-too principle. 
From a CR viewpoint, these processes generated by contradictions are indications 
that there is something wrong in ontology (being); that is why we need to expand 
the conceptual system to remedy the absences that explain the contradictions. This 
necessitates a further level of 4D: learning as product-in-process following Bhaskarian 
dialectics (in 7.6.1, p. 244). 
Despite a reliable body of research on AT in mathematics education that spans 
decades, its methodological approach differs from Engestromian dialectic, or what 
he calls "the logic of expansion... [where] expansion is essentially a social and prac-
tical process, having to do with collectives of people reconstructing their material 
practice" (Engestrom, 1987, Dialectics of Substance, para. 21), which is mainly, but 
not limited to interventions. Roth and Lee's (2007) educational review shows that 
interest in AT has increased and expanded since the late 1980s to non-participant 
observational and theoretical research, and currently remains open to further devel-
opment. In fact, Engestrom (2008b, p. 382) himself suggests that AT "is an evolving 
framework which needs to the developed further as it is applied in empirical stud-
ies", encouraging new researchers to explore it. It is from here that I can make 
an original contribution by grounding AT in a critical realist philosophy. In what 
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follows, I continue with the guiding question: what has been left out of this partic-
ular learning theory? In order to provide an answer, I now refer to the theoretical 
research within three generations of AT. 
4.4 Theoretical dualisms as potential for a fourth-
generation AT 
Theoretical research in AT is difficult to encapsulate, and just as empirical research, 
it varies across multiple disciplines. This type of research has two main aims: 
(A) to understand the intricate character of new objects by developing new con-
ceptions, while a second related purpose wants 
(B) to understand and overcome the nature of dichotomies or dualisms that AT 
suffers from. Such theoretical problems perhaps imply "a need for a fourth 
generation of Activity Theory" (Engestrom, 2008a, p. 10). 
I take this issue seriously in order to make, what is to the best of my knowledge, 
a humble contribution to knowledge, entitled the Critical Realist Activity Theory 
(CRAT). 
(A) Recently, theoretical research in AT has turned to understanding what En-
gestrom (2008a, p. 3) calls "runaway objects" because of their monstrous and volatile 
character, but also because of their immense potentiality to drive innovation. Some 
examples of these objects are global warming, open-source software, neo-liberal eco-
nomic policies, health-related pandemic diseases, and so on. Activity-theoretical 
concerns involve the creation of ideas that seek to grasp the nature of new complex 
communities. For example, the Linux group and WikiLeaks exhibit the complexity 
of a new type of community because they are difficult to bound due to their heteroge-
neous membership and difficult to eliminate since they thrive from making strategic, 
"mycorrhizae-like" partnerships with other communities (Engestrom, 2006, p.1784). 
I want to emphasize that the only way to study Engestromian runaway objects is 
through an interdisciplinary investigative program that combines various sciences 
(elaborated in Chapter 6, p. 183). In a related theoretical article, Blunden (2009) 
arrives at a similar reflection. 
In investigating the basis for an "interdisciplinary" concept of activity, 
the aim is (1) to construct a richer definition of activity as a premise for 
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both psychological and sociological sciences, and (2) focus on those prob-
lems lying on the boundary between psychology and sociology. (Blunden, 
2009, p. 5). 
I dedicate the Chapter 6: an appendix to Chapter 5, to elaboration of the idea of 
interdisciplinary activity grounded in CR because the issues concerning interdisci-
plinarity, in AT and in general, stem from the tenets of basic CR. 
Aside from the study of runaway objects, Warmington (2005) argues that the 
study of activity systems should be the study of contradictions located within la-
bor activity of production and reproduction. Others such as Blackler and McDon-
ald (2000) focus their activity-theoretical argument around the concept of power 
relations in the work place. We can immediately ask, what does it mean to con-
ceptualize power relations today? CR is able to illuminate AT in this regard by 
explicitly distinguishing between empowering transformative capacity (or power,) 
and the concern with any form or relationship of exploitation, domination, and other 
forms of oppression such as exclusion (or power2). We clearly want of power, toward 
a greater enabling capacity to transform power2, to enable the oppressed or victims 
of power2 to be self-empowered, together with a transformation of the very relations 
of domination that are in need of abolition, so that a new class of exploiters does 
not manifest itself. While power, is a resource denoting our basic ability to act in 
the world, power2 stems from or constitutes what Bhaskar (2004) calls master-slave 
relationships'; the way to transform the latter is by augmenting power, to abolish 
or transform power2, as summarized in the following. 
1Bhaskar (1994, p. 2) derives master-slave relations from Hegel's philosophy, which denote the 
struggle between a pair of self-aware individuals that fight for recognition, but whoever wins cannot 
achieve recognition from a dead opponent. The victorious one is the master who opts for enslaving 
as opposed to killing the looser. The master appears to have recognition and freedom, while the 
slave is succumbed to discipline and harsh labor. However, the slave sees herself or himself in the 
object of activity (as a reflection in the objectification of her or his labor) and in this manner, the 
slave succeeds to a greater extent than the lazy master does "in removing the externality of the 
world". 
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Table 4.2: Manifestation of powers and power2 
Power Manifestation 
powers 
as 	 trans- 
formative 
capacity 
It refers to our capacity for change that is intrinsic to human 
praxis. The autodidactic capacity of an individual for reflection 
can be seen as an example of powers. All power2, relations of 
oppression, can also be used as transformative. powers—e.g., 
slavery was used as workforce to develop the cotton industry. In 
this sense, powers is a more inclusive concept, where relations of 
oppression may be relations of transformation but the opposite 
does not hold. 
power2 	 as 
oppression 
it refers to any form of oppression, control, exploitation, abuse, 
and how power functions for ill treatments. 
Adopted from Bhaskar (2008b, p. 60). 
(B) A second part of the AT theoretical research deals with understanding and 
overcoming the nature of various dualisms from which AT suffers, as shown in Table 
4.3, p. 95. 
Table 4.3: Dualisms of AT and their resolution via a 
philosophical grounding on CR 
Theorist AT dualism CN resolution 
Engestrom (1999) 
Davydov (1999) 
the dualism between me- 
diation 	 via 	 sign 	 systems 
and mediation via instru- 
ments or the dualism be- 
tween communicative inter-
action and instrumental ac-
tivity (in general terms) 
transcendental realism, ref-
erential detachment, and re-
jection of the linguistic fal-
lacy 
Sawyer (2002) the individualist-collectivist 
dualism 
social relationism 
Continued on next page 
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Table 4.3 — Continued from previous page 
Theorist AT dualism CN resolution 
EngestrOm (1999) 
Davydov 	 (1999) 
Daniels 	 (2004) 
Blunden (2009) 
the 	 internalization- 
externalization 	 dualism: 
a 	 code 	 for 	 the 	 pair 	 of 
structure-agency 	 and 
individualism-collectivism 
dualisms 
Transformational Model of 
Social Activity (TMSA); so-
cial relationism 
Zinchenko 	 (1985) 
Davydov 	 (1999) 
Engestrom (1999) 
Davydov 	 (1999) 
Daniels 	 (2004) 
Blunden (2009) 
dualism between psychic (or 
goal)-related 	 process 	 and 
object 	 (or motive)-related 
activity dualism: 	 a code 
for the pair of mind (or 
mental)-body and reasons- 
causes dualisms 
Synchronic emergent pow- 
ers 	 materialism 	 (SEMP), 
ontological materialism and 
a robust theory of causal- 
ity, 	 including 	 intentional 
causality 
Engestrom (1999) the relativist-historicist du- 
alism 
the "holy trinity" of CR: ac-
cepts (a) ontological realism 
and accepts (b) epistemic 
relativity, while opening up 
the possibility of judgmen-
tal rationality. 
These unsolved dualisms fall within the micro and macro aporias of social theory 
(see Table 5.1, p. 118), which suggest that AT can benefit from a firm philosophical 
grounding in order to resolve them. I shall argue that Critical Realism (CR), as 
a philosophical system acting as under-laborer for the social sciences, can provide 
the conceptual tools by which AT can transcend the identified dichotomies. By 
identifying the fallacies of various false dualisms in social theory, CR is able to 
reject them and postulate a more complete account of reality. 
One may ask: what is wrong with dualism? At this point, it is convenient 
to explain the difference between dualism and duality. While duality signifies a 
non-pejorative, valid category that denotes how concepts are related but distinct, 
dualisms encompass a false fission between them. The duality of theory and prac- 
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tice, for example, encompasses the existence of interdependent and fundamentally 
different correlatives, which typically (although not always) may be perceived from 
the single facet of the other concept. One may perceive theory as practice and vice 
versa under what CR denotes as a "perspectival switch" (Bhaskar, 1998b, p. 15). 
Other non-pejorative dualities are hiatuses showing an irreducible distinctness be-
tween both concepts: social structure and agency, the intransitive dimension (ID) 
and the transitive dimension (TD) of knowledge, beliefs and meaning, or the com-
ponents of the activity system, to name a few. Examples of pejorative dualisms 
are summarized in Table 5.1, p. 118 in the philosophy of social science. And the 
dualisms between the real non-actual causual law and the empirical regularity in 
the philosophy of science, which is manifested in the problems, such as the problem 
of induction, see 5.3.2. Wheareas in the philosophy of social science, problems man-
ifest as dualisms, in the philosophy of science, they manifest as aporia—e.g., such 
as the problem of induction, transduction, fetishism, and the epistemic and ontic 
fallacies', including the linguistic fallacy'. Both of these fallacies are founded on 
an anthropism meaning that they place human beings at the center stage of reality. 
Against anthropism, MinGyu (2008) argues that CR, in its basic and dialectical 
forms, identifies the fundamental anthropic error of western philosophy as based on 
a misunderstanding of ontology (being), and provides a resolution to this error based 
on the bedrock of unity and non-identity (duality) in the philosophy of meta-reality 
(PMR). 
According to Bhaskar (2008b) what underpins dualisms is essentially an implicit 
acceptance of (or explicit indifference to) dialectical contradictions, which are mainly 
expressed as relations of subjugations or master-slave relations in society between 
individuals or entire nations. In section 7.8, p. 266, I further explain Bhaskarian 
dialectical contradictions; for now, I continue with the exposition of theoretical liter-
ature on the dualisms that AT suffers from and suggest a CR-ontological resolution. 
'The ontic fallacy is the consequence of the epistemic fallacy because when we define reality 
implicitly in terms of our knowledge (or similarly, in terms of language) such definition means that 
what we know about reality is just reality itself, which presupposes that our knowledge of reality 
is correct (Bhaskar, 2008a, 2008b). In this sense, reality is collapsed to a single dimension in which 
our objects of activity (or investigation) move from our knowledge to the world. 
'The linguistic fallacy is a version of the epistemic fallacy, which analyzes phenomena in terms 
of language, which is tantamount to analyzing all phenomena in terms of knowledge (Bhaskar, 
2008b). 
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4.4.1 The dualism between mediation via sign systems and 
mediation via instruments or the dualism between 
communicative interaction and instrumental activity 
Engestr8m (1999) argues that third-generation AT suffers from various dualisms, 
among which we find the dichotomy between mediation-by-signs and mediation-by-
instruments, a derivative from conflicting interpretations of both Vygotskian and 
Leont'evian theses. He suggests that while third-generation AT sees that media-
tion by semiotic means, including language, is an inherent part of all human pro-
ductive activity, a rigid interpretation on either a Vygotskian or Leont'evian side 
dichotomizes the AT theoretical field. 
However, in section 3.5.1, p. 56, I put forward a different reading by suggesting 
that the dichotomies generated from a passage from one generation of AT to the 
next, are not due to conflicting interpretations. More precisely, the theoretical 
problems of AT are not caused by favoring a Vygotskian reading over Leont'ev (or 
vice versa); rather we must view this passage from the onset as a harbinger of each 
developed version, which is necessitated because there is a systemic problem within 
the theory itself that is signaled by its various dichotomies. And I have argued 
that a first dualism is signaled with the notion of a unit of analysis. In Vygotsky's 
Thinking and speech (1987), this theoretical unit refers to an irreducible whole or 
cell containing all of its parts but is irreducible to them, as follows: 
word meaning is a unit of thinking, it is also a unit of both these speech 
functions ... Social interaction presupposes generalization and the devel-
opment of verbal meaning... Therefore, it may be appropriate to view 
word meaning not only as a unit of thinking and speech but as a unit of 
generalization and social interaction, a unit of thinking and communica-
tion. (ibid., pp. 48-49). 
The problem is that while a strand of sociocultural theorists takes word meaning 
as an analytical unit to mediate the relationship between cognition (or thinking) 
and speech with others or with the self in terms of thinking as communicating', a 
different strand of sociocultural theorists takes this unit as Wertsch's (1981) tool-
mediated action (see Figure 3.1, p. 42), while Zinchenko (1985) and Blunden (2009) 
1To coin Sfard's book title Thinking as Communicating: Human Development, the Growth of 
Discourses, and Mathematizing (2008). 
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insist that word meaning is only a part of a larger genus that needs to include 
liberation and collaboration as a human project. Engestromian AT is closer to this 
latter view by arguing that word meaning can be merely a unit of analysis that 
lacks an object of activity. We can shed light into the problem of units of analysis 
by differentiating between (1) the object and its methods of investigation, including 
our (2) knowledge and discourse about it. 
Let us suppose that X is our object of scientific study. From a CR vantage point, 
we cannot equate our analysis of X, such as our discourse, methods, or knowledge 
about X to X itself. (2) If we reduce X to discourse, then we are committing 
what, in CR terms, is known as the linguistic fallacy and (1) if we reduce X to our 
knowledge, beliefs, and methods about it, then we are committing the epistemic 
fallacy. In section 5.2, p. 119, I argue for transcendental realism as the stance to 
reclaim ontology in order to elucidate and resolve this dualism between mediation 
by signs and mediation by instruments. 
Generally, Davydov (1999) situates this dualism within the broader realms of 
communicative interaction and instrumental activity, which is the idea that all hu-
man activity is a prototype of labor aiming at production. While AT stresses that 
human activity is linked to different forms of communication, such communication-
instrumental dualism occurs if the two notions are opposed or homologous to each 
other. Davydov articulates his resolution: 
[the] notions of activity and communication must not be opposed. At 
the same time, one cannot study communication and evaluate its role 
in peoples" lives without examining their activity. Communication only 
gives form to activity. (ibid., p. 47). 
However, what is missing is the domain that is detached from the other two—a 
referent to an external real world. I argue that CR provides a resolution to the 
communicative interaction-instrumental activity dualism with the Bhaskarian idea 
of (1) referential detachment: 
the argument for referential detachment is the argument for existential 
intransitivity and, in science, is the ground for the argument for the 
stratified, differentiated, and changing ontology which critical realism 
has hitherto deployed. And to speak of the "ontic content" of a proposi-
tion is merely to indicate the ontic referential aspect of the 'referential- 
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expressive' duality of function, which is a necessary component... of an 
adequate theory of truth. (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 40). 
In short, referential detachment is an argument parallel to the re-vindication of on-
tology, which can pictorially be seen in terms of the Bhaskarian (2) semiotic triangle, 
as shown in Figure 4.3, p. 100. Thus, the couple (1) and (2) help us to resolve the 
Adopted from Bhaskar (2008b, p. 223). 
communication-instrumental activity dualism. From a CR perspective, reference is 
to the external real world, such that the referent, to which the thing, object, or state 
of affairs in the real world belongs is the intransitive dimension of the objects of sci-
entific investigation, which exist and act independently of our knowledge of them. 
For instance, when communicative interaction is linked to human activity, language 
provides us access to individuals' consciousness, perceptions, wants, desires, and 
beliefs; however, without an external referent point, we cannot adequately theorize 
their independent existence and causal efficacy. Metaphorically, we can imagine that 
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the lack of such an independent dimension generates a perception of frankensteinian-
type of individuals that have a body without a mind. A different problem arises 
if language is detached from this communication-activity link, in which case, we 
fall into a post-modernist perspective, which is the view of reality as exhausted by 
concepts, as if language appears to enslave the individual'. 
Without collapsing reality into dualisms, CR allows us to understand the triad 
of relations among (1) the realm of communication that includes language in broad 
terms or what in the semiotic triangle is denoted as signifier, (2) the realm of epis-
temology, the objects and methods of knowledge, or what in the semiotic triangle is 
denoted as signified; (3) the realm of ontology, the referents which are the external 
and real objects of science, such that these objects are detached from the other two 
realms. According to Bhaskar (2008b), to refer raises the possibility of opening a 
debate about some referent, something in the world, and the possibility of referents 
that are yet to be discovered. However, this possibility does not eliminate or exhaust 
the field of external referents, hence the importance of an argument for or about 
ontology. 
4.4.2 Individualist-collectivist dualism 
Sawyer (2002) identifies an unresolved tension in first-generation AT, namely, the 
dichotomy between methodological individualism and methodological collectivism. 
This dichotomy refers to the problem of an individual versus a group of individuals 
as a unit of analysis, which as we will later see, extends to third-generation AT. 
Following M. Archer, Sawyer (2002) suggests that sociocultural theorists should 
resolve this problem by adopting analytical dualism, which refers to an analytic 
separation mode that does not collapse "the hiatus-in-duality of agency-structure 
and other dualities" (Hartwig, 2007e, p. 150). From this perspective, properties 
of collectives or groups, which refer to group type, size, hierarchical composition, 
and so on, are analyzed separately from those individual properties, which refer 
to gender, age, socio-economic background, and so on. He highlights that such 
ability to separate is inconsistent with a "process ontology", the idea that "holds 
that only processes are real; entities, structures, or patterns are ephemeral and do 
not really exist" (Sawyer, 2002, p. 2). In other words, "process ontology" is not a 
1To refer to the metaphor and title of Jameson's The prison-house of language: A critical 
account of structuralism and Russian formalism (1974). 
101 
4. Applications and dualisms 
theory of being that puts forward the grounds on which methodological separation 
is consistent without falling into inseparability claims, which suggests that society 
and the individual cannot be distinguished from each other. 
Although analytical dualism is proposed, there is still the need to see how a two-
way causality between the social structure and agency can happen. The important 
point is that we cannot have agency without structure, and in any conceptualization 
of the social structure, nothing can happen without agency, so that when we make 
an explanation in social science, we normally need to refer to both structure and 
agency. Thus, we see that a crucial element, as argued by Archer (1982) on the thesis 
of analytical dualism, is not to conflate these two terms. CR agrees with Archer's 
argument in the sense that, analytically, the individual and society have to be kept 
separated because these notions refer to different objects of study. The analytical-
dualism issue is to perceive structure and agency as a problem of analysis, when for 
critical realists they are clearly different but related, in terms of the Transformational 
Model of Social Activity (TMSA). CR argues that structure and agency are not two 
different perspectives of reality, while the analytical-dualism perspective encourages 
it. 
4.4.3 Internalization-externalization dualism: a code for the 
pair of structure-agency and individualism-collectivism 
dualisms 
Although I began with dualisms that pervade first-generation AT, as we will see, 
third-generation AT also suffers from the same and other dichotomies, as echoed by 
various major theorists in the different field (see Davydov, 1999; Engestrom, 1999; 
Blunden; 2009). For example, Engestrom and Cole (1997, p. 304.) have suggested 
openly that the activity-theoretical approach "may be seen as one attempt to over-
come the dualisms of collective- and individually-based units of analysis" , but there 
are still theoretical issues that remain unresolved within this framework. Daniels 
(2004, p. 313), for instance, is very clear when remarking that Engestrom's activ-
ity system is collective referring to social practices of individuals and organizations, 
whether these practices "are performed individually or with others" ; he recognizes 
that it is methodologically difficult to capture evidence from the community, their 
rules, and their divisions of labor, so as to emphasize the individualist-collectivist 
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dichotomy. 
Although AT is concerned with relations between and within structures of ac-
tivity systems, the way in which AT conceptualizes relations continues to create 
dualisms, which suggests that we can ground AT on CR philosophy. In other 
words, it is possible to exemplify the individualist-collectivist dualism that per-
vades through generations of AT from CR via social relationism. I shall expand on 
the AT dichotomy between individuals and collectives and their CR resolution via 
social relationism below, and fully in section 5.8, p. 142. 
The second unsolved problem of AT, as identified by Davydov (1999), deals with 
the differentiation between what is externally changing versus what is internally 
changing. From first-generation AT, we have seen that Vygotskian-inspired socio-
cultural theory postulates a two-way movement between individuals and their social 
and cultural environment, but unknown mechanisms that characterize this difference 
pose a problem for AT. Engestrom (1999) echoes this problem of transformation as 
the classic dichotomy between internalization and externalization. To reiterate from 
section 3.3.1, p. 45, internalization refers to the key mechanism that has dominated 
socio-cultural learning theory; it was discovered by the Soviet school of psychology 
in which Vygotskian research demonstrated that children's acquisition of knowledge 
was facilitated with the aid of more advanced peers or adults, which is the theory of 
the Vygotskian zone of proximal development (ZPD). Whereas internalization deals 
with the role of psychological tools and other instruments, externalization deals with 
invention or creation in order to facilitate a task; that is, it deals with one of the 
most important aspects of human activity, which is its ability to create and go be-
yond given constraints. From an AT perspective, there is a duality of internalization 
and externalization because both of these processes can occur together by having 
feedback effects on each other. 
Whereas internalization is related to reproduction of culture, external-
ization is the creation of new artifacts that makes possible its transforma-
tion. These two processes are interpretably intertwined. Roy Bhaskar, 
elaborating on the notion of emancipatory social activity, comes to essen-
tially the same conclusion. (Engestrom, 1999, p. 10, emphasis added). 
From the above quotation, we see that AT agrees with Bhaskarian CR in the duality 
of internalization and externalization as distinctly intertwined processes. Thus, it 
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is a good way of showing how the theoretical leaders of AT are starting to move 
towards CR, and the point of CRAT is to illuminate such a move. 
However, if internalization and externalization are perceived as completely sep-
arated processes, a false dualism grounds both of them, what Davydov (1999) calls 
mechanist activism. From a mechanist activism viewpoint, nature and society are 
explained by how they are brought about in accordance to familiar models of ma-
chinery, which tend to posit internal change as having no origins in external human 
activity—e.g., the heart as a pump, brain as computer, to name a few. An opposite 
facet of mechanist activism is to perceive change as a sponge that only saturates 
by absorbing from external human activity. Against mechanist activism, Davydov 
suggests that AT needs to develop new conditions of reality in which it can be 
possible 
for people not to disfigure nature and society. But often there are not 
adequate conditions for the realization of this possibility... This is vitally 
important in order to show how narrow is the idea that humans must 
only understand, explain, and make themselves in the world, not change 
it. (ibid., p. 43). 
In short, what these "adequate conditions" refer to the need for an ontological theory 
of reality that adequately considers the conditions for the possibility of nature and 
society as distinct units without encapsulating collapsing internal to external activity 
in terms of mechanistic activism (or vice versa). As before, I shall argue that Critical 
Realism (CR) is such a theory because it explicitly develops an ontological view of 
reality. Paradoxically, mechanistic activism shows necessarily the idea of external 
change is constructed from the fail attempts that try to overcome its deficiencies in 
the view of internal change only. 
It is important to clarify that under the internalization-externalization dual-
ism, there are actually two dualisms at work. The first dualism is between social 
structure and agency. The second dualism is between the methodological collec-
tivism and individualism, as discussed earlier; it also pervades the first generation 
of Vygotskian-inspired sociocultural theories. While the CR idea of Transforma-
tional Model of Social Activity (TMSA) resolves the first main structure-agency 
dualism, what resolves the second collectivist-individualist dualism is the idea of 
social relationism that states that the subject matter of social science, our society, 
is constituted by relations between the individuals that compose it. 
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First, we have a CR critique of the structure-agency dichotomy as resolved with 
the TMSA model, and then the development of CR embeds this model in four-planar 
social being (Bhaskar, 2009). Second, we have the CR critique of the individualism-
collectivism dichotomy as resolved in social relationism, which is embedded in the 
notion of seven-scalar social being to emphasize the point that we are dealing with 
relations and entities at a number of ontological irreducible different levels, (which 
is an idea that I have discussed with Figure 4.1, p. 72 in this chapter, as a mixed 
laminated system to organize the application of the AT in the field of mathematics 
education according to the micro, institutional, and cultural-historical levels). In 
particular, the resolution to the second dualism, the split between the individual and 
the collective, makes use of the TMSA, and the idea of social relationism. According 
to CR, social relationism has a dual-character that pervades all aspects of the social 
sphere. Social relations are both virtual and material; for example, the idea of a 
family is a virtual structure that we do not see; but what we see is the effect that 
this virtual structure leaves on material thing, say a graduation portrait of one of 
its members. The idea of social relationism is a virtual-material characterization of 
our daily interaction with people, that 
exists only in virtue of material things, possessing no material substance 
of their own (i.e., they are "VIRTUAL" or "ideal") and so are in prin-
ciple imperceptible (non-empirical), hence can only be ascribed as real 
causally, by their effects on material things. Or their material presence 
consists only in their effect on material things. (Hartwig, 2007g, p. 410). 
Moreover, we can build on the idea of social relationism to understand that social 
structure and agency, in terms of what CR denotes, is a laminated system in terms 
of various levels of scale. 
To return to the first structure-agency dualism, Blunden (2009) argues for an 
interdisciplinary view of AT, the idea that takes various disciplines such as sociology, 
political science, and psychology in order to use activity as a meaningful scientific 
concept. The main aim of such interdisciplinary projects is to appropriate concep-
tions from a variety of scientific fields that are concerned with social phenomena. 
Then, in a reversed move, this appropriation can foster links by which different dis-
ciplines can communicate with each other, and in this way AT can "contribute to 
overcoming the individual-society dichotomy" (ibid., p. 2). On the interdisciplinary 
conception of human activity, I shall argue that CR allows us to see that Blunden's 
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proposed resolution of an interdisciplinary project of collaboration is an TMSA-
entailed viewpoint of practical materialism, which is constellationally overreached 
or englobed by (3) ontological materialism > (2) > epistemological materialism > 
(1) practical materialism (Bhaskar, 1994, p. 226). In this manner, CR moves the dis-
cussion on interdisciplinarity and the types of materialism forward, which I expand 
below and in more detail in Chapter 6, p. 183. 
Moreover, Davydov (1999, p. 44) suggests a resolution to the structure-agency 
via the thesis of Emile Durkheim in order to argue for a conception of "collective 
subjects": a social structure that can be "imagined in the form of some totality or 
group of persons" . The immediate question that follows is to question a Durkheimian 
model of structure in order to find out it limitations. From a CR viewpoint, we 
can articulate the error of a Durkheimian collectivist's conception of society that 
combines a positivist-methodological approach, which allows collective subjects to 
be conceived as a reified version of the conditions, for instance, of collectiveness, 
consciousness, solidarity, and altruism, that compose such "totality or groups of 
persons" without accounting for agency. In turn, we have a one-way feedback effect 
from the social structure down to the agency. I shall argue that CR not only allows us 
to critique Durkheimian stereotypical conception of social structure, but also allows 
an opposite error or stereotype reification; namely, a voluntary one-way effect from 
agency exerting influence on the social structure (see Figure 5.3, p. 147). In other 
words, we can resolve the classic dichotomy of social structure and agency that AT 
suffers from via TMSA. After we have understood the structure-agency dualism and 
its unique resolution in TMSA, the next step is to situate the discussion in what 
Bhaskar (2008b) calls the four-planar social being, which is itself a type of planar 
laminated system consisting not only of [b] a dimension of our social interactions 
with other people, and a [c] dimension of social sphere or the social structure, but 
also of [a] a dimension for our transactions with the biosphere or nature and a 
further [d] dimension that deals with the stratification of our individual embodied 
personality, depicted in Figure 4.4, p. 107. From a CR viewpoint, agency plays 
a role in all of [a]-[d] planes of reality, but each plane is the object of study of 
some particular discipline, e.g., plane [a] is the object of study of disciplines like 
ecology, geography, and climate sciences; plane [b] is studied under micro-sociology; 
plane [c] is the object of study of the more macro social structure, e.g., sociology, 
economics, political science, but also cultural and linguistic anthropology, each of 
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Adopted from Bhaskar (2008b, p. 60). 
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these study different aspect of the social structure, and plane [d] is the object of 
investigation of psychology. For instance, in the simple act of buying coffee we are 
involving those [a]-[d] planes from, in production, consumption, and exchange and 
in a very intricate way with those material transactions with the raw materials of 
nature. Thus, the importance of this planar laminated system consisting of four 
dimensions is that they are part of our agency, i.e., they are involved in whatever 
activities involve us. 
4.4.4 Psychic (or goal)-related and process-object (or motive)-
related activity dualism: a code for the pair of mind 
(or mental)-body and reasons-causes dualisms 
Another problem of AT is the dualism between psyche (or goal)-related activity 
and object (or motive)-related activity (Davydov; 1999; Engestrom, 1999). It is 
important to discern the two dualisms underpinning this unresolved theoretical is-
sue. The first dualism at work is the classic mind-body dichotomy, and the second 
one refers to the dichotomy between the study of mental processes such as beliefs, 
motivations, and the study of social processes, such as doings, activities, practices, 
and interactions. 
Zinchenko (1985, p. 115) argues that 
[it] would be naive to expect a chapter of this kind to resolve the nu-
merous problems that arise in connection with a taxonomy of the unit of 
analysis of mind... [One can] only attempted to reconstruct Vygotsky's 
ideas on unit of analysis and to show that the requirements he formu-
lated for these units are requirements for current and future efforts in 
psychology. 
To expect the unexpected, I shall be arguing that CR provides unique and robust 
resolutions to these problems. 
Engestrom (1999) identifies that one of the unresolved theoretical issues of third-
generation AT lies at the heart of the mind and body dualism, but coins it as 
the dichotomy between psychic processes (mind), which are processes of the mind 
which are plastic, flexible, not completely understood, and diachronically continuous 
or always uninterrupted, and object-related activity (body), which are processes 
that are discontinuous with clear beginnings and ends and directed towards the 
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achievement of some goal or object. He points out that one of the implications of 
this dualism is that object-oriented activities may come to be seen as secondary 
by-products of the continuity of the mental psychic processes. In other words, 
Engestrom is referring to a problem of reductionism in which a body is an incidental 
result of mind. 
[There] is a theoretically much more interesting disagreement that con-
cerns the relationship between object-related activity and psychic pro-
cess... The problem here is that the origin of activity seems to be rooted 
in an individual internal psychic source. This would eliminate the funda-
mentally cultural and social nature of activity so powerful emphasized in 
the principle of object relatedness of activity. (Engestrom, 1999, p. 22). 
I shall argue that AT can also benefit from grounding this mind-body dualism versus 
reductionism in CR because it identifies it as rooted in the classical conflict between 
those of idealistic versus materialistic dispositions. CR equips us with the philo-
sophical concept of Synchronic Emergence Powers Materialism (SEPM), by which 
to resolve the issue. On this particular dichotomy, as well as with the previously 
stated ones, we find the importance of CR in the identification of their grounding 
errors and their sublation; namely, the key oppositions between idealistic versus 
materialistic grounded stances by (1) practical materialism: the assertion of the key 
role of human agency by either reproduction or transformation of the social sphere 
(or TMSA-entailed viewpoint); (2) epistemological materialism: the assertion of the 
independent existence of those objects of science that can also act independently 
of scientific thought (or TR-entailed viewpoint); and the assertion, not of mechan-
ical or reductive materialism, but of (3) ontological materialism with the notion of 
emergence which asserts the priority of nature upon any social phenomena or more 
specifically: 
the unilateral dependence of social upon biological (and more gener-
ally physical) being, and the emergence of the former from the latter. 
(Bhaskar, 2009, p. 76) 
In other words, because (3) ontological materialism > (2) > epistemological > (1) 
practical materialism, we cannot have mind without body. 
On the mind-body dualism, Davydov (1999) argues that the problem is based 
on the fact that third-generation AT does not explicitly account for psychological 
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processes, e.g., motivation, drive, un-consciousness, emotions, beliefs, and so on, 
which are the very ideas with which second-generation AT was concerned. In this 
sense, we have a structure of human activity as body without mind. To resolve 
this dualism, he suggests incorporating mind into body, so that if we add these 
psychological processes (mind) as components to the AT structure (body), then we 
are required to accept their existence. 
From a CR perspective, we see that what Davydov is referring to is in fact, the 
reason why the Bhaskarian notion of intentional causality is important. Intentional 
causality makes it clear why social forms such as mind, thought, language, theories, 
motives, desires, etc, are crucial for the development and learning of human beings. 
These social forms are what produce our manifestations in reality since we cannot 
simply "jump" from social structure to reality. Even if this "jump" is mediated 
by human beings, we always have a passage through intentions and agency. What 
intentional causality means for social science is that our understanding of intentions 
can play a role in actually producing change because the causality of our reasons is 
what provides us with the connection between the objects with which psychology 
is concerned. For example, why a person has a particular motive or reason, what 
happens when we perform actions in an activity or practice as we reproduce the social 
structure? The critical role of causality of reasons, when we act upon psychological 
objects (motives, beliefs, etc), becomes intentional causality that enables the social 
and the psychological sciences to be linked together. Thus, we have appropriate 
grounds by which to account for psychological science. 
4.4.5 The relativist-historicist dualism 
Another theoretical problem with AT, as identified by Engestrom (1999), is the du-
alism of relativism against historicity. Whereas relativism argues that all beliefs 
and practices are equally valid, historicity argues for the understanding of an object 
by tracing it from genesis. This tracing is the identification of the object's inner 
contradictions (double blinds) through manageable units of time (or periodization). 
Historicity refers to the methodology that requires the analysis of the object's his-
torical development, such as I have done in Chapter 3, p. 34, with the historical 
evolution of AT. However, it does not necessarily reduce historical development to 
its ontogeny, evolution, or biography; rather, it deals with the identification or the 
isolation of the key historical elements. Moreover, Engestrom (1999) rejects rela- 
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tivism because it ignores the differences in reality and its incapacity to furnish the 
social sciences with conceptual tools other than comfortable academic discourse, 
by which to make value judgments. In addition, he accepts historicity as a key 
methodology for what he calls "expansive cycles" that refers to 
a developmental process that contains both internalization and exter-
nalization... It requires reflexive appropriation of existing culturally ad-
vanced models and tools that offer ways out of the internal contradic-
tions. (ibid., p. 33). 
On the dualism between historicity and relativism, I shall argue that CR is capable 
of offering a firm philosophical grounding to better understand and resolve this 
problem. In particular, Bhaskar (1979) develops the conceptual tools by which 
social science and philosophy are in a relation with its object of study. 
The "holy trinity" follows shortly from the initial argument for a new ontology, 
i.e., the distinction between the transitive and intransitive dimensions, the critique 
of the epistemic fallacy, open and closed systems, and the stratification of reality, 
which consists of the distinction between the realm of the real, the realm of the 
actual and the realm of the empirical. From this new argument for ontology, we 
have: (a) ontological realism: the dimension of intransitive objects of knowledge, 
which exists and acts in an independent manner from our theories about them, 
the transitive space. CR accepts (b) epistemic relativity: the idea that beliefs 
are products of society, which implies that all knowledge is a historically transient 
entity; in other words, our criteria for truth and values are not externally situated 
from our particular historical time as we see that our knowledge changes through 
time. Epistemic relativity also includes fallibilism, the idea that our beliefs may turn 
out to be false. In addition, CR opens a space for the possibility of (c) judgmental 
rationality: the idea that individuals can make decisions between relative beliefs, 
which itself assumes both epistemic relativity and historicity. CR and AT reject 
relativism which state that we cannot know which belief is better and its judgmental 
version, the idea that holds all beliefs are equally valid because, as suggested by 
Engestrom (1999), "people have to decide where they want to go, which way is 
up" (p. 26). From a CR perspective, (b) we only know reality under approximate, 
historical and temporary descriptions of such objects of knowledge and (a) those 
objects of knowledge live and act, in the intransitive space, independently of theories 
and descriptions we create about them. 
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CR can transcend the historicist-reductionist dualism since it argues that the 
pair denoting (b) epistemic relativity and (a) ontological realism is accepted and 
that each concept assumes each other in both the natural and social sciences. Ac-
cording to Bhaskar (2009), we have a historical Kantianism if (b) epistemic relativity 
denotes the truth, and then (a) ontological realism denotes the limitations. This 
pair (a) and (b) is what Bhaskar (2009, p. 99) calls the "duality of truth" since it 
captures two features of truth, an epistemic feature and an ontic feature. In the 
epistemic feature, the notion of truth is used to report and-or assign claims, val-
ues, and judgments, and to report conditions, circumstances, or states of affairs. In 
the ontic aspect, the concept of truth is used to designate such conditions, circum-
stances, or states of affair s that are derived from such claims, values, and judgments 
as "true". According to Bhaskar (2009, p. 78), the "duality of truth" is skewed, in 
the sense that it is derived from the fact that "truth (unlike being per se) is always 
tied to the possibility of language, theory and human practice". We can say that 
from a CR viewpoint, truth functions to (1) designate; that is, "truth-judgments", 
"truth-values", and "truth-claims", and also this truth (2) lives and acts indepen-
dently of human beings; that is, "true-conditions" or "true-states of affairs". To 
understand the ontic state of truth we can think of the objects of knowledge that 
reside independently of our theories about them. In short, the "duality of truth" 
is parallel to the divide of the transitive (the epistemic aspect) and the intransitive 
(the ontic aspect) dimensions of knowledge, which I argue is capable of providing the 
philosophical grounds for AT and the dualism between relativism and historicity. 
I want to go a step further in order to situate the duality of the conception of 
truth within a "dialecticzation" of truth not just in terms of basic CR, but also 
in dialectical Critical Realism (DCR forthcoming in Chapter 7, p. 220). Bhaskar's 
(2008b, p. 106) argues for what he terms truth tretrapolity or a more "adequate 
theory of truth" (p. 106), which consists of four main components; I now paraphrase 
and provide examples of this dialectical theory of truth: 
• The first component is what he calls truth as (a) normative-fiduciary: the 
idea of truth as a social bond. For example, if a teacher asks a student to read 
a certain book because it is informative on a particular topic, which for the 
teacher is true at the social level, it can be interpreted as "trust me", "take 
my advice", or "take my word for it", etc. Of course, this social level is not 
to say that the teacher may be right, but this is to show an aspect of truth 
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conceived in the first level. 
• A second aspect of truth is what Bhaskar terms as (b) adequating: the idea 
of truth as an epistemic-warrant, when a proposition or belief has been sub-
jected to scientific scrutiny and there are sufficient elements or grounds for it. 
For instance, truth in the statement: penicillin kills most of bacterium in an 
infected host. 
• A third component of truth is very interesting because it straddles the epistemic-
ontic divide. Bhaskar (2008b, p.157) calls this notion of truth the "epistemic-
ontic" duo (or expressive-referential). An example of this (c) expressive-
referential term is when we say that the sky is blue, the color of the sky 
is perfectly expressed by the statement: the sky is blue, so that it refers (e.g., 
an expressive part) and simultaneously conveys (e.g., a referential part) truth. 
Tarski's Theory of Truth', the idea that truth is redundant because we are 
just expressing what we know about the world and we do not really need to use 
the term truth, captures this third component of the truth tretrapoly. These 
three philosophical ideas do not state that they are pretending to be the whole 
true; rather, they capture parts or aspects of truth. 
• The fourth component of truth is what Bhaskar calls true as (d) alethic or 
ontology. Bhaskar derives alethic truth from the Greek word that means real. 
The classic Bhaskarian (2008a) example in basic CR is that when emeralds 
show a color green with light reflecting on them, it is a particular property 
that is manifested in the nature of their molecules and the structure of the 
crystal or whatever structure that composes it. While AT has various implicit 
aspects of truth, CR openly theorizes that truth is a structure in nature or in 
society. This fourth-sense of truth is, in CR terms, truth as natural necessity 
or stratification, which is of great importance because it conveys the external 
and real stratification of our world, independently detached from our language 
or theories. Following the DCR Bhaskarian argument, we need all four senses 
of truth. 
'I borrow the title of Field's (1972) analysis of the Tarskian model. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a first proposal of CRAT gives an example of the 2E: learning as 
process where processes are generated by contradictions with the corpus of literature 
provided by the applications of AT to mathematics-educational research. Using 
critical realism, I reveal a Kantianism about the categorization of the activity system; 
nonetheless, with a three-layer laminated system that I call nested mathematics-
educational activity system, it is possible to discern the levels of reality at which 
this research community operates and the types of contradictions that pervade their 
respective activity systems. 
In Chapter 5, p. 116, a second proposal of CRAT is to answer the guiding question 
by addressing dichotomies that AT suffers from. This project is in tune with both 
AT and CR, as articulated by Engestrom and Miettinen (1999, p. 5) when they 
identify that 
transcending the dualism between thought and activity, theory and prac-
tice, facts and values has much in common with the theoretical aims of 
Activity Theory. 
Thus, an activity-theoretical aim is aligned with basic CR, which aims to over-
come macro dichotomies: (1) Collectivism (holism)-individualism; (2) Reification-
voluntarism (society-individual); (3) Naturalism-anti-naturalism (positivism-hermeneutics); 
and micro dichotomies: (4) (Body-mind) Dualism-reductionism and (5) causes-
reasons. Thus, I shall expand on the ways by which CR can deal with some identified 
dualisms and unsolved problems of AT. 
In the following chapters, I illustrate how (1) basic CR resolves the activity-
theoretical aim of transcending such dichotomies (in Chapter 5, p. 116) and (2) 
show how the argument for a deepening of ontology, dialectical Critical Realism 
(DCR) allows us to conceptualize 4D: learning as product-in-process by providing 
us with a broadened understanding of Hegel-Marx dialectic via a critique of both 
western and dialectical branches of philosophy (in Chapter 7, p. 220). 
114 
4. Applications and dualisms 
115 
Chapter 5 
Tenets of basic critical realism 
The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without masters-
builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave 
lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but everyone must 
not hope to be [that]... and in the age that produces such masters... it 
is ambition enough to be employed as an under-laborer in clearing the 
ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of 
knowledge'. 
5.1 Introduction 
Roy Bhaskar is the principal creator of the philosophical system entitled Critical Re-
alism (CR). The main concern of this philosophical project deals with "the natures 
of, and prospects for, human emancipation" (Bhaskar, 2009, p. 103). As the CR 
project continues its under-laboring in the sciences, many other authors continue to 
contribute to it, as is customary in the classic CR texts, we must distinguish three 
key phases of the Bhaskarian philosophical thesis: basic critical realism (BCR), di-
alectical critical realism (DCR) and the philosophy of Meta-Reality (PMR). Within 
basic CR there are three main groups of theory: transcendental realism (TR), a 
philosophy of science, critical naturalism (CN), a philosophy of social science, and 
the theory of explanatory critique (EC), a philosophical theory of value. 
This chapter explains basic CR by restricting its focus to: BCR = TR + 
'In Critical Realism, the idea of philosophy as under-laborer of science makes reference to this 
excerpt in Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690, p. 15, emphasis added). 
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CN + EC using Bhaskar's Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (SRHE) 
(1986/2009) > The Possibility of Naturalism (PN) (1979) > and A Realist Theory 
of Science (RTS) (1975/2008a)'. Such substantive introduction of the principles 
of BCR is not to be taken as a trivial overview; rather, it is the injection of a 
transformative element into the investigation of the next level of this new conceptu-
alization of learning. Following Bhaskarian dialectics, the new level is 4D: learning 
as product-in-process, which is uniquely characterized by the Bhaskarian transfor-
mative praxis, or agency. What example of learning at the transformative-praxis 
stratum requires agency? I argue for putting BCR to work in order to resolve not 
just the dualisms of Activity Theory (AT) but also the resolution of other dualisms 
indispensable for social theory in general, doing so with an argument that begins by 
re-vindicating ontology as irreducible and distinct from epistemology. 
The term Critical Realism came about as a running together of transcendental 
realism (TR) and critical naturalism (CN). In particular, the "critical" part in CR 
is twofold (Bhaskar, 1998, p. ix). First, "critical" refers to Kant's transcendental 
arguments. A transcendental argument may be defined as an examination into the 
necessary conditions of possibility for some human activity as conceptualized in our 
experience. In transcendental arguments, we could also be looking at ontological, 
epistemological, or axiological conditions in respect to action. For example, we know 
that a "being" exists in the world, but by establishing a transcendental argument, 
"non-being" is also constitutively necessary to "being", and thus, we find that "non-
being" (or absence) is a condition, or necessity, for being (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 50). 
Another example is that we cannot have presence without absence. Second, "crit-
ical" refers to the transition from a factual account of the world to an evaluative 
account of the world—that is, the transition from facts to values, which is elab-
orated in EC (section 5.13, p. 172). This twofold critical part is set up in BCR. 
In general terms, BCR is a critique of pre-existing philosophies, one that began 
around 1975 by identifying that other philosophies had left out ontology from their 
conceptualization of the world, which BCR sets out to re-vindicate. 
Now, we have already seen that Activity Theory (AT), as it has been developed 
up to now, leads us into certain dualisms. Critical Realism, contains a philosophy of 
social science, which is understood or characterized as critical naturalism (CN). This 
allows us to deal with such macro-dualisms as between (1) collectivism and individ- 
'The reader is referred to the glossary for the abbreviations and symbols used in this work. 
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ualism, (2) social structure and agency, and (3) naturalism and anti-naturalism. 
Underlying these macro-dualisms, we find certain micro-dualisms, such as those be-
tween (4) mind and body (together with reductionism), (5) reasons and causes, and, 
of course, (6) facts and values. I discuss the macro-dualism first, followed by the 
micro-dualisms—in terms of the resolution of the mind-body problem—with the 
theory of intentional causality, which takes this discussion uniquely into what be-
comes the Bhaskarian theory of explanatory critique by focusing on the derivation 
of values from facts. These six dichotomies are the prevailing antimonies from which 
social theory, and to a specified extent AT, suffer. The main argument here is that 
CN provides a unique resolution of these dualisms, enabling us to transcend them, 
as synthesized below. 
Adapted from source (Bhaskar 1998, pp. xii-xiv cited in Hartwig, 2007d, p. 92) 
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5.2 Critical realism - transcendental realism 
CR explicitly theorizes ontology by asking: "what the world must be like for science 
to be possible" (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 36). It asserts that the world, the subject matter 
of ontology, is an intelligible place for human beings such that science is possible, 
from which the only premises are what we recognize as scientific activities. The 
assertion implies that reality exists independently of our conceptualization about it. 
To understand knowledge of reality, CR differentiates between the transitive and 
the intransitive dimensions of science. 
5.2.1 Mind the gap! Between the transitive and intransitive 
dimensions 
CR argues that the transitive dimension, or epistemological space, is the dimension 
in which "the object of knowledge is the material cause or antecedently established 
knowledge which is used to generate the new knowledge" (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 17). 
This transitive realm is the dimension of knowledge, and it is concerned with tran-
sitive objects, such as theories, models, concepts, and anything that we may use 
to understand the world. In addition to transitive objects, there are those objects 
that we are trying to obtain knowledge of—intransitive objects, in the intransitive 
dimension (ID). The intransitive dimension, or ontological dimension, is the space 
in which "the object is the real structure or mechanism that exists and acts quite 
independently of men and the conditions which allow men access to it" (ibid., p. 17). 
The intransitive dimension is the dimension of real objects, such as structures, mech-
anisms, tendencies, and causal relations. The intransitive dimension consists of real 
objects that exist and act independently of how human beings think about them in 
natural science. In social science, how human beings think about the social world 
comes to affect the reality around them. Moreover, the differentiation between epis-
temology and ontology implies a differentiation between the ID and the typically 
knowledge-dependent TD. There is always a differentiation between the transitive 
and intransitive dimensions (the distinction between our knowledge and what our 
knowledge is of); that is, the two dimensions are in a relation of interaction when 
viewed over time. The transitive dimension of knowledge is also part of the in-
transitive dimension of being and therefore must be included within ontology too. 
TD is the realm of scientific process, scientific beliefs, and so on, and the ID, the 
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knowledge-independent realm is the world outside of those beliefs. This differen-
tiation between the transitive objects and the independent intransitive objects of 
science provides the point of departure from which CR argues for ontology. Follow-
ing BCR, the crucial distinction between the transitive and intransitive dimensions 
allows us to give an account of science in a non-empiricist way. Thus, it is important 
to distinguish the Bhaskarian argument for transcendental realism from two classical 
views in traditional philosophy, classical empiricism and transcendental idealism, as 
follows. 
5.3 Three philosophies of science: differentiating 
transcendental realism from two traditional 
philosophies of science 
Transcendental realism, starting from the premise of the contingency of 
our own experience, sees nature as real; and science as our persistent 
effort to understand it. (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 229). 
Transcendental realism is the CR stance in Bhaskar's RTS (2008a). It argues that 
ontology is necessary in order to sustain the concept of science. This necessity im-
plies that the causal laws of the world that are identified in experimental conditions 
(closed systems) may hold but also that they are not empirical regularities. Rather, 
these causal laws hold in open systems, outside experimental conditions. Moreover, 
causal laws have to be analyzed as tendencies. Causal laws can act and exist with-
out being perceived, and they can act without manifesting in a particular outcome. 
Transcendental realism establishes the conditions for the irreducibility of ontology 
so that science can be understood as a social process that is dependent on human 
activity. From this viewpoint, reality is stratified and differentiated into three differ-
ent overlapping domains (the real, the actual, and the empirical). Following RTS, I 
begin by differentiating transcendental realism from two philosophical traditions of 
science: classical empiricism and transcendental idealism, which lack an ontological 
dimension capable of sustaining the dialectic or process-in-motion of the logic of 
science, as shown in Figure 5.1, p. 121. 
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Adopted from Bhaskar (2008a, p. 15). 
5.3.1 Classical empiricism 
Classical empiricism as represented by the philosopher David Hume and his subse-
quent disciples may be understood as "a radicalized version of Locke's own principle 
of empiricism, namely that all knowledge of "matters and facts of existence hails 
from sense-experience alone" (Bhaskar, 2009, p. 30). From this perspective, knowl-
edge is seen as the mechanical effect of objects—which exist outside, in reality—and 
is exclusively attainable through the senses. Classical empiricism stops at stage (1) 
in Figure 5.1, p. 121, of the dialectic of science, in which the results of the phe-
nomena under scrutiny are identified as universal regularities or sequences of events. 
Since classical empiricism sees scientific knowledge as derived from the category of 
sense-experience, it is incapable of providing an accurate account of science because 
it ignores the ontological dimension. From a classical empiricist's perspective, we see 
two main occurrences: the first is the homology between world and sense-experience, 
and the second is the implicit use of knowledge to constitute the world itself. In 
other words, when we are referring to empirical realism, we are talking about the re-
duction of being (ontology) to knowledge (epistemology), and the implicit definition 
of knowledge especially in the form of experience. 
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[A] Humean or classical empiricist account of science ... [is] a fusion 
of the world and experience, encapsulated in the doctrine of empirical 
realism (empiricist ontology); and a reduction of our knowledge to the 
level of experience which, as constitutive of the nature of reality itself, is 
held to be certain (reductionist epistemology). (Bhaskar, 2009, p. 38). 
The important aspect to highlight is that the condition of being in relation to knowl-
edge is the absence of the work of scientific activity because, on the one hand, there 
is no more to being than knowledge, and, on the other hand, there is no more to 
knowledge than its reflection on the surface of being. Therefore, according to this 
ideology, knowledge does not involve work, and the world does not involve struc-
ture. From this viewpoint, there are two important consequences: a destratification 
in the realm of ontology and a dehistoricization in the realm of epistemology. The 
destratification of knowledge refers to the presupposition of an unstructured real-
ity, and the dehistoricization of knowledge refers to the assumption that, generally, 
epistemology must stand as "the guarantor of justified belief"' (ibid., p. 38, empha-
sis added), necessitating the creation of foundations of knowledge and the inclusion 
of closed systems (where universal regularities of events occur), as opposed to the 
means by which we can understand activities. Against a classical empiricist point of 
view, transcendental realism argues that we only get an accurate account of science 
when we hold the TD and ID together and that to see science as purely transitive 
or intransitive is erroneous. In short, classical empiricism (1) ignores the ID—the 
real objects of scientific knowledge that cannot be reduced to the level of sense-
experience, i.e., the empirical, and (2) it ignores the stratification of reality (and 
hence also our knowledge). This dual error, i.e., a reality without ontology and 
without stratum, gives rise to such problems as the problem of induction. Below, 
we can elaborate on the problem of induction in order to further clarify the erroneous 
stance of classical empiricism. 
5.3.2 Riddles of induction 
The problem of induction is the "problem of what warrant we have for reasoning 
from particular instances to general statements (induction proper) or from observed 
to unobserved or past to future instances (eduction)" (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 207). In 
'This phrase is, in my opinion, one of the most concise ways to describe the idea of ideology. 
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short, induction makes inference from particular to general statements'. Following 
RTS, the classic all-emeralds-must-be-green example can be used to elucidate this 
idea. 
Imagine that every emerald that we have ever encountered is green. Humean 
skepticism prompts us to ask: how do we know that the next emerald is not going to 
be different? An empiricist answer to this question is that we do not know, as a good 
Humean skeptic. This logic is representative of the problem of induction. Induction 
compels us to speculate that if every emerald that we have seen up to now is green, 
then, by induction, all emeralds must be green. The reason why CR allows us to see 
why all emeralds must be green is because we can effectively identify the structure 
that makes them green. As long as structures have the structure that they do—for 
example, as long as emeralds remain emeralds—then they must appear green to any 
observer under reasonable conditions because the crystallization of chromium-rich 
particles in the composition in the stone is the underlying deeper structure that gives 
emeralds their green property. This is a deeper level of structure is what explains 
the green appearance of emeralds. Thus, we do not have to test every single emerald 
in the world to see if they are all green because such explanation of the mechanism 
or structure is at the level of the real behind such green appearance. So that this 
logic gives the general form of resolution of the problem of induction! 
CR resolves the problem of induction' because it describes the generative mecha-
nism or structure that explains phenomena in such a way as to deduce the property 
from it; consequently, induction does not play a role in the movement of science 
towards understanding what lies behind and explains appearances. 
'Induction can be distinguished from eduction, or inference from a particular to another. If 
one sees a white swan, for instance, then by induction, one can speculate that all swans must be 
white. Now, if one sees that this swan is white, then by eduction, one concludes that that other 
swan must be white, too. Eduction is a subset of induction, i.e., usually, eduction is not performed 
unless there is already an induction occurring; the alternative is deduction—that is, inference from 
a general principal to a particular. For example, if all swans are white, then by deduction, this 
particular swan must be white. 
2In Bhaskar's RTS (2008a), we also find other problems that stem from relying on particular 
instances for evidence-based science and that remain trapped in their explanation of causality at 
a single level of reality without involving other levels, e.g., the problem of subjective conditionals, 
which is the problem that asks, if a causal event was observed yesterday, is it the case that it still 
holds today? A different example is the distinction between a necessary and an accidental sequence. 
Although for these purposes, the only two philosophies that are discerned here are empiricism and 
transcendental idealism, we can also resort to Bhaskar's (1975) for an analysis of post-modern 
philosophies of science. This analysis of Feyerabendian- and Bachelardian philosophies show its 
origins, along with a critique of Kuhn's paradigms and Popper's models of explanations, among 
others in which, as in classical empiricism, remain "stuck" . 
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If generative mechanisms and structures are real then there is a clear 
criterion for disguising between a necessary and an accidental sequence: a 
sequence Ea.Eb is necessary if and only if there is a generative mechanism 
or structure which when stimulated by the event described 'Ea' produces 
Eb. If we can have empirical knowledge of such generative mechanisms or 
structures then we can have knowledge of natural necessity a posteriori. 
(Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 31). 
To paraphrase, if generative mechanisms do not exist, i.e., if all we know about the 
world is what we can apprehend through sense-experience, then we can never make 
a universal statement because it would presumably be about what we can perceive 
and/or experience. 
Bhaskar (2008a), expanding on the problem of induction, also refers to the so-
called new "riddle" of induction formulated by the philosopher Nelson Goodman, 
who was concerned with conundrum such as, what is to prevent nature from chang-
ing? In the Goodmanesque version of the problem of induction, Goodman coins 
artificial predicates such as "grue" and "bleen" , which are defined so that, all emer-
alds are, for example, "grue" up to some arbitrary time in the future, e.g., January 
1st 2012, and blue thereafter. This Goodmanesque account is a paradox because, say 
now after some time, the evidence that we have is equally consistent with all emer-
alds are 'green" and also for all emeralds are"grue". In opposition, CR argues that 
the understating of evidence does not depend on a particular number to be found or 
on the lapse of time because we can explain the reasons why, for example, emeralds 
have to be green. This new "riddle" is just a new variance of an old problem, both 
of which are erroneous, given that the mere continuation of time cannot establish 
a cause. Thus, the main error of the problem of induction and its Goodmanesque 
variance is that they remain "stuck" at the level of surface appearances. In contrast, 
science investigates beneath surfaces to see why the properties of appearances hold, 
then by doing so, science moves to a deeper level of structure. 
5.3.3 Transcendental idealism 
The transcendental idealist viewpoint originated from the philosopher Immanuel 
Kant, and has more recently received an impetus from the latter writings of Lud-
wig Wittgenstein. This viewpoint sees human beings as active in the production 
of knowledge. In Kant it is the application of knowledge, and more recently, by a 
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process of synthesis knowledge. The way in which human beings are conceived to 
be active, in Kant is by the application of the categories to the manifold of sense-
experience, and more recently, by a process of synthesizing knowledge by means of 
the construction of a model or epistemological structure. For instance, the difference 
between the regularities of empirical patterns and causal laws is that in the case of 
causal laws a structure is imposed on an empirical regularity. This transcendental-
idealist viewpoint is an improvement on classical empiricism because it allows for 
a model or an epistemological structure. The aim of the epistemological structure 
is to enable the scientist to imagine the generative mechanisms that may cause the 
phenomena under scrutiny. However, transcendental idealism is still subject to the 
same problems of empiricism because it does not allow for an ontological structure. 
We see that transcendental idealism stops at stage (2) in Figure 5.1, p. 121. Tran-
scendental realism agrees with the idea that scientists employ an epistemological 
structure and other various cognitive models in order to make sense of the world. 
However, these models need to be tested in order to empirically identify intransitive 
objects, such as generative mechanisms and structures. Transcendental idealism 
sees plausible explanations of generative mechanisms as merely imaginary and not 
as objects that might be real. From a CR point of view, there is then a distinction 
between the imaginary and the imagined, for "what is imagined may be real, but 
what is imaginary cannot" (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 146). It is in this sense that CR, 
in the form of transcendental realism, argues for the need to appeal to the world 
in order to test theories and be able to decide between them. Thus, transcendental 
idealism posits an epistemological structure but lacks an ontological structure. 
5.3.4 Transcendental realism 
The third position in Figure 5.1, p. 121 refers to transcendental realism, the CR van-
tage point in the philosophy of science. In orthodox philosophies of science, Humean 
classical empiricism and Kantian transcendental idealism assumed the implicit on-
tology of the empirical realist perspective, in which "the real objects of scientific 
investigation are defined in terms of actual or possible experience" (Bhaskar, 2009, 
p. 5). Empirical realism is what (1) classical empiricism and (2) transcendental 
idealism have in common. This involves the reduction of the domain of the real 
to the domain of the empirical, i.e., to experience or to what is experienced. It is 
the idea that reality is just a reduction to the actual and the empirical. In short, 
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empirical realism is what we get when we reflect on the identification that classical 
empiricism makes between the world and experience. However, transcendental re-
alism argues that there are other levels of the world that are not experienced see 
Table 5.2, p. 127). In addition, empirical realism differs from transcendental realism 
regarding the interpretation of results from experimental procedures. Whereas from 
an empirical-realism perspective, the interpretation of results is nothing more than 
empirical universal regularities, from a transcendental-realism viewpoint, results are 
not regularities but the invariance of a result produced in experimental conditions. 
Just like transcendental realists, empirical realists see the importance of creating 
epistemological structures or models by which to explain the world (the move from 
(1) to (2) in Figure 5.1, p. 121. The importance of the epistemological structures is 
not what can potentially result from them but, leading us to explore whether what 
is possible in the scientific imagination is real or not, i.e., we explore whether the 
epistemological structure we imagine reflects some ontological structure in reality. 
5.3.5 Mind the gap! Or else, the epistemic fallacy 
Critical realism, in the form of transcendental realism, rejects these two philosophical 
viewpoints, classical empiricism and transcendental idealism, on the grounds that 
they are incapable of sustaining both transitive and intransitive objects of knowl-
edge. In particular, argumentation that results from answering questions about the 
nature of the world only in terms of its knowledge perpetrates a fallacy, the epistemic 
fallacy: 
[It is] the view that statements about being can be reduced to or analyzed 
in terms of statements about knowledge; i.e., that ontological questions 
can always be transposed into epistemological terms. The idea that 
being can always be analyzed in terms of our knowledge of being, that it 
is sufficient for philosophy to "treat only of the network, and not what 
the network describes" , results in the systematic dissolution of the idea of 
a world ... independent of but investigated by science. (Bhaskar, 2008a, 
p. 36) 
The epistemic fallacy is what occurs when we do not mind the gap between ontology 
and epistemology, i.e., it reduces the intransitive to the transitive dimension. This 
mistake in argumentation often results in methodological inconsistencies or views 
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that are irrelevant to science because the transitive dimension of knowledge is based 
on the implicit category of sense-experience. In opposition to the epistemic fallacy, 
CR re-establishes the ontological dimension of science as an explanatory conception 
of the stratified and differentiated world, which I elaborate upon in the following 
section. 
5.4 On stratification and differentiation of our world 
CR argues for ontology by establishing a distinction between the transitive dimen-
sion (TD) and the intransitive dimension (ID). It argues that science needs to be 
understood as a social process that investigates aspects of the world that exist 
independently of it with the Description-Retroduction-Elimination-Identification-
Correction (DREI(C)) model of knowledge production. It is here that Bhaskar 
(2008a) argues by means of two moves. The first move is the stratification and dif-
ferentiation of the world, and the second move describes the logic of the move from 
knowledge of one stratum to knowledge of the next. 
CR conceptualizes the world as stratified into the overlapping domains of the 
real, the actual, and the empirical, as shown below. 
Table 5.2: The stratification of reality (dr > da 
 > de) 
dr=domain 
the real 
of da=domain 
the actual 
of de=domain 	 of 
the empirical 
mechanisms V 
events V V 
experiences V V V 
Adapted from Bhaskar (2008a, p. 56). 
The stratification of reality is designed to show that causal laws, mechanisms, and 
other objects of scientific knowledge cannot be reduced to domains of the actual or 
the empirical. The real, the actual, and the empirical are three overlapping domains 
of reality. The Bhaskarian formula dr > da > de is very useful for conveying the 
mutual inclusions between the three domains. The real is the all-containing domain 
of reality. This domain contains mechanisms, events, and experiences. Mechanisms 
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"exist as the powers of things and act independently of the condition that enable us 
to identify them" (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 186). Such mechanisms generate events and 
experiences, which constitute the domain of the actual. The actual consists of events 
and experiences. The domain of the actual gives rise to the empirical. The domain 
of the empirical consists of experiences. These three overlapping domains are not 
independent of each other but are in a one-way relation to each other. In other 
words, we do not have events without mechanisms, and we do not have experiences 
without events. 
5.4.1 Open and closed systems 
In addition, stratification also leads to a differentiation in both the natural and 
social sciences. The former is concerned with understanding reality manifested in 
natural phenomena, and it employs the capacity of experimentation to allow for the 
observation of a single mechanism (in closed systems). It is in this sense that natural 
science allows us to empirically access the deep structures of reality. Social science 
is concerned with understanding reality in terms of the mechanisms that produce 
and manifest natural and social phenomena (in open systems). 
Only under experimentally controlled (closed) conditions are the domain of the 
real and the domain of the empirical in one-to-one alignment with the domain of the 
actual. This is because outside the experimentally closed condition, we are always 
dealing with a multiplicity of generative mechanisms, which makes it difficult to 
predict anything at the level of the actual. The point of an experiment is to isolate 
a single mechanism and observe its action free from the effects of other mechanisms. 
Because we only study a single mechanism under such closed conditions, then we 
can precisely describe its effect, whereas in an open system, we do not know if a 
particular result is due to a mechanism, interacting confounders, factors, or other 
causes. Outside closed systems, what is actualized depends on all the mechanisms 
in effect. 
The question that follows is: how do we derive new scientific knowledge from ex-
isting knowledge? Following the Bhaskarian DREI(C) model of scientific discovery, 
science can be perceived as an iterative process-in-motion of knowledge production. 
The model may be seen as building on knowledge from one stratum to a more 
complex stratum. I paraphrase the meaning of the model below: 
D stands for description. The first step in the process of discovery is description of 
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the phenomenon. This initial stage is concerned with providing a description of 
that which is under investigation. An example of this would be the description 
of behavior that follows a law-like pattern. 
R stands for retroduction. The next step, retroduction, is the process of imagining 
possible mechanisms that, if they were real and acted in the postulated way, 
would account for the phenomena in question. It requires making hypotheses, 
imagining, exploring, and posing analogies. For example, during scientific 
investigation, the first part, discerning X, involves thinking about all possible 
mechanisms that might account for X. 
E stands for elimination. This process consists of testing the previously imagined 
process. It is aimed at the eradication of false theories through processes of 
elaboration and through the eradication of alternatively erroneous explana-
tions. 
I stands for identification. It refers to the identification of the plausible mechanisms 
responsible for generating the phenomena. At this level, we want to fully un-
derstand everything about the identified mechanism(s) so that we can describe 
how it behaves, what it does, etc. In this way, the process of discovery starts 
again. 
C stands for correction. It refers to the need to make corrections according to new 
evidence. 
The DREI(C) model shows how theoretical explanations build upon scientific knowl-
edge, which moves from one level (e.g., stratum I) to a deeper level of explanation 
(e.g., stratum II) in a continuous, iterative manner. Bhaskar (2008a) provides an 
example in the field of chemistry and other examples in physics because these two 
sciences are often regarded as paradigmatic fields in the tradition of the philosophy 
of science, as shown below in Table 5.3, p. 129. 
Table 5.3: Example of the multi-tiered stratification of 
scientific knowledge 
stratum I 2Na+2HC1 = 2NaC1 + H2, ex-
plained by 
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stratum II Theory of atomic number and va- 
lency 
mechanism 1 
stratum III Theory of electrons and atomic 
structure, explained by 
mechanism 2 
stratum IV [competing theories of subatomic 
structure] 
mechanism 3 
Adapted from Bhaskar (2008a, p.169). 
This multi-tiered model is meant to illustrate that the reason why experimentation 
(or analogous procedures) is that we have many competing theories that describe 
many possible explanations about a particular phenomenon. We use such multi-tied 
models to test scientific knowledge in order to arrive to underlying structures and 
mechanisms. To recall, Kantian transcendental idealism argues that in order to have 
scientific knowledge, we need some kind of epistemological structure—e.g., a model. 
Transcendental realism agrees with this notion of epistemological structure, but it 
also see that there is a potential plurality of possible models of epistemic structures, 
so that we need to know which, if any, of the models which are historically generated 
are correct. Since there is no straightforward answer, there is a need to test plausible 
explanations. 
At this point, it is convenient to distinguish between three senses of the strati-
fication of reality. Firstly, there is the sense of the distinction between the domain 
of the real and the actual, in which we differentiate structures or generative mecha-
nisms from the events they generate. Secondly, there is the sense of the multi-tiered 
stratification of reality, as exemplified by dr > da > de in Table 5.3, p. 129. 
5.4.2 The importance of emergence 
CR argues that emergence is understood in terms of a set of criteria which go 
together, as shown in Table 5.4, p. 131. 
130 
5. Basic CR 
Table 5.4: Three criteria and one consequence for emer-
gence 
3 criteria + 1 consequence = emergence 
criterion the higher order phenomena is (1) unilaterally existentially 
dependent on a more basic ("lower") order, domain, or level, 
e.g., we do not have mind without matter, 
criterion the higher order phenomena is (2) taxonomically irreducible 
to it, e.g., we cannot study the level of mind or its products—
as social structures, actions, rules, conventions—solely by us-
ing concepts from the domain of matter; and most impor-
tantly, 
criterion the higher order phenomena is (3) causally irreducible in the 
level or domain of phenomena from which it initially emerges, 
e.g., once we have mind, then mind becomes causally irre-
ducible in the domain of matter; another example is that once 
we introduce the impact of human beings, then they may af-
fect the climate of the planet, or when human beings perform 
actions, such actions always involves interference in the world 
of matter. 
consequence the lower level must (4) already contain the higher level as a 
possibility, e.g., the lower order implicitly contains the higher 
order enfolded within it as a possibility, as in the Darwinian 
theory of evolution, in which human beings are implicit or 
enfolded as a possibility in the ape. 
Adapted from Bhaskar (2009, p. 76). 
The first three criteria of the concept of emergence are the most important, at least 
fro BCR, which I illustrate with further examples: 
(1) Unilateral existential dependence A way to state the structural level's uni-
lateral existential dependence on nature is to say that the social presupposes 
the existence of the material (but the opposite does not hold). The dictum 
given by Marx and Engels—"as man is only human, he must eat before he can 
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think" (Bhaskar, 2009, p. 76)—can be taken to illustrate how this unilateral 
priority of existential material is asserted before the dependence of the social is 
brought into being. This unilateral existential dependence also applies to the 
way in which the natural and social transform so that every social transfor-
mation implies natural transformation, but natural transformation does not 
automatically imply a social one. 
(2) Taxonomic irreducibility The word taxonomy refers to conceptual systems 
we use to classify or describe phenomena, and its irreducibility implies the 
need for new concepts to render classification of phenomena accurately with 
the already existing concepts. Consider the example of asking someone to turn 
on a light switch. Although it could be argued that the action of turning on 
the light switch depends upon an individual's physiology, it must also involve 
having an intention for doing it. The description of this action cannot be 
reduced to mere psychological concepts, but there is also a need for concepts 
that relate to intentionality, especially when explaining human actions, which 
is what taxonomic irreducibly means. 
(3) Causal irreducibility Intentional activity presupposes causal efficacy of in-
tentional actions for bringing about transformations in the physical world. 
Climate change, for instance, produces changes in the material world as an 
unintended result of the burning fossil fuels that produce greenhouse effects, 
which ultimately raise the temperature of the planet; similarly, everyday hu-
man actions produce intended (and unintended) physical change in the world. 
This is what causally irreducibility means. 
5.4.3 Mind the gap! Between dr: the domain of the real 
and da: the domain of the actual. Or else, actualism 
Actualism is the reduction of the domain of the real to the actual (Bhaskar, 2008a, 
p. 81). Empirical realism is the identification of dr: the domain of the real further 
with de: the domain of the empirical. In short, empirical realism involves actualism. 
In the Bhaskarian dr > da > de three-level strata, actualism is a collapsed of the real 
to da: the domain of the actual, and empirical realism constitutes the identification 
of the real by the empirical. 
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The Humean theory of causal laws identifies laws as "constant conjunctions" of 
events or universal "empirical invariances" Bhaskar (2008a, p. 54). Causal laws are 
powers (or tendencies) of generative mechanisms or structures, which operate at 
the level of dr , the real. The great error of the Humean theory is that it identifies 
the generative mechanism with actuality and our experience of it; it identifies the 
mechanism with what is produced by the mechanism, e.g., dr=da, or level of the 
empirical—e.g., dr=da=de. This Humean account puts forward such a theory by 
tying causal laws to the closed conditions in which empirical invariances occur. 
In open systems, we only have the possibility of misconstruing dr and da when 
the system is closed so that there is only a single constant conjunction to analyze 
because as soon as there are two or more constant conjunctions, they are no longer 
constant, and thus the system is not close, but open. 
Causal laws are the workings of mechanisms, at dr: the domain of the real, not 
patterns of evens, at da: the domain of the actual. Hence, constant conjunctions 
of events are insufficient and unnecessary for scientific laws. Bhaskar (2008a, p. 28) 
uses the term "natural necessity" to describe the very necessity in open systems, 
which exists independently of our activity and us. The problem with actualist 
theory is that laws and mechanisms are identified as the invariant regularities of 
empirical patterns. Such identification means that actualism considers only one 
level of reality, the actual, and assumes that this level is going to remain constant 
all the time. From a CR-stratified view of reality, we know that all phenomena, 
social and natural, vary both according to context and over time. Thus, actualism 
fails because it remains stuck at a single level of reality by equating laws with their 
constant conjunctions, i.e., with what is used to identify or test a hypothesis about 
laws. We see that empirical invariances are important but only under scientifically 
controlled conditions so that if they are to apply outside those conditions, laws 
cannot be constant conjunctions. In short, actualism confuses causal laws with 
empirical regularities, or Humean constant conjunctions of events, i.e., it confuses 
the laws with their empirical laws, i.e., which can be used under experimentally 
closed conditions to identify them or test them. The immediate question is: how do 
phenomena from experimentation need to be analyzed? 
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5.5 Causal laws are tendencies, not universal em-
pirical regularities! 
Once we see that there is a need for experimentation or analogous procedures in 
a stratified view of reality in order to test scientific knowledge, then our ability to 
understand experimentation makes an assumption about the objects that are yet to 
be discovered. In this way, Bhaskar (2008a, p. 31) argues, that "the intelligibility of 
experience in science itself presupposes the intransitive and structured character of 
the objects to which, in scientific experience, 'access' is obtained" . Such stratification 
and differentiation of reality from which we can understand science is conveniently 
conveyed with the Bhaskarian formula dr > da > de, and it also can help to illustrate 
what happens when this overlapping does not hold. First, we can consider the case 
dr = da = de, to be the assumption of an empiricist ontology that sees that the 
analysis of the object to be discovered in experimental conditions is derived from 
sense-experience. CR sees that the object to be discovered is presupposed but that it 
belongs to the intransitive objects of science. In this sense, experimental conditions 
(closed systems) allow us to identify the pattern of events that leads to the object 
of scientific discovery. From a CR perspective, intransitive objects are objects yet 
to be discovered, causal laws, and are independent of the experimental patterns or 
regularities of events that they produce. Second, the case that dr 	 da (e.g., the 
detachment of generative mechanisms from events, including experiences) implies 
that generative mechanisms cannot be reduced to their qualities, and da de (e.g., 
the detachment of events from experiences) implies that generative mechanisms 
cannot be investigated in terms of inherent qualities. CR argues that causal laws of 
the natural world are not statements of any form, i.e., causal laws are not empirical, 
universal, experiential, or a priori statements. 
In an open system, we never find a single mechanism acting in isolation; rather, 
we encounter a flux of multiple mechanisms acting upon phenomena, this flux being 
one of the reasons why empirical results cannot be guaranteed in open systems, 
given that we may have many mechanisms operating in various contexts. In a closed 
system, we are able to isolate one mechanism operating on a certain phenomena. 
Then we can make and test conjectures about that particular mechanism given that 
it should always operate in the same way in nature. Thus, one of the reasons why we 
cannot set up a closed system to test human affairs is that people tend to adapt and 
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act in different ways over time. From a CR viewpoint, we want to explain causality 
not in terms of the Humean constant conjunctions but in terms of tendencies. 
5.5.1 Tendencies 
As with many BCR concepts, the notion of tendency is developed extensively 
throughout the history of this philosophical system. In RTS, Bhaskar (2008a, p. 223) 
differentiates between two types, tendencyi (t1) and tendency2 (t2). On the one 
hand, tendencyi describes the activity of the exercised power or workings of a mech-
anism. Such mechanism will work in such a way regardless of other conditions. For 
example, the effects of alcohol on human beings illustrates t1 because after alco-
hol consumption, individuals will always tend to get drunk, regardless if they are 
actually behaving drunk or not, which depends on other physiological factors and 
counter conditions—e.g., the interaction of coffee with alcohol acts as counter agent 
to diminish its effects. Tendencyi is the exercise of a power "normically qualified" at 
the level of the real that does not automatically translate to the level of the actual. 
Thus, the first and basic concept of t1, a tendency that is always a "transfactually 
efficacious" law (Bhaskar, 2008b. p. 223), is always in operation at the level of the 
real. However, the actuality of what occurs at the level of the actual may be different 
as it depends on various other factors. 
On the other hand, the concept of tendency2 (t2), which is like t1 with some of the 
conditions already satisfied. A t2 exists when most of the stimulated and releasing 
conditions are already satisfied. For example, not only does a kleptomaniac have the 
possibility of stealing but also his or her tendency is oriented to steal. To illustrate 
this point rigorously, I refer to Bhaskar's (2008b) explicit explanation denoting that 
entity or thing X has a t2-type causal power to perform behavior cb if the following 
three conditions hold (see Table 5.5, p. 135 right below). 
Table 5.5: Explanation of tendency2 
(i)  X has the power (or liability) to do (or suffer) 0; 
(ii)  X is in an enduring condition to do cb, i.e., it is predisposed or oriented 
towards doing 0; 
(iii)  X will do 0 given an appropriate set of circumstances, in virtue of its pre-
disposition, and in the absence of intervening or (countervailing) causes. 
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Adopted from Bhaskar (2008a, p. 223). 
From the above explanation, we see that to state that X has t2 to perform cb is 
also to state that X will perform 0 under appropriate conditions and in virtue of 
its particular nature (e.g., its structure). It is important to differentiate t2 from t1 
 
because in an open system we need to note that although X has a tendency, this does 
not mean that it will exercise this tendency or realize it. The main point to make 
about distinguishing between t1 (e.g., transfactually efficacious laws) and t2 (e.g., 
"ready" intrinsic, enabling laws from constraints) is that there is a real difference in 
the behavior and nature of entities or things. Some examples illustrate these ideas: 
• A morbidly obese individual is one who has had the tendency to consume 
more calories than he or she uses daily (the exercise of this t1 is something than 
persists, as shown by the effects of an excess of adipose tissue that accumulates 
over time). 
• A kleptomaniac is one who has or had an insistent tendency to steal (even if 
the exercise of this t2 may be suppressed or unsuppressed). 
• A dog has a generic tendency to bark (the exercise of this tendency t2 depends 
on the conditions under which the dog barks, such as when playing, when 
fearful, etc.). 
To sum up, Bhaskar (2008a, p. 181) argues for an analysis of causal powers as 
tendencies in open systems. Such a distinction is blurred in a closed system because 
experiments create artificial conditions in order to trigger a tendency by means of a 
"stimulus" , but in an open system the realization of a tendency is not guaranteed. 
Even in the case that we restrict ourselves to closed systems, there is still a difference 
between (a) the operation of a generative mechanism (at the level of the real) and 
(b) the production of a result (at the level of the actual); however, these two, (a) 
and (b), are in a one-to-one relationship. Thus, unless we have an ontology, which 
explicitly minds the gap between the real from the actual, such difference between 
(a) and (b) might be blurred or confused, as to think that (b) always holds. 
Why do we want to explain causal powers in terms of tendencies? We can see that 
a problem arises if we suppose that behavior is rule bound or that events do not have 
causal reasons. The Bhaskarian argument states that in treating causal powers as 
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tendencies, we are opening a space in order to make reference for explanations of gen-
erative mechanisms. We can explain causality in terms of tendencies to avoid a triv-
ialization of explanations—such as the ones made by a Popper-Hempel model, also 
called the "deductive-nomological theory of explanation" (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 61)—
rendered by the way explanations of a certain phenomenon require it to either sub-
sume or always make reference to generalizations. 
The Popper-Hempel theory of explanations makes a fatal double error of suppos-
ing that: (1) explanations always include causal laws, and (2) such laws are given 
in terms of empirical universalized generalities (Bhaskar, 2008a). Contrary to this 
model, CR asserts that the identification of causes is never necessary or sufficient 
for science because scientific activity is not merely concerned with listing causes or 
with their fulfillment but with the way causes relate (even if such relations appear 
contradictory). In short, Humean constant conjunctions of events are not necessary 
for causal laws because there are no instances of genuine universal empirical reg-
ularities; we could only have such universal regularities if the world was a closed 
system, so the very fact that we need to establish closed systems (or other means 
to identify them) means that outside these conditions, the world is an open system. 
For example, a researcher may not be scientifically interested in the suppression 
or non-suppression of kleptomania. Rather, he or she may be instructed in the 
reason for it and for the generative mechanisms that cause or produce it. From this 
perspective, the notion of causal powers as tendencies serves the important role of 
a place holder for scientists, such that: "when we know what a thing is we know 
what it will tend to do, if appropriate circumstances materialize" (Bhaskar, 2008a, 
p. 230). In other words, once we attribute a causal power to a thing or entity, then 
we have assumed that there is a real foundation for such a thing, independent or 
not of its realization, which is a scientific explanation that is capable of satisfying 
the principle of natural necessity. 
In Dialectic: The pulse of freedom, Bhaskar (2008b, p. 414) further elaborates 
upon the concept of tendency in a matrix of a-d types of tendencies. Tendencya is 
code for t1 and denotes a power that is "normic", or usually qualified, and acted 
upon, or "transfactually efficacious", which differs from a power that is "ready" to 
be executed, or tendencyb (or t2), and it expresses the direction of a certain process 
in terms of a "geo-historical trajectory" (or whether its intrinsic type of enabling 
conditions are fulfilled). Drawing upon such differentiations, Bhaskar (ibid., p. 415) 
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distinguishes between further types of tendencies. One such tendency is a "prone" 
tendency, which is executed (or its extrinsic type of enabling condition is fulfilled). 
For example, children are prone to eat ice cream. It expresses the mediation of 
a certain moment, a motivated tendencyd (or its intrinsic type of stimulating and 
also releasing conditions is fulfilled). To summarize the above discussion, I refer 
to Hartwig's (2007i) tabular representation of tendenciesa_d as part of a dialectical 
matrix (see Table 5.6, p. 138). 
Table 5.6: Types of tendencies, the concrete-universal 
chain, and the ontological-axiological chain 
concrete 
universal 
= singular 
universality processuality (particular) 
mediations 
concrete 
singularity 
tendencya 
(transfactual 
efficacy) 
tendencyb 
(directionality) 
tendency, 
(mediation) 
(generic) 
tendencyd 
(combined 	 ten- 
dential 	 effects 	 in 
any outcome) 
ontological- 1M 2E negativity 3L totality 4D 
axiological 
chain 
non-identity transformative 
agency 
tendencyi tendency2 tendency3  tendency4 
(transfactual) (ready) (prone) (motivated) 	 (e.g., 
a human disposi-
tion) 
Adapted from Hartwig (2007i, p. 458). 
The four types of tendencies (transfactual, ready, prone, and motivated) are not 
the only ones. Moreover, Bhaskar (op. cit., p. 415) also develops three other notions 
of tendencies, starting with the fulfillment of extrinsic-type but not intrinsic-type 
releasing conditions, or "lapsed" (delayed) tendency, (or tendency5). A power that 
is realized under all open circumstances is tendency6. Finally, the last, which is 
synonymous with empirical universal regularities that are assumed under all closed 
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conditions, is tendency7. 
Now, I want to review the above discussion on tendencies and fuse it with section 
5.2, p. 119 of this chapter. The importance of the concept of tendency, as developed 
in all its seven types, marks a clear point of difference between transcendental re-
alism and empirical realism (including its version of positivism). On the one hand, 
transcendental realism posits that intransitive objects, the objects of scientific inves-
tigation, exist and act quite independently of our knowledge of them, objects which 
are acquired in open systems and are subject to interference and interaction between 
various causal mechanisms. Following Bhaskar (2009, p. 242), we can ask: what is 
the social function or role (the ideological effect) of Humean constant conjunctions? 
[This logical form serves] to conceal the reality of structures irreducible 
to events, and more particularly of social structures to human actions 
and of societies to individuals... it defuses the possibility of science... of 
the conditions and possibilities of change in the unwilled structures at 
work in social life, the only possible ground of human emancipation. 
Above, Bhaskar argues that the logical form of Humean constant conjunctions follow 
an equivalent logic to the Marxian wage form because although there is nothing 
mysterious about their intention, both logics function to conceal the world of causal 
mechanisms and structures via the formula "whenever x then y" (Bhaskar, 2008a, 
p. 59) for determinism. For the capitalist, the logic of wages disguises the origin 
of surplus value—whenever I work one hour overtime, then I earn one and one-half 
of $7.25—and for the classical empiricist, causal laws are constant conjunctions—
whenever I see an emerald, then the green color is its law-like property—both logics 
are as irrational as they are necessary and also sufficient conditions for universal 
laws. 
Adapted from Bhaskar (2008a, p. 115). 
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Table 5.7, p. 139 shows that classical empiricists posit that Humean constant con-
junctions (of events) are both necessary and also sufficient for causal laws. In con-
trast, for the transcendental realists, it is not sufficient—since it is equivalent to 
the problem of induction—and it is not necessary—otherwise, why would we then 
need to set up closed systems? It cannot be necessary because there are no uni-
versal empirical regularities! Then, the transcendental idealists continue with the 
same problem, as they try to use Kuhnian paradigms, categories, or models to argue 
that it is sufficient. The transcendental realists agree that there is a need for such 
models but criticize transcendental idealists because they are unable to justify one 
paradigm over another. Thus, besides epistemic relativity, we also need judgmental 
rationality. 
5.6 A critical-realist account of science 
Science cannot be justified by any account that reduces it to its methods. Science 
needs to distinguish between transitive and intransitive dimensions and needs the 
means by which to create new scientific knowledge. 
[Without] the support of a revised ontology, and in particular a con-
ception of the world as stratified and differentiated too, it is impossible 
to steer clear of the Scylla of holding the structure dispensable in the 
long run (back to empiricism) without being pulled into the Charybdis 
of justifying it exclusively in terms of the fixed or changing needs of the 
scientific community. (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 10) 
To paraphrase the above quote, we need a third option in order to avoid choosing 
between two monsters; the practice of science cannot be justified without a revised 
ontology. Since science is a socially dependent enterprise, its justification depends 
on social matters. In addition, the CR account of science points to two moves that 
are necessary. First, given that scientific activity occurs, the world needs to be 
thought of a system that is structured such that science can be possible in order 
to understand it. Second, science belongs in the transitive dimension; it is not an 
independent category of human activity but is human activity. We see that science 
is dependent on human activity; thus it is scientific activity that makes possible the 
conceptualization of the structure of the world. 
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At this point, it is important to revisit the tenets of CR. From a CR point of 
view, there is always a gap, a distinction between the transitive and intransitive di-
mensions (TD-ID) of both the natural and social sciences. Thus, mind the gap! The 
TD-ID gap points to the difference between ontology and epistemology, but what is 
then the ontology of reality? CR argues in two ways, both of which are implied by 
experimental activity. A single instance establishes two arguments namely (1) the 
separation of ontology from epistemology and that (2) the ontology of a structured 
world, e.g., dr > da > de, in which the real is irreducible to the actual, and in 
which there is a differentiation between open and closed systems. The Bhaskarian 
argument is established by an immanent critique of experimental activity. This is 
an immanent critique because it selects as premises features which classical empiri-
cism and transcendental idealism regard as very important in science and proceeds 
to show that given an analysis of the feature; namely, experimental activity, such 
positions are unsustainable. 
If we do not mind the gap, between the intransitive and the social transitive 
dimensions, then we commit an error in argumentation namely, the epistemic fallacy. 
And if we do not mind the gap between the realm of the real (dr) and the actual 
(da), then commit the fallacy of actualism because we fail to see the irreducibility 
and multi-strata of our world—i.e., dr > da > de. Moreover, if we fail to analyze the 
subject matter of social science, society in open systems as tendencies (e.g., to-td), 
then we commit the Humean error of equating constant conjunctions of events with 
laws, which closes the gaps by treating the world as if it were a closed system. These 
two big gaps, the TD-ID difference and the dr - da distinction are in principle distinct 
but connected, form part of the arsenal to understand reality from the viewpoint of 
critical realist ontology. 
5.7 Critical realism - critical naturalism 
Critical naturalism is the CR stance in Bhaskar's The Possibility of Naturalism 
(PN) (1979), which explains that the philosophy of social science (and to an extent 
substantive social theory) is characterized by various dichotomies and provides the 
means to resolve them. We can refer to Table 5.1, p. 118, in order to recall the 
macro-dichotomies—e.g., collectivism vs. individualism, structure vs. agency, and 
naturalism vs. anti-naturalism—and the micro-dichotomies—e.g., mind vs. body, 
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reason vs. cause, and facts vs. values—of social science. While the immanent 
critique in transcendental realism is, in the first place, of experimental activity (but 
later also of applied activity) because this is the key topic that classical empiricists 
and transcendental idealists consider important. Now the immanent critique in 
CN, the philosophy of social science, is of the transcendence of dualisms. There is 
then a hermeneutic struggle in the philosophy of social science and social theory 
over existing dualisms; CR renders the resolution for the each of these dichotomies, 
which are also already identified in the activity-theoretical approach. This argument 
does not imply that one side of the dichotomy (e.g., structure) is more important 
than the other (e.g., agency) but that there is a need to understand the relations 
between them as a unified account which does justice to each of the terms. 
5.8 The dichotomy between individualism and col-
lectivism (or holism) 
The dichotomy between methodological individualism (or individualism for short) 
and methodological collectivism (collectivism or holism for short) is transcended 
with social relationism, or the idea of a "relational conception of the subject matter 
of social science"—that is, our contemporary society (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 31). On the 
one hand, we have a view of society that states that to understand social behavior 
or phenomena generally depends on understanding the behavior of individuals. The 
main purpose of individualism is to affirm that the explanation of social behavior or 
phenomena generally is only a matter of explaining individual behavior. This idea is 
very important because it highlights that the problem with this doctrine as involving 
a double reduction of (1) society to individuals (i.e., methodological individualism) 
and (2) of all being to behavior—i.e., all phenomena is behavior without relations 
and without social structures. Another way to think about individualism is see 
it as equating the terms "individual" and "behavior" . On the other hand, the 
counterpoint to individual behavior is group or mass behavior, or collectivism (or 
holism). The purpose of collectivism is to explain the behavior of individuals in 
groups or to explain the behavior of the masses. The key problem with collectivism 
is that it mistakes the subject matter of social science with the study of behavior in 
groups or the behavior of groups. In this manner, we see that the shared problem 
of individualism and collectivism is to misconstrue society as behaviors or events. 
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An important implication of these doctrines can be traced to the development 
of social theory. Both individualism and collectivism make the homology between 
society (in terms of individuals or masses) and behaviors. This homology together 
with an empiricist ontology (the view that knowledge can only be obtained from 
sense-experience) is responsible for creating a theory of society in which its laws are 
derived from the conjunction of patterns in social events-behaviors and which are 
validated by an implicit logic of common sense: the theory of positivism. This point 
is illustrated in the following diagnosis: 
it is this couple (empiricism-individualism) that I think must be held 
largely responsible, or rather acts as the metatheoretical trustee for the 
practices responsible, for the social scientific malaise. (Bhaskar, 1979, 
p. 25) 
Schematically, Bhaskar (1979) illustrates in more detail the limits of both individu-
alism and collectivism by reviewing four different attempts to conceptualize society, 
as shown below. 
Adapted from Bhaskar (1979, p. 39). 
Three of the four perspectives of society use behavior as the main unit of analysis, 
the other, the Mandan theory, which does see society as relational and from a 
realist viewpoint. The first, utilitarianism, is yet another instance of the empiricist-
individualist pairing. This utilitarian doctrine is contemporaneously popular, as the 
so-called rational choice theory (the application of neo-classical economics to social 
life), follows the same lineage that favors rationality, a commonsensical approach, 
to explain behavior for its own sake as the main driving force to acquire its ends—
such as passions, feelings, the idea of common good, etc.—and one in which reason 
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is always an a priori assumption. Second, in Weber's neo-Kantian view of society, 
we see that society remains individualistic, given that the individual's intentional 
behavior is conceptualized to construe society via our willpower. This model remains 
committed to epistemological structures to a degree of epistemic stratification. Last, 
the Durkheimian view of society, termed the "conscience collective" (Bhaskar, 1979, 
p. 38), refers to various types of solidarities, such as altruistic behavior derived from 
the individual's connection with the social space in which ideas, attitudes, behaviors, 
and cultures are shared. 
In section 4.4, p. 93, we saw that Activity Theory suffers from this individualism-
collectivism dualism. To transcend this limit, CR proposes going beyond a behav-
ioral unit for analyzing society. From a CR perspective, behavior belong to the 
realm of the actual, so that what is ruled out is the real. Behavior is only a su-
perficial aspect of society, so the aim of CR is to explain in terms of the structures 
or mechanisms that generate it. Thus, CR proposes seeing society in terms of its 
relations: "the relation of production of various kinds" (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 56) and 
at its core we have the Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). The 
concept of society as heterogeneous relations of production allows CR to transcend 
the dichotomy between individualism and collectivism. 
CR does not identify society either with individual behavior or mass behavior—
e.g., crowd behavior. Rather it proposes a relational conception of society or social 
relationism, which entails a look at relations between individuals. More specifically, 
CR defines society as the object of study that is "necessarily theoretical, in the 
sense that it cannot be empirically identified independent of its effects, so that it 
can only be known, not shown, to exist" (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 57). This view of society 
is concerned with relations that persist between people, such as the variety of often 
asymmetrical relations between males and females, old and young, and between 
oppressors and oppressed. For Bhaskar, the idea of accentuating enduring relations 
is because such relations are the generative mechanisms of social science—e.g., the 
structural relations of husband and wife, speaker and listener, Member of Parliament 
and constituent, manager and workers, supervisor and student, parent and offspring, 
etc. More specifically, the structure of society is: 
the persistent relations between individuals (and groups), and with the 
relations between these relations (and between such relations and nature 
and the product of such relations). (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 36) 
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To further understand the CR relational conception of society, it is necessary to see 
it against the background of other models of society. Following PN, I shall show 
such background in terms of four different conceptions of society and their respective 
relations to agency. 
5.9 The dichotomy between reification and vol-
untarism (structure-agency) 
Bhaskar (1979) develops the Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) 
to deal with the dichotomy between agency and structure. The agency-structure 
dualism also represents a problem for activity theorists, as shown in section 4.4, 
p. 93. In CR terms, agency refers to human praxis, both conscious substantive 
transformative production and typically transformative unconscious reproduction 
or transformation of structures, i.e., the conditions and means of substantive pro-
duction. We have first-order production and second-order reproduction or transfor-
mation of structures, which govern the production of structures and relations. The 
term "structure" refers to social objects or products that are relatively autonomous, 
given that they exist only as a consequence of human praxis—e.g., social institutions, 
language, culture, and so on. 
To transcend the agency-structure divide, a CR viewpoint begins with an analysis 
of its four models of society based on the work of Weber (Voluntarism, Model 1, 
Figure 5.2, p. 146), Durkheim (Reification, Model 2, Figure 5.3, p. 147), Berger and 
Luckmann (Illicit-identification, Model 3, Figure 5.4, p. 147), and Marx (Model 4, 
Figure 5.6, p. 151); Bhaskar (1979) stresses that Marx is on a different level, given 
that he develops elements for a realist ontology and a relational view of society). In 
Model 1, the structure is simply the product of agency. In Model 2, the structure 
exists independently of agency. Model 3 combines the two previous models so that 
the individual produces society (as in Model 1) and so that the society, so produced, 
feeds back to produce the individual (as in Model 2). In this way, the individual 
internalizes society and externalizes agency, e.g., the individual attributes in society. 
In Model 3, agency is an internal form, and the structure of society is an external 
form of the individual, and as we shall see with Figure 5.4, p. 147 such idea is 
also found in Engestromian structure of learning activity (compare with Figure 5.5, 
p. 149). 
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I provide diagrams and extended descriptions of all three models, which serve as 
the introduction to the concept that resolves the agent—structure divide, Model 4: 
the Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). 
Adapted from Bhaskar (1979, p. 40). 
Bhaskar (1979) describes Model 1 as a stereotypical Weberian perception of 
society combined with voluntarism conceptualization. From this viewpoint, society 
is formed by the wishes and wills of individuals, but the model does not account 
for the initial conditions that are available to the individual from society for the 
production of her wishes and desires. In this sense, we see that in this model, "there 
are actions, but no conditions" (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 46). The upward arrow is meant 
to illustrate how society is constituted, from an individualist viewpoint, with those 
objects of social knowledge that are the consequence of the individual's intentional 
behavior and meaningful actions. 
Bhaskar (1979) describes Model 2 as a stereotypical Durkheimian conception of 
society that is the result of combining a positivist methodology with a collectivist 
view of society. The reification model combines concepts of a collective (e.g., masses 
of people or groups) with an idea of natural relationships (e.g., collective conscious-
ness, solidarity, altruism, etc.). The problem with reification is that it reduces the 
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Adapted from Bhaskar (1979, p. 39). 
individual to conditions of natural relations without allowing for the efficacy of in-
dividual's actions, which might impact the initial conditions. Thus, we see that 
"there are conditions, but no actions" (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 89). The downward ar-
row is meant to illustrate how society is constituted with those objects of social 
knowledge that are external to and pressing on the individual. 
Adapted from Bhaskar (1979, p. 40). 
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Bhaskar (1979, p. 42) argues that Model 3 is a correct conceptualization of so-
ciety, insofar as it both conceives of the structure as preceding the agency and 
describes society as "always already made" . However, Model 3 shows externalized 
individual agency as society and, then, society as being internalized by individuals, 
which conflates these two because agency is seen as the inner form of society and 
society is the outer form of agency. According to Bhaskar (1994), this model is in-
adequate because, just as with Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration, a type of 
illicit-identification, we find that if agency externalizes society then there is nothing 
more to society than there is in individuals. However, it is clear that, say capitalism 
is more than what is internalized by particular capitalists because it has a whole 
logical system that cannot be reduced to its particular types. In Model 3, the zigzag 
arrows are meant to illustrate such internalizing—externalizing movement. The 
diagonal upward arrow indicates that society provides the conditions from which 
individuals obtain structures by a process of internalizing society. The diagonal up-
ward arrow indicates that the individual goes on to (re)produce society in a process 
of externalizing the produced society. According to Bhaskar (ibid., p. 35), this model 
is advocated by Berger and Luckmann and their associates, and to describe it, he 
coins the term "illicit-identification model" because its two-way flow between society 
and individuals provides a very attractive pseudo-dialectical conception. In short, 
the conceptualization of this model, which posits an internalization—externalization 
dynamic (i.e., society being internalized in agency and agency being externalized in 
society) is superficially attractive but ultimately erroneous. 
We may recall from section 3.5, p. 52, that Activity Theory uses a type of Model 
3, as shown with the Engestromian structure of learning activity in Figure 5.5, 
p. 149. 
For Engestrom, the structure of learning activity is equivalent to Figure 5.6, 
p. 151, because it illustrates the internalization-externalization process, which, sig-
nifies that 
Learning activity may be conceived of as expansive movement from mod-
els to the methodology of making models and back... But learning ac-
tivity is more than this. It is true development of instruments: "purifi-
cation"by elimination of secondary or accidental features, variation and 
enrichment, testing novel connections and disconnections. By bringing 
the products of science and art into a new type of formative contact with 
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Figure 5.5: Engestri5mian structure of learning activity 
Adopted from Engestrom (1987, The structure of learning activity, para 12). 
productive practice, learning activity introduces a new creative moment 
into the activities of science and art themselves. In other words, learning 
activity never leaves its instruments qualitatively intact. It is not just 
consumption of instruments given from outside. (Engestrom, 1987, The 
structure of learning activity, para. 8-10). 
Thus, there is a conceptual and graphical mirroring between Model 3 and the above 
learning activity because in the consumption of epistemic models given from social 
outside, agents reproduce that the social structure. In their creation of new epistemic 
models, agents also transform the structure. However, AT do not take into account 
(1) the temporal element in which structure precedes agency and it does not take 
into account that (2) the actions of agents still serve to reproduce the social structure 
(of learning activity), albeit unwillingly. 
A CR view of society agrees with the internalization-externalization process that 
occurs between society and individuals. However, there are two main problems with 
Model 3. First, societies and individuals can be shown to have very distinctive 
qualities and properties, yet this model does not articulate the relationship be-
tween the two. To illustrate this point, in Model 3, we see that society has all 
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the characteristics (e.g., consciousness, desires, and praxis) of a human being and 
that the individual has all the characteristics of society, but society is an abstract, 
theoretical, unconscious object incapable of having human characteristics. Hence, 
illicit-identification is a crude model of society. Second, the model assumes a sym-
metrical temporal element between the structure and agency by which both occur at 
the same time. For example, it does not recognize that for any particular instance of 
agency in time (e.g., an individual's birth, youth, mature life, etc.) there is always 
a pre-given structure—e.g., language, political system, cultural context, and so on. 
Bhaskar (1979) gives an example that clearly illustrates why Model 3 is wrong: sup-
pose that an individual goes to sleep at night, and then, the next morning, when 
he or she decides to change society, the societal structures are still there to struggle 
against. If society were simply the externalization of agency, then attempting to 
change structures would not be a problem. 
Thus, we see that all three sociological models lack an asymmetrical temporal 
element in which structure pre-exists agency, but this argument does not imply that 
structure determines agency. In this sense, the agent's response cannot be predicted 
from the structure alone. For instance, individuals can shape the given structures 
of the world, e.g., through learning a language, education, changing government 
policy, an institution, etc. To recall, Models 1, 2, and 3 address the structure-
agency problem in different ways, but all of them lack the dimension of temporality 
in which society pre-existed the individuals. The CR solution to this problem is 
that the agency is posterior to the structure. Given this, it is wrong to say that the 
individual creates society because society exists prior to any round of agency and 
any individual's conceptualization of it. 
From a CR viewpoint, the existence of society is not disputed; what is disputed 
is the individual's role in it. The agent can either transform it or reproduce the 
social conditions in which he or she lives. In this manner, there is always a structure 
there, as given, and individuals have to use the structure. Therefore, what happens 
by virtue of using the structure is that individuals reproduce society or transform it, 
shown by the Bhaskarian TMSA, (see Figure 5.6, p. 151). The TMSA must always 
be perceived as involving two levels: (1) the level at which the agent is producing or 
a achieving a certain result (e.g., the marriage of two people), and (2) the level of 
the social structure, in which in their substantive activity, agents reproduce or else 
transform it. This re-production is, for the most part done unintentionally, or to put 
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it in Bhaskarian: people do not get married to reproduce marriage or the family; 
people do not work to reproduce the capitalist wage-labor relationship; people do 
not go to Mass to reproduce Catholicism; people do not study higher degrees to 
reproduce the university institution; similarly, people do not speak to reproduce a 
language, and so on. Rather, these are the unintended products of the social struc-
ture or what in colloquial terms is, the enduring relationship's collateral damage or 
byproduct. The Bhaskarian TMSA graphically conveys these two levels in which 
(1) is the level of the agent (individual) and (2) is the level of the social structure 
(society). TMSA takes the connection between social structure and agency as one 
Figure 5.6: Transformational model of social activity or TMSA (Model 4) 
Adapted from Bhaskar (1979, p. 46). 
that has always existed. The parallel arrows between the society and the individual 
show how the pre-given society is the theoretical, unperceivable object of inquiry 
that cannot be characterized independently of the effect it produces. The downward 
arrows indicate that it operates on individuals through inter alia, a process of so-
cialization. The upward arrows indicate how the individual can operate on society 
by either transforming or reproducing it. This connection is clearly summarized as 
follows: 
people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a nec-
essary condition for their activity. Rather, society must be regarded as 
an ensemble of structures, and practices and conventions, which individ-
uals produce or transform, but which would not exist unless they did 
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so. Society does not exist independently of human activity (the error or 
reification). But it is not the product of it (the error of voluntarism). 
(Bhaskar, 1979, p. 46). 
From a CR viewpoint, there is a split between structure and agency such that they 
are irreducible: the notion of irreducibility means that one term, such as the social 
structure, cannot completely be explained using the other term, such as "agency" , 
and vice versa, so that agency cannot be completely explained in terms of "struc-
ture". Rather, there is always a gap between these two terms. The property of being 
irreducible is equivalent to stating that we cannot regard agency as internalization 
and that we cannot regard society as externalization because they are different ob-
jects of investigation. Because of this, in any concrete explanation, we need to refer 
to both. 
Now, we have already seen that Activity Theory employs an erroneous internalization-
externalization conception of society. CR proposes Model 4, which resolves the 
structure-agency dualism by elaborating upon the connections between them in 
such a way that we recognize both irreducible terms to be necessary. Thus, we see 
that we cannot explain phenomena in the world without involving structures, while 
simultaneously we cannot give explanation without involving agents. 
In order to better differentiate between the TMSA and Model 3, it is impor-
tant to clarify both their shared and distinctive features. A feature that these two 
models share is the condition for the continuity of society. This model is also dis-
cussed in Bhaskar's Plato, etc. (1994), in which the TMSA model is compared to 
Anthony Giddens' model, and we see that it, too, has this feature in common. In 
other words, society can only continue insofar as agents act or produce it, so that 
society does not exist without individuals' actions. The most important feature that 
distinguishes this model from previous ones is the temporal asymmetry'. that exists 
between agency and structure, a mind-the-gap! principle'. From a CR viewpoint, 
the structure is always there, so that when any act is being contemplated—that is, 
when any initiation of agency is beginning—the agent is always acting on the basis 
of the presence of the past. This reference to the past signifies a reference to the 
1See Appendix B for other asymmetries, p. 289. 
2This mind-the-gap! principle is a type of, what Bhaskar (2008b, p. 205) calls, a hiatus, which 
requires us to conceptualize it in two related but different dimensions (the gap as a type of gulf in 
the spatial dimension and a split in the temporal dimension) as "necessitating the constellational 
dislocated duality social structure and human agency". 
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structures that the agent inherits and employs in life. 
The previous dualism of reification and voluntarism is resolved with the TMSA, 
Model 4, by (1) insisting on the temporal element, in which society is always prior 
to agency; however, (2) in using the structures, human agency (both individual and 
collective) reproduces or transforms it. In using these structures, agency itself gets 
transformed, and what transforms it is human agency. In this manner, the depen-
dency on human praxis implies that reification is not possible. At the same time, 
voluntarism is not possible because individuals do not create the social structure, 
the structure is presupposed, and thus the best they can do is to transform it. Thus, 
the TMSA avoids the problems of reification and voluntarism. Moreover, after we 
have resolved the dichotomy of structure and agency and explored the TMSA, the 
next step is to situate it in what Bhaskar (2009, p. 68) calls four-planar social being. 
(For an explanation of this (social) planar laminated system see Figure 4.4, p. 107 
and section 6.3.3, p. 195). In the four-planar social being allows us to recognize, first, 
that agency plays a role in all of the planes and, second, how particular domains 
of study focus on a single plane. For instance, the fourth plane is the stratifica-
tion of the embodied personality, which is the object of the study of psychology. 
Micro-sociology is concerned with the second plane (social interactions with people) 
and macro-sociology is more concerned with the third plane (the social structure). 
In this manner, I have shown how CR provides a more holistic account of these 
concepts, which are also important for Activity Theory, in order to consider social 
explanations without falling into dualisms or reductionist arguments. 
5.10 The dichotomy between naturalism and anti-
naturalism (positivism-hermeneutism) 
The central question that Bhaskar (1979, p. 1) addresses in order to transcend the 
dichotomy between naturalism and anti-naturalism is: "To what extent can society 
be studied in the same way as nature"? On the one hand, naturalism claims that 
all sciences come together according to positivist principles, and its logic can be 
traced back to the European Enlightenment. In particular, the positivist view of 
knowledge holds the priority of reason to be a rational, common-sense assertion 
that can be justified through scientific, sense-experience verification, from which 
positivism derives its authority and legitimacy. (In SRHE, Bhaskar (2009) argues 
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that positivism works as an ideology of science and of other social practices). On the 
other hand, anti-naturalism is concerned with the interpretation of objects of study 
in social science. This theory of interpretation (or hermeneutics) has been found to 
have originated from a concern to interpret the scriptures. Hermeneutics is already 
present in the Viconian tradition, which claims that it is possible to know objects 
that are created by human beings. In particular, a Viconian view of knowledge holds 
that it is possible for human beings to understand the objects they create but that 
since the natural world is the creation of God, that world itself lies beyond human 
comprehension. For example, we can understand the things we create because we are 
the authors of them, but we cannot understand the things created by God. In order 
to resolve the dualism between naturalism, as embedded in positivist principles, and 
anti-naturalism, as embedded in hermeneutics, Bhaskar (1979) proposes a critical 
naturalism (CN) by arguing that both society and nature can be studied in (1) 
essentially the same manner, i.e., the study of generative mechanisms of social or 
natural phenomena in general, but (2) using specific methods for each discipliner . 
The main purpose of CN is to "vindicate naturalism against hermeneutics on 
the basis of a non-positivist, specifically realist, account of science" (Bhaskar, 2009, 
p. 81). It is differentiated from reductionism—the argument that proposes that 
the study of one, for example nature, can be identified with the other, for example 
the social, by reducing the social realm to the natural realm, or vice versa—and 
scientism—the argument that proposes that both subject matters can be studied 
using the same methods, thereby denying the significant differences in the nature 
of their respective objects of investigation. In contrast to both reductionism and 
scientism, critical naturalism aims to give a more appropriate and specific account of 
the methods by which natural and social sciences can be distinguished. To this aim, 
the argument is grounded on three main considerations that place limits on the pos-
sibility of this project by looking at the similarities and differences between subject 
matters. Bhaskar (ibid., p. 56) calls these three considerations ontological, episte-
mological, and relational limits; more specifically, these three barriers are called "the 
limits of naturalism" because they define the extent to which social science cannot 
be like (i.e., must be different from) natural science. 
1As we shall see in the next chapter, these two ideas refer to what Bhaskar (2010, p. 20) calls 
(1) the axiom of meta-theoretical unity: the possibility of an essential unity of the natural and 
the social, which differs in the specific way in which these fields produce science; (2) a method-
ological specificity: the idea that asserts that the natural and social sciences differ in some of their 
methodology (compared with Table 6.6, p. 215). 
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From a CR perspective, I want to highlight that the nature of the object of study, 
in fact, determines the type of possibility for its scientific investigation. This point 
is a hallmark of CR, and it means that the way we study any object pertaining 
to the social or natural realm is grounded in what it is. For example, we can 
interview people, but we cannot interview the objects with which natural science is 
concerned, e.g., we cannot interview the weather. The nature of the object of study 
determines its mode of inquiry. This vindication of the ontology of the object of 
investigation means that although it is critical of anti-naturalism, CR can argue that 
hermeneutics is an important part of the method of social science. The study of the 
three main limits of naturalism, outlined below, is the study of the conditions that 
make social science possible. These three limits are important because they have 
methodological implications, which, in turn, are due to the fact that the possibility 
of applying those methodological conditions depends on practice, as tabulated by 
Hartwig (2007c) with the following Table 5.9, p. 155. 
Table 5.9: Limits to naturalism 
Type Derivation Limits 
ontological Transformational Model 
of 	 Social 	 Activity 
(TMSA) 	 (CN) 	 four- 
planar social being 	 (or 
social cube) (DCR) 
social, unlike natural, structures 
are 	 (1) 	 concept-dependent, 	 en- 
tailing 	 a 	 hermeneutical 	 start- 
ing 	 point 	 for 	 social 	 science; 
(2) activity-dependent, entailing 
(quasi)-autopoiesis 	 (or partially 
self-created); (3) more space-time 
specific, 	 entailing relative tran- 
sience (geo-historicity) 
relational TMSA (relational char- 
acter 	 of social life 	 en- 
tails causal interdepen- 
dency of social science 
and its subject matter) 
social-relational dependence: 	 so- 
cial, unlike natural, structures are 
causally impacted by science. 
Continued on next page 
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Table 5.9 — Continued from previous page 
Type Derivation Limits 
relational TMSA (relational char- 
acter 	 of social 	 life 	 en- 
tails causal interdepen- 
dency of social science 
and its subject matter) 
social-relational dependence: 	 so- 
cial, unlike natural, structures are 
causally impacted by science. 
epistemological 
or methodologi- 
cal 
TMSA (openness of so- 
cial systems, impossibil- 
ity of closure) 
absence of decisive test situations 
for social sciences 
critical TMSA (unacknowledged 
conditions, 	 unintended 
consequences, tacit skills, 
unconscious 	 motivation 
of agency) 
social, unlike natural, objects in- 
cluded beliefs about themselves; 
situates 	 the 	 possibility 	 of 	 ex- 
planatory critique of conscious-
ness and social forms 
Adapted from Hartwig (2007c, p. 93). 
5.10.1 Ontological limits of naturalism 
The ontological limit refers to the differences between the subject matter of so-
cial science (social structures) and the subject matter of natural science (natu-
ral structures). The ontological limit is derived from the emergent properties of 
social structures in open systems. We can recall from TMSA the definition of 
a social structure (e.g., language, theories, institutions, etc.); it is itself a social 
product that is susceptible to transformation because it is created by social ac-
tivity. In SRHE, Bhaskar (2009) gives four initial ontological limits: (1) activity-
dependence, (2) concept-dependence, (3) time-space-dependence, and (4) social-
relational-dependence. These four ontological barriers are paraphrased and illus-
trated with salient examples that pertain to both the social and natural worlds. 
(1) Activity-dependence The existence of social structures is dependent but ir-
reducible to the social activity that creates and regulates these structures. For 
example, an educational institution exists because of the activity generated in 
it, but it cannot be identified as the sum of the individuals who compose it. 
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By contrast, the existence of natural structures is independent of human ac-
tivities. In nature, for instance, plutonium exists independently of its utility; 
thus, the activity-dependence that we are referring to here is human activity. 
(2) Concept-dependence The existence of social structures is dependent but not 
exhausted by individuals" conceptualizations of them. All activity that is 
intentional occurs at the interception of reasons and causes, i.e., intentional 
activity is informed by beliefs and wants/desires. Hence, social explanation 
needs reference to social parameters, which denotes the dependency of social 
structures on concepts. For example, the structure of a war depends on the 
notion of war, but war is about much more than the concept. Alternatively, 
when we turn to the natural realm, we see that natural structures exist inde-
pendently of our conceptualization of them. For instance, gravity existed in 
pre-Newtonian times, before the concept was discovered. The need to invent 
concepts to understand both the social and natural world does not reduce 
these worlds to mere concepts. In particular, in the case of the social world, it 
has an irreducibly material dimension, i.e., it involves flesh-and-blood bodies 
as well as material objects, such as trees, and so on. 
(3) Time-space-dependence Because social structures are created by human ac-
tivity, they are social products. As social products, social structures ex-
ist for agents in a particular time and place and can be reproduced and-
or transformed within a particular range that corresponds to agents' spatio-
temporality in history. For example, the abolition of slavery in Western Europe 
occurred in a particular spatio-temporal range, about a century prior to the 
abolition of slavery in the Americas. Natural structures, though, appear to 
endure as greater space and time universals because it is very probable that all 
natural structures are subject to change after long periods of time. An exam-
ple of a natural structure is the cosmos; something that came into being and 
has its own geo-history, but it is a very slow one, un-perceivable in comparison 
to how human beings perceive everyday time. 
(4) Social-relational-dependence The existence of social structures as social 
products depends on the activity of agents to effectively reproduce or transform 
the structure. Agents occupy a particular position when they are engaged in a 
network of social relations that enable, and also govern, the practices needed 
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for such reproduction. To a minor extent, agents also transform the structure. 
Thus, the network of relations is a necessary condition for the continuity of 
the structure and the identity of agents. As an example, we can say that 
a teacher occupies a particular identity and position with respect to the net-
work of relations that define a classroom. However, with respect to the natural 
world, natural structures exist independently of social relations, although so-
cial relations can create products that affect natural structures. For instance, 
pollution affects the atmosphere. 
Aside from all these differences between social and natural structures, Bhaskar 
(1979) identifies three more limits: (5) relationality, (6) internal complexity, and (7) 
interdependency, but we see that although (5)-(7) apply to social structures, they 
do further differentiate social structures from natural structures, as shown below. 
(5) Relationality Social structures are not perceivable, but they are materially 
manifested in the present as the result of individuals' actions. Thus, social 
phenomena must be perceived as the resultant effect of various causes. Social 
structures as social effects imply that there are relations between individuals' 
actions, relations that transform or reproduce these actions. For instance, we 
cannot perceive the structure of slavery, but we perceive the relations between 
master and slave that produce it; similarly, we cannot perceive the structure 
of a family, only the relations between its members. 
(6) Internal complexity and (7) interdependency Generally, social structures 
display a type of internal complexity because we do not see them from their 
genesis; rather, they are manifested as the result of processes. Interdepen-
dency refers to all the conditions that need to come together (e.g., agents, 
relations between agents, modes of production, etc.) to create such internal 
complexity. To further illustrate, complexity and interdependency are very 
much a function of the fact that the social world is essentially an open system, 
but most of nature is an open system as well. We can recall that open systems 
are domains where empirical regularities do not occur. 
In addition to ontological limits, there are those barriers that are denoted by the 
methods employed to study both natural and social structures (i.e., epistemological 
limits). The connection between social knowledge and social theory and their con-
ceptualization, which are part of the subject matter of social science, also includes 
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facts and values (see section 5.14 on p. 176 of this chapter) as part of what I had 
discussed in the previous section, i.e., relational limits. 
5.10.2 Epistemological limits of naturalism 
Let us recall that the objects of study of social science are not perceivable, but 
we can perceive their effects. We can recall the example of a family in which we 
cannot perceive the social structure—that is, the network of relations between the 
adults, the father and mother, and the children. However, the nucleus of the family 
is what we use to denote the effect of the unseen network of such relations. Effects 
only manifest in the presence of open systems, where patterns or regularities from 
experiments are not manifested. The reason for this manifestation is that we cannot 
do experiments in social science, or at least anything that seems to be an experiment, 
because it cannot result in a regularity, which reflects the operation of a law. In 
general, we do not get regularities in open systems. The patterns that are found are 
done so somewhat by chance because it is impossible to do experiments in social 
science. In order to do an experiment, we need to be able to close the system that we 
are dealing with, which we cannot do in the social world. In other words, we cannot 
close the system of the social world. To reiterate, the objects of social science, social 
structures, cannot be closed to experimental conditions. 
Now, we cannot do experiments with study social structures without encounter-
ing two main problems: measurement and irreversibility. The first problem deals 
with taking measurements. In social science, we often see that we cannot ade-
quately measure concepts—e.g., race, socioeconomic status, and so on). According 
to Bhaskar (1979), the use of language as a measure stands as the structure (par-
allel to geometry in physics) that allows the social structure to give an accurate 
meaning of definitions employed in social theory. In other words, the analogue of 
measurement is meaning. For instance, since we cannot measure concepts; what we 
can do is give a precise characterization of the situation. However, meaning is not 
a measurement but a statement about a situation. A second problem deals with 
irreversibility, which allows social science to give an accurate account of definitions 
it employs. According to Bhaskar (1979), irreversibility (as parallel to entropy, the 
theory of increased disorder in the natural science) presents us with the problem 
that both quantitative and qualitative notions change over time. For example, en-
tropy is the opposite of negentropy, or dialectic (a more comprehensive account of 
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the dialectic is given in Chapter 7, p. 220); dialectic is progressive change to a more 
comprehensive structure. Negentropy, or dialectic, is an increase in order and form, 
whereas entropy is an increase in disorder. In this manner, we see at least two dif-
ferent ways to characterize change over time: as the increase of chaos (entropy) or 
as the increase of order and form (dialectic). For instance, the second law of ther-
modynamics says that physical systems show an increase in disorder. Now, there 
are various phenomena in the natural world to which this increase in disorder does 
not apply, such as the evolutionary process of some plants, like orchids, which de-
veloped from more primitive forms to their current orderly state. In short, entropy 
is not a generalized truth in natural science. Analogously, the irreversibility of both 
quantitative and qualitative conceptualizations is not a generalized truth regarding 
increased disorder in social science. These two problems are manifested in social 
theories that try to convey an adequate account of social structures but that are 
ultimately limited. I give examples of such limited theories by referring to Bhaskar's 
RTS, in which he shows how certain theories do not apply in natural science and in 
social science because they rest on two main principles of orthodoxy, which he calls 
P1 and P2: 
• P1= empirical-invariance, i.e., laws are or depend upon empirical regularities, 
and 
• P2= instance-confirmation (or falsification), i.e., laws are confirmed (or falsi-
fied) by their instances. (Bhaskar, 2008a, p.117). 
According to Bhaskar (2008a), the orthodox philosophy of the natural and social 
sciences is grounded in Hume's theory of causality underpinned with principles P1 
(empirical-invariance) and P2 (instance-confirmation), which are based on the as-
sumption of a single level of an undifferentiated world, and thus all these theories 
(1-10, below) yield a closure. Bhaskar gives two conditions for closure: 
"Bl" the absence of powers, which is dependent upon the absence of in-
trinsic structure (implied by atomicity), and B2" the constancy of pow-
ers, which is dependent upon the constancy of intrinsic structure". (ibid., 
p. 68). 
From a CR point of view, reality is open but susceptible to closure. The Bhaskarian 
view identifies a number of theories, including theories of explanation and prediction. 
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All these theories ultimately do not yield the presupposed closure, and they are all 
presupposing an analysis of explanatory structure or generative mechanism as be-
ing Humean constant conjunctions, either these constant conjunctions (or empirical 
regularities) are both "necessary and sufficient" (op. cit., p. 118) or they are nec-
essary, i.e., as in transcendental idealism, but not sufficient. The crucial part is the 
assumption that they are necessary because such presupposition ties the generative 
mechanism to the level of actuality and empirically. For critical realists, Humean 
constant conjunctions are neither necessary nor sufficient, as illustrated with Table 
5.8, p. 143. These theories are paraphrased as follows. 
A theory of deductivism uses the term deductivism to refer to theories that act 
on the grounds of "P1: empirical-invariance" and "P2: instance-confirmation" . 
These theories include those that auto-denominate themselves under the titles 
"instrumentalism": the idea that questions the interpretative descriptions of 
laws but fails to question their argumentative logic, and "inductivism"—the 
idea that makes an inference of general from particular instances; it presup-
poses a confirmation of law which aims to give rise to. Inductivism can be 
considered deductivism in its practice. The underpinning logic of deductivism 
is the argument understands the world as reducible to a surface structure. 
This logic reduces everything to the surface so that there is no deep structure 
in the world. 
The P1: empirical-invariance principle at work (1) As previously discussed, 
Hume's theory of causality sees causal laws as events. Since it is possible 
for such relations to be constant—that is, either causal laws depend on cir-
cumstances or causal laws depend on events—then we have the P1: empirical 
invariance, and thus a closure. (2) Bhaskar (2008a, p. 118) sees two instances 
of that general argument which identifies causes in the form of "X causes Y": 
(2a) a theory to find meaning, i.e., events are explained by the pairing of X 
and Y, and (2b) a theory for justification, i.e., events are provided a rationale 
by the pairing of X and Y. For these (2a-2b) theories, the events can always 
be substituted for a weaker version under a different set of descriptions. 
A theory of explanation (3) The Popper-Hempel theory is a theory of explana-
tion. It is a deductive-nomological theory that explains an event by subsuming 
it deductively under a universal empirical generalization or narrative. From 
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a Popper-Hempelian perspective, events can be explained by including them 
in a single universal law, also referred to as the "covering-law requirement" 
(Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 119), or by subsuming them into a set of universal laws 
and their initial conditions. Nomological deductions (or D-N: meaning deduc-
tive and nomological, or universal law-like statements) fall under this category 
because these types of explanations aim to deduce something under a univer-
sal law when the law is interpreted as an empirical regularity. A nomological 
account implies a universally and empirically truthful account. It is most fre-
quently justified by reference to Hume's theory of causality, so such an account 
stands or falls with this theory. This D-N form takes two prerequisites: (3a) 
reducibility—a requirement which states that we are able to deduce the things 
that we want to explain (explanandum) from the explanation (explanans), i.e., 
explanans explanandum—and (3b) covering law—as explain above, this re-
quirement subsumes events under at least a single universal law understood 
actualist or as a universal empirical regularity. 
A theory of prediction As the name suggests, theories of prediction argue that 
events are effectively predicted by a deduction from their initial conditions and 
from a set of universals. In such cases, predictions mean that the explanation 
of events lie in the future, which is differentiated those that are in the past. 
(5) A theory of symmetry of (3) explanation and (4) prediction, in which a 
D-N explanation can be a D-N prediction if in the implication explants 
explanandum, the explanans are known and accounted for as cited evidence 
at an earlier time. (6) Theories in which the explanation of events, laws, 
and science lies in hypotheses or principles that use descriptive, fictional, or 
instrumental interpretation follow a D-N form, and thus have closure along 
with Humean theory. (7) The explanation of scientific theories is done in 
terms of a linear evolution of science; it includes (7a) scientific theories in 
which truth—value and meanings remain unaffected by change and (7b) new 
theories that remain invariant under other established theories. These theories, 
according to Bhaskar (2008a), take the form of what Kuhn meant by "normal 
science" , which are also a type of D-N form of closure. 
P2: The instance-confirmation principle at work (8) The explanation of science-
theories-laws is done by confirmation or corroboration with actual or possible 
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sense-experience. (9) The explanation of science-theories-laws is done by fal-
sification with a counter object or the example of an actual or possible sense-
experience. (10) The criteria for what is regarded as scientific (an agreed 
observable situation by which to refute a theory) and unscientific. 
To sum up, such theories in orthodox philosophy of science make a fatal presup-
position of actualism and implicitly they also presuppose a closed system. We can 
recall that in open systems, theories of explanation and predictions do not provide 
the bases for justifications because they lack invariance or empirical patterns. The 
P1: empirical-invariance principle is at work in theories of prediction and causal 
identification (e.g., see numbers 2, 4, and 5), which result in a closure. In D-N 
arguments (e.g., see numbers 3, 6, and 7), we see that they are grounded in Hume's 
theory (1), and thus they give a closure. Now, the instance-confirmation principle 
(P2) is at work in theories of confirmation, corroboration, falsification, and a cri-
terion for what is regarded as scientific or unscientific (e.g., see numbers 8, 9, and 
10), which gives a closure in open systems. However, they are possible in closed 
systems. Thus, all these orthodox theories assume actualism or empirical realism 
and therefore presuppose a closed system, therefore they are all false! 
Now, it is important to explain the role that experiments play in natural science 
from a CR perspective. The role of an experiment is to allow us to test a hypothesis 
regarding the operation of a structural mechanism by creating a situation in which 
we observe or can measure the effect of the mechanism acting alone—that is to say, 
without interference from other mechanisms and structures. 
5.10.3 Relational limits of naturalism 
According to CR, social science has an "internal" relationship with its object of 
inquiry, but natural science does not. For example, social science uses concepts, 
explanations, laws, and theories that are susceptible to its own field, which is not 
the case for natural science. Social objects of knowledge are linked by their inter-
dependence with social activity. What this internal relationship means is that the 
researcher is part of the subject matter that he or she is trying to describe when 
studying social science. The researcher's social activity is interdependently con-
tained as part of the social object of his or her investigation. In other words, the 
investigator is included as part of social science, whereas in studying natural science, 
the investigator is not included. For instance, if a scientist is giving an account of 
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the theory of electrons, he or she is not internal to that theory; in other words, the 
discourse employed in the social activity is not internal to that theory in a way that 
it is internal when giving an account of, for instance, an anthropological description 
of a community. 
In contrast, in natural science such objects of knowledge exist and also act in-
dependently of whatever knowledge we are capable of producing about them. It 
is here, that Bhaskar (1979, p. 60) distinguishes between processes of "causal in-
terdependency" and "existential intransitivity". The former refers to a contingent 
characteristic of production, and the latter is an a priori condition applicable to 
both social and natural spheres. First, we can explain causal interdependence by 
reference to the connection between social theory and society. This internal link 
makes us aware that theory does not exist without society. Second, we can explain 
existential intransitivity by considering any object of investigation, 0, in the nat-
ural or social spheres. This 0 exists; viz., it has been produced. It is in a state 
of "being", and thus it is subject to investigation. Bhaskar (1979) points out that 
the existence of the object is the same for both the natural and social sciences but 
that objects 0 differs precisely because of the mode by which the existence of 0 is 
investigated. 
We can now return to the opening question of this section, which aims to tran-
scend both naturalistic and anti-naturalistic views. We see that the main error 
of positivism is its disregard for existential intransitivity. And the main error of 
hermeneutics is that it does not account for it. In turn, social knowledge and social 
theory and their relational conceptualization are part of the subject matter of social 
science so that if we have a theory that is capable of explaining social phenomena 
then it may help to transform it. For instance, if we are in possession of a theory 
about how to stop people from being unemployed and then we act on it, it opens 
up the possibility for the theory to reduce the level of unemployment, and in this 
manner the theory reduces the practical problem. 
Following Bhaskar (1979), we have seen is that there are similarities and differ-
ences between social science and natural science. These sciences can explain phe-
nomena by reference to generative mechanisms and structures; however the methods 
by which explanations are achieved differs in both cases. Whereas in natural science, 
experimentation may allow for structural discovery, in social science, hermeneutics 
plays an important part. In Bhaskarian terms, social reality is pre-interpreted! We 
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do not have social reality unless it is already interpreted in some way. Social science 
begins by investigating it hermeneutically, the pre-interpretations of its subject mat-
ter. This pre-interpretation means that if we want to investigate people's actions or 
belief systems, we must obtain their interpretations or ways of seeing reality in the 
first place. For Bhaskar, this is the idea of hermeneutics, a critical one. Then after 
this initial inquiring into the perspective of people, then we can critique it. 
The problem is that orthodox hermeneutics fails when it argues that the hermeneu-
tic moment, which is not found in the natural world, exhausts the social world 
meaning that interpretative theory completely explains the social. For CR, the so-
cial world is concept dependent, which the hermeneutics usually argue, but concepts 
do not exhaust it. For instance, we can recall classic Bhaskarian examples in which 
there is more to war and hunger than the mere notions of war and hunger, but what 
is the "more" ? From a CR viewpoint, we can describe the "more" as the material 
elements in social life. For instance, the material element in the case of war is the 
actual fighting between people, deaths, destruction, etc., and the material element in 
the case of hunger is the actual feeling of emptiness due to the lack of food. In short, 
concepts come into the social world, but we cannot explain the world via means of 
concepts alone. In this manner, it is important that I highlight that hermeneutics 
is necessary, but not sufficient, in social science. For example, interviewing a family 
about their relationships is a way to get to the structure and character of such re-
lationships. Thus, hermeneutics in a CR is an initial step in the process to get to 
explanatory structures in social life. 
5.11 The dichotomy between dualism (body-mind) 
and reductionism 
Critical Realism (CR) transcends the classical dichotomy between dualism and re-
ductionism with the concept of Synchronic Emergent Powers Materialism (SEPM). 
On the one hand, dualism is the position that argues for the separation between 
mind and body. From this perspective, mind is seen as an intangible and mysteri-
ous entity that leaves the nature of consciousness unexplained. On the other hand, 
reductionism is the doctrine that argues that mind is neither the inner adaptation or 
response to the environment nor the outer expression of behavior; rather, mind is a 
material substance whose workings are identified as functions of the brain. From this 
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viewpoint, human experiences, intentions, wants, and other functions are not simply 
an outcome of the brain, but these functions are reduced to their identification to 
particular areas of the brain that seem to produce them. However, this causal view-
point does not account for consciousness, intentionality, desire, or pain and their 
location in the brain. Whereas dualism argues for the split between the physical 
body and its non-substance mind, reductionism considers the mind-body unity to be 
a material substance, but it ignores consciousness, from which the initial questions 
about the nature of mind and body first came. To transcend the dualist-reductionist 
problem, CR conceives mind "not as a substance, whether material (reductionisms) 
or immaterial (dualistic idealism), but as a complex of powers" (Bhaskar, 1994, 
p. 102). From a CR perspective, mind and body are part of a single unified material 
power in which the functions of the brain are real and causally efficacious but irre-
ducible to identification by their locations in the brain. Bhaskar's original SEPM 
idea proposes the following: 
I want to leave open the questions as to whether there is a bearer or 
substance whose powers they are; and, if there is, as to what its identity 
is. That is, it will remain possible that mind just is a complex or set of 
powers, as far as we know, historically emergent from and present only in 
association with (certain complex forms of) matter. But it will equally 
remain possible that there is a substance, whose nature is at present 
unknown, which is the bearer of those powers. (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 124). 
This powerful position and argument for it, resolves the mind-body dualism (to-
gether with reductionism) of Activity Theory. In light of current developments 
in neuroscience and other disciplines, our understanding of the how the brain has 
evolved and keeps evolving needs to be expanded. The particular idea of synchronic 
emergence is compatible with the evolutionary explanation of the origin of the brain 
as the medium of mental processes, what is termed "diachronic explanatory re-
ductionism" (ibid., p. 25). But even though the brain provides the basis for the 
possibility of the existence, identification, and exercise of mental powers, these can-
not be completely reconstructed or explained in terms of the governing elements that 
compose the brain. In short, while synchronic emergence means that that brain is 
irreducible to a lower level of its functions, diachronic emergence means that its 
evolution cannot be predicted from analysis of its current functions. CR provides 
us with SEPM, an ontological point of view that remains historically consistent 
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with the evolutionary genesis of mind, while accounting for mind's dependency as 
an emergent power, but at the same time neither avoiding the collapse of our un-
derstanding of those powers of the brain into the pure identification of physical, 
chemical, and behavioral conditions (a reductionist point of view) nor covering it 
with purely mystical, and indescribable ideas (an idealist point of view). 
5.12 The dichotomy between reasons and causes 
SEPM provides a "robust theory of intentional causality" (Bhaskar, 1994, p. 76), 
which is what other theories of mind, such as AT, lack. To explain intentional 
causality, Bhaskar (1979, p. 88) aims to give an affirmative answer to the philo-
sophical question, "Can reasons be causes?" In particular, SEPM accounts for the 
intentional behavior of people by grounding causes in reasons. When something is 
done for a reason, this is an instance of intentional causality. We see that it is only 
because our behavior is always caused by some reason that we can properly identify 
it as intentional. Otherwise, when something is caused by no reason, we characterize 
such an event as accidental, a contingent event. Another way to restate the proper 
characterization of intentional behavior is to say that if we do not have a reason 
for behaving or acting in a particular way, then we do not say that that behavior 
or action is intentional. However, intentional behavior is not obvious. Let us con-
sider another example in which we need to redefine a behavior in order to see the 
intentionality. Suppose that we describe the action of eating a plate of peas. Then, 
we find that there is no answer to the question regarding the reasons why a person 
eats peas in particular. It might be the case that peas are the only source of food 
available for a hungry person. Given that, there is no particular reason attached to 
the cause illustrated with the simple description of the behavior, e.g., eating peas. 
What this example is trying to convey is the redefinition of the action in order to 
see the intentionality. 
5.12.1 The theoretical robustness of intentional causality 
The theory of intentional causality is an argument that implies that though people 
are not always knowledgeable of the reasons for their actions, when they are acting 
intentionally; there is nevertheless always a reason for their action. For example, 
people are capable of giving reasons that explain some behaviors or actions, but these 
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reasons are only available in terms of their physiological, social, and psychological 
mechanisms. In this way, the Bhaskarian intentional causality argument is also 
aimed at re-vindicating psychological science with the hypothesis of naturalism that 
considers that "there are generative structures, knowable to men, producing the 
manifest phenomena (in this case of consciousness)" (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 102). By re-
vindicating psychology, I mean that the science of psychology is well worth the many 
efforts to understand human beings, motives, reasons, etc., and only possible if we 
have a stratified notion of reality. Thus, investigation of social, psychological, and 
neural-physiological states can be understood because the mechanisms that affect 
individuals' reasons operate in open systems (non-experimental conditions). 
In addition, SEPM accounts for the notion of consciousness as an irreducible 
property of the brain that is conceived as an emergent power. Bhaskar (1979) is 
committed to showing that there exist certain powers that people exercise in con-
sciousness. The existence argument is shown compared to the problems of idealism. 
These powers are irreducible to the physical operations that turn into actions, which 
is an argument against both materialism and behaviorism. To further understand 
Bhaskar's argument, we start with the definitions of what are meant by mind, per-
son, praxis, and human praxis from a CR viewpoint. 
5.12.2 Persons and praxis 
When a person acts, he or she is always both (a) performing a social act and (b) pro-
ducing a physical effect (or change). We have that (a) when a social act is performed 
is typically done by (b) producing an effect in the material world. In addition, the 
notion of praxis has two aspects. The first aspect of praxis is intervention in the 
world. This intervention is temporally inferred by both phylogenetic relations (e.g., 
developing from a birth state to a branching process) and ontogenetic relations (e.g., 
developing traits or characteristics) of human development, and it normally has a 
physical form (e.g., production). For example, when we have a conversation, we are 
intervening in the world of matter by producing sound waves, as the physical bases 
of our utterances as they are being interchanged with an interlocutor. Under other 
conditions, the physical form might be of primary importance, such as in the case 
of a hungry person, where the exchange of food is important. The second aspect 
of praxis is the reflective capacity of people for intervention, which is related to the 
state of being aware of an intention; we can recall that this involves consciousness. 
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In fact, self-reflexivity is necessary in order to define the conscious state of any en-
tity. From a CR point of view, reflexivity is a "necessary condition for any discursive 
(non-intuitive) intelligence" (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 190). Such reflexivity allows a person 
or entity to comment about reality and to causally intervene in the world. 
5.12.3 Activity 
With respect to human activity, CR points to the distinction between what agents 
do (which are actions) and what happens to people (including agents). The generic 
term "behavior" includes intentional actions and things that happen to people but 
are not intentional (contingent events). Consider the case, for example, in which we 
are trying to catch a bus; it is normally intentional. However, catching a cold is not 
an intentional event but a physical result. To further illustrate this double aspect of 
human activity, Bhaskar (1979) provides the following points. The first is that there 
is a distinction between behavior and intentional action. If an agent holds his or her 
hand up, then the raising of the hand is done because something caused it. But there 
is a distinction between the behavior (the mere movement) and the intentional action 
(raising the hand). The second point is that in the case of intentional behavior, such 
behavior is not intentional under all descriptions. To return to the example of the 
plate of peas, it is intentional under some descriptions—for example, we are eating 
peas because we are driven by hunger. To take the example further, if we were 
to drop the plate of peas, this might set off a different response, an unintended 
consequence of actions. The crucial idea is that when there is intentional action, 
there is a reason. 
According to Bhaskar (1979), there is a correct way to describe an action, and 
it depends on context as well as on the purposes that inform it. However, we can 
make an appropriate decision to determine if the action, under some description, is 
intentional or not. Although some actions may be considered basic acts (e.g., moving 
an arm), this type of basic behavior may nonetheless be performed intentionally. The 
difference between a basic act and a non-basic act is that in the basic act, we do 
not perform it by doing something else. For example, for most adults, walking and 
tying shoelaces are basic acts, whereas for a toddler, walking and tying shoelaces are 
non-basic, given that performing them requires conscious attention until, gradually, 
the act becomes basic, as if it were performed without thinking. The notion of a 
basic act is particularly important in learning because the more we know about a 
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particular domain of reality, the more we can perform basic acts. 
In addition, the action may also be mis-described by both the agent and the 
observer of the action. As we have seen, we can distinguish between what the 
agent performs and what is performed in the action. For instance, if as a person 
performs the action to make a right turn but due to a traffic jam finds himself or 
herself on a different road, then driving into the traffic jam is the result of an action 
but is not what was originally intended. The explanation of an action will always 
involve cognitive (e.g., beliefs) and cognate (e.g., desires-wants) aspects. Aside from 
these necessary components, we may return to the Bhaskarian components of action 
(shown in Figure 1.1, p. 4) to recall all other aspects that need to be satisfied for 
an action. Moreover, in the description of an action, if one of these two aspects 
is mentioned, then the other is presupposed. Therefore, if an action is done for 
a particular reason, then that reason causes it. A CR viewpoint argues that the 
concept of causality is vital in order to assess the causal efficacy of any type of 
reason. Without the idea that a reason causes an action, there are no grounds for 
saying the action is intentional! 
5.12.4 A cause for what? 
It follows that we need to ask: what is a cause? In our daily experience, we refer to 
a cause when such thing is de facto perceived as a factor affecting the circumstances 
that resulted in a deciding what has "tipped of balance of events" (Bhaskar, 1979, 
p. 91) that made the difference of some known result or outcome. What is charac-
teristic of CR is that it looks for the underlying mechanisms without denying that 
other phenomena are also important. Reasons function in CR as causes, and it is 
possible to have empirical knowledge of reasons because they are refutable by means 
of reference to the totality of what a person does. In order to show that reasons 
can be causes from which empirical knowledge can be discursively derived, Bhaskar 
(1979) rebuts previous arguments that deny this and shows why if naturalism is 
possible, then reasons need to be seen as causes. 
According to Bhaskar (1979, p. 95), one of the strongest arguments against 
anti-causality is the "logical connection argument". This argument maintains that 
(a) there is a separation between causes and effects but also that (b) reasons are 
homologous to actions. In other words, reasons are the same as the actions they 
aim to explain. In turn, (c) there is a distinction between reasons and causes. From 
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a CR viewpoint, these premises are faulty because an effect can successfully be 
identified (or described) with reference to its causes. For instance, Bhaskar (1979, 
p. 95) presents an example using the statement "toast as burn"; that is, when we 
describe toast by referring to its state of being burned, then what we are doing 
is re-describing it in terms of the causes of its present condition, denoted by the 
burn-as-adjective effect. It is not sufficient to say that a cause is always logically 
different from an effect because the way we describe the effect is precisely in terms 
of its cause. In this way, the identification of a cause logically entails its effect. 
To give another example, consider the statement, "Tom drinks coffee". We may 
describe drinking as a non-intentional action, but normally we assume that when 
we drink coffee, we are doing so intentionally. In this manner, causality is ordinarily 
attributed but in the context of another environment (e.g., prison, hospital, etc.), 
drinking coffee might not be intentional but forced. 
Regarding the notion of a cause, "it has to be a cause for something" (Bhaskar, 
1979. p. 94). If we have X, a cause, then it needs to be attached to some want or 
action so that we see an internal connection between X, a cause, and causing X. 
To return to the example, the reason for wanting (the illumination of a space) is 
internally connected to causing it (turning on the light). If reasons are not causes, 
then what is at stake is the notion of decisions, accountability, justification, and 
rationality for accepting one explanation over others, illustrated as follows: 
unless reasons were causally efficacious in producing one rather than 
another sequence of worldly movement, sounds or marks, it is difficult 
to see how there can be grounds for preferring one reason explanation to 
another. (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 103). 
To paraphrase, what Bhaskar is effectively saying is that unless we understand 
reasons to be potential causes, we cannot distinguish between an explanation, in 
terms of a reason, that is true and another that is false. Moreover, when we speak 
about intentions, generally there must be a belief (something cognitive) and a want 
and-or desire (something cognate) and further aspects, as seen in the Bhaskarian 
components of action (Figure 1.1, p. 4). The intentionality fuses the desire-want 
and the belief. We can think that belief is what guides a person to satisfy a want-
desire. If there is only belief itself, i.e., a belief for its own sake, then it does not 
necessarily issue an action; it needs to be accompanied by the want-desire, i.e., we 
need to want something for the action to be intentional. Therefore, CR argues that 
171 
5. Basic CR 
reasons and causes cannot be differentiated on the grounds of their explanations or 
the differentiation of their effects. Reasons are not just justifications; but rather are 
the necessary conditions for the adequacy and accountability of any action. 
5.13 Critical realism - explanatory critique 
This section illustrates one of the most important tenets of BCR: explanatory cri-
tique. The concept of explanatory critique is how Bhaskar (1979) resolves the di-
chotomy between facts and values. The dualism between facts and values starts with 
Humean theory that proposes it is inadmissible to go from "is" to "ought"—e.g., F 
-"+ V: it is inadmissible to transition from factual statements to evaluative proposi-
tions. In opposition to Hume, CR argues that it is possible to transition from "is" to 
"ought" from facts to evaluative statements. I will illustrate the argument in three 
simple stages by making reference to daily examples. The first stage is concerned 
with (1) the CR commitment to critiquing false beliefs. The second is related to 
(2) the critique of the action that is always grounded in the belief, and the third is 
concerned with (3) the removal of the causes of false belief. 
(1) The commitment to critiquing false beliefs From a CR perspective, to crit-
icize a belief is to commit oneself to an evaluation that is aimed at removing 
that belief. For example, if we criticize the belief that witches exist, then 
we are simultaneously committed to an evaluation not to believe that witches 
exist. From a critical-realist viewpoint, every time we criticize a false belief, 
such as the belief that witches or ghosts do not exist, we are simultaneously 
committed to its evaluation, that because witches do not exist, one should not 
hold that false belief. The critique not only is a criticism that highlights what 
is wrong with a false belief but also is an explicit or implicit commitment to 
the evaluation either that the belief is wrong and therefore should be changed. 
(2) The critique of those actions that are always grounded in the belief To 
illustrate, if an individual has a false belief and he or she acts on it, then some-
one who criticizes the belief is also implicitly criticizing the action insofar as 
the action is informed by the belief. In other words, the critique of the be-
lief is also an implicit critique of any action informed by that belief. Let us 
suppose, for example, that an individual believes that witches exist and that 
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this individual acts on this belief, e.g., through various forms of worshiping, 
such as the offering of scarifies, cleansing spells, etc. We can criticize the be-
lief in witches as a false belief by saying that witches do not exist. However, 
this criticism is also implicitly saying that the individual should not act the 
way he or she does (by worshiping or doing any with any other action based 
on the belief in witches) because all actions are informed by both beliefs and 
wants. In other words, there is no action without a belief. Thus, the second 
point states that to criticize a belief is not merely a suggestion to get rid of it. 
Rather, it criticizes any physical or other type of action that is informed by 
that false belief. 
(3) The eradication of the identified causes of the false belief For example, 
if we are able to identify the causes of a false belief, then saying that that belief 
is false not only is an implicit criticism of the actions but an commitment to 
changing the mechanisms that are generating them. For example, if we think 
that believing in homeopathy is caused by, for instance, a lack of education 
that then causes people to believe in certain mechanisms with curative pow-
ers, then we are implicitly criticizing whatever actions that produce the false 
belief, thereby demonstrating a commitment to eradicating the structures that 
support the practice of homeopathy. In this way, we see that to move from 
the critique of a belief to the causes of a belief already opens up the space 
to explanatory critique. At the heart of this discussion is Hume's theory, the 
central doctrine, or orthodox analytical philosophy, of science that states, as 
its first argument, that individuals cannot make a transition from a fact to a 
value position, e.g., Hume's Law: F -4 V. In other words, when we are con-
fronted with facts, we can we are still free to adopt any value position. For 
example, a fact that associates cigarette smoking with a high risk of getting 
cancer is quite irrelevant given that there are values we can choose in order to 
ignore this fact. Regarding the transition from fact to value, CR objects to it 
on the grounds that the process of learning about mechanisms of the world is 
constantly shaping our understanding of it and therefore continuously shaping 
our values. A second argument states the reverse: that we cannot make a tran-
sition from values to facts, e.g., scientism: V -4 F. Regarding the transition 
from value to fact, CR does not dispute that a value position often influences 
a factual one; however, it insists that factual findings can also influence val- 
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ues. In this way, there is no vicious argumentative circle. Critical realists are 
interested in knowing whether scientific knowledge can help humanity resolve 
moral disputes, which is the more powerful connection that departs from the 
orthodox philosophy of science. The orthodox school of thought holds that 
there is no judgmental rationality, an undecided position on the matter. 
I have already illustrated the Bhaskarian explanatory critique with the three stages 
and the examples above. Now, I move to a comprehensive explanation in more 
general terms, as denoted by the inference scheme (IS), below. 
Table 5.10: Explanatory-critique inference scheme (IS) 
(i) T > P (ii) T exp 1 (P) -+ (iii) V (S -+ I(P)) -+ (iv) V0_, 
Adopted from Bhaskar (1991, p. 152). 
Bhaskar (1979) develops the concept of explanatory critique to deal with the problem 
of facts and values. Why do we need to explain false beliefs? The answer is that 
otherwise, a false belief might not change since humanity is unable to produce an 
explanation that without it, the powerful social conditions that hold some belief 
in place cannot be changed. For example, suppose that I have a rational belief in 
the power of the Pope, the king of England, the tribe chief, or the banker, then I 
am unable to change such way of thinking until I also question and get rid of the 
social structure—i.e., religion, the monarchy, the tribe, capitalism and so on. The 
key question is: why do I believe that? In Bhaskarian, if we cannot explain why 
there is false belief that, for example slavery is an adequate practice, then we there 
is little possibility of changing it. We can make a clear case when we characterize 
a system of beliefs as a false consciousness or ideology. The three-part argument of 
explanatory critique is illustrated as follows. 
The main idea of explanatory critique is denoted by the three-part argument in 
which T denotes a theory or set of theories that are able to explain P, a belief that 
is held about some object. I paraphrase each of the three stages from Bhaskar's PN 
(1979) as follows: 
(i) T >P, the theory T is superior to a belief P, and 
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(ii) T exp 1 (P), the theory T explains the very illusory character I of a belief P. In 
other words, T is explaining why people have certain false beliefs or illusions. 
The important implication of parts (i) and (ii) is to criticize a belief as false; 
that is, to say why false continuousness is held is to explain the practices or 
actions that sustain such a false belief. In other words, the critique of action 
entails an explanation of the belief that sustains such an action. It is followed 
by: 
(iii) -V (S ---> I(P)), a negative evaluation -V that explains why false beliefs are 
necessary, an explanation sufficient for social relations S to account for the 
actions sustained by illusion of belief I(P) as a dissonance between reality and 
belief. Smoking can be seen as an example illustrating this point. Smoking has 
been shown to be a significant cause of various types of cancer, yet it remains 
prevalent in society. In this sense, we have a negative evaluation of smoking. 
The last part of the explanatory critique is, then, 
(iv) Vo_s, the positive evaluation that aims to change the source of false belief. In 
other words, positive evaluation states that we need to get rid of structures 
that produce illusionary beliefs, 0 — s. To return to the example of smoking, 
the positive evaluation not only is meant to insist in the explanation that 
smoking causes cancer but also is a motivation to get rid of the cause, which 
requires a critique of the actions and structures that go with it, such as the 
act of smoking. To get rid of smoking, we need to ask, why do people want 
or feel the need to smoke? The key idea here is that until people change their 
perspective and thus practice, they will go on smoking. 
The development of Bhaskar's (1979) explanatory critique, as presented in IS, is 
not a straightforward refutation of Hume's laws, i.e., F -0+ V, and it is not an 
argument that advocates radical political practices. It is an argument that is aimed 
at explaining why practices are held and backed up by false belief. Given that 
explanatory critique is grounded in the explanation of the needs, wants, intentions, 
aspirations, illusions, and, potentially, belief and in the critique of the actions that 
inform them, we can raise the following question. 
Why is explanatory critique important for social science? Explanatory critique 
attempts to explain why people hold illusory or false beliefs. It becomes necessary 
for the transformation of any society. Another way to illustrate the critique of 
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false beliefs is with the example of people who have obsessions, such as people who 
constantly wash their hands. What we need to do is to understand the reasons 
why such people have the compulsion to wash their hands, what they believe, and 
what is causing that action. From a CR perspective, if we are concerned with 
social transformation, then we need to understand the causes of false beliefs. To 
reiterate from section 5.12.1, p. 167, actions do not exist without beliefs. All human 
action can be subjected to criticism, explanation, or justification, which involves 
getting to the root belief that informs the action. The argument of explanatory 
critique in the Inference Scheme (see Table 5.10, p. 174) is the theoretical means by 
which to explain false continuousness. This concept of explanatory critique becomes 
necessary for any society because it is through practice that false beliefs are held, 
and practice is necessary for the continuity of any society. From the perspective 
of CR, if the individual agent is able to explain the rationale of his or her belief, 
then there is a possibility of transforming it. It is important to note that beliefs 
cannot be described as being grounded in total voluntarism because action is always 
intentionally grounded in belief. 
5.14 The dichotomy between facts and values (and 
that between theory and practice) 
[Social] science is non-neutral in a double respect: it always consists in 
a practical intervention in social life and it sometimes logically entails 
value and practical judgments. (Bhaskar, 2009, p.158). 
We have already seen that the dichotomy between facts and values is centered on 
the idea of "no ought from an is" (Bhaskar, 1994, p. 83), developed by Hume as 
the central doctrine of the orthodox analytical philosophy of science, e.g., Hume's 
Law: F -,+ V. In opposition, Bhaskar's (1991, p. 115) argument as developed in 
IS is the following that (i) T > P. (ii) T exp 1 (P) ---> (iii)-V (S --+ I(P)) --4 (iv) 
V0_, can be contrasted against other sociological arguments, e.g., scientism, Hume's 
Law, Taylor's argument, Searle's arguments, and Prior's argument, as illustrated in 
Table 5.9, p. 155, in order to identify their shortcomings from which we can further 
discern why explanatory critique is important for social science. What is crucial 
to emphasize is that from a CR perspective, our factual statements have critical 
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evaluative implications for the transformation of societies in general. 
Table 5.11: Arguments to override the fact-value di-
chotomy 
Scientism: VHF 
Hume's Law: F-AN (positivism and its displacements) 
Charles Taylor's argument: T 4-÷ F -+ V 
John Searle's arguments: I.F. -+ V 
A. N. Prior's argument: F.F. —> V 
Bhaskar's argument: (i) T > P. (ii) T exp 1 (P) -+ (iii)-V (S —> I(P)) --> (iv) 
V 4,-, 
Adopted from Bhaskar (1991, p. 155) 
where V = values, F = facts, T = theory, P = practice, S = causal reasons. 
First, Bhaskar (1991) starts with the distinction between the first two propositions—
(1) selection of problems (e.g., facts cannot be derived from values) and (2) Hume's 
Law: F-AN (e.g., values cannot be derived from facts)—in which his main argument 
is directed against Hume's Law, but he also rejects scientism. It follows that in 
refuting scientism, Bhaskar accepts the dependency between facts and values. More 
specifically, Bhaskar (1979) shows that the transition from value to fact (scientism: 
V-0+ F) has been traditionally analyzed from different perspectives. 
1. The perspective of the subject (the subject matter of social science) 
(a) in relation to the subject's selection of problems 
(b) in relation to the subject's conclusion 
(c) in relation to the subject's relative standards of inquiry 
2. The perspective of the object of investigation 
3. The perspective of the relationship between the subject and object 
1. From the perspective of the subject, it is argued that social science is con-
cerned with "value-free" objects but is in need of "value-relevant" objects of study. 
(a) First, the selection of problems in social science is guided by this value bias. 
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The social object of study is motivated by practical reasons (e.g., technical, indus-
trial, or medical concerns, etc.), and the natural object of study is motivated by 
theoretical reasons that seek to understand mechanisms that describe the natural 
object. The problem with the perspective of the subject is that it confuses practical 
applications with purely theoretical interests. From this perspective, for example, 
we can justify the investigation of the natural object (e.g., the study of cells) with 
theoretical reasons—e.g., to understand uncontrolled division of cells. Similarly, the 
social object (e.g., the study of social drives of smoking) can be justified for practi-
cal reasons—e.g., to sell more cigarettes. Then this perspective leaves unexplained 
what constitutes the "value-relevant" objects of study. (b) Second, the concern with 
the conclusion posits a powerful "interface" between the subject's interest in and 
knowledge about the object of study. Bhaskar (1979, p. 63) suggests that the "inter-
face" could operate consciously (e.g., lying), semi-consciously (e.g., optimistic wish-
ful thinking), unconsciously and by rationalization (e.g., mystifications or ideologies 
that could be regarded as necessary). Thus, rationalization presents a problem of 
value bias in the sense that a rationale presupposes knowledge about values and 
society in general. With respect to all these modes of "interface" he suggests that 
these are modes of avowal, which are unnecessary and misleading. (c) Third, in 
order to avoid making a selection between these modes of "interface", CR accepts 
that all beliefs are social products (e.g., what he calls "epistemic relativism", which 
implies that the knowledge derived from scientific inquiry and the truth—value cri-
teria for its rationality do not exists beyond its history. In addition, Bhaskar rejects 
the idea that all beliefs, values, and knowledge about the object of investigation 
are equally valid (e.g., what he calls "judgmental relativism" ). Therefore, I want to 
emphasize that a CR critique of social science in relation to the three perspectives of 
the subject (e.g., when the subject of social science is concerned with the selection 
of problems, conclusions, and standards of investigation) is grounded in accepting 
epistemic relativity: the idea that beliefs are socially produced, and rejecting judg-
mental relativism: the idea that all beliefs as equally valid, but that is accepting 
judgmental rationality: the idea that an individual can choose between beliefs. 
2. The perspective of the object of knowledge: social science requires that we 
be able to evaluate means of communication in order to give an accurate account 
of the object under investigation. From this perspective, "value impregnation" is 
required to stress the dependency between the subject matter (social science) and 
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its object (the knowledge of its values). Once we agree that social-scientific dis-
course is not neutral but is saturated with value, what follows is an inquiry into the 
descriptive accuracy of such evaluative descriptions—e.g., the Bhaskarian accuracy 
of description, Table 5.12, p. 179, illustrates the range in which values permeate 
discourse. 
Table 5.12: The accuracy of description in value-
impregnated social-scientific discourse 
During Nazi-ruled Germany 
(a) The country was depopulated 
(b) Millions of people died 
(c) Millions of people were killed 
(d) Millions of people were murdered 
Adapted from Bhaskar (1994, p. 110). 
A hermeneutic description of these statements tells us that regarding the period of 
Nazi-ruled Germany, the statements (a) to (d) are all accurate. However, statement 
(d) is, at the same time, more factual and more precise because it renders a better 
description. Thus, the perspective of the object that says social science needs to 
be able to evaluate its means of communications fails to provide criteria for the 
accuracy of the descriptions of values that better explain the object of study. We 
see from this perspective that the accuracy of hermeneutic description is necessary 
but remains an insufficient condition, as illustrated by Bhaskar: 
In general, one can say that the most adequate description of a phe-
nomenon will be that entailed by the theory which maximizes explanatory 
power, for which hermeneutic adequacy is necessary, but not a sufficient, 
condition. (Bhaskar, 1994, p. 110). 
A hermeneutic perspective can be taken as a staring point, given that it is necessary 
to maximize explanatory power for any phenomena, but it does not completely 
explain the world. For example, knowledge is a necessary condition for transforming 
the world, but it is insufficient on its own. 
3. The relationship between facts and values stresses the dependency of 2. 
and entails the "contingent necessity for value-laden descriptions" (Bhaskar, 1991, 
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p. 155). The problem with 3. is that, just like 2., it lacks criteria for accurate 
descriptions. To illustrate, the arguments by Taylor, Searle, and Prior show ways 
in which one may try to override the fact—value dichotomy; their summary and 
rejection, according to Bhaskar (1991), are as follows. 
• Taylor's argument T H F -4 V states that theories create values, but it is 
rejected on the grounds that it fails to provide criteria for deciding among 
theories. Otherwise, we would be able to favor any theory that produces the 
desired values. 
• Searle's argument I.F. ---> V states that values can be derived from institutional 
facts (I.F), but it is rejected on the grounds that it fails to question the moral 
grounds or criteria of institutions. To give a simple example, the argument 
says that if we make a promise, then we must do what we have promised. 
Of course, the promise can be made tactically with the aim of benefiting 
particular interests, and in this sense, there is no constraint to keep to what 
was promised. 
• Prior's argument F.F. -+ V states that values are derived from functional facts 
(F.F), which makes a distinction between "good facts" —facts under which 
societies flourish (e.g., knowledge about the mechanisms that cause disease)—
and "bad facts"—those under which societies decay (e.g., systematic plans for 
extermination, culling, etc.). However, it is rejected on the grounds that it 
fails to ask the question, does the flourishing of a society occurs as to cause 
harm to or neglect of other societies? 
Although I have summarized how Bhaskar rejects the arguments by Taylor, 
Searle, and Prior, this not does immediately mean that one can argue for the tran-
sition from facts to values because social science is informed by both the values and 
practices that motivate it. More specifically, we can recall that the argument for ex-
planatory critique is not merely a refutation of Hume's Law or of scientism. Rather, 
there is a dependency between facts and values, which Bhaskar (1991) demonstrates 
with the following Figure 5.7, p. 181. As denoted by the diagram, Bhaskar (1998) 
looks at the asymmetrical relationships between facts and values. The Figure 5.7 on 
p. 181 shows how the move from facts to values entails it. In other words, scientific 
facts call for certain values. For example, our scientific knowledge about smoking-
related causes of cancer calls for an attitude of worth and importance towards health, 
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Adopted from Bhaskar (2009, p. 161-162). 
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second-hand smoking, economic repercussions of tobacco plantations, etc. As well, 
in going from value to fact, according to Bhaskar, values motivate and pre-dispose 
certain factual findings, but they do not entail it. For example, societies value the 
banking system, but they do not call for facts (say into bank bonus for top exec-
utives); there remains an irreducibly empirical element necessitating investigation 
into what reality shows. 
5.15 Conclusion 
The principal concern of this chapter is to conceptualize the new level of Bhaskar-
ian dialectics 4D: learning as product-in-process. In doing so, I have investigated 
learning as a transformative praxis by means of the introduction to BCR. Simul-
taneously, this introduction functions as the main conceptual means by which CR 
resolves various dichotomies of Activity Theory and social theory in general. 
Moreover, this chapter needs to be understood as a first of three parts under the 
conceptual umbrella of 4D. The second-part is the following Chapter 6 on p. 183 
is an appendix to Chapter 5, where 4D: learning as product-in-process means by 
putting CR to work on the issue of interdisciplinary activity. I first identify what 
does interdisciplinarity mean for AT, and in general; second, I show what has been 
omitted from it. Then I shall argue for ontological and epistemological reasons in 
order to properly ground interdisciplinarity, in a CR philosophical substance, against 
actualism, reductionism, and mono-disciplinarity. 
The third part is Chapter 7 on p. 220, where 4D: learning as product-in-process 
means introducing dialectical CR and putting it to work. I shall argue that DCR 
can render a superior account of the historical development of concepts that are 
very important to AT (e.g., the concept of contradiction) by giving an in-depth a 
critique of the philosophical roots of Hegel and Marx from which AT initially stem 
from. As with AT, dialectical learning is also inspired by Hegel, but in DCR, it lacks 
Hegelian closure in thought. 
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Chapter 6 
An appendix to Chapter 5: 
Applied critical realism and an 
interdisciplinary conception of 
activity 
Verse, they tell us of One Greater To whom the dying appealed; Verse, 
as one our fates are sealed: We are damned or saved together!' 
6.1 Introduction 
Interdisciplinary activity' refers to the "integration of a number of disciplines into a 
research cluster which provides, or purports to provide a new, framework for under-
standing" (Hartwig, 2007f, p. 259). Climate and cognitive, or the learning sciences, 
can be taken as contemporary examples of such activity. From a critical realist (CR) 
perspective, in order to provide an original framework for understanding an object of 
investigation, interdisciplinarity requires insights from a range of dissimilar schools 
of thought (Bhaskar, 2010). With that, there is an additional possibility of conflict 
due to the inherent nature of such interplay between different disciplines. An imme-
diate question thus arises: what is the platform of civility, values, accepted customs, 
lA translation of José Marti's Versos sencillos by M. A. Tellechea (1891/1997, p. 123). 
21 am using the principal of division in discussing Critical Realism (CR); i.e., I am concerned 
with basic CR, then in this chapter I am dealing with the issues that stem from it. Those issue 
mainly deal with interdisciplinarity. For this reason, Chapter 6 is called Appendix to Chapter 5. 
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or conditions by which multiple disciplines of distinct domains of knowledge can 
generate successful interdisciplinary activity? I argue that because it attempts to 
provide a conceptual under-laboring foundation for what is often an arbitrary pool-
ing of multiple disciplines, which lack an adequate scientific ontology, CR offers a 
philosophical platform that advances interdisciplinarity. 
The trouble with [interdisciplinary research], for example, is not that 
it has no (or too many) paradigms or research programmes; but rather 
that it lacks an adequate general conceptual scheme. (Bhaskar, 2008a, 
p. 194). 
Allow me to begin by explicitly differentiating between related multi-, cross-, and 
post-disciplinary research activities or projects. Multidisciplinary activity involves 
research, which in order to understand some object of investigation, draws upon 
multiple fields of knowledge without challenging their identity or their methodolog-
ical boundaries. Price (2010), for instance, argues that while, in the last decade, we 
have experienced an increase in multidisciplinarity-related research and teaching, 
e.g., in universities that award multidisciplinary degrees, US agencies, and recog-
nized institutions, such as the World Health Organization, which have embraced 
research under this flag, the actual meaning of this term remains a contested issue. 
This is because, in general terms, multidisciplinary is justified as a mixed method-
ology, which has a tendency to unify quantitative and qualitative research without 
regard for their incommensurability. Kuutti (1996) and Nardi (1996), for exam-
ple, apply Activity Theory (AT) as a multidisciplinary framework that draws upon 
cognitive and computer sciences under a mixed methodology in order to study the 
relationship between the learner as user and machine in terms of human-computer 
interaction research. Cross-disciplinary activity refers to research exemplified from 
the viewpoint of another discipline; for instance, a facet of this thesis, i.e., Critical 
Realist Activity Theory (CRAT) can be seen as research of AT that is exemplified 
from a philosophical CR viewpoint. Transdisciplinary activity refers to research that 
provides a transportable model or framework to cross boundaries from one discipline 
to another. For instance, Hadorn et al. (2008) provide a general three-phase model, 
as described by (1) an initial identification and structuring of the problem (e.g., 
poverty, hunger, land degradation, diseases, or more specifically, the economic and 
ecological problems caused by the biotic invasion of, for example, non-native grey 
squirrels into coniferous landscapes populated by red squirrels in Scotland and the 
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UK). This is followed by an (2) analysis of the problem, and a final (3) bridging 
of conclusions to fruition. Post-disciplinarity additionally denotes research that en-
visions the end of disciplines as we currently know them, and advocates for a new 
form of research freedom as an eclectic unity. 
Following Price (2010), we can reserve the word interdisciplinarity for critical-
realist philosophically grounded activity. Multidisciplinarity is always referred to as 
non-critical realist and mixed-methodology research with outcomes that resemble a 
"pastiche" of various pieces of autonomous research stories without the advantage 
of seeing a potential of contradictory outcomes that may result from a single, solid 
"laminated" explanation. Price isolates a range of methods of justification (which 
claim to be multidisciplinary investigations) that are provided in the literature. 
They are paraphrased under the four general titles that follow. 
First as qualitative, then as quantitative In other words, first a hypothesis 
formulation, which is followed by a hypothesis testing rationale. This justifi-
cation consists of two phases. While the first phase uses qualitative methods 
(e.g., case studies, interviews, etc.) to aid in the formulation of a hypothesis, 
the second phase uses statistical methods to test it. The basic dilemma with 
this method is that there is no system to account for exceptions to the rule, 
as in the case of the problem of induction (discussed in section 5.3.2, p. 122), 
when in fact the exception makes the rule. 
A multi-case study sampling rationale This rationale provides a justification 
for multiple-case studies that are treated as a sample pool of a whole pop-
ulation. In this case, the researcher needs to argue for a literal-theoretical 
replication of each case study in the sample pool, i.e., case studies need to be 
homogenous enough to utilize statistical inference in order to draw predictive 
conclusions. 
[A] literal replication stage, in which cases are selected (as far as 
possible) to obtain similar results, and a theoretical replication stage, 
in which cases are selected to explore and confirm or disprove the 
patterns identified in the initial cases. (Zach, 2006, p. 9) 
The problem with this approach is that it fails to notice that the uniqueness 
in every individual particular (e.g., structure, event, case study, etc.) can offer 
insights of some universal (e.g., a generative mechanism, a law, etc.). 
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A blurred qualitative-quantitative methodological rationale This is the typ-
ical use of statistical methods on categorical data, for instance, the use of non-
parametric statistics in the case of the assumption of a normal distribution 
is not satisfied. This claim of interdisciplinarity is based on the grounds of a 
vulgar-pragmatism "best-fit purposes" that fail to resolve the incommensura-
bility of two different types of data and methods. 
Waving the interdisciplinary flag Such "waving" means to gather a research 
report, under the title of interdisciplinarity, investigations from different dis-
ciplines about a single topic. This type of justification refers to gathering 
information from different fields to make a report in order to "guide" investi-
gators regarding best methods. For example, the topic of climate change has 
been studied under a number of different disciplines; say mathematics (e.g., 
it uses weather models to fit recorded global surface temperature) and ge-
ography (e.g., it uses theoretical investigations of glacial periods from the 
starting premise of the earth's expansion of massive continental glaciers). 
Such claims of interdisciplinarity are founded on a skeptical post-modernist 
approach, which rationalizes its report as follows: (a) the best thing to do 
in qualitative research is to fully describe or communicate the status quo. 
Nonetheless, it forgets that the issue is often to change it; and (b) the best 
thing to do in quantitative research is to make predictions with computer sim-
ulations as if the world were a closed system. On the contrary, CR posits that 
there are no (epistemically significant) closed systems in the social world and 
generally, it is only in the laboratory that we have epistemically significant 
closed systems in the natural world'. 
CR currently sees the importance of maximizing "explanatory power" (Bhaskar, 
2008b, p. 123) in a totalizing of traditional disciplines (e.g., sociology, history, math-
ematics, philosophy, etc.) and non-traditional ones (e.g., discourse analysis, ed-
ucational studies, or cultural analysis) without claiming post-disciplinarity (e.g., 
'There are spatio-temporal restricted; but, which are very long standing closed systems; for 
example, the solar system since we can accurately predict the position of say, a planet on a precise 
date such as May 15, 2016. Critical realists have argued for a degree of openness of systems. In 
other words, some systems are more open than others. For example, Brown (2009) refers to the 
school environment as a quasi-open system, and the same could be argued about a prison, because 
although they are socially open system, our knowledge of the mechanisms that regulate or tend 
to control them allows us to make certain predictions (or educated guesses). Such tendencies that 
the quasi-open system exerts is be simply overridden by other countervail ones in most cases. 
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research that does not consider particular disciplines, but rather it sees it as dif-
ferent discourses' in the surface events of reality), and without resulting in anti-
disciplinarity (e.g., research that at the expense of universalizing, ends up dissolving 
disciplinary boundaries and creating a crisis of identities because it lacks an apt 
philosophical foundation). Following Bhaskar (2010), disciplinarity is necessary be-
cause it allows the opportunity to move from the surface of reality, for instance, from 
events to deep structures and generative mechanisms, so that what is needed is a 
dialectic of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. Disciplinarity is essential because 
of the depth it affords toward the understanding of how the different mechanisms 
work together. Interdisciplinarity is similarly requisite to providing an integrated 
account of such phenomena. 
Although it is most prevalent in the social sciences and humanities, in the nat-
ural sciences we find a variety of examples of these inter-, multi-, cross-, and post-
disciplinary projects. They frequently emphasize an epistemologically oriented na-
ture of research, while CR emphasizes that knowledge cannot be reduced to its 
methods: epistemology is included in ontology. 
'Following Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, p. 38), the term discourse refers to the "semiotic 
elements of social practices" . This semiotic reference is to various forms of language such as verbal 
and non-verbal communication, and visual images. Since social practices (e.g., human production) 
are seen as articulating together various elements of social life, then discourse as different ways 
of perceiving the world is also considered a means to depart from the deterministic view, which 
reduces human production to purely economic-related deterministic practices. The main problem 
with a post-modernist view is that it homologizes the different disciplines (e.g., physics, politics, 
mathematics, etc.) with genres, which are "the particular discoursal parts of manners of interacting 
and acting in social events" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 31). Hence, the post-modernist' analytical 
argument is that semiotic analysis is necessary to account for interconnections between orders of 
discourse: which are "the socially ordered set of genres and discourses associated with a particular 
social field, characterized in terms of the shifting boundaries and flows between them" (Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough, 1999, p. 58). The argument is that analysis of any type of discourse should include 
both "structural" and "interactional" dimensions of a network of social practices. The structural 
dimensions refer to ways in which interaction is constrained by the orders of discourse. The 
interactional dimension refers to way in which that social network is capable of re-construction 
through the articulation of its resources. Thus, there is then a feedback from the international 
to the structural dimension. In other words, the analysis adopts both a view of "insider" and 
"outsider" suggesting that the research is involved practically in the issue of distribution and 
appropriation of resources, and theoretically in the issue of describing those resources. Although 
this structural-interactional element is consistent with the Bhaskarian TMSA; in general, the post-
modernist view claims explanation phenomena in terms of language in the broad sense of the 
term without a referent to the world outside, implying that disciplines become a mismatch of 
genres. In general, various disciplines, as we know them, are extremely useful because they provide 
explanations of mechanisms that generate phenomena outside the mere invention of terms, which 
is what is lacking in a post-modernist account of scientific disciplines. 
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The analysis of open-systemic phenomenon establishes the character-
istic multiplicities of causes, and a fortiori mechanisms and therefore, 
potentially, theories (of these mechanisms)... a further ontological fea-
ture besides complexity is required: this is emergence, more specifically 
the emergence of levels. (Bhaskar, 2010, p. 4). 
In this approach, CR attempts to transverse fields of knowledge without dissolving 
the differences in the methods of the various disciplines by considering the nature 
of the object of study in an open system. One such example is the view of reality 
as an open system from which a multiplicity of generative mechanisms emerge at 
different levels, as a means of establishing a case for interdisciplinary activity. From 
a CR perspective, we can deploy a variety of different perspectives on the object 
of investigation without collapsing different methods of investigation to maximize 
analytic power. 
We can turn now to a relationship that conceives the interplay of a range of dis-
similar disciplines under a successful disciplinary activity. This is completed in terms 
of the ontological and epistemological consideration of activity as interdisciplinarity, 
which is elaborated in sections 6.3, p. 191 and section 6.4, p. 203, respectively. Such 
exemplification not only grounds AT on a CR philosophical platform, but CR can 
simultaneously provide concepts and conditions for a successful realization of inter-
disciplinary activity in more general terms, as discussed in section 6.5, p. 215. In 
order to sublate it under a CR philosophy, in this endeavor, I begin by identifying 
how the idea of activity as interdisciplinarity in AT came about in the first place. 
6.2 The search for substance in AT: the concep-
tion of activity as interdisciplinarity 
Blunden (2009, p. 5) initially found that within the AT tradition, there is no serious 
engagement with the question of ontology or substance, as he calls it. 
[No] writer in the CHAT tradition has broached the issue of substance. 
Outside the domain of psychology and small group interactions, CHAT 
theorists generally are generally naive realists in respect to formations 
outside the domain under study. Such an approach does not give a means 
of critically appropriating from other disciplines. 
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In particular, Blunden suggests the idea of activity as interdisciplinarity by arguing 
that this term should not be mono-disciplinary and thus confined to the field of 
psychology. Instead, he held that, (1) the concept of activity, and (2) the problems 
of AT are of an interdisciplinary nature because they are part the world. In the pre-
vious chapter, it was argued that critical naturalism (CN) can resolve not just (2) 
the dualisms of AT; but, more broadly, other classic dichotomies of social theory as 
well, thereby grounding AT on a critical realist ontology. I turn now to the question 
that delves into (1) the concept of activity and its interdisciplinary nature. Specifi-
cally, what is the philosophical nature, the ontological case, for an interdisciplinary 
conceptualization of activity? Blunden provides a starting suggestion that requires 
a new ontology (or substance). This ontology as substance can conceivably be the 
theoretical ground of all sciences: 
A common foundation for all the human sciences, underpinning concepts 
of, for example, state and social movement equally as, for example, learn-
ing and personality. For this is needed a clear conception of the "unit 
of analysis" of activity, i.e., of what constitutes "an activity", and a 
clear distinction between the unit of analysis and the substance, i.e., 
ultimate reality underlying all the human sciences... [such] foundations 
from which the various societal phenomena can be rendered in terms of 
the same unit of analysis: project collaboration. (ibid., pp. 1-26). 
In effect, Blunden appropriately argues for the need of a new foundation of reality, 
an ontology that underlies all sciences; however, he conceives this new foundation in 
terms of what he calls a "project collaboration" or foundation in interdisciplinarity 
as: 
the artifact-mediated collaboration of individuals in common projects... To 
be clear, "project collaboration" is not something different from activity, 
but simply a unit of activity, a unit of joint mediated activity. Social 
life is a tangle of interactions, both formal and informal, between in-
dividuals, both friends and strangers; what is being suggested is that 
"projects" are the threads from which the fabric of social life is woven 
and may be analytically unstitched. (op. cit., p. 19-20). 
According to Blunden, his notion of "project collaboration" differs from Leont'evian 
structure of activity in that it is subject-centered as opposed to merely object- 
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oriented. Specifically, subject-centered indicates that it conceptualizes "project" 
as a historical pre-existing, consciousness -formation part of the individual, and it 
agrees with Leont'evian activity in the sense object-centered, as a system of social 
relations is directed toward the achievement of some collectively defined ideal. For 
example, a Western society is involved in "project collaboration" toward the idea of 
democracy or a pair-wise collaboration between a supervisor and student is directed 
toward the idea of a thesis. 
First, although his notion of collaboration is not ontologically developed, Blun-
den sees the need for what in CR is termed as under-laboring for and of the human 
sciences. In contrast to AT, CR re-vindicates an argument for ontology. As shown 
in Chapter 5 (sections 2-6), the CR research program is aimed at the removal of 
false dualisms as under-laborer for an emancipatory society. It accomplishes this 
through transcendental realism (sections 2-6), which elaborates a non-Humean, non-
positivist, critical ontology, which is different from orthodox analytical philosophy; 
and, in the form of critical naturalism (sections 7-12), removes dichotomies in the 
social sciences. Moreover, this critical philosophical program of-for the sciences pro-
vides an explanatory critique (sections 13-14), which is indispensable for research 
openly aimed at the emancipation of human beings by a critique of false theories, 
which was lacking in AT since its historical development omits the philosophy and 
impact of Hume. 
Second, although Blunden argued for an interdisciplinarity conception of activity 
with the notion of "project collaboration", it remains a limited project. Although it 
can be seen as only one of several requisite conditions needed to pool the knowledge 
fields for a successful interdisciplinary project, it is undeniable that this collabora-
tion is an important factor. Consequently, we see that a collaboration project is 
indeed an epistemological case, which omits the ontological case completely and the 
ontological questions generally. Once again, Blunden is referenced, this time it is 
at the point where he begins by arguing that since most AT theorists are "naïve 
realists" , within the AT tradition, there has not yet been a serious engagement of 
ontologyl; however, Blunden himself has not sufficiently theorized ontology, as is 
show below (and in Chapter 5, sections 2-6). Nonetheless, although it is devel-
oped from a CR perspective, Blunden's idea of the conception of interdisciplinary 
activity as substance is taken seriously. This thesis argues for (a) ontological and 
1See Blunden's quote at the beginning of section 2, p. 188. 
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(/3) epistemological considerations by which CR under-labors for activity in AT as 
interdisciplinarity and in general. 
(a) In the ontological considerations, it is argued that CR provides the substance 
(ontology) for interdisciplinarity. (1) The implications of complexity are illustrated 
in the CR terms of the multiplicity of generative mechanisms, which both exist 
and additionally act independently of our theories. They are further illustrated in 
(2) the implications of emergence at various levels of reality, which, in CR terms, 
provides a more inclusive account of it without privileging any particular mechanism 
(a move that is left to be determined in each particular case of investigation). In 
this approach, CR pinpoints two of the foremost errors that affect contemporary 
interdisciplinary activity; and, in fact, these errors underpin the irrealist philosophy 
of science: the epistemic fallacy and the fallacy of actualism (Bhaskar, 2008a). 
Therefore, in order to avoid partial augmentative positions that tend to privilege 
only one causal mechanism and explain phenomena in terms of a single level of 
reality, CR distinguishes the need to differentiate ontology from epistemology and 
anti-reductionism. The following from (1) the implications of complexity in section 
6.3.1 on p. 191, and of (2) emergence in section 6.3.2 on p. 193, CR argues for (3) the 
Bhaskarian idea of laminated system, (as elaborated in section 6.3.3 on p. 195), which 
seeks to aid the maximization of explanations beyond the reductionist arguments. 
Subsequently, the question that follows is: how do we re-constitute the real problem 
in knowledge into a unified account as successful enterprise? 
(0) Although it is capable of providing conditions to make interdisciplinarity a 
successful enterprise, in the epistemological considerations, it is argued that, with 
the idea of the RRREI(C) schema and the heuristic device of laminated systems, CR 
is an advance over reductionism. Following the Bhaskarian (1) cross-disciplinary un-
derstanding, (2) a referential overlap between disciplines, and (3) effective epistemic 
integrations. All of these conditions work together within particular disciplines to 
integrate the problem that reality has produced in terms of a unified phenomena. 
6.3 Ontological considerations 
6.3.1 The implications of complexity 
A CR account of science for interdisciplinary activity starts by characterizing the 
world, for the most part, as an open system from which we can see how the complex- 
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ity of a multiplicity of generative mechanisms together with the notion of emergence 
allows these mechanisms to interact at various levels of reality. This study of com-
plexity necessitates multidisciplinarity in science as "ontologically grounded in the 
need to refer to multiplicity of mechanism at different, including emergent levels of 
reality" (Bhaskar, 2010, p. 4). This requisite is illustrated in the two-fold core ar-
gument of basic critical realism (CR), which was discussed in the previous chapter. 
Interdisciplinarity is thus advanced with an original argument for the re-vindication 
of ontology as differentiated and irreducible from epistemology; if this is omitted, 
we commit two tremendous errors. 
The first error is the epistemic fallacy, which involves the reduction of onto-
logical to epistemological questions (Bhaskar, 2008a, p. 27). A critical ontology 
is particularly important since interdisciplinary research has principally considered 
epistemological questions related to the methods and types of knowledge (Bhaskar, 
2010). The recognition of the epistemic fallacy in interdisciplinarity works simulta-
neously to lead us into the first condition for successful interdisciplinary activity, i.e., 
the distinction between ontology and epistemology. This distinction occurs because 
in interdisciplinary activity, the same object of investigation is referred to in a range 
of ways via different descriptions of dissimilar disciplines. The CR ontological case 
for interdisciplinarity means that disciplines are epistemic, and thus the terminology 
that explains the same object in different ways lacks its ontological counterparts. 
The fundamental idea here is that when dealing with interdisciplinary research, an 
awareness is needed that the terminology has many fallacies built into the words and 
thus there is the need to distinguish between ontology and epistemology. Instead, 
what normally happens is that there is no differentiation between the mechanisms 
and structures in the world (e.g., ontology) and the knowledge about them (e.g., 
epistemology), which is a completely normal outlook. In Bhaskarian terminology, 
such a stance denotes a "natural attitude" , in which: 
you don't posit ontology on the one side and epistemology on the other 
side: you just have knowledge and you take it that that knowledge is of 
the world. Ontology only becomes relevant when you are not satisfied 
with knowledge, when what passes for knowledge is patently wrong or 
absurd [and I would add, when knowledge passes for common-sense]. 
Thus when I came to understand the necessity to argue for ontology 
explicitly and to re-vindicate it as a subject, it was because I was then 
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very dissatisfied with the implicit ontology in social science and in the 
philosophy of social science. (Bhaskar, 2002b, pp. 192-193). 
Following Bhaskar, it can be seen that this "natural attitude" is the reason why 
philosophers like Hume and Kant, where they are seduced into thinking that they 
did not need to refer to the world as distinct from knowledge. However, we observe 
that referring to the world as separate from knowledge becomes absolutely essential 
when there are completing claims to knowledge of the world; at that point we have 
to differentiate knowledge from the world. 
[1] Ontology is always in principle distinct from epistemology, even where 
our knowledge of the known world is unquestioned [as in our natural atti-
tude]; and that [2] structures, mechanisms, processes, fields and the other 
intransitive objects of scientific knowledge are always distinct from, and 
irreducible to, the patterns of events they generate, even in experimen-
tally closed laboratory situations. (Bhaskar, 2010, p. 2). 
Specifically, there are three main instances when there is a need to differentiate on-
tology from epistemology: (1) at the level of contentious knowledge, i.e., in cases 
dealing with a contentious area, like the social sciences, in which theories and knowl-
edge claims are often disputed; (2) at the level of important periods of scientific 
change or revolution, i.e., where there is a question regarding changing beliefs such 
as in scientific revolution, and (3) in interdisciplinary activity, i.e., which involves 
the investigation of an object of study that uses different descriptions from different 
disciplines. Hence, from a CR point of view, we are concerned with both ontological 
and epistemological forms of inquiry. 
6.3.2 The implications of emergence 
It is important to note that because a multiplicity of generative mechanisms is in-
dependent from our knowledge of it, and since we are in an open system, it does not 
need to involve different levels. For instance, a multiplicity of mechanisms can all be 
identified as being either biological or physiological, so we need to introduce emer-
gence as a conception that implies the interaction between different levels of reality. 
Once emergence is introduced, we include a multiplicity of generative mechanisms 
of different types, which are all assumed to interact at different levels of reality, and 
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thus the need for different fields, disciplines, and theories capable of explaining such 
mechanisms and how they interact at different levels. 
Emergence is probably the best argument against reductionism and for the com-
plexity of dynamical systems that start from simple rules, but emerge to create 
complex and unpredictable dynamics. In the social world, for example, we see 
emergence in language and the movement of crowds; while in the natural world, it is 
in the formation of snowflakes, termite colonies, the weather, etc. Let us recapitulate 
the main criteria for emergence, from Table 5.4, p. 131. 
(1) unilateral dependence of the higher level on the lower level, 
(2) taxonomical irreducibility of the higher level terms and concepts, and 
(3) causal irreducibility of the higher level in the lower level. 
These criteria allow us to differentiate, not just between the emergence of levels, 
which refers to ontological emergence of a unilateral multiplicity of generative mech-
anisms consisting of higher order levels, such as in the case when we explain human 
beings as having irreducible biological, social, and psychological mechanisms, but in-
cluding the emergence of outcomes or intradisciplinarity, to use CR terminology. In 
short, when mechanisms interact together, they behave in a very different and com-
plex manner. To capture such complexity, CR goes beyond reductionism by making 
an argument for emergence as part of a philosophical argument that distinguishes 
ontology and epistemology for interdisciplinary activity. 
Why is there a tendency for reductionism in the sciences? The answer is found in 
basic CR, in the critique of actualism, which Bhaskar develops in A Realist Theory 
of Science (2008a). As is illustrated in the previous chapter, we know that reducing 
the real domain to the actual results in the tendency to construct abstract universals 
or mono-disciplinary concepts, such as grand narrative or other master means by 
which to interpret and signify phenomena. There is also a tendency to reduce the 
actual domain to the empirical level, which results in empirical statements in which 
the structures of society and nature are identified as empirical universal regularities. 
From a CR perspective, we have an analysis of the social and natural phenomena 
from a non-orthodox account of science, in which reality is differentiated into a 
multi-layered stratum; that is, the all-containing real domain, which includes the 
actual and the empirical domains. The importance of the CR account of science 
for interdisciplinary activity, is thus characterized by open systems from which we 
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can see how the complexity of a multiplicity of generative mechanisms together with 
notion of emergence allow these mechanisms to interact at various levels of reality. 
What subsequently follows from the need to differentiate ontology from epistemology 
and anti-reductionism is the notion of a laminated system. We can turn now to the 
literature on applied CR in order to illustrate how the concept of laminated system 
has been used across disability research, women's studies, and climate science, to 
name a few. 
6.3.3 The idea of laminated system 
Critical realism advances interdisciplinarity beyond reductionism with the idea of a 
laminated system, the notion of ontologically different and irreducible levels for the 
analysis of social and natural phenomena. The analogy of a lamination helps us to 
imagine a hard but flexible structure made up of various ontological levels that can-
not be separated and cannot be dissolved into each another. Although this critical 
realist notion was introduced with Table 4.1, p. 75, in the context of educational 
studies with an amplified model of Brown's (2009, p. 5) "learning environment", 
in what follows, a more general account is provided of the four types of laminated 
systems: the (ontological) level, (social) planar, (social) scalar, and emergent spatio-
temporality, along with contemporary applications to interdisciplinary research. In 
the following, the first three types of laminated systems are discussed and examples 
are provided. 
Table 6.1: Four types of Bhaskarian laminated systems 
(1) An (ontological) level laminated system is more general since it is employed 
when referring to the different kinds of mechanisms as studied by the various 
scientific disciplines, e.g., a case-specific disciplinary ensemble (or CSDE). 
(2) A (social) planar laminated system focuses on the four dimensions of 
which human beings are a part, e.g., the four-planar social being. 
A (social) scalar laminated system emphasizes social relationism e.g., the 
seven hierarchical levels of scale or seven-scalar social being. 
Continued on next page 
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(4) An emergent spatio-temporality laminated system refers to different 
space and time together in the same dimension, e.g., the buildings in the city of 
London in which the very architecture, including its techniques and materials 
show vestiges of past epochs together with the most advanced ones. Another 
example is the different methods of producing commodities or services, from 
simple trading, to the invention of portable currency, and the contemporary 
credit card, which emerge in various epochs and remain alongside all the other 
forms. 
6.3.4 (Ontological) level laminated system: case-specific dis-
ciplinary ensemble 
Bhaskar and Danermark (2006) developed the first type of laminated system, i.e., (1) 
the case-specific disciplinary ensemble (CSDE) or mix of irreducible levels of being 
with distinct kinds of mechanisms studied by different scientific disciplines. In their 
study, Bhaskar and Danermark make two important separate but related moves on 
the subject of reductionism. The first move is a critique of reductionism, which 
argues that we cannot privilege any particular level in the way that reductionist 
views approach disability studies. The second move is to construct a (ontological) 
level laminated system, a case-specific disciplinary ensemble, for one specific case of 
dysphagia, a particular eating disorder in which it is difficult to swallow liquid or 
solid food (see Table 6.2, p. 196). 
Table 6.2: Case-specific disciplinary ensemble (CSDE) 
for dysphgia to evaluate reductionist phases of disability 
research 
CSDE 
1. Physical level 
2. Biological 
3. Psychological 
4. Psycho-social 
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CSDE 
5. Socio-economic 
6. Cultural 
7. Normative types of mechanisms 
Continued on next page 
Adopted from Bhaskar and Danermark (2006, p. 12). 
In Bhaskar and Danermark's analysis of interdisciplinarity, the authors start by 
providing a critique of reductionism. This critique examines three different reduc-
tionist phases of disability research. The first phase, which was prevalent during 
the 1950s and 60s, saw the dominance of a medical model, it tended to associate 
disabilities with physical phenomena that merely require medical treatment. The 
second phase occurred during the late 1960s and 70s with the introduction of the 
socio-economic model of disability, which identified disabilities with a question of 
resources. For example, if everyone who needed a wheel chair had appropriate ac-
cess to this resource, then there would be no need to make distinctions between 
individuals based on their disability. This phase brings to light the necessity to 
make resources not just available, but also accessible to everyone. The last phase, 
which occurred during the late lOs and 90s-onward, introduced a cultural or linguis-
tic model that associated disabilities with the idea of language since it involves the 
construction of the concept of disability according to the perception of a particular 
society. From a CR perspective, we see that in the case of complex phenomena such 
as disabilities, we cannot emphasize a single mechanism, but we need to construct 
a laminated system, such as Bhaskar and Danermark's second move, in order to 
understand all physical, socio-economic, and other levels, in terms of a coalescent 
totality. 
In a subsequent move, Bhaskar and Danermark constructed the seven levels of 
the case-specific disciplinary ensemble (CSDE). The main point to remember about 
this model is that we cannot state a priori account for the importance of a particular 
level or the number of levels needed in a particular investigation. Specifically, the 
number of levels is a toolkit, which is not set, but depends on the object of study 
of a particular structure, phenomenon, event, or situation under inquiry and thus it 
is subject to change. Nonetheless, these levels do not exhaust reality. In the case of 
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investigating what AT calls a run-away object such as climate change, for example, 
the researcher might want to include additional levels such as (viii) a political level, 
aside from the (ix) socio-economic one, and a level of (x) international relations as 
well. It is also important to note that the concept of laminated system has very 
broad categories. The purpose of the CSDE is to ontologically underpin a critique of 
historical research in disability studies. For this particular study, the levels represent 
a fruitful device for talking about the object of study (e.g., the case of an eating 
disorder in this research). This type of laminated system consists of irreducible levels 
of scientific ontology (being) as defined or understood by the scientific fields of the 
day. For instance, the field of chemistry might identify one type of mechanism, while 
those in biology might identify another completely different mechanism. 
The CSDE is the most basic anti-reductionist system since it depends only on 
complexity and emergence and applies to purely natural phenomenon irrespective 
of the social world. In this basic type of laminated system, there can be any number 
of levels. It is important to distinguish that the CSDE is not the same as the 
seven categorical levels of deepening ontology, e.g., 1M: non-identity-7Z/A: non-
duality, which are the categorical development of philosophical ontology. Whereas 
the 1M-7Z/A categorical levels of deepening of ontology refer to general features of 
reality, the different levels of CSDE refers to various kinds of mechanisms, which are 
characterized by emergence relations. In fact, any CSDE can be constructed with as 
many levels as needed by the analyst. To illustrate the CSDE, suppose that we want 
to explain the event in which a meteorite strikes the ground of some uninhabited 
planet. Although this phenomenon does not involve the social realm, because of the 
multi-causal mechanisms such as the physical, chemical, biological, etc., interacting 
at various levels of reality: it would still have to be explained in an interdisciplinary 
way. 
Another application of this laminated system to interdisciplinary research is 
Hoyer's (2010, p. 51) investigation of climate science where he differentiates a lam-
inated system consisting of seven thesis about CO2-reductionism in order to go 
beyond it and to sketch out what would be fitting in what he calls a "post-carbon 
society" , which is the idea of a liberated society from its fossil-fuel cage in which we 
can think of sustainable human interactions with nature. 
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6.3.5 (Social) planar laminated system: four-planar social 
being 
Bhaskar (2009) develops the notion of four-planar social being from the simpler 
transformational model of social activity (TMSA), which was discussed with refer-
ence to Figure 5.6, p. 151. In short, the TMSA model states that agency is in a 
relation to a structure that pre-existed it. The crucial temporal differentiation is 
that social structure always pre-exists individual agency, and then the role of such 
individual agency is to reproduce or transform the structure. Therefore, no struc-
ture can exist without human activity since structure always pre-existed agency. 
Then, in Bhaskar's Scientific realism and human emancipation (SRHE) (2009), the 
basic idea of TMSA is dialecticized and generalized into a four-planar social being, 
which is illustratively encompassed into what he terms the Bhaskarian social cube, 
which is a schema to understand the multiple dimensions of our social existence (see 
Figure 4.4, p. 107). Thus, the move from TMSA to a four-planar social being does 
not involve the conception of the former as intrinsically flowing in a geo-historical 
trajectory. More specifically, this notion is conceived by rejecting the idea that hu-
man nature is purely positive; rather, with this cubic model, "all decisive moments 
in social life are negative" (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 160). 
The cubic model is generalized in the sense that it conceptualizes the inclusion 
of all social life in terms of its four planes. The examples below will facilitate a 
better understanding of each plane of the social cube: 
plane [a ] is a dimension that accounts for ecological interactions between humans 
and their natural surroundings; 
plane [b ] is a dimension of interactions between people, for example, communica-
tion, discourse, and so on; 
plane [c ] denotes the dimension of social structure, for example, economic struc-
ture, linguistic structure, cognitive structure, etc.; 
plane [d ] is a dimension of stratification (biopsychosocial) of our embodied per-
sonality (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 68), which incorporates the various strata of in-
dividuals. 
For instance, in section 3.3 on p. 41, it is shown how the Vygotskian thesis falls 
within one of these four dimensions of interaction between agents; but lacks a clear 
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conception of social structure, material exchanges, or transactions with nature. Fur-
thermore, although he accounted for culture, a full stratification of the human bio-
psycho-social embodied personality was also missing from this theory. Thus, whereas 
social scientists tend to think only in terms of structure and agency, we can broaden 
how we perceive the four-planar conception, which introduces four irreducible di-
mensions by which to conceive all social phenomena as a planar laminated system. 
6.3.6 (Social) scalar laminated system: seven-scalar social 
being 
The (social) scalar and (social) planar laminated systems are applied in various fields 
by researchers to explain complex phenomena, but this is only done in the social 
world. In particular, the second and third models do not refer to a particular type 
of mechanism. The four-planar social being is a planar laminated system of four 
irreducible levels or planes that can be situated in its context, but also in terms of 
the idea of a hierarchy of various levels of scale. Historically, the idea of a hierarchy 
of various levels of scale comes from the classical dualism between (methodologi-
cal) individualism, on the one hand, and (methodological) collectivism on the other, 
which was previously addressed in section 5.8, p. 142. From a CR perspective, what 
social scientists are particularly interested in are neither individuals nor groups of 
individuals, but in their relationships. In the family, for example, we have enduring 
relationships between children and parents; or; in the economy; we have relation-
ships between workers and managers. Then the key idea is to further develop the 
resolution to this dualism in social relationism by allowing for investigations at dif-
ferent orders of the hierarchical scale. Thus, Bhaskar (2010) shows seven levels of 
agency, which are illustrated with examples, in the following Table 6.3, p. 200. 
Table 6.3: Seven different hierarchical levels of agency 
Hierarchical level Example 
(1) 	 The 	 sub-individual 
psychology 
This level includes structures within the individ-
ual human being such as the unconscious, motives, 
and objects of discourse. 
Continued on next page 
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Hierarchical Level Example 
(2) The individual or bi- 
ography 
This level is concerned with stories of people, nar-
ratives, and biographies, such as the typical sagas 
that appear in novels. 	 The analytic style of J. 
P. Sartre and A. Camus are examples of agency at 
this level. 
(3) The 	 micro-level 
is 	 investigated, 	 eth- 
nomethodologists, 	 to 
give 	 an example, 	 and 
others 
Bhaskar (2006) gives the example of E. Goffmann's 
micro-sociology, which is applied to face-to-face 
performance interaction to illustrate a typical ob-
ject of study for this level. 
(4) The meso-level is con- 
cerned 	 with 	 persistent 
relations between asym- 
metrical functional roles. 
This level is the classic dimension at which soci-
ologists work such that they are concerned with 
persistent functional relationships within certain 
kinds of society. The classic example at this level 
is the role of the worker and the capitalist, or the 
common citizen and a government representative 
(5) The 	 macro-level 
investigates 	 whole 	 so- 
cieties, 	 regions, 	 or 
economies. 
The British economy is one example. Contempo-
rary capitalism is an example of the "whole" struc-
ture at which this level is concentrated. 
(6) The 	 mega-level 	 is 
concerned 	 with 	 en- 
tire 	 civilizations 	 and 
traditions. 
For instance, the history of medieval religion or the 
tradition to speak a particular language. 
(7) The 	 planetary 	 (or 
cosmological) 
	 level 	 is 
concerned 	 with 	 the 
whole universe or planet. 
This level may include historical and-or theoretical 
studies about the cosmos such as its beginnings 
and continuity. 
Adapted from Bhaskar (2010, pp. 9-10). 
From a CR point of view, what is important to note is the interplay of the levels. 
In other words, when we refer to something at any particular level, we find that the 
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level above it and the level below are involved, but irreducible to each other. For 
this reason, we can also regard these seven levels of scale as a laminated system. 
To give an example of the scalar type of laminated system, without revert-
ing to reductionism, we look at Price's (2010) seven levels of scale to explain the 
mechanisms of women's oppression in South Africa. This seven-layer explanation is 
paraphrased as follows. 
Table 6.4: Case-specific disciplinary ensemble (CSDE) 
for dysphgia to evaluate reductionist phases of disability 
research 
Levels of scale 
1. Level of conscious-unconscious-motivation is concerned with women's nar-
ratives of personal history. 
2. Level of human-material interactions deals with economic research that 
relates variables of poverty and oppression. 
3. Level of human interaction at the small scale refers to socio-economic re-
search that relates variables such as, the rate of HIV infection and violence to 
men, women, and their community, etc. 
4. Level of structural characteristics of society provides theoretical explana- 
tions of the impact of structures such as the purchase and sale of wives or the 
theory of men as sexual predators. 
5. South African society as a whole focuses on characteristics such as tribalism, 
female discrimination, and the rise of higher paying jobs for men throughout 
the society. 
6. Geo-historical trajectories of South African society where we find the history 
of colonization, geographical location, and the move toward independence as 
key instances that continue to affect this society. 
7. Global trends are concerned with the phenomena of globalization of less 
developed countries and their rapid growth. 
Adapted from Price (2010, pp. 18-21). 
Price's (2010) seven levels of scale model are used to provide explanatory mechanisms 
for the oppression of women in South Africa. She additionally explains how the 
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original term of laminated system was introduced by Andrew Collier who wanted to 
defend Althusserian Marxism against a reductionist-vulgar version that subsumes 
all explanatory societal mechanisms to economic determinations by grounding anti-
actualist and anti-reductionist explanations on Bhaskar's (2008a) RTS. In particular, 
Althusserian Marxism could be construed as a Bhaskarian anti-reductionist type 
of laminated system where the realm of economy is not a privileged mechanism 
to explain society, rather there are other realms such as that of politics, culture, 
ideology, religion, that affect it. Another example of a scalar laminated system 
mixed other (ontological) levels in the field of education is the idea of an open 
learning environment (see Table 4.1, p. 75). 
Thus, CR interdisciplinarity with the concept of laminated system, as shown 
with many of its different types of application that successfully move from mono-
disciplinary activity because they cut across disciplines without resorting to single 
explanations privilege a single explanatory mechanism. The explanatory result may 
include possible contradictory results in a solid, "laminated" unit. 
After exemplifying the ontological consideration of CR for the advancement of 
the interdisciplinary conceptualization of activity, we now turn to an explanation of 
the epistemological consideration and how CR is simultaneously capable of providing 
concepts that produce the conditions for its successful realization of interdisciplinary 
activity. To this end, we can recall the RRREI(C) schema and we can additionally 
anticipate the idea of the Bhaskarian dialectical process, which is the process of 
"absenting absence" (Bhaskar, 2010b, p. 176), to be developed in Chapter 7, p. 220. 
Such dialectical process is a driving force of change to repair remediable constraints, 
lack of freedom, and all other ills. In basic CR, we see the re-vindication of ontology, 
and in dialectic critical realism (DCR), we shall see the re-vindication of negativity 
(absence) by a deepening of ontology. For now, in order to widen the perception of 
interdisciplinary activity by deriving the conditions for its successful realization, it 
will be demonstrated how the Bhaskarian dialectical process can be applied to the 
RRREI(C) model. 
6.4 Epistemological considerations 
In the epistemological consideration, this study demonstrates that CR can advance 
interdisciplinary activity by avoiding partial positions that explain phenomena in 
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terms of a single level of reality via a heuristic method to conceive theoretical and ap-
plied scientific explanations to the RRREI(C) schema, i.e., resolution-redescription-
retrodiction-elimination-identification-correction model, as is paraphrased below. It 
is subsequently demonstrated that the various justifications of interdisciplinary ac-
tivity are epistemic. In conclusion, the question is asked under what conditions in-
terdisciplinary activity can flourish. In answer to that, it is shown that CR uniquely 
proposes ontological conditions for the successful interdisciplinary conceptualization 
of activity. 
RRREI(C) schema of applied scientific explanation In the previous chapter, it 
is illustrated how Bhaskar (2008a) develops the DREI(C) schema (i.e., description-
retrodiction-elimination-identification-correction model) of theoretical scientific ex-
planation. Now, we turn to the Bhaskarian model for applied scientific explanations, 
namely the RRREI(C) schema of applied explanations as follows: 
R The first R in RRREI(C) schema stands for resolution. It is the resolution of 
phenomena into partial totalities of separate components (or causes). This 
condition means that when analyzing any concrete phenomena or event in 
open systems we see it in terms of its effects, so that it answers the ques-
tion: what separate components (or causes) constitute the phenomena under 
investigation? At this first level, we want to analyze the exact nature of both 
determination of and what interaction occur in the formation of the object of 
study, which is never an isolated component (or single cause of the event), but 
involves partial totalities of the separate causes that compose it. 
R The second R in this applied explanation of complex phenomena stands for re-
description of such separate components (or causes) in theoretically viable 
terms. This re-description takes into account the geo-historical processes and 
mediations that make up its background. 
R The third explanatory condition stands for retrodiction. This level answers to 
the question: what might have caused the phenomena under investigation? 
It involves working out the possible "solutions" to components (or causes) by 
looking at the way they were set off by conditions during the interaction that 
created the phenomena under inquiry. Retrodiction takes us from investigating 
the level of the empirical, i.e., from a component suitably re-described of the 
complex situation or event, via structures and generative mechanism, to the 
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antecedent causes. 
E This explanatory condition stands for the elimination of alternative antecedent 
causes of such event or situation. 
I This level stands for identification of the antecedent state of factual affairs, which 
means that at this level, after we have analyzed or resolved a component, 
and redescribed it, we use the generative mechanism to infer back to what 
conditions would have initially set it off or stimulated it. For instance, suppose 
that a friend is sick with a cold; we can infer that at some point our friend was 
exposed to a germ that triggered an immune response. Following a trace of 
events, we learn that not long ago our friend passed through an airport, and 
since airports are highly populated areas with possible contagious people, this 
event represents such a condition that might have initially triggered the cold. 
In turn, everything that happens in our concrete world is a coming together 
of generative mechanisms of different levels of reality; but each mechanism is 
assumed to have an initial condition, and that is what the RRREI(C) model 
seeks to pinpoint since we are ultimately interested in determining the main 
cause of a complex situation or problem of investigation. 
C The C stands for correction of phenomena in the light of new, further analysis, or 
evidence. The letter C is in brackets to denote that this process will normally 
involve iterations of complemented analysis in a regressive movement that 
takes us back to the re-description of phenomena after new causes have been 
corrected and identified. To return to our example, suppose that our friend 
goes to the doctor because her flu-like symptoms not only persist, but also 
worsen. From the results of her medical exams, our friend discovers that her 
illness is caused, say by E. coli 0157: H7, from eating contaminated burgers 
during her recent travels. 
From a CR perspective, our interest in the RRREI(C) schema is to identify what 
that is in the world has resulted in the problem of investigation; say, the collapse of 
a bridge, a fine ballet performance, an outbreak of E. coli, etc. We are interested in 
the factors of the world that have contributed toward generating either a problem 
or a fine activity. In the DRIE(C) model, our interest is to "excavate" into ever 
deeper structures in order to pinpoint the generative mechanisms. However, in the 
RRREI(C) model, we essentially take the generative mechanisms for granted, and 
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use them to determine what it was in the world that set such generative mechanisms 
off in the first place, which is essentially the reason why the latter is a schema of 
applied or concrete explanation as opposed to the former theoretical explanatory 
model. In this manner, CR provides a clear epistemological advantage for inter-
disciplinary activity that goes beyond reductionist argumentation by providing us 
with the methods to analyze an emergent multiplicity of generative mechanisms in 
open systems. While the DREI(C) model gives us a means to build a theory of 
generative mechanisms, the RRRIE(C) method allows us to use it to find out what 
was trigged such mechanisms. We now turn to the methods through which the in-
terdisciplinary conceptualization of activity has been justified in the literature and 
further illuminate the CR ontological conditions needed for its successful realization. 
6.4.1 Real-world problems in interdisciplinarity 
What is the justification for interdisciplinary activity? This question is the start-
ing point of Hansson (1999), who reviews how interdisciplinarity is justified in the 
literature by identifying three main augments in favor of it and three arguments 
against it. Although all of the arguments are one-sided, the author argues that each 
of them captures some aspect of interdisciplinary research capable of contributing 
to our understanding of how it is justified. The arguments in favor can be reduced 
to two, and are summarized as follows: (1) the nature of the problem of study, 
i.e., an ontological argument, and (2) the nature of scientific breakthroughs, i.e., an 
epistemological argument. What CR does is that it provides a strong ontological 
argument, which is missing from these six positions. We shall see that although var-
ious views favor interdisciplinarity, they do not explain what is it about the world 
that makes it necessary and possible to do interdisciplinary research. 
In short, (1) the first ontological argument conceives the idea of interdisciplinar-
ity as a means by which the science can advance from an abstract discipline to a 
more concrete one. (2) The epistemological argument about scientific breakthroughs 
posits the history of discoveries, such as the Newtonian theory of gravity, to con-
ceptualize interdisciplinary activity as a tool to enhance a scientific subject, its 
competence, and our overall understanding in historical context. This epistemo-
logical argument is captured by the Bhaskarian transdisciplinarity, i.e., what is in 
an RTS, Bhaskar (2008a, p. 150) calls a "paramorphic model-building", i.e., when a 
new model is constructed of the unknown mechanism from radically different sources 
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in the retroductive moment of scientific discovery. Hence, there is a new model of 
the unknown but real mechanism that produces the phenomena. This transdisci-
plinarity is a vital moment in creative science. On this position, Hansson's main 
contribution relates to an epistemological circumstance, which she highlights with 
a paradox between mono- and interdisciplinary work in which great scientific dis-
coveries that are based on successful interdisciplinary research are those that have 
radically transformed the field into a new discipline, which can be seen as a move 
back toward mono-disciplinarity. The last argument for interdisciplinarity is (3) 
the possibility of combining new theories, which is exactly like the one in argument 
(1), where interdisciplinarity is taken as the means to advance knowledge from an 
abstract theory to a concrete outcome. 
The counter arguments against interdisciplinarity focus on (4) its parasitical de-
pendence on other fields of knowledge. Specifically, this argument is the opposite 
of the third position, (5) its sinking properties with respect to the traditional scien-
tific system; i.e., interdisciplinary tends to be perceived as a less rigorous field than 
traditional single disciplinary, and (6) the overriding of the idiosyncratic nature of 
creative ideas. The purpose of Hansson's exploration is not to impart criticism on 
each of the six found arguments, but to contribute to the understanding of the ways 
in which it tends to be justified in the literature. In particular, the six arguments il-
lustrate the ontological dimension, i.e., the very nature of interdisciplinary research, 
and the epistemological dimensions, i.e., the involvement and exploration of mul-
tiple and pre-existing resources such as, different theories, conceptions, cognitive 
models, etc., drawn from a variety of disciplines, creates its own requisite conditions 
of possibilities and challenges. These conditions can be taken as arguments either 
for it or against it. The problem with interdisciplinarity does not depend on taking 
sides to justify it as either in favor of or against it. Irrespective of our alliances 
for or against it, since it is already a phenomenon of collaborative efforts, which 
exists to create new knowledge, it simultaneously creates challenges. Given that 
interdisciplinarity arises out of the need to deal with problems in the real world and 
it already presupposes a structured reality; the current challenge is to interrogate 
the starting premises, so that the next step is to investigate under what conditions 
interdisciplinary research can be a successful enterprise. 
I argue that CR is capable of moving the interdisciplinarity discussion forward 
by providing a strong ontological argument. CR regards interdisciplinary research as 
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necessary for ontological reasons because ontology is distinguished from epistemol-
ogy in the first place. CR argues that orthodox justifications of interdisciplinarity 
leave out the ontological case. From a CR perspective, what makes interdisciplinar-
ity necessary is: firstly, the fact that we have open systems, meaning that we have 
both multiplicity and complexity without reductionism or actualism; and secondly, 
we have emergence in both outcomes and mechanisms. Moreover, along with these 
two ontological and epistemological considerations, CR posits the principles that 
are capable of sustaining a successful interdisciplinary activity. Following Bhaskar 
(2010), it can be argued that what we need for successful interdisciplinary activity 
is (1) cross-disciplinary understanding, (2) a referential overlap between disciplines, 
and (3) effective epistemic integration. The relationship between the three Bhaskar-
ian terms is that of mediation, i.e., (2) referential overlap mediates between (1) and 
(3), but when (2) is lacking from a discipline, then we need immanent critique and 
development to effectively open up a discipline. Although the next section is dedi-
cated to explaining immanent critique, the differences in the three Bhaskarian ideas, 
which were previously mentioned, will be examined first. 
From the point of view of interdisciplinarity, there is the immediate rise of a prob-
lem of communication between two or more scientific disciplines. CR argues that 
the initial step needed to solve this problem is (1) cross-disciplinary understanding, 
which means there is a human relationship between two interdisciplinary researchers, 
each of which is a specialist in their own discipline. In some cases, there could be a 
situation with a single interdisciplinary worker. In either case, the interdisciplinary 
investigator needs to understand the implications for what is being investigated by 
other disciplines different from their own. For example, a mathematician needs to 
understand the implications of what is being said by those in disciplines such as 
sociology or political science. This initial moment encapsulates the first step needed 
in interdisciplinary understanding. Given that for interdisciplinarity, it is not suffi-
cient to possess knowledge or a mere understanding of two different disciplines, but 
what is needed is an integration of the two or more knowledge bases; the second 
step of successful interdisciplinary work is what Bhaskar (2010) encapsulates as an 
(3) effective epistemic integration. However, in disciplines such as economics, the 
second step, which requires integration of knowledge, is very difficult to obtain be-
cause economics does not have an open space for other disciplines. In such cases 
where there is no clear opening to integrate other disciplines, we find that even if 
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we have a clear understanding of the discipline, we cannot "fit it" together with 
our own primary field of research, so we end up with no integration. According to 
Bhaskar (2010), what is needed to open the space of a discipline is an immanent 
critique, i.e., a critique of both the theoretical and practical inconsistencies, and 
development. In short, interdisciplinary researchers need to critique a discipline in 
order to open it up until a Bhaskarian (2) referential overlap, which is the idea that 
disciplines overlap in what they are referring to, is obtained. For instance, if we are 
able to see what an economist or mathematician is talking about on our conceptual 
map of the word as a sociologist, and vice versa, then we have a mutual reference 
between interdisciplinary workers. 
How can we understand two different disciplines, when they seem like two worlds 
apart and as if they were two completely different cultures?' It could be argued that 
there is an un-bridgeable gap for an individual attempting to understand a particular 
field in which they are initially untrained, say for a mathematician who is trying 
to understand a philosopher: it might seen as akin to a different "breed" of human 
species. To transcend the two-culture divide, CR argues for two main principles, 
131: universal solidarity since it can help motivate the reflective capacity of human 
beings to remove such dualisms and for the need for P2: axial-rationality because it 
plays a crucial role in the self-development, growth, and learning of each individual 
(Bhaskar, 2010), as shown in the following table. 
Table 6.5: Two principles in the philosophy of meta-
reality (PMR) 
PMR principles 
P1: universal solidarity 
Denotes the possibility for any human being to empathize and understand, in 
principle, with any other fellow human being. 
P2: axial-rationality 
Continued on next page 
1Bhaskar (2010s) cites the idea of The Two Cultures, a term coined by C. P. Snow, to illustrate 
this divide between humanities and the sciences. The two-culture divide is a major problem; 
for instance, in the area of climate studies, because social and natural scientists typically have 
problems understanding each other. 
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Table 6.5 - Continued from previous page 
PMR principles 
Denotes a basic capacity for learning, e.g., how to deal or cope with our ma-
terial reality (e.g., to cook, to read, etc). This capacity can be applied and 
accessed by various communities, irrespective of differences in language, cul-
ture of linguistic, cultural, etc. 
Adapted from Bhaskar (2010, p. 18). 
We can anticipate the Bhaskarian philosophy of meta-reality (PMR), where these 
two principles are fundamental to understanding the priority of unification over 
splits, and for theorizing resolution to conflicts. Since, in order to understand it, we 
can argue for a view in which disciplinary divides are a constellationally englobing 
reality; for now, we can sustain the idea of successful interdisciplinarity with these 
two principles—P1: universal solidarity and P2: axial-rationality, which are both 
grounded on PMR. 
The first principle, P1: universal solidarity, effectively underlies (1) cross-disciplinary 
understanding, which is a powerful principle that can effectively be used when deal-
ing between two different cultures. In a nutshell, P1: universal solidarity says that 
in principle, people who come from a particular culture have the capacity to un-
derstand any other culture. Informally, we can initially justify this principle by 
imagining that instead of being born under the particular set of circumstances (e.g., 
time, place, "thrown" into a particular structure or set of circumstances, etc.), there 
is a contingent event that can change the specifics of such circumstances, which 
cause a shift from what could have happend under the original circumstances. The 
change of circumstances implies a change in the influences due to our environment. 
A classic Bhaskarian example is to imagine that a person who to be born in, for 
instance Japan, but something happens and instead, grows up in Mexico, is exposed 
to different structures such as languages, beliefs, and culture. Now, even if this 
person has a different life, which is influenced by a particular social structure; but 
the same beliefs, which were appropriated by rationale inspection and the elimina-
tion of false beliefs, then the individual will have arrived at those same beliefs by 
a different process. From a CR perspective, this is essentially true since it begins 
to suggest that human beings are capable of understanding others who are very 
different from themselves. The logic is that individuals can arrive at similar shared 
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beliefs by a process of rationally inspecting them to eliminate false beliefs, by various 
routes, independently of structure, time, and original point of departure. This idea 
suggests that anyone has the capacity to identify with all other fellow human be-
ings, and that includes different cultures, tribes, etc. While this principle underpins 
general understanding, it does not imply that people will understand each other; 
but it does assume that there is a principle, so that they can. For example, in the 
conflict between two cultures, it is important to say that it does not matter what 
the conflict is, as is the case with the divide between the Israelis and Palestinians; 
but, in principle, they can identify and empathize with each other. In this manner, 
people can begin to empathize with those who are continually regarded as other. It 
is important to emphasize that this principle says that an individual can understand 
the other, but it does not say that they can come to an agreement with it. For in-
stance, in principle, we can understand Hitler, but that does not mean we can come 
to an agreement with him. Thus, the first principle, universal solidarity underpins 
(1) cross-disciplinary understanding. 
The second principle, P2: axial-rationality, underpins coming to an agreement, 
i.e., (3) effective epistemic integration. This principle states that whatever culture 
we encounter, we see that at a very basic level people in any culture have to cook, 
bring up children, learn to build houses, use iPads, etc. This describes a common 
feature that all individuals, irrespective of culture, have a basic level of competence 
in relation to their common material world. What we are describing by basic com-
petence is a process of learning that is not innate, but rather in the course of this 
process, we learn by making mistakes and correcting them. This process provides 
us a basic logic for learning, so that self-correction is part of it, and we gradually 
learn when we do make a mistake. For instance, it is possible that interdisciplinarity 
with the pooling together of various disciplines attempts to explain the same world 
in which we all live, so this principle posits a method with which they can arrive at 
an agreement. 
To give an example of P1: universal solidarity and P2: axial-rationality, I re-
fer to Bhaskar's Theorising Ontology (2007), in discussing these two principles of 
interdisciplinary activity, he states that because difference presupposes identity "cri-
teriologically, there is no difference between us and the other" (p. 201). In other 
words, from the point of view of our criteria, of judgmental rationality, Bhaskar is 
saying that the other thinks that she or he is rational (just as we tend to think that 
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our position is a rational one). Let us suppose that we tend to demonize terrorists 
because, for example, they commit suicide bombings in the name of a political, re-
ligious, or scientific cause. However, in terms of their actions, this argument states 
that there is no difference between the other and ourselves because, e.g., terrorists 
or persons that we tend to demonize have, what they take to be good reasons for 
committing those actions. This argument is not relativism, i.e., it is not saying 
that such reasons are actually good, but that these people think these are good 
reasons. From the viewpoint of judgmental rationality, for example, these reasons 
for terrorism are false. The argument is not homologizing people under a univer-
sal common ground, but recognizing their concrete singularity from which there is 
space to establish solidarity. In fact, it is this gap or space within difference without 
collapsing or homologizing identity that allows for P1: universal solidarity, so that 
we can see that it is because unification of the other and us is implied and that 
universal resonance of solidarity is hence possible. 
From a CR perspective, judgmental rationality, the idea that it is possible for 
human beings to arrive at decisions between relative beliefs, represents an implicit 
form of P2: axial-rationality, the crucial reasoning in natural and social sciences 
founded on the principle that before we encounter difference, there is an element 
of unity or an explanation for it. For example, let us suppose that without loss of 
generality, X is not Y, then there is a difference between X and Y, which is neither 
nothing nor zero. For the non-trivial case, there is a difference between X and Y, 
and this is something other than zero, say Z. We can take this example and apply 
it to the height of two cavemen. To emphasize that this capacity takes us back 
to a primitive time, we can imagine that X and Y are a couple of Neanderthals of 
different heights. This fact presupposes that there is a standard point of reference, 
e.g., height, in common, by which the measure of difference is not zero. In short, 
we cannot say two things are different unless they have a point of reference, e.g., a 
point in which they are the same. This search for identities and relevant differences, 
according to Bhaskar (2007), are found across all cultures. 
It is important to pursue P2: axial-rationality because if we can show arguments 
why unity is basic and more important for social life than split, then we might expect 
to find something like a logic for resolving conflicts, which is a current topic of the 
Bhaskarian philosophical project. In this manner, the philosophy of meta-reality 
(PMR) claims that it has a logic for conflict resolution. This is fundamentally a 
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logic for resolving antagonism since this argument emphasizes the notion that our 
human species is bounded by these two principles or transcendental capacities to 
identify with other fellow beings, which is based on P1: universal solidarity and P2: 
axial-rationality, and thus identify, recognize, and reconcile with others. 
In our daily communication, for example, we experience conflicts and disagree-
ment about culture, language, and plain semantic utterances. In such instances, 
from a PMR perspective, although we have two opposites fighting for their distinct 
interpretations, there is at least a unity, or something that these two are fighting 
about, as a point of entrance to understanding each other. This idea is crucial be-
fore any change can be possible. Specifically, understanding presupposes a structure 
about itself, and what we want is entrance to map such structures, so that we can 
begin to conceive how change might be possible in the other. The colloquial phrase 
is to "try to get into the shoes of the other" and that is no easy task, especially 
when we perceive the other as impenetrable, foreign, and irrational; and that is in 
addition to the situations in which we have ideological disagreements. To return to 
the example where Bhaskar (2007, p. 201) emphasizes the attempt to understand 
why a person becomes a terrorist: 
this depends upon, the extent to which we can put ourselves in the place 
of the other. It is not only that we must feel as if we could have been 
the other, but that actually we could have been the other. 
The main point, according to these Bhaskarian principles, is to highlight that iden-
tity, recognition, and reconciliation with the other involves practice in the form of 
commitment to act upon our altered views. 
Now, let us consider an interdisciplinary example to illustrate P1 and P2. Sup-
pose a medical research team (e.g., doctors, nurses, epidemiologist, patients, medical 
advisor, etc.) has a real health problem, e.g., the European outbreak of a new strand 
of E. coli, which may depend on different aspects that concern the various members 
of the team, and may even concern patients themselves, since they are often excluded 
from such teams. The first half of the problem is to be able to establish communi-
cation between team members, i.e., to lay the foundations for (1) cross-disciplinary 
understanding. After this is done, the second half of the problem rests on the need 
to provide an explanation for it, i.e., to lay the foundations for (3) effective epistemic 
integration. What this example attempts to illustrate is that a health problem in 
the real world can be seen as an integrated challenge so that what is needed is an 
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integrated resolution (e.g., a course of action, a policy, and so on). The important 
point about such an integrated resolution is that we need to integrate the various 
partial explanations of the members of the interdisciplinary research team, so that 
we have a unified explanation of the phenomena. Frequently, resolutions to real life 
problems take a multi-dimensional form that involves models, theories, or a variety 
of different conceptual resources from various realms of knowledge, i.e., mediation 
by (2) referential overlap. From a CR viewpoint, what is important for interdisci-
plinary studies is to integrate various forms of understanding, but they also need 
to be aware of the implications. Such an integrated understanding, for instance, re-
quires that an individual must be able to perform as, for instance, an epidemiologist, 
an economist, biologist, etc. This is done by dropping disciplinary labels in order to 
achieve the end result, which seeks to give an integrated explanation to a real world 
problem, which requires "taking a system of thought on its own terms, showing how 
it involves various internal contradiction and aporiai" (Bhaskar, 2010, p. 21). For 
instance, in the sense that social interaction does not fit the determinations made 
by economic models; and in a way it goes even further because there is no possi-
bility of referring to other or very little aspects of social life; a grounding error of 
traditional economics is the exclusion of social relations, i.e., it is a closed field that 
lacks (2) referential overlap. What I want to illustrate with the example is that for 
CR, to explain a real life problem is to criticize it; that is, to isolate its source of 
imputed fallacy and the causal explanation for which a defective fallacy is socially 
reproduced, as opposed to a mere criticism in which judgments and condemnations 
of real life problems are causally imparted without any type of causal foundation. 
Although the implementation of critique is a difficult task, (social) scientists need 
to be able to understand a problem as a first step before they attempt to resolve 
it. Analogously, CR provides a first step for conceptual under-laboring of various 
scientific disciplines since at the level of meta-critique the ideal of interdisciplinary 
activity is not possible unless there is a real world problem to resolve (e.g., the con-
tradiction between human beings who continue to rely on fossil fuels for energy and 
human sustainability as a species in the planet). 
Now, problems in interdisciplinarity are encountered when a discipline is closed, 
meaning that there is no (2) referential overlap between other disciplines level of 
understanding or level of agreement. According to Bhaskar (2010), in this case, 
what is needed from interdisciplinary research is to open such discipline by doing 
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an immanent critique and development. In basic CR, Bhaskar (2008a) makes the 
distinction between the intransitive dimension (ID) and the transitive dimension 
(TD). The next step in the CR philosophy of science is to add a third space, which 
Bhaskar (2009) terms as "the meta-critical dimension (MD) of discourse" (p. 17); 
which, for instance, incorporates both philosophical and historico-sociological expo-
sitions of science in order to perform a meta-critique of assumptions of traditional 
arguments such as empiricism, positivism, and absolute idealism. In general terms, 
meta-critique: 
typically aims to identify the presence of causally significant absences 
in thought, seeking to elicit, for instance, what cannot be said or done 
in a particular language or conceptual system about what is said, done, 
known, implied or presupposed by means of it; or more broadly, what 
cannot be said in a scheme about what is done in the practice into which 
the scheme is connected (ibid., p. 18). 
In the formal sense, in order to differentiate his position from other criticism of the 
orthodox philosophy of science, as we can see from the following topology, as shown 
below in Figure 6.1, p. 217. In Chapter 3, p. 34, we see an example of how in this 
thesis I engage with MC1 of Activity Theory and some elements of MC2. 
6.5 Under what conditions can interdisciplinary 
activity flourish? 
Because interdisciplinary activity deals with real-world problems, including what 
in AT terms are called run-away objects, its successful realization depends upon 
conditions that affect practitioners as theories or vice versa. In particular, Bhaskar 
(2010) proposes conditions for successful or ideal interdisciplinary activity. These 
conditions are also applied to the researcher as an individual. 
Table 6.6: Conditions for ideal interdisciplinarity 
The flourishing of interdisciplinary activity requires: 
(1) disambiguation of ontology and epistemology 
Continued on next page 
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Table 6.6 — Continued from previous page 
The flourishing of interdisciplinary activity requires 
(2) anti-reductionism 
(3) the idea of explanation in terms of a laminated totality 
(4) the idea of explanation in terms of a laminated totality 
What may be called the "holy trinity" of interdisciplinary research: (4a) meta-
theoretical unity, (4b) methodological specificity, and (4c) theoretical pluralism 
and tolerance Dissolution of barriers e.g., of career, financial, administrative, 
and ideological ones. 
Adapted from Bhaskar (2010, p. 20). 
I want to begin with (4) the "holy trinity" of interdisciplinarity. Fundamentally, 
(4a) meta-theoretical unity is the level of philosophy where meta-theory is the phi-
losophy relevant for this level: At the level of meta-theory, it states that successful 
or ideal interdisciplinary activity is not possible unless there is a real world problem 
to resolve, e.g., the contradiction between human beings who continue to rely on 
fossil fuels and their sustainability as a species on the planet. It is important to 
emphasize that the interdisciplinary researcher needs to be committed to (1) the 
distinction between epistemology and ontology, which is the "Mind the gap!" basic 
realist position. Because the aim is to isolate the particular mechanisms, which 
are involved, so that the objective is to investigate beyond a single level of phe-
nomena to what causes it: it follows that the interdisciplinary researcher needs to 
be committed to (2) a stratified and differentiated (i.e., non-actualist) view of the 
world in a CR position. In general, (1) and (2) are the basic meta-theories for all 
interdisciplinarity. An interdisciplinary research team needs to understand these 
first two basic CR notions. The understandings of (1) entails that research teams 
can have different descriptions of the same object, which is the reason why this 
"Mind the gap!" is necessary. The understanding of (2) necessitates that research 
teams can have descriptions of mechanisms or structures, and not of surface phe-
nomena. Thus, the importance of the idea of reality as separates from knowledge 
and beliefs and of reality being deep. The integration of mechanisms (via a team 
or otherwise) subsequently provides a partial account as an aspect of the laminated 
articulated reality. A unified explanation and resolution may follow as a coherent 
totality. In this way, the comment to (3) anti-reductionism states that there is no 
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Adopted from Bhaskar (2008b, p. 242). 
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single generative mechanism, but a multiplicity of them that generate all phenom-
ena via the construction of explanations in terms of (4) laminated totalities. What 
follows is what we do or (4b) methodological specificity, which states that interdis-
ciplinary activity, involves the understanding of a real life problem, such that the 
interdisciplinary workers need to use different descriptions to talk about it. What 
is important is that during interdisciplinary work, researchers investigate the prob-
lem from multiple perspectives from open systems, while respecting the particular 
concrete theories that they have by following both (4c) theoretical pluralism and 
tolerance; which, as we know, each level might consist of different theories that are 
particular to it. For instance, as a mathematician, the researcher might construct 
statistical models, which are different from those ethnographic methods used by so-
ciologists; but this does not mean that different disciplines can attach each other's 
methods. In addition, tolerance refers to the idea that the interdisciplinary worker 
needs to be committed to a tolerant working environment, which involves respect 
for distance and space. For instance, if a member of a research team draws upon 
a particular, say Vygotskian-inspired perspective, then the other members cannot 
forbid or prevent such a theoretical approach so as to jeopardize the project. Lastly, 
in order for interdisciplinary to flourish we need to think as a society to remove the 
obstacles that prevent its realization or (5) dissolution of barriers. The fundamental 
point is to dissolve the various obstacles, including barriers to career, financial, and 
administrative barriers so that people can have careers as interdisciplinary work-
ers. A reason why mono-disciplinarity may be more advantageous is because that is 
where the concentration of institutional power is, which needs to be corrected, and 
which CR can help to accomplish. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this section, Blunden's (2009) proposition is taken in order to ground the con-
ception of activity as interdisciplinarity on a strong ontology, or substance to use a 
Robinsonian term. 
Substances in a given philosophical system are those things which, ac-
cording to that system, are the foundational or fundamental entities of 
reality (Robinson, 2004, cited in Blunden, 2009, p. 26). 
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Nonetheless, I have argued that because of its ontological, epistemological, and prac-
tical advantages over various argumentative fallacies, substance is CR. In addition, 
CR does not start from the premise that justifies interdisciplinary. It is not an argu-
ment for or against it, but given that the world is structured in such a way that we 
are now dealing with real-world problems (e.g., ecological catastrophes, pandemic 
outbreaks of new diseases from comestible plants and animals to human populations, 
collapse of economic-juridical systems, the privatization of intellectual commons for 
profit, etc.) that necessitate interdisciplinarity, then CR puts forward not its own 
justification, but P1 and P2 principles by which this human project can flourish 
guided by various conditions, including a holy trinity of interdisciplinary activity. 
In terms of education, I have highlighted and expanded the ontological spin taken by 
Price's (2010) seven-scalar laminated system to explain women's oppression in South 
Africa and Brown's (2008) notion of learning environment, which denotes the idea 
that educational contexts are ontologically irreducible and thus need to be analyzed 
appropriately at a number of levels without excluding the social-economic relations 
between families and pupils in which we see the social, cultural, and economic dis-
parities of society, entering and thereby affecting the schools. In this manner, I have 
shown how to effectively ground an interdisciplinary activity on CR open systems 
with a particular focus, but not restricted to the field of education. 
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Chapter 7 
Tenets of dialectical critical 
realism 
The best school for the dialectic is emigration. The keenest dialecticians 
are refugees. They are refugees because of changes and they study noth-
ing other than changes ... If their enemies triumph, they calculate how 
much the victory has cost, an they have a sharp eye for the contradic-
tions. The dialectic, may it always flourishl . 
7.1 Introduction 
The development of Critical Realism (CR) continues through a second stage, Dialec-
tical Critical Realism (DCR). Bhaskar elaborates the theoretical underpinnings of 
dialectical logic in Dialectic: The pulse of freedom (DPF) (2008b). At its heart, DPF 
is the analysis of the failure of human thought to comprehend one thing: ourselves, 
our agency, our transformative capacity in the world. It reveals the ways in which 
human beings have effectively invented many forms to systematically eliminate their 
sustainability in the world. Bhaskar writes DPF with three main objectives in mind. 
The first objective is to enrich and deepen the basic concepts of CR. A second aim 
is to theorize the dialectic that, although inspired by the philosophy of Hegel, is 
different and original in its own right. A key issue is that the concept of dialectic 
must be capable of sustaining social theory with implications for self-emancipation. 
Third, DPF aims to provide a critique of both analytical and dialectical branches 
'Brecht cited in Bhaskar (2008b, p. 241) 
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of Western philosophy. These three objectives are related to each other and act to 
establish the underpinnings of social theory. 
This chapter continues to investigate the level of 4D: learning as product-in-
process. In parallel with the three objectives of DCR, the initial objective of Critical 
Realist Activity Theory (CRAT) is to enrich this level with the introduction of DCR 
(sections 2-6). The second objective is, as it has been developed up to now, to argue 
for a conceptualization of learning as a passage through the Bhaskarian dialectic 
(section 7). The third objective of CRAT necessitates putting DCR into practice 
by showing that it can render a superior account of the historical development of 
concepts that are very important to Activity Theory (AT) (e.g., the concept of 
contradiction) by providing an in-depth critique of the philosophical roots of Hegel 
and Marx from which AT initially stemmed (sections 8-10). 
7.2 MELD or the Bhaskarian logic of emancipa-
tion 
The link between CR and DCR is a relationship of presupposition. The second 
moment presupposes an understanding of the first. This presupposition means that 
although DCR is an original account of the dialectic based on the work of Hegel 
and Marx, it does not overthrow basic CR. Norrie (2010, p. 15), for example, artic-
ulates the link between these moments as a "dialecticization" of CR categories of 
difference, structure, internal relations, and agency. While in basic CR we see the 
re-vindication of ontology, in its "dialecticization" we see the re-vindication of the 
notion of negativity and with it the very important critique of ontological monova-
lence, "the generation of a purely positive to complement a purely actual notion of 
reality" (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 5), a concept that has determined the course of Western 
philosophy. 
The critical realist dialectical system consists of four levels: 1M, 2E, 3L, and 4D 
(or MELD) and each of these domains has a chief characteristic. The chief character-
ization of 1M: non-identity is provided by the concepts of difference and structure. 
Then, the notion of absence is a chief characteristic of 2E: negativity because it 
stems immediately from opening up the negative, i.e., from the re-vindication of re-
ality as negative as well as positive. In 3L: totality, we get internal relations between 
entities as a main characterization of this level. The last main characterization of 
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4D: agency is given in terms of transformation in praxis because it stems, as a pulse, 
from within agents themselves. In addition, it is important to note that the fourth 
level, 4D, assumes knowledge of the third level, 3L, which assumes the second 2L 
that, in turn, presupposes the first level, 1M. According to Bhaskar (2008b, p. 289) 
the dialectic is "neither good nor bad in itself, except insofar as it empowers us in 
our understanding of reality". How does MELD empower us to understand reality, 
and in particular, to understand learning? In what follows, I elaborate on each of 
the four levels of MELD by linking each level to its chief characteristic found in the 
basic CR categories, and its significance to learning theory. 
7.3 1M: non-identity is characterized by differ-
ence and structure 
The first level of the MELD schema is based on the idea of basic CR that states 
that we have a stratified and differentiated world. Structure comes in 1M with the 
distinction or difference in the new ontology, i.e., critical realist ontology between 
the domain of the real and the domain of the actual. In other words, reality follows 
a structure with its own differences or fissures inscribed in it. Non-identity signifies 
difference that can be found in notions of differentiation between some of the most 
important ideas of basic CR. The warning, Mind the gap!, is the phrase that I use 
in Chapter 5 on p. 116 to denote the areas where we have inexorable and irreducible 
differences in basic CR, in terms of: 
• The intransitive and transitive domains of science denoting an irreducible dif-
ference between the objects of scientific investigation (e.g., generative mecha-
nisms and real structures) and the production of knowledge of those objects 
(e.g., theories, concepts, models, etc.); 
• The epistemic fallacy denoting the difference between epistemology and ontol-
ogy; and 
• The fallacy of actualism denoting the difference between three domains of 
reality, namely the real that includes but is greater than the actual, which 
includes but is greater than the empirical. 
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In turn, non-identity is really another way of saying difference, and the characteristic 
of all the themes and concepts from this initial level, 1M, is that they are non-identity 
relations or relations of difference, and to make sense of them we need the notion of 
absence, which is developed in the next level, 2E. 
Where there is difference there is structure and CR provides the idea of a strati-
fied world. The notion of non-identity is also linked to the basic CR concept of nat-
ural necessity, an exemplariness of generative mechanisms and structures at work, 
which assumes the stratification of reality. Following Bhaskar, Norrie (2010, p. 230) 
also explains natural necessity in terms of our thrownness into the "material mesh-
work of being" that is capable of determining the possible grounds for social justice. 
From basic CR, we can recall that natural necessity is found at the level of genera-
tive mechanisms that produce events, but not at the level of any regularity between 
them. Natural necessity means that the world must be structured in order for sci-
ence to occur. Hence, we can think of non-identity as the means by which we can 
communicate the difference in stratified reality. 
What is the consequence, then, of removing 1M from reality? Following Bhaskar 
(2002a), the epistemic fallacy underlies the elimination of the necessary 1M cat-
egories. As in Humeanism or positivism, what follows is an implicit ontology, a 
Kantianism that is incapable of sustaining labor or human praxis, let alone self-
emancipation because, as Hume famously stated, there are simply no good reasons 
(or its variant, that all reasons are equally valid) to exit a building by the tenth-
floor window, instead of the door (Bhaskar, 2002a). Two main implications result 
from the failure to thematize ontology: (1) destratification or the idea that there 
is no depth in reality leading to actualism; the opposite of 1M: non-identity yields 
identity, or more specifically, the "subject-object identity theory" which eternalizes 
knowledge as infallible and certain (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 152), and an implicit ontol-
ogy sets a ground for closure in argumentation, the source of all theoretical aporias. 
And (2) non-differentiation is the incapacity to sustain difference in reality. The 
implication is that change is impossible, giving a vision of reality as a perpetual 
shallowness, or what Bhaskar (ibid., p. 251) calls "demi-reality": it is a half-reality, 
the part of reality consisting in, or sustained by illusion, or other falsities such as 
absurd effects and symptoms, and various other types of reduction ad absurdum 
such as reification and voluntarism. 
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7.4 2E: negativity is characterized by absence 
The second level of the Bhaskarian dialectic is negativity, which is chiefly character-
ized by the notion of absence, a vital concept for change. Negativity is the vastness 
of absence, space, boundaries, and lack, including voids that remain when some-
thing has been left out. Its enormity is indicative of the Bhaskarian asymmetrical 
priority of the negative over the positive. Absence does not immediately entail the 
accumulation of what Bhaskar calls "determinate absences": 
absence for example, from consciousness (e.g., the known, the tacit, the 
unconscious), and-or an entity, property or attitude (e.g., the spaces in 
a text) in some determinate space-time region, e.g., in virtue of distanci-
ation or mediation, death or demise or simple non-existence. (Bhaskar, 
2008b, p. 9). 
However, in such cases we see that determinate absence gives rise, among other 
thingsl , to contradictions (or double-binds). The dogmatic Hegelian and Marxian 
way of conceiving absence is to say that there are contradictions everywhere, which 
does not get the theorist very far. From a DCR perspective, we are aware that 
precisely because the rise in contradictions may lead to either their proliferation 
(entropy) or a process by which to restore them (negentropy), we need to go beyond 
dogmatic viewpoints. It is as if we are, at this point, standing in front of crossroads, 
so that we need to take a step further in order to theorize agency in 4D in a very 
precise form that does not imply a perpetual, determinist (or endist) outcome, or its 
justification for the purpose of some religious form of signification, or other irrealist 
conviction. Thus, one of the primary objectives of DCR is to revindicate the notion 
of negativity as absence. This re-vindication allows us to see the most basic form of 
the dialectic, and one in which there is an absence in theory or practice. This absence 
or incompleteness may lead to a contradiction, in the case where this absence has 
relevant meaning that matters in reality; otherwise, the incompleteness is, in some 
ways, irrelevant. When such incompleteness is relevant (e.g., when what is omitted 
is causally relevant to or for the phenomena in question), contradictions, as the 
signaling devices for practitioners or theorists, begin to emerge. Such contradictions 
may proliferate until there is a move to restore consistencies with a deeper level of 
1See Appendix A on p. 287 to find a list of oppositional (negative) notions other than contra-
dictions that are responsible for causing challenges. 
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structure, or an aspect of totality that was not recognizable before. 
The crucial point to keep in mind is that Bhaskarian determinate absences refer 
to determinate non-being as opposed to indeterminate nothingness. The meaning 
of the negative is related to what is absent, when something has been left out, but 
is not restricted to it'. Now I turn to illustrating the types of absences and why this 
notion of absence is crucial in both the social and natural worlds. 
7.4.1 Absence, its chain of modalities, and Bhaskarian four-
fold polysemy 
We can begin with a list of classic Bhaskarian examples of various types of absences: 
• The absence of food in the presence of a hungry person, 
• The absence of women or slaves in the presence of politics, for example, in 
classical Greek times, 
• The absence of rain in the presence of drought, 
• The absence of education in the presence of ignorance, 
• The absence of raw materials in the presence of goods or services, say an 
automobile. 
• The absence of ethics in the presence of vice, and 
• The absence of spaces between the letters or words in an intended sentence or 
utterance. 
I use the preceding list to illustrate that Bhaskar's (2008b, p. 37) argument to 
revindicate negativity is as important in the natural as is in the social world, without 
saying that it is the same in both domains. To revindicate this notion, Bhaskar 
argues that (1) absence is non-being as opposed to simple nothingness; (2) non-being 
(absence) is real, i.e., it exists in our world; (3) the ontological status of non-being 
(absence) sets a zero-level by prioritizing it over its opposite, being (presence); and 
(4) the gap that is opened up in the prioritization of non-being over being itself 
1l3haskar (2008b, p. 8) also uses negation and negativity in many other senses of the verb so 
as to: "negate" including deny", contradict", oppose", exclude", marginalize", denigrate", erase", 
split" " and so on. 
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denotes the asymmetrical primacy of the ontological status of negativity (absence) 
over positivity (presence). The consequence of opening a gap of negativity posterior 
to positivity brings with it the veto of an all-positive world and the possibility of 
change (absenting) over non-being (absence). In a "dialectization" of the negative, 
we see that this concept expands in terms of four modalities, as shown in 7.1, p. 226. 
Adopted from Bhaskar (2008b, p. 283). 
Bhaskar (2008b, p. 283) argues for the importance of four modalities of negativity 
that follow the four inclusions: (1) real negation > (2) transformative negation > 
(3) radical negation > (4) linear negation. The first modality of negativity is (1) 
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real determinate negation as the all-embracing concept, referring to the absence of 
entity, feature, product or process X; it includes all other forms of negativity, its 
mediations, and changes; the second is (2) transformative negation, referring to some 
type of change or transformation in terms of two poles, as process and product; then 
we have (3) radical negation referring to self-negation and involving auto-sublation, 
auto-transformation, and auto-realization that denotes the overcoming of the self-
being or inner-contradiction (or double-bind); and lastly we have (4) linear negation, 
which involves a multiple of distanciations (e.g., the ontological and epistemological 
gap). 
Following these modalities of absence, we can elaborate on real negation as the 
driving force for transformation. First, we need to differentiate between two stages, 
i.e., the transformation of the product (or absence of process) and transformation 
of the process (or absence of product). In these cases, what is absent from the 
entity (product or process) is the means by which that entity comes into being. 
This logic results from the application of the asymmetrical priority of absenting 
(change of product) over absence (as process), which refers to transformation in the 
product itself. Bhaskar (2008b, p. 39) denotes such a stage with the term "process-
in-product" . In a reversal, the logic that results from the application of the primacy 
of absenting (change of process) over absence (as product) refers to the absence 
from the product of that by which the product is itself completed; in other words, 
this stage denotes an ongoing process of transformation by which the process is itself 
what brings the product into being or becoming. Bhaskar (ibid., p. 39) denotes such 
a stage with the term "product-in-process" . The result of these stages functions as 
a pluralistic chain of co-existence of different modalities of absence that Bhaskar 
(op. cit., p. 39) terms as the "fourfold polysemy" in order to denote this logic of 
negativity in terms of MELD (1M: absence as product, 2E: absence as process, 3L: 
absence as process-in-product, and 4D: absence as product-in-process). 
In this thesis, I show how Bhaskarian fourfold polysemy functions as a pluralistic 
in terms of the conception of learning at each of its stages, from 1M to 4D, without 
resorting to reductionist accounts of learning. 
(1M) Learning as product Theoretically, 1M denotes a simple absence of pro-
cess. This level leaves out the process by which the product comes into being. 
CRAT thematizes 1M with the outcomes (or products) that result from the 
application of the three previous theories—collaborative learning, cooperative 
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learning, and supplemental instruction—to small-group schemes in higher ed-
ucation, as given in section 2.3, p. 24. To conceptualize 1M, I have argued 
that this level is evident in the way learning products acknowledge the need 
to account for learning processes, the following level in the journey through 
this dialectic. 
(2E) Learning as process Theoretically, at 2E we have a process of change (ab-
senting) without product. The process may or may not be caused by contra-
dictions. This idea of absenting as change without product refers to the sense 
in which learning is a yearning for change because as long as we live there is 
always something new to be learned. CRAT conceptualizes this level, section 
2.4 on p. 27, as an apprehension of incompleteness via the Bhaskarian notion 
of the absence. 
(3L) Learning as process-in-product Theoretically, 3L is the level of totality in 
which the process that is sometimes incomplete, contains gaps, fissures, and so 
on, is part of the product. CRAT exemplifies this level with the AT notion of 
an expansive transformation (which is equivalent to the Hegelian Aufhebung, 
a totality that is closed in thought and thus needs supplementation with (i) 
the next level in practice, which is 4D, and (ii) the Bhaskarian notions of open 
systems) as I show in section 3.6, p. 59. 
(4D) Learning as product-in-process Theoretically, this is the level of transfor-
mative praxis. CRAT elaborates this level in section 7.6.1, p. 244, by means 
of putting CR to practice in resolving the dualisms of AT, and in this chapter, 
by means of providing a critique of both the analytic and dialectical Western 
philosophical bedrocks that sustain the historical development of AT. 
The purpose of the logic denoted as the fourfold polysemy is connected with one 
of the key objectives of DCR, which is to revindicate the notion of negativity with 
what Bhaskar (2008b, p. 20) terms the critique of "ontological monovalence", the 
doctrine that reality is purely positive. According to Bhaskar (2002a, p. 60), the 
positivization of the world can be traced back to "the Parmenidian distinction of 
being and non-being", an anamorphic perspective that results from the imbibition of 
the negative (absence as non-being) by the positive (being). Greimas and Rastier's 
(1968, p. 83) model of "the elementary structure of meaning", as illustrated with 
Figure 7.2, p. 230), can be used to provide an example of positivization in the world 
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because their model contrasts two semiotic axes: the positive S axis (representing 
any type of semiotic system or the reality of meaning) as opposed to the negative 
S axis (absence of meaning), where S subordinates its contradictory S. A purely 
positive account of reality is a subject that Plato retakes and re-formulates with-
out the negative S, but only in terms of their difference. Whereas Plato replaces 
absence with difference, Aristotle denies it. This contradiction between S (a pos-
itive account of reality) and the omitted or re-formulated S (a negative account 
of reality), to place it in Greimasian terms, requires a compromise to overcome it, 
as in the invocation of the past as the element to substitute for S. What I am 
referring to is what Bhaskar (2008b, p. 138) terms the "self-referential paradox": 
the idea that generates a "stalemate" between the justification of belief, either in 
terms of religious convention or social convention, as a resolution to problems such 
as that of induction. Thus, the positivization of reality begins with its anamor-
phic perspective, followed by the reformulation of the negative for difference, and 
replacement of the 2E level, and is what Bhaskar (2008b, p. 138) calls the "Plato-
Aristotelian fault-line... [denotes] the fissions caused by ontological monovalence" of 
the Western-philosophical trajectory that thereby reinforces the status quo. 
What is the consequence of removing 2E from reality? Following DCR, we see 
two main implications of ontological monovalence that underlie the elimination of 
the necessary 2M categories: (1) theory-practice types of inconsistencies, which 
are "the absence of coherent philosophy within a lot of contemporary thought" 
(Bhaskar, 2002a, p. 60), including theoretical dichotomies—mind vs. body, facts vs. 
values, reasons vs. causes, and so on—the problem of induction, and other types 
of unsustainable epistemologies; and (2) the fallacy to thematize absence results 
in such splits, and such splits necessitate some type of "resolution", usually in the 
form of compromises that function as defense mechanisms allowing a false theory 
to continue—e.g., the TINA formation: the acronym for "there is no alternative" 
(Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 113). Without absence we have a reality without difference; 
without difference human beings would not able to tell apart anything, not even 
their own needs from the needs of others. Thus, the move to eliminate absence is 
actually eliminating the very natural necessity, to put in Bhaskarian terms, that 
sustains us in the world. Now, after outlining the Bhaskarian re-vindication of 
absence, we can see it in terms of causation. 
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7.4.2 Absenting: causing is transforming, is re-determining 
Absenting is, in simple terms, the eradication of an absence. When we speak about 
absenting the absence, we are talking about getting rid of the absence. A process of 
absenting is a process of transformation. It involves the possibility of the eradication 
of an absence. To recall, AT posits the possibility of transformation, with the term 
expansive learning, which has an implicit ontology and thus it remains unable to 
deal with its own dualisms, while it completely lacks theoretical possibilities for self-
emancipation. Now, we can further see how in DCR the notion of transformation 
as the process of absenting is homologous to causality, which is directly linked to 
emancipatory implications. 
Synchronically, we can think that the world is full of objects, products, practices, 
entities, processes, etc., that are lacking in it. Such absences have causal effects 
at any one point in time, or, to put it in DCR terms, I am referring to spatio-
temporal causality, which is the idea that causality is not mechanical; it does not 
mean regularities that are determined, but that are dynamic. In Bhaskar's (2008b, 
p. 281-281) great dictum: 
To cause is to change is to absent is to transform and re-determine. 
Causation is absenting... So we have the result that negativity is the 
hub not only of existence but also of causality. Quite simply, to cause is 
to absent. 
In order to convey the dynamism of causation, I refer to Hartwig's (2007b) tabular 
representation (see Table 7.1, p. 231, below) in which causality is applied to the 
MELD schema. This dynamism denotes a concatenation of causality that leads to a 
chain of bringing about transformation, what is, in DCR terms, denoted as a "chain 
of causation" of phenomena. 
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Adapted from Hartwig (2007b, p. 59). 
This dialectical matrix needs to be differentiated from a perspective of regularity—
deterministic causality (i.e., the idea that can be explained metaphorically by a 
billiard-ball situation, in which the cause of some phenomena X sets a chain reac- 
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tion of events Yl, Y2, ... Yn that holds regularity under some closed descriptive 
conditions). After we apply the MELD schema to the notion of causality, we see 
that it sets in motion a chain of events where the cause of some phenomena X 
is a transformation of an effect, which leaves traces of such a phenomenon. Such 
traces follow a chain of phenomena and may happen in any one of the four modes 
of absences. This chain corresponds to the four modes of universality, and what I 
call "traces" refer to the four types of Aristotelian causes, and to the four types of 
Bhaskarian tendencies. From a DCR viewpoint this relates to 1M: non-identity, in 
which we have a product that is a synchronic or snapshot view of the world. This 
initial level is a structure that is generally very useful in terms of a basic assessment 
of what is in or out in our account of reality; we need structure to identify the 
terms of the next level of process. The 1M-level captures the Aristotelian material-
formal cause; it is basically a static view of the world. We can think that product 
is something that history has thrown up at us, so that it is already out-there in the 
world. 2E: negativity requires that we set the product in motion and it is captured 
by the Aristotelian efficient-final cause: the perception of the product as made up 
of the process. At the level of 3L: totality, we do not encounter a single process; 
rather, as in the Aristotelian formal-material cause, we encounter a multiplicity of 
processes coming together in a product, which is denoted as process-in-product. In 
4D: transformative praxis, we have the transformation of process-in-product into 
something new, as in the Aristotelian final-efficient cause, denoted by product-in-
process. Other philosophical traditions typically explained transformation or change 
as a redistribution of unchanging elements or instances such as atoms, forms, and 
facts. In fact, if we analyze what we ordinarily mean by change, then it involves 
the coming into being of something new, and-or the passing out of being of some-
thing that was there. This notion of change implies that it involves something more 
than just a redistribution of unchanging elements, for instance, as in Parmenidesian 
blockism, in which reality is eternal and nothing significant has ever happened. In 
contrast, DCR links causes and transformation as the removal of absences as the 
means by which to conceptualize transformation in the social and natural worlds. 
From a DCR viewpoint, we are concerned with conceptualizing transformation of 
what is lacking in social and natural realms: in more specific terms, I am referring 
to the "process of absenting absence" (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 176), which is what the 
dialectic is. 
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7.4.3 From absence to absenting and back 
The basic form of the Bhaskarian dialectic is that relevant absence occurs when 
something has been left out. At this point we need to distinguish between a rele-
vant and a non-relevant absence. A relevant absence has pernicious effects in the 
way it registers as incompleteness, which then goes on to generate contradictions. 
In contrast, a non-relevant absence does not register any incompleteness and thus 
contradictions may go unnoticed. After an absence is set in motion, i.e., after it is 
registered as pernicious incompleteness, what follows is that it generates contradic-
tions that, in consequence, give rise to a process of transformation. This process 
of transformation is not automatic. In turn, transformative praxis takes time and 
effort in order to discover what has been left out. 
The classic Bhaskarian example about the history of science illustrates the pro-
cess of delay prior to transformation. To the physicists of the end of the nineteenth 
century, it was clear that there was something wrong in the structure of their con-
ceptualization of reality using Newtonian models; the challenge was to discover what 
was left out from the theory. After a long delay that took time and effort, theories 
like quantum mechanics and Einstein's theory of relativity provided new insights 
into problems of physics. The point of this example is to illustrate that transforma-
tive praxis is not automatic, but it may actually take a long time and much effort 
to achieve. After such a discovery of what is absent is made, then there is a move to 
incorporate it into to the theory (or into the natural world, as nature incorporates 
it). In this manner, we see how the basic form of the dialectic is a move towards 
rectification or remedying of the incompleteness. After discovering what has been 
left out and after this has been included as part of a theory, we have a more in-
clusive totality, free from contradictions, which refers to the idea of transformation 
directed at remedying the absence. Another name for this dialectical process is ne-
gentropy, or the move to increasing order, as opposed to entropy, which is the move 
to increasing disorder or chaos. 
7.4.4 Relevant absence is pernicious incompleteness 
Bhaskar (2008b) argues that we cannot have being without absence, but we need to 
differentiate between relevant and non-relevant absence. First, consider the case of 
a hungry individual who wants to remove feelings of hunger. The absence of food is 
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the negative condition of food that drives the individual towards an absenting or the 
move to remove that condition. In this case, the absence is registering as pernicious 
incompleteness, which may lead to a contradiction of eating or dying. We can show 
that this idea is so important that the world is overflowing with examples of absence. 
Let us recall, for instance, that various self-immolations started protest movements 
after a man in Tunisia set himself on fire (and later died in consequence) because 
police prevented him from selling his produce without a permit. Furthermore, let us 
consider malnutrition, scurvy, and homelessness as three examples of absence, which 
are still prevalent even in the so-called advanced countries such as the USA. This 
type of absence can result in people having much lower life expectancies, which may 
lead to premature deaths. Here we have a clear absence of nutrition, vitamin C, 
and an absence of proper housing. In all these cases, the accumulation of absences 
is registering as incompleteness, which could have pernicious effects. The important 
point to denote from these examples is that for an absence to be a relevant absence; 
that is, to register as pernicious incompleteness, it moves the system to generate 
inconsistencies that have detrimental effects, such as in the first example, which 
necessitates resolution in a complete, more comprehensive totality. 
As we have seen from the examples, inconsistencies can be resolved, but not 
always, which is not to say, in the Hegelian sense, that inconsistencies can always 
be resolved. Bhaskar (2008b, p. 84) argues that "in an open world neither inconsis-
tency nor incompleteness are [completely eliminable]; and the possibility of both is 
transcendentally necessary conditions for science". To paraphrase, Bhaskar is saying 
that in some form or another, we are always going to have some inconsistencies (or 
incompleteness) left, i.e., we can never get rid of them entirely because of the nature 
of the world. Let us consider a theoretician that is able to point out where a theory 
seems not to be able to be fixed by identifying that such a theory is incomplete. 
In such a case, there might be an inconsistency followed by a difficult challenge to 
resolve it. The good theorist either ignores or resolves the challenge in order to 
create a more consistent theory. As an example we can take this thesis, where I was 
able to point out that inconsistencies with AT are derived from ignoring Hume's 
theory, which caused various dualisms. In this particular case, inconsistencies can 
be resolved via CR. 
To further elucidate this point, I want to refer to Bhaskar's Plato etc. (1994) 
where he gives a list of the most relevant types of dialectic that are concerned with 
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including what has been left out from the understanding of transformation. 
Adopted from Bhaskar (1994, p. 184). 
In short, if we have an absence, then something that may be necessary is lacking 
in a thing, or a situation is incomplete, and the basic form of the dialectic involves a 
move towards completing it. The inclusion of absence yields a more comprehensive 
totality, the negentropic solution, but there is also the case when there is proliferation 
of absences, the entropic solution. This level of 2E: negativity is implicit in the level 
that follows. 
7.5 3L: totality is characterized by internal rela-
tions 
[The] only plausible concept of a totality is that of a partial totality rife 
with external as well as internal, and (not the same thing) accidental as 
well as necessary connections, replete with gaps, discontinuities, voids 
as well as pockets of thoroughgoing (sub-)totality. (Bhaskar, 2008b, 
pp. 270-271). 
The third level of the Bhaskarian dialectic is 3L: totality, which is grounded on 
the idea of understanding the world as a whole that includes its splits (partial 
totalities) and its boundaries (sub-totalities). The chief characterization of totality 
is the notion of internal relations. From basic CR we can recall that there is an 
internal relation between two elements, say A and B, if one element, A, is a necessary 
condition for the other element, B. In more precise terms: 
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A relation between the structures or mechanisms M1R M2 is internal if an 
only if ... M1 would not act in the way it characteristically does unless 
M2 was so related to it; it is symmetrically internal if this condition 
applies reciprocally in the case of M2R M1. (Bhaskar, 2009, p. 108). 
Traditionally, the assumption about nature was that there were no internal relations, 
so that if we change a natural object (e.g., the direction of a river), then it did not 
have an effect on the other (e.g., the natural eco-system that depended on the river). 
From a DCR perspective, this traditional assumption breaks down in the social world 
because in social reality we have that interactions affect elements that are internally 
related. For instance, when there is a mutual exchange of utterances between two 
people, we have that there is an interaction of sentences that depend on, but also 
follow form the initial interlocutor involved in the mutual conversation. 
Totality may be described as a constellation that maps a "system of internal 
relations" (Hartwig, 2007j, p. 470), which is mainly developed in the third level of 
the MELD schema. At his level, totality is a system to be connected through, and 
engaged in various types of intra-activity, but it also has a spanning structure to 
the other three remaining levels. The question that follows is: what is the mode by 
which the Bhaskarian totality spans across the other levels? The answer is provided 
via the mode of holistic causality, which occurs when complex parts of a whole are 
united, as explained below. 
7.5.1 Holistic causality as the mode of operation of totality 
Bhaskar (2008b) develops the notion of holistic causality as the mode by which 3L: 
totality operates. At this point, we need to recall that causality assumes the four 
modes of absence (see Figure 7.1, p. 226) in other words, causality does not imply 
mechanical "billiard-ball" determination, but has a dynamism that occurs as a chain 
of four types: 
(1) Transfactual causality in 1M or the idea that causation is efficacious at the level 
of generative mechanisms. 
(2) Rhythmic causality in 2E or the idea that causation is not only local but exer-
cised in a spatio-temporalization by causal powers of structures. 
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(3) Intra-active causality in 3L or the idea of causality as a system or structure of 
internal relations (or totalities). 
(4) Intentional causality in 4D or the idea that people are laminated structures so 
that, as stratified individuals, they are capable of giving reasons for causes. 
After we see the four types of causality, then our conception of determination is 
shaped. In particular, Bhaskar (2008b, p. 127) argues that holistic causality happens 
when we have a and 0 or "complex coheres", where a and 0 are such that: 
Table 7.3: Holistic causality 
The mode of operation of totalities in action 
(0) The totality, i.e., the form of structure of the combination, causally de-
termines the elements; and 
(/3) The form of structure of the elements causally co-determine each other, 
and so causally (a) determine or (0) co-determine the whole. 
Adopted from Bhaskar (2008b, p. 127). 
The (0) case tells us that totality is seen as emergent. In other words, totality 
has emergent powers and also includes its elements, which are seen to have relative 
autonomy. In this sense, totality takes milder types of determination. Moreover, 
holistic causality is "a structured, asymmetrically weighted, differentiated nexus" 
(ibid., p. 271). We can think of holistic causality as an emergence of a unit, a cell, 
or a whole with its particular forms of determinations, mediations, structures, nega-
tions, exclusions, and concreteness from which it can react against itself. Holistic 
causality is exercised in the four moments of DCR and gives a fourfold perspective 
on causality: "as (1M): transfactual efficacy, (2E): spatio-temporal process, (3L): 
holistic causality, and (4D): intentional agency" (Norrie, 2010, p. 95). 
In basic CR, for instance, there are various instances where we see that totality is 
exercised. In Bhaskar's PN (1979), totality at work appears as the drive to connect 
philosophy and science, and scientific knowledge and everyday practice, in theory 
and praxis. In RTS, totality at work appears as a reality that is structured into three 
levels (empirical as the all-containing domain of reality, which is differentiated but 
contains the actual, which is differentiated but contains the domain of the real) where 
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causal relations form a series of connections between those different three levels. At 
the level of the empirical, the exercise of causation adds "transfactual efficacy" of 
those generative mechanisms that exist and act in the intransitive dimension (ID), 
independently of our notions. In addition, when reasons are acted on (i.e., when 
reasons are said to be efficacious), then they are a subset of causes. In other words, 
reasons form unities, referred to as "constellational unities" (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 273), 
as I show below. 
7.5.2 Constellationality and mediation 
Two closely related themes in 3L: totality are the key ideas of constellationality and 
mediation to resolve oppositions or dualism. On the one hand, the idea of mediation 
denotes an intermediary (or a possible healing of splits, dichotomies, etc.) between 
two entities; more precisely, DCR argues that mediation occurs "if A achieves C, 
secures or eventuates in C (either in whole or in part) via or by means of B, then 
B may be said to mediate their relation" (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 114). On the other 
hand, the idea of constellationality is first coined from an Adornian adaptation 
from W. Benjamin in order to analogically concretive how "ideas are related to 
objects as constellations to stars" (Hartwig, 2007, p. 78). However, the Bhaskarian 
constellationality is different in scope since it takes different forms, which is closely 
related not only to the idea of connection (mediation) but also disconnection. 
The characteristic of constellationality is a key part of 3L: totality. There are 
two important notions to keep in mind when speaking about constellationality, (1) 
mediation, i.e., the means or medium of connection; and (2) what Norrie (2001, 
p. 54) calls "differentia", i.e., as disconnection, or another way to say the difference 
between distinct, but overlapping levels of reality. For instance, constellational-
ity is used to articulate traditional problems of opposition in terms of relations of 
containment. Such relations of containment mean that one term is contained as 
a subset of the other and that both terms make up a constellational unit. To ex-
plain constellationality, Bhaskar (2008b) begins with various relations that may be 
seen as problematic in terms of mediation (a closed-subjective mediation and an 
open-objective mediation); for instance, let us consider the following five duos: 
(1) subject and object, 
(2) ontology and epistemology, 
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(3) reasons and causes, 
(4) language and reality, 
(5) internality and externality. 
From a naïve realist view, we have that the relation, say between (3) language and 
reality, is bounded with our subjectivity. In other words, we can only articulate 
such mediation as a bounded condition of our knowledge or ability to articulate it 
in language. In this manner, it is closed by our subjective mediation. In contrast to 
the closed-subjective mediation stance, in DCR we have a "transcendental detach-
ment" (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 271). From this vantage point, we see that the duo, (3) 
language and reality, are in a constellational unity, in which the being or reference 
is independent of our use of language and other types of referential means we use to 
denote its existence, so that to argue for differential detachment is to argue for the 
ontological stratification and differentiation of reality. 
Another example of constellational unity is the mediated relation between (1) 
subject and object, where we step out from a hemisphere of closed subjectivity to a 
hemisphere of open objectivity. Such open objectivity means that it is possible for 
us to have a conception of truth, with both scientific and philosophic grounds, at an 
ontological level. This notion of open objectivity is exemplified if we recall mind the 
gap! The intransitive and transitive divide (ontology-epistemology) dimensions of 
language from a viewpoint of a geo-historical emergent conception of knowledge. In 
a closed-subjective hemisphere it is impossible to have a conception of truth, since 
everything is contingent without any social or natural scientific grounds. Now, dif-
ferentia highlights the distinction that unities, as opposed to identities, are denoted 
by both analytical and dialectical reasons, which implies that they do not cancel 
each other out. In short, constellationality provides us with the means to interde-
pendently bind the oppositional relation of containment or dichotomies, from which 
an open-objective mediation as opposed to a closed one occurs, without canceling 
out their respective difference. This idea of openness and the metaphor of stars as 
partial universes in a constellation take us into the only conceivable totality in terms 
of other important concepts, sub-totalities and partial totalities, as I discuss below. 
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7.5.3 The openness of partial and sub-totalities 
We can start by differentiating between an open totality and a closed one. For 
Bhaskar (2008b), the future and totality are necessarily open. In contrast, Hegel's 
totality is "constellationally closed" (ibid., p. 271). The reason why Hegel's totality 
is closed is that he joins both the concepts of identify in the first moment and differ-
ence in the second movement around a master idea, which leads him to an absolute 
"true totality" (ibid., p. 270) so it does not include its discontinuities. This master 
idea cannot sustain the four 1M to 4D moments of DCR since it lacks the last mo-
ment of a 4D: transformative praxis. Contrary to a closed-Hegelian totality, Bhaskar 
(2008b) argues that there is no master idea of an absolute totalization, but that of 
a partial totality and also "totalities within totalities" (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 55), or 
sub-totalities. Norrie (2010, p. 90), following the Bhaskarian 3L, also stresses that 
we have an open totality since it assumes that there are partial totalities, a term 
to "denote the splitting, fracturing and broken nature of the whole under condition 
of material diffraction", and sub-totalities, a term in which we do not perceive ev-
erything as internally related, but only some phenomena. The reason we need to 
conceive the world as containing its own breaks, fissures, and splits (or its partial 
totalities), in which we find totalities within other totalities (or its sub-totalities), 
is to be able to see the world as a place where the future is not determined but 
rather is an open domain. In opposition to a closed notion of totality, this level has 
a fourth moment in DCR as a step into the open space for the future as defined by 
4D: transformative praxis. In this sense, the crucial implication of the Bhaskarian 
totality is the idea of ontological openness. In other words, reality as a totality is 
a differentiated structure that includes its own subsets as "discontinuities, hiatuses, 
spaces, binds, barriers, boundaries and blocks between totalities" (Bhaskar, 2008b, 
p. 126). Therefore, the Bhaskarian totality is linked to the idea that ontological 
reality is open; it includes being "paced" with its own fissures and mediation. 
What is the consequence, then, of the de-totalization of reality? Following 
Bhaskar (1994), we see that there are two implications of the failure to thema-
tize the openness of 3L. Hegel's attitudes of (1) the Unhappy Conscious of X (split 
within the element X itself) and (2) the Beautiful Soul (alienation) provide the best 
examples of such consequences. We can imagine that this is the level where we 
encounter the effects of the other two levels. For example, the acceptance of con-
strains, authority, ills, fate, and acts or God, is what Bhaskar (2008b, p. 28) calls 
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the "uncomprehensive necessity", and is homologous to the failure to conceptual-
ize natural necessity at the 1M level of ontology. An implicit ontology yields the 
Beautiful-Soul effect of alienation. A second consequence of de-totalization is (2) the 
elimination of absence that creates theory-practices splitting inconsistencies. This 
positivization of reality yields the Unhappy-Conscious effect of theory split within 
our practice. According to Bhaskar (2004, p. 189), Hegel wants to overcome these 
two attitudes, i.e., alienation without a theory-practice split with this "immanent 
teleology", but fails to do so because by doing so, Hegel closes this 3L level of total-
ity with his endism. I have only provided two attitudes or effects of de-totalization; 
however, Bhaskar (1994) provides us with other effects such as Descartes' stoicism: 
a reification of knowledge as absolute certainly, and various types of fetishisms. 
7.6 4D: agency or transformative praxis 
The chief characterization of 4D: agency is transformative praxis, which is essential 
in the social world, but also it is essential in the process of producing a negentropic 
outcome. To put it simply, DCR reclaims agency form the slumbers of disempower-
ment and sometimes-fictional role under which irrealist philosophy locates it. At a 
philosophical level, we see that the dualism between realism and irrealism grounds 
the dichotomy between agency and embodiment. While irrealism is the doctrine 
that denies the existence and action of real entities in the world, realism asserts 
it, and CR posits its inexorable nature independently of our knowledge. From an 
irrealist viewpoint, reasons that are acted upon are embodied in some grand idea 
(e.g., a potential good, salvation, or change for others, informed choice, necessity to 
eradicate some ill), so that the agent acts on behalf of reasons that are "out-there" 
in the world of "grand" ideas or non-real entities. In particular, we see that at the 
moment of action, the agent is not subjectively or objectively responsible for it, as 
her reason is disembodied from its irrealist cause. Two classic examples from naive 
Marxism and religion can be provided here. First, when Marxists sustain the ex-
planatory theory of identifying a true interest in the working class, so that the idea 
of the proletarians as the social class of emancipation provides the idea for a revo-
lutionary movement, it is not too divorced from the sanctification that attaches the 
predicate "in God's name" after every intended action. This disembodiment is the 
cause of many fallacies in philosophical thought: anthropism, monovalence, actual- 
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ism, moral irrealism, deagentification, existentialism, etc. In this manner, irrealist 
philosophy is unable to sustain the basic CR notion that reasons (which are acted 
on) are causes. In contrast, DCR sees reasons in terms of a totality that emerge 
from its causes and form the causal powers of mind (as conceived by Synchronic 
Emergence Powers Materialism [SEPM]), that depend on the negative presence of 
the past, and are contingent on the future. On the grounds of self-authority alone, 
DCR constellational encloses moral and ethical stances. In other words, we find 
that at first instance, knowledge and being are related in a dualistic way; but form 
a DCR vantage point, we come to see that knowledge as itself part of being. In this 
manner, we can see way the concept of being constellationality contains knowledge 
as part of itself, so that when an agent acts under a self-authority doctrine, then 
if this personal-authority position is not serious it implies that she is not ethical. 
We may recall from 3L that Norrie (2010), for instance, illustrates ethics by arguing 
that the relationship between ethics and history that can be seen in terms of an 
open totality by the way in which ethics is partly constellationally contained within 
our history. 
Now, we can think of 4D: transformative praxis, as the transformation of trans-
formative praxis, which is the point of introducing Bhaskar's (2008) dialectic of 
freedom: 
the desire to be desired and this involves the desire to be recognized, 
again through the logic of dialectical universalizing insofar as this in-
volves the capacity to enjoy rights and liberties, [it] entails the real en-
joyment of equal and universally reciprocally recognized rights and lib-
erties, including the right to de-alienation and the enjoyment of health, 
education, access to resources and liberties. 
Now, 4D: transformative praxis entails that emancipation must be grounded on self-
authority; hence it needs to be self-emancipation such that we cannot emancipate 
a group of workers under the flag of a revolutionary working class. People them-
selves are self-revolutions, i.e., each individual has to create the condition as an 
emancipatory agent. 
Although Hegel serves as an inspiration for the Bhaskarian dialectic, it is through 
the critique of Hegel and Marx that DCR is different and original in its own right. 
Norrie (2010) rightly points out that whereas DCR is composed of the already 
mentioned four levels, the Hegelian dialectic consists of only three levels: (1) the 
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first level of identity, i.e., the tautologically true thing or concept, a thing X is such 
a thing itself because it is called that X; (2) the second level of negativity, i.e., the 
process by which the conflicting states cancel out in an interpretative understanding 
or Aufheburg; and (3) the triad level of closed totality, i.e., the structure where truth 
is seen to lie in the whole in the all-encompassing constellation through reason. 
I want to further elaborate on the distinction that shows how the Bhaskarian 
dialectic (DCR) is differentiated in all three levels from the Hegelian dialectic. In 
DCR, 1M means non-identity, whereas for Hegel, the first level is identity. Although 
Hegel and Bhaskar (2008b) both have the concept of negativity, what Hegel is lacking 
is real determinate absence. Hegel conceptualizes negativity as nothingness, which 
automatically cancels out. This cancellation of the negative is what made Marx 
(and others) believe that Hegel was an apologist, since Hegel aimed to produce 
an immediately good outcome in philosophy. In contrast, Marx conceptualized 
the negative space, as containing contradictions, that has not been resolved by 
Hegel's philosophy. In DCR, the third level is an open totality, whereas the Hegelian 
totality is closed. The last level in DCR is 4D, a level that denotes the importance 
of transformative praxis to change the world, which in Hegel's dialectic is simply 
absent. This level is needed in order to avoid the Hegelian closeness, which is 
the realization of the theory-practice unit in theory, as a return to open totality 
in order to "achieve the unit of theory and practice in practice" (Bhaskar, 2008b, 
p. 5). In this manner, we have seen a "dialecticization" of basic critical CR that 
is provided by the Bhaskarian dialectic in the MELD schema. Simultaneously, this 
Bhaskarian dialectic provides us with new philosophical grounds by which to re-read 
or re-interpret the philosophical roots in which the activity-theoretical approach is 
rooted. 
7.6.1 4D: learning as product-in-process 
At 4D: learning as product-in-process, CRAT investigates learning as transforma-
tive praxis including emancipatory praxis: whenever we perceive a real change in 
the world, for example, we can make a parallel of this event at this 4D-level of the 
dialectic of emancipation. In particular, we can relate it to the individual level of 
a student's understanding, which inevitably requires engagement as practice, which 
is already an intrinsic spark of freedom. To further elucidate this idea, let us re-
call that various protest movements in Tunisia were sparked with self-immolations, 
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for instance, by a man who set himself on fire (and later died in consequence) be-
cause police prevented him from selling his produce without a permit. In the same 
manner, learning always involves an action of some form to another as there is no 
learning without action, a point already articulated in the second generation of AT 
with the dictum: "There is no such thing as activity without a motive" (Leont'ev, 
1981, p. 408). Another way to state this idea is to say that we have not learned until 
we have changed in some particular way, which is when knowledge is part of our-
selves, what Bhaskar (2002b, p. 115) terms as an "in-building" of knowledge, e.g., 
when knowledge "becomes part of our inner most being" (p. 115). Then our inner 
being changes by applying knowledge, i.e., the employment of knowledge to make 
or create objects that we are trying to learn from is, what Bhaskar terms, the stage 
of "making" (or creating) because it involves our agency or "transformative praxis 
[poesis] or production, i.e., objectification... (creative work) [at, in and on the phys-
ical world]" (ibid., p. 112). In other words, dialectical sublation is expanding and 
explaining the form of what happens in a transformation. It is expanding the con-
tent of what happens between the social structure and agency, in Transformational 
Model of Social Activity (TMSA), which is precisely the explicated version of what 
Engestrom had identified as the point of commonality between third-generation AT 
and Bhaskarian CR. 
At this point, we are able to articulate the main problem with AT in terms of 
its conception of learning. As AT has an implicit ontology that is crucial for this 
investigation, it cannot explicitly locate learning as a self-emancipation pulse that 
is an intrinsic part of the individual; rather it posits learning as a potentiality of 
actions of a group of people that can be "collectively generated as a solution to 
the double bind potentially embedded in the everyday actions" (Engestrom, 1987, 
p. 174, emphasis added). Once again, the key problem is that learning is displaced 
to a type of superstructure position, i.e., learning is not fully articulated as a self-
emancipating pulse that is enfolded in the individual, but we only see it as an effect, 
a symptom, of a manifestation of an invisible structure that generates it. Thus, there 
is a need for a superior theory of reality; against deagentification, CR re-vindicates 
ontology and with it, agency, as self-emancipatory potentiality, thereby assimilating 
AT into the dialectic, the logic of emancipation. 
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7.7 The structure of the Bhaskarian Hegel-Marxian 
critique 
I now turn to show how DCR can provide a superior account of the historical devel-
opment of concepts that are very important for the activity-theoretical approach by 
giving an in-depth critique of Hegel and Marx, from which the philosophical roots of 
AT come. In particular, CR offers a critique of Hegel and a critique of elements in 
Marx. The following Table 7.4, p. 246 aims to illustrate the distinction between an 
Engestromian and Bhaskarian interpretation of these two classics and the notions 
of contradiction and learning. 
Table 7.4: Engestromian versus Bhaskarian interpreta-
tions 
Interpretation Engestrom Bhaskar 
Hegel The first philosopher to in- The U-D-R logic and the critique 
quire 	 into the 	 nature 	 of of (1) realized idealism, (2) spir- 
knowledge under a societal itual monism, and (3) immanent 
influence. teleology (or endism) and there-
fore they can be related back to 
ontological monovalence, the idea 
of reality without the negative (or 
absence) 
Continued on next page 
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Table 7.4 — Continued from previous page 
Interpretation Engestrom Bhaskar 
Marx (1) The Hegelian notion of 
self-creation as labor that 
is a revolutionary practice, 
i.e., "[the] coincidence of the 
changing of circumstances 
and of human activity can 
be conceived and rationally 
understood only as revo-
lutionising practice." (Marx, 
1888/1972c, p. 144) It is 
used in order to overcome 
the dualism between ideal-
ism and mechanical mate-
rialism (2) Dialectical con-
cept of commodity as a 
"contradictory unit of use-
value and exchange-value" 
(Engestrom & Miettinen 
1999, p. 5) 
The critique of (1) principle of 
identity, (2) logical mysticism, 
and (3) subject-predicate inver-
sions. Now, each of these in-
stances (1)—(3) can be related 
back to fallacies in the Western-
philosophical traditions: (1) the 
principle of identity relates to 
the epistemic fallacy, (2) logi-
cal mysticism relates to actual-
ism (or what Bhaskar calls the 
Plato-Aristotle fault-line), and 
(3) subject-predicate inversions 
also stem from the principle of 
identity, but looking at Hegel's U-
DR logic, (3) refers to endism, 
the idea that we have arrived at 
the end of history. The critique 
of subject-predicate inversion and 
immanent teleology 
Contradiction (1) Ubiquitous sources that 
drive transformation. (2) 
Four types of contradic-
tions. 
(1) Hegelian and Marxian contra-
dictions, (2) Dialectical and logi-
cal contradictions 
Epistemology: a theory 
of methods of interven-
tion (but not restricted to 
them). Learning as the pos-
sibility of expansive trans-
formation 
Ontology: in DCR there is a 
deepening of the theory of reality 
already developed in basic CR. A 
dialectical conception of learning 
as dialectical sublation 
Conceptualization 
of learning 
Adopted from Bhaskar (2008b, p. 127). 
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AT takes its starting point in the philosophy of Kant, and specially Hegel and 
Marx, without providing a critique of the problematic elements of these two classics 
of dialectical philosophy. A simple look at reality demonstrates that there were 
problems in practice that Hegel did not manage to carry out in his program, and 
the purges of Stalinism can be taken as evidence that there was incompleteness and 
other problematic elements in Marxist theory as well. Thus, we cannot take these 
classics as points of departure in the articulation of theory without being critical 
about them in the first place. This is the point of entrance of the Bhaskarian Hegel-
Marxian critique. According to Bhaskar (2008b, p. 92), Marx believed that there 
was, in the dialectic of Hegel, a "rational kernel", which suffered mystifications 
under the Hegelian system; however, Bhaskar stresses that Marx did not get around 
to articulating what this rational kernel was, and this is inter alia what DCR claims 
to be able to do. 
In order to provide an adequate account of the philosophical roots of AT, using 
the Bhaskarian dialectic, it is crucial in terms of three stages. First, it is impor-
tant to understand the dialectic of Hegel, and what is incorrect with the Hegelian 
dialectic by using the more appropriate concepts developed by DCR by means of 
the Bhaskarian critique on Hegel (in section 7.7.1, p. 248 ). Then it is also impor-
tant to show what is incorrect or otherwise inadequate with Marx by means of the 
Bhaskarian critique of Marx (section 7.7.5, p. 261). 
7.7.1 Bhaskar on Hegelian dialectics 
The activity-theoretical community does not explicitly elaborate on a critique of 
Hegelian dialectics; rather, Engestrom and Miettinen (1999) assert that Hegel is the 
first philosopher to inquire into the nature of knowledge under a societal influence, 
as a topic that links Hegel and the Vygotskian thesis. 
Hegel was the first philosopher to draw attention to the role of material, 
productive activity and the instruments of labor in the development of 
knowledge. He clearly enunciated the theory that individual conscious-
ness is formed under the influence of knowledge accumulated by society 
and objectified in the world of things created by humanity. (Engestrom, 
1987, The triangles of human activity, para. 4). 
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In contrast, DCR provides the first schema of the Hegelian logic along with its 
critique. In the Bhaskarian interpretation, there are two senses of the dialectic in 
Hegel. As identified by Bhaskar (1994, p. 15), the first inflection is the idea of 
dialectic as "the logical process of reason" and the second inflection is the method 
or motor of this logical process that is the dialectic. The first inflection is itself 
constituted by two main strands: (A) the Eleatic strand, which is the dialectic as 
reason; and (B) the Ionian strand, which is the dialectic of process. 
(A) The Eleatic strand Bhaskar (2008b) traces back the dialectic as reason (Eleatic 
idea) to its Greek origins. This idea derives from the Greek word, dialectike, 
which is roughly translated as the art of discussion or conversation by means 
of "reasoning by splitting into two" (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 15). According to 
Bhaskar (2008b, p. 50), this Eleatic idea of the dialectic as reason results in 
Hegel in what Bhaskar terms as "realized idealism", or the Hegelian identity 
between thinking and totality. 
(B) The Ionian strand The dialectic as process (the Ionian idea) typically takes 
a double ascending-descending movement: (1) the ascending dialectic refers to 
the existence of higher forms of reality. According to Bhaskar (2008b, p. 46), 
the ascending dialectic takes the form of "spiritual constellational monism" in 
Hegel. And (2) the descending dialectic refers to the manifestation of those 
higher forms in terms of phenomena in reality, which as Bhaskar says, results 
in "immanent teleology" . The combination of the ascending-descending unit 
forms the Hegelian dialectic: 
a logical process or dialectic which actualizes itself by alienating or be-
coming something other than itself, and which restores its self-unity by 
recognizing this alienation as nothing other than its true expression and 
manifestation. (Bhaskar, 2004, p. 116). 
In order to better understand the above account of the Hegelian dialectic, Bhaskar 
(2008b) identifies characteristics as auto-generated, auto-differentiating, and also 
auto-actualizing. 
Auto-generating The Hegelian dialectic as a process is capable of restoring or 
actualizing itself from alienating states (e.g., problem, conflict, contradiction, 
deadlock, split, etc.) by a unification of opposites. 
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Auto-differentiating The Hegelian dialectic involves the recognition of the alien-
ation, the absence (e.g., contradiction) state, as its own free state of manifes-
tation and expression—e.g., resolution, transcendence, enlightenment, critique 
of beliefs. 
Auto-actualizing The Hegelian dialectic as the particular state(s) that is already 
inscribed into the unity or whole that makes the dialectic completed in itself 
as a system. 
Once again, the Hegelian dialectic combines reason (Eleatic idea) and process 
(Ionian idea) as part of the first of two main inflections, which we will be returning 
to. In addition, I want to highlight these three key terms: realized idealism, spiritual 
constellational monism, and immanent teleology, because they represent recurrent 
terms by which I organize the rest of this section. For now, I want to concentrate on 
the second inflection, the motor of this logical process of reason that is the dialectic. 
Bhaskar (2004) illustrates the Hegelian dialectic as the second movement in the 
U-D-R schema (see Figure 7.3, p. 251). 
p-transform In the first instance, we need to move to the point where we observe 
contradiction, as denoted by p in the diagram. In other words, it requires 
work in practice to get to the level of analytical thought or understanding. 
This move is what Bhaskar calls pre-philosophical or pre-reflexive thought 
(PRT) to understanding, using Hegel's term. 
U (understanding) It is our basic analytic thought that conforms to the principle 
of non-contradiction in which meanings remain stable and truth-values do not 
change. However, we do not notice the contradictions in our understanding. 
For instance, if our understanding about a particular domain of reality excludes 
something, then we get contradictions. The dialectic brings out the contradictions 
that signal the fact that our universe of discourse needs to be expanded, so that we 
have to introduce what has been ignored. 
In the field of education, the dialectic is particularly important because if we 
are concerned with the idea of inclusive education we need to consider those sectors 
that have been excluded. This example is meant to illustrate one of the ways in 
which we use the insights of the dialectic without acknowledging it in educational 
practice today. 
To return to the U-D-R schema: 
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Adapted from Bhaskar (1994, p. 119). 
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cr-transform It refers to the move needed to recognize contradictions, inadequacies, 
or anomalies in our understanding of concepts and-or practices. Metaphori-
cally, we can imagine that a "quantum leap" is needed in order to bring out 
such inconsistencies. 
D (dialectic) As defined earlier, is the second level in which we have the experience 
of a real determinate negation: the experience of absence as the experience of 
some product that is being left out that drives the need to remove it (Bhaskar, 
2008b). 
r-transform It refers to a second move needed to rectify the already identified 
inconsistencies. A second "quantum leap" that we need to take in order to 
resolve such contradictions. 
R (reason) What Hegel calls reason is what, in DCR terms, is meant for the 
building of a more comprehensive totality, which aims to incorporate what is 
left out. After we incorporate what has been omitted, then we can restore 
consistency to the system. In addition, Bhaskar (2008b) talks of a further 
possible move that depends on wisdom, what he terms as a post-philosophical 
wisdom (PPW). This move depends on our values, such as the idea of a social 
project, etc. 
Before seeing Bhaskar's (2004) critique of the Hegelian dialectic, it is important 
to understand what it means to think dialectically. Marx had already identified 
the essence of the Hegelian dialectic, with the motor of scientific progress (Bhaskar, 
2008b). The problem with Hegel, according to Marx, is that he covers it in a mystical 
shell. 
The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means 
prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working 
in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on 
its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover 
the rational kernel within the mystical shell. (Marx, 1887/1992, p. 15). 
To paraphrase, Marx is saying that Hegel identified the rational kernel in scientific 
progress, but after doing so, Hegel proceeds to cloud it within this mysterious shell. 
I want to refer to examples in order to understand the proper essence of the 
dialectic. Let us consider any scientific theory about the world. Typically, natural 
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or social theories tend to leave something out of their conceptualization of reality. 
Nevertheless, many of these theories are successful for long periods of time because 
they manage to capture essential features in the domains of social or natural phe-
nomena. However, we see that in our history of science there are false attempts 
as well as development. This logic of development can be explained in dialectical 
terms. 
Thus, we see that at any time in the history of science there is a moment of normal 
science, in Kuhnian terms. In short, normal science is a process by which a novice 
scientist is tested to see if she is able to obtain the right results. Anyone working in 
a scientific lab can be seen as a contemporary example of what this process is about. 
The problem arises when anomalies, which are always present, start to accumulate, 
thus becoming contradictions. It is a fact that these contradictions accumulate; 
we can even call contradictions that accumulate other contradictions a powerful 
contradiction. Some of these powerful contradictions indicate that something has 
gone wrong in this system, or totality, to use DCR terms. 
What this example means dialectically is that when contradictions are accumu-
lating something crucial has been left out. In short, the theory is radically incomplete 
so that what is being left out generates contradictions. Such absence can produce 
contradictions, which then act as a signaling device for us to expand the universe 
of theory or practice so as to restore consistency. Thus, we see that contradiction 
is a signaling device that tells us that something enormous has been left out, so 
that what we need to do is to discover the feature of reality that has previously 
been omitted. In short, the absence is generating contradictions, then contradic-
tions need to be resolved; that is, there is a move to find out what has been left out, 
so that there are various processes involved 
Exemplary cases of the resolution of contradictions in a more inclusive totality are 
found in the great moments of scientific discovery. In the case of Newton, the theory 
of gravity explained more features of reality that previous theories had excluded—
e.g., a pre-Newtonian way of understanding the fall of an object might have theorized 
that there is something inherent in the object that was causing it to fall, rather than 
the understanding that there is something which is exerting a force that pulls the 
object to the ground. Something similar can be said about Einstein's discovery of 
the relativity of space and time, and many other great scientific discoveries. 
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DCR provides us with the idea of dialectic as a powerful means by which to 
discover "the rational kernel in the mystical shell" (Marx, 1887/1992, p. 15). I refer 
to Bhaskar's (2008b) reading to show how Marx wanted to explain the meaning 
of the rational kernel, but this idea was not elucidated during Marx's time. In 
short, Marx left the idea of the rational kernel as a mystery. The demystification 
of the Marxian rational kernel is what DCR claims to do, in part. After a scientific 
discovery is able to restore consistency then we can rebuild a more comprehensive, 
and again, a more inclusive totality. 
The purpose of these examples is, of course, to illustrate the basic form of the 
dialectic. In short, there is an incompleteness that denotes the presence of an ab-
sence, or in CR terms, a real determinate negation that becomes generative. This 
absence or incompleteness is what causes contradictions, which are proliferating in 
the system. In order to remedy such (pernicious) incompleteness we need to rectify 
it; that is, we need to include what has been excluded. The dialectic process is a 
very simple process. It is a movement that goes from absence to the generation of 
contradictions; it is followed by the way contradictions necessitate new discovery 
and a more comprehensive theory, or to put it in DCR terms, a more comprehensive 
totality, which allows us to restore consistency. 
We see the dialectical process at work in the case of natural science by the way 
scientific discovery aims to restore what has been left out into the theory and then 
more theoretical work is done to make a new whole consistent. Bhaskar (2008b) 
argues that an analogous process can be found in the social world. For instance, the 
struggle for women's right to vote in the decades before World War I can illustrate 
how there was an absence (e.g., namely the exclusion of women from voting) in the 
electoral system of major Western countries. The result of the fulfillment of absence 
resulted in a more inclusive electoral process. We can continue in history to identify 
more absences, from slavery to colonialism, to the more recent uprisings in Egypt 
and Libya against dictatorships. 
Again, we can see that both in the social and the natural world, there is this 
same move. The move starts with the realization that there is a problem because the 
system is incomplete. In other words, absence is generating the incompleteness in 
the system that we call totality. Such absence may be social, natural, or cognitive. 
This identification necessitates the rectification of the absence. We are talking about 
the re-incorporation of what was absence, so that the remedying of the absence is by 
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the construction of a more comprehensive inclusive totality, which is what dialectic 
is! 
Now, aside from making the logic of Hegelian dialectics accessible to us in terms 
of the logic as the kernel of emancipation, DCR goes a step further. The next 
step is to see that the Hegelian system, in terms of the three Bhaskarian terms 
of realized idealism, spiritual monism, and immanent teleology, also has its limits. 
Following this interpretation, we can see that Hegel aims to accomplish three main 
goals throughout his life. 
Realized idealism This notion is the idea of the dialectic as reason or the Eleatic 
strand. In broad terms, realized idealism refers to the limits of human thought, 
and for Hegel the understanding of reality includes its speculative parts. Hegel 
aims to see reality in terms of what he calls Absolute Spirit. This idea of the 
Absolute Spirit is the way to reconcile two conflicting views—e.g., reason and 
thought, what Bhaskar terms the notion of "constellation identity" (Bhaskar, 
2008b, p. 19). 
Spiritual monism Contrary to the idea that human beings are always divided 
(e.g., the division between cognition and will), Hegel aims for an ascend-
ing dialectic in a unified division: a "unity-in-diversity, identity-in-difference, 
harmony-in-conflict," etc., (ibid., p. 117). Spiritual monism is the idea of the 
dialectic as process or the Ionic strand. 
Immanent teleology According to Bhaskar (2008b), Schiller's Letter on the As-
cetic Education of Mankind influenced Hegel to want to resolve the conflicting 
view between a major spiritual world (e.g., in thought) and how this spiri-
tual world descends to exist as part of a minor material word (e.g., of the 
being). Hegel aspires to avoid the fates of what he calls Beautiful Soul and 
Unhappy Consciousness. In short, Beautiful Soul and Unhappy Consciousness 
are archetypal figures in the Hegelian dialectic that function to explain social 
"attitudes" or ideological concepts. Their purpose is to substantively explain 
the (implicit) logic in which the individual moves toward a state of reflection 
in self-consciousness. 
First, Unhappy Consciousness refers to the logic of skepticism, in which an in-
dividual knows about the inconsistency between theory and practice, but resolves 
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to take refuge, for instance, in an attitude of submissiveness under the presence 
of some master. Second, Beautiful Soul refers to the logic of alienation, in which 
the individual tries to overcome the divide between the self and world by with-
drawing from the very society it aims to understand in reflexivity. Hegel begins 
his philosophical journey wanting to overcome the Beautiful Soul (alienation), but 
never accomplishes the move beyond the Unhappy Consciousness because, although 
he is aware of the theory-practice contradictions, he resolves to take refuge in a 
contradictory-free endist view of reality. This resolution is a compromise and Marx 
criticized Hegel for it. Hegel's endism can be understood in DCR terms with what 
Bhaskar calls the TINA syndrome, after the Thatcherian catchphrase "there is no 
alternative", so that to say that Hegel's contradictory-free history is a symptomatic 
way to mediate his theory-practice inconsistency is similar to saying that: 
some conceptual or social form is at once both false and necessary... ([it] 
is a distinguishing feature of dialectical argument), incoherent yet indis-
pensable, (for Hegel, logically) contradictory but dialectically essential 
is just to say what is a Tina compromise. (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 113). 
To apply a modified Thatcherian catchphrase to rephrase the above, we can say that 
in Hegel "there is no unresolved contradiction", meaning that all contradictions can 
be resolved in thought. The idea of TINA is strongest in the way it shows a closure. 
After we see that Hegel wants to accomplish key objectives, to avoid the destiny 
of the Beautiful Soul with his philosophical system, denoted by Bhaskar's (2004) 
U-D-R scheme (see Figure 7.3, p. 251), we can start to discern Bhaskar's (2004) 
critique of Hegel. 
The Bhaskarian critique of the Hegelian philosophical system unfolds from an 
initial form of immanent critique to an antimonial critique, and to a final omissive 
critique. In addition, Bhaskar uses three criteria: rationality and seriousness, to-
tality, and clarity, which apply to all forms of critique. In particular, the criteria 
of rationality and seriousness are mainly related to the immanent critique, which is 
related to realize idealism, but they also apply more generally as well. The criterion 
of totality mainly applies to spiritual monism, which is concerned with the omissive 
critique. The third form of critique is antimonial critique that is mainly targeted to 
the immanent teleology, which raises questions of clarity. I want to highlight that 
the omissive critique applies to all these forms of critique and that there are also 
antinomies in all of them. Moreover, what it is important for us is to understand 
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that all forms of critique (e.g., immanent, antimonial, and omissive types) and all 
three criteria (e.g., rationality and seriousness, totality, and clarity) apply to all 
the key terms (e.g., realized idealism, spiritual monism, and immanent teleology). 
Therefore, Bhaskar (2004) organizes the Hegelian critique around these notions, as 
shown in Table 7 p. 262. 
7.7.2 Critique of realized idealism 
The first main problem with the Hegelian dialectical system is realized idealism 
because it commits the epistemic fallacy: it does not have a concept of ontology 
apart from epistemology. The criterion of seriousness, the possibility of theory and 
practice unification, is also employed to produce an immanent critique. According 
to Bhaskar (2008b), Hegel commits the epistemic fallacy when he reduces the gap 
of being and knowledge of being to just thought. In other words, Hegel resolves the 
inconsistency of theory-practice in theory. This means that Hegel does not have a 
4D: the moment of transformative praxis. Hegel has the idea of process, but he does 
not have the idea of process driven by human beings in society, and that is the reason 
why Bhaskar (2008b, p. 96) calls it this "speculative illusion". In turn, Hegel is not 
really serious when he aims to resolve contradictions, as he commits the fallacy of 
speculative illusion that relates to the product of actualism (also referred to as a 
centrist or expressivist perspective). In contrast, DCR resolves the theory-practice 
gap in practice (or better said, in 4D: transformative praxis). 
7.7.3 Critique of spiritual monism 
The second chief error with Hegel's dialectic is spiritual monism, which seeks both 
the explanations of phenomena that happen in the world and the rectification of 
contradictions in philosophical thought; that is, in the thought of philosophers such 
as Hegel. From a DCR view, contradictions need be to resolved in material reality. 
In particular, spiritual monism lacks the CR idea of stratification in material reality. 
Thus, we see that the chief error with spiritual monism is really actualism, which 
reduces it all to a superficial level of the actual by not accounting for depth in reality. 
Moreover, spiritual monism does not really understand what CR calls SEPM: the 
idea that, as far as we know, mind is an emergent power of matter (Bhaskar, 1979), 
and Hegel does not account for this. Thus, spiritual monism is a form of ontological 
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idealism (also referred to as the triumphalist perspective). 
The concept of totality serves here to emphasize the CR commitment to ontology 
and it is used to produce an antimonial critique. According to Bhaskar (2004, p 124), 
Hegel fails to produce an "absolute absolute" . This double absolute that splits 
reality into what we can know (or account for) and what we have not discovered yet 
is Hegel's absolute. In short, what I am referring to here is the lack of the concept 
of ontology and stratification of reality, or in CR terms, a lack of transfactuality. 
Moreover, Bhaskar (2008b) shows how Hegel collapses both the intransitive and 
transitive realms of reality, which determines the possibility of science. Thus, Hegel 
lacks intransitivity. Bhaskar (2004) also shows that, for Hegel, causal laws are 
teleological, because the Hegelian dialectic lacks the notion of natural necessity, as 
he aims to see freedom in fate, at a single actual level of reality that defines the 
order of his existing life. 
7.7.4 Critique of immanent teleology 
The third key mistake in the Hegelian dialectical system is with immanent teleology. 
The source of error here is that immanent teleology does not allow for 4D: trans-
formative praxis. The source of the problem in immanent teleology is ontological 
monovalence: the absence of the concept of absence or real determinate negation 
itself; such as, the absence of transformation, change, geo-history, and the possi-
bility of a better world. It does not allow us to sustain the TMSA: the idea of a 
society in which we do not create social structures but we reproduce and more or 
less transform them (Bhaskar, 1979), which is always a possibility. Also, immanent 
teleology does not allow for resolutions, which can be discussed under the idea of 
clarity. This criterion raises questions about the dimension of space and time and 
it is used in the critique of Hegel to produce an antimonial critique. Bhaskar (2004) 
highlights that Hegel produces a totality that is closed in the dimensions of space 
and time. 
Allow me to sum up the three errors of the Hegelian system. First, realized 
idealism commits the epistemic fallacy: it collapses both the transitive and the 
intransitive dimensions; it fails to sustain CR ontology. The second error is spiri-
tual monism, which involves what Bhaskar (2008b) calls the speculative illusion; it 
commits the fallacy of actualism: the destratification of material reality and also 
the failure to sustain SEPM by dislocating mind from matter. Third, immanent 
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teleology commits the fallacy of ontological monovalence and does not allow us to 
sustain TMSA by denying transformation, which results in an endist perspective, 
also denoted with an early Fukuyamaian view of the end of history as we know it. 
To illustrate, what Hegel is doing is assuming that contradictions are going to 
be resolved in a progressive and preservative manner. This progressive manner that 
preserves existing phenomena is only one model of change. We can differentiate at 
least two models of change: the dialectical model is negentropy (increase into order) 
and the model of entropy (decline into confusion, chaos, or disorder). For instance, 
in the theory of thermodynamics, entropy occurs in physical systems generally, but 
as we see in biological evolution, entropy does not always occur. In fact, as animals 
and plants evolve through time, we get the opposite process that corresponds to 
an increase in order or negentropy. In social science we have dialectical changes (or 
negentropic changes) throughout human history (e.g., as we have already mentioned 
in the women's suffrage struggle, colonial independence, etc.). In the social world, 
there are also examples of entropic change, the process by which contradictions 
proliferate and whole civilizations collapse (e.g., possible examples are the Mayan 
civilization, the Dark Ages in Europe, etc.), and even our contemporary civilization 
is open to the possibility of entropic changes. These two models are not, of course, 
the only models by which to conceptualize change. For instance, we can have a 
revolutionary, abrupt change (e.g., consider the recent social uprisings), an evolu-
tionary slowly evolving change (e.g., the biological unfolding of humans or other 
living organisms through history), an endogenous change from within (e.g., the rate 
at which an infection spreads in an individual host), an exogenous change generated 
from external conditions (e.g., the case of language mutations when a local dialect 
is exposed to external linguistic influences from migrating communities), intentional 
change as individual consciousness or the awareness of a collaborative group (e.g., 
if I know smoking causes cancer, then I intentionally decide to quit smoking), or 
unintended change as a unforeseen result (e.g., in obtaining a doctoral degree, I did 
not foresee the consequences of reproducing the institutional system of higher edu-
cation). In fact, we can build a typology of different conceptions of change. Most 
importantly, there is also transformative change, which does not preserve previously 
existing phenomena, but radically negates them. On this note, Hegel assumes that 
all phenomena will be retained. The counter point to Hegel's assumption is scientific 
revolution, in which the existing beliefs are falsified. 
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In this manner, once we do not make all change conform to the Hegelian schema 
where dialectical totality (dt) is seen as a dialectical process (dp), which is itself 
seen as dialectical reason (dr), then we have a variety of different models of change. 
For instance, I have already discussed the models of negentropy and entropy. In 
particular, I resort to Bhaskar's (1994) genealogy of the notion of dialectic as shown 
in Figure 7.4, p. 260, as an exemplary model of change that encompasses the main 
ideas that I have already discussed. 
	
Adapted from Bhaskar (1994, p. 136). 
Therefore, we have seen that the Hegelian schema (dt=dp=dr) is incomplete 
because the notion of determinate negativity, which is the motor of the system, is 
absent from it. Hegel's dialectic is shown to be a subset of a larger CR dialectical 
system: dr° > dr+ > dr > dr" > drm (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 28), where I paraphrase 
each of the terms as follows: 
dr° Processes are not deterministic, but occur in geo-history. 
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dr+ It involves the resolution of contradiction (theory and practice inconsistency). 
dr It involves the rational outcomes or resolution of some contradiction. This level 
conforms to the Hegelian "determinate negation". 
dr" It involves the possibility of a recondition between theory and practice. 
dr" It opens up the constellation to the possibility of freedom. This possibility 
encourages, in practice, the possibility of an emancipatory society. 
Metaphorically, we can think of the Hegelian system as a complete constellation 
because concepts are related to the elements that make up a system as complete. 
For Bhaskar (2008b), this dialectical system is "constellationally closed" (p. 24). 
This closed system does not mean that Hegel saw the end of the world in the future 
of a process of geo-history, but that, as we have seen, Hegel loses transfactuality 
and intransitivity, he commits the epistemic fallacy, and lacks 4D as transformative 
praxis. 
I can now turn to Marx, who isolates the main ideas of Hegel in what he called 
the rational kernel in the Hegelian dialectic, the process whereby incompleteness 
generates contradictions. And these contradictions are resolved by incorporation 
of what is left out into a more comprehensive inclusive totality, as I explain in 
what follows. From a DCR perspective, we see that although Marx stated in the 
introduction to Capital to have uncovered the rational kernel from its mystical 
cover, he never actually develops it. In particular, the Bhaskarian DCR claims to 
articulate what Marxian meant by the rational kernel in Hegelian dialectics, the logic 
of emancipation. Now, I continue with the Bhaskarian critique of some elements in 
Marx. 
7.7.5 Bhaskar on the Marxian critique of Hegelian dialectics 
and Marxian dialectics 
Although AT takes much of its terminology from Marx's Grundrisse (1984/1973) 
and argues that Marx is the "first philosopher to explicate pointedly the theoret-
ical and methodological core of the concept of activity" (Engestrom & Miettinen, 
1999, p. 3), it does not provide a formal critique. However, the Engestri5mian in-
terpretation of Marxian dialectics reveals, although not fully articulated, two types 
of dilemmas. First, AT agrees with the epistemological materialist reading of the 
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Hegelian notion of self-creation as labor in Marxian terms of emancipatory practice. 
Ironically, the activity-theoretical interpretation of the Hegelian—Marxian reading 
of self-creation also reveals its main problem because being (ontology) is fused with 
its methods (epistemology), or as they put it: human "nature is not found within 
the human individual but in the movement between the inside and outside, in the 
worlds, of artefacts and artefact creation" (ibid., p. 5). Second, AT is aware of 
the deterministic, and often endist readings of the Marxian notion of labor under 
capitalism, and argues that the creative potential of labor remains an undeveloped 
theme, as follows. 
Marx developed the idea of alienated labor [or the] idea of total submis-
sion of concrete work to abstract work and production of surplus value of 
the creation and uses of technologies, makes much of his analysis of the 
effects of labor on humans a somewhat abstract and exaggerated history 
of ever-increasing misery and exploitation. That is also way the creative 
and dynamic potential of work process and technologies remains under 
developed in his work. (op. cit., p. 5). 
On topics (1) epistemological materialist and (2) endism, DCR argues that although 
Marx did not conceive the dialectic with what Bhaskar (1994) organizes as a formal 
critique, the intuition was there in the essence of his method, which was a basically 
realist one. Now from this realist intuition, I want to focus on what Marx identified 
as being erroneous with Hegel by following a Bhaskarian interpretation. There are 
three main criticisms that Marx made about Hegel, according to Bhaskar. These 
criticisms fall under the theme of the Bhaskarian formal critique: (1) the principle 
of identity, (2) logical mysticism, and (3) inversions (Bhaskar, 1994, pp. 125-126) 
and are organized in the Table 7.5, p. 262. 
Table 7.5: The Marxian critique of Hegel as schematized 
by Bhaskar 
Hegelian 
principle 
(1) realized idealism (2) spiritual monism (3) preservative sub- 
lation 	 (immanent 
teleology) 
Formal 
critique 
(1) principle of iden- 
tity 
(2) logical mysticism (3) 	 subject- 
predicate inversions 
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Form of 
materialism 
(1) epistemological (2) ontological (3) practical 
Philosophical 
critique 
(1) centrism- expres- 
sivism 
(2) triumphalism (3) endism 
DCR 
organization 
(1) critique of epis- 
temic fallacy 
(2) critique of specu- 
lative illusion 
(3) critique of onto- 
logical monovalence 
Substantive 
critique 
(1) lack of autonomy 
of nature 
(2) cognitivism (3) 	 lack 	 of 	 geo- 
historicity 
Adapted from Bhaskar (1994, p. 126). 
To reiterate, Marx did not articulate the explanation of the forms of materialism 
with the specific Bhaskarian terminology: (1) epistemological, (2) ontological, and 
(3) practical ones. Rather, these types are developed by Bhaskar (1994) as a heuristic 
attempt to bring out the rationale in Marx (as what Marx would have articulated if 
he had had the time to develop his philosophy during his lifetime). We can begin with 
the first type of materialism by recalling basic CR. In this sense, (1) epistemological 
materialism is basically transcendental realism. Hence, "the main point here is 
the existential intransitivity and transfactual efficacy (relative or absolute) of the 
objects of scientific thought" (Bhaskar, 2009, p. 130). In other words, it asserts 
that there is a world out-there that is differentiated and structured. It follows 
that (2) ontological materialism is about mind and thought being grounded on the 
material being. At this level we have the three criteria for emergence (see Table 
5.4, p. 131) of unilateral dependence, i.e., the social is unilateral (dependent on the 
biological, and thus the physical), taxonomical irreducibility, i.e., it is consistent 
with Synchronic Emergence Powers Materialism or SEMP, and causal irreducibility 
of the social sciences to include the natural sciences, which asserts that although 
mind is grounded on material being, it can be reduced to it, so that we see that 
"mental states are real, i.e., irreducible causally efficacious" (Bhaskar, 2009, p. 152). 
In addition, (3) practical materialism is the TMSA. 
For instance, we can consider Marx's own refection on history: 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; 
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The 
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tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain 
of the living. (Marx, 1852/1972b, p. 595). 
What Marx is referring to is, in fact, the unintentional, unilateral conditions that 
people do not create in the present, but which are always given by the past. Marx's 
visual metaphor presents the idea that the past conditions have a prior weight 
on present circumstances and which in basic CR is denoted with the TMSA that 
highlights the social conditions that pre-existed the individual. Thus, this unilateral 
condition of materialism is what Bhaskar calls "the meta-sociological basis of Marx's 
materialism" (p. 153), which takes the form of a type of materialism, which does not 
appear in the above Table 7.5, p. 262, but one which is important to illustrate. I am 
referring to the substantive research program of (4) geo-historical materialism, which 
is the four-planar social being (Figure 4.4, p. 107). This materialism is centered on 
the key notion of the causal primacy of the mode of labor (re)production of human 
beings in both natural (physical) states, and in the development as human-species 
beings. After illustrating the four types of materialism, I continue following the 
Bhaskarian interpretation of the concepts that make up Marx's formal critique of 
Hegel in the (1) principle of identity, (2) logical mysticism, and (3) triple inversions 
(Bhaskar, 1994, p. 125). 
(1) Critique of the principle of identity The first is, in Bhaskar's (2008b) terms, 
the principle of identity: this notion is a code for the epistemic fallacy that 
we have already seen in RTS. In this manner, once we make this connection, 
it becomes very easy for us to understand it. To recall, the epistemic fallacy 
means that knowledge and being are the same, which is wrong. 
(2) Critique of logical mysticism The second error that Marx identifies in Hegel 
is what Bhaskar (2008b) denotes as logical mysticism. Bhaskar explains this 
Marxian critique on Hegel with the notion of speculative-positivist illusion, 
which is the idea that thought and philosophy operate free of social and mate-
rial determinations, as if these notions exist in a thought realm in itself. How-
ever, let us resort to Bhaskar's PN (1979); in particular, we can resort to the 
concept of SEPM, which allows us to understand that thought is the product of 
mind, and also the understanding of mind as an emergent power of matter that 
is grounded on material conditions in a broad sense (e.g., social and biological 
determination) that act as constraints on our thought. Throughout human 
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history, people have had different thoughts and a field of the social sciences is 
dedicated to studying how these are related to different material conditions, 
such as forms of economic production, political systems, and methods of repro-
duction. Moreover, the second Hegelian error (speculative-positivist illusion) 
is connected to actualism. From Bhaskar's (2008) RTS, we can recall that ac-
tualism is the reductionist view of reality to a single level in the destratification 
that occurs in traditional philosophy. 
(3) Critique of subject-predicate inversions According to Marx, the third key 
error of Hegel is what Bhaskar (2008b) refers to as subject-predicate inversions, 
which is the code for ontological monovalence. To reiterate, this ontological 
monovalence is the continued restoration of positivity that involves living with-
out absence, incompleteness, or contradictions. Ontological monovalence tries 
to immediately resolve the contradiction by, sort of say, slighting them to the 
side. A source of ontological monovalence is in not understanding Bhaskar's 
(1979) TMSA, in which human beings always take the conditions of society, 
to reproduce or transform society itself. 
We see that there are three great errors that Marx pointed out about Hegel, 
using the terms provided by Bhaskar (2008b): the epistemic fallacy, actualism, 
and ontological monovalence. As noted by Norrie (2010), Bhaskar (2008b) 
endorses Marx's critique of Hegel, but does not stop there. 
In addition, I want to focus on what Bhaskar identifies as being erroneous with 
Marx by following the interpretation set out in Table 7.4, p. 246. Bhaskar goes on to 
make some criticisms on Marx for not carrying through his insights sufficiently, as 
we see in the three ideas: centrism, triumphalism, and also endism. The main idea, 
according to Bhaskar, is that in Marx there was an underdevelopment of scientific 
realism, and there was also an underdevelopment of the critique of empiricism as 
Marx was concentrating on rationalism and idealism. In short, the various types 
of underdevelopments in the Marxian thesis left the project unfinished as he was 
concentrating on the transitive dimension, i.e., the process of science, from which 
Marx viewed science as labor. 
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7.8 Bhaskar on contradiction 
Although the concept of contradiction may be employed as a metaphor to describe 
some constraint, dissonance, deadlock, or impasse in the physical world, it has a 
very specific definition with respect to goal-oriented human actions. Whereas in AT 
we find four types of contradictions, as summarized with Figure 4.2, p. 88, in DCR 
the notion of contradiction in broader terms denotes, more generally, a constraint or 
a bind, in a situation that may typically involve opposing parties. The satisfaction 
of this constraint may occur at the expense of involved parties. 
More specifically, Bhaskar (2008b) isolates the role that the concept of contradic-
tion plays in the Hegelian dialectic. To do this, he contrasts both Hegel and Marx 
in order to differentiate the boundaries and to show the intercepting places between 
both logical and dialectical contradiction. We are reminded that there are various 
dialectics, and not all need to depend on contradiction and they may or may not 
adhere to logical norms. To begin, I show the differentiation between internal and 
external contradiction. 
7.8.1 Internal and external contradictions 
AT and DCR agree on the notion of internal (or built-in) contradictions; however, 
DCR introduces a more rigorous account of them. The concept of contradiction, in 
general terms, deals with a well-known dilemma in everyday life. Consider the case 
when we are in front of a crossroads where we need to take one of two roads ahead. 
The paradox that I want to illustrate is that it is not possible for us to follow two 
paths simultaneously. In other words, we are confronted with a situation in which 
we experience an auto-constraint because it is not possible to have it both ways, and 
in this sense we have a situation of a double-bind, a contradiction in general terms. 
We can also illustrate such a situation with the catchphrase of Catch-22, after the 
novel of the same name, to show the dynamics of such paradoxical logic. 
According to Bhaskar (2008b, p. 56) an internal contradiction is "a double-bind 
or self-constraint (which may be multiplied to form a knot)" . In general terms where 
S: system, structure, or agent, internal contradiction occurs when S is "blocked" 
from functioning according to R: a rule, system, or principle, because it might be 
functioning according to some other rule or principle, say R'. To solve this blockage, 
the system S might take an action, T', that is meant to undermine or override the 
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original T. The generation of this opposite allows S by means of T' to override or 
undermine T, or R' overrides R. 
In this case a system, agent, or structure, A is blocked from performing 
with a rule of principle, R, because it is performing with another R'; or 
a course of action T, generates a countervailing, inhibiting, undermin-
ing, overriding, or otherwise opposed course of action T'. R' and T' are 
radically negating R and T respectively. (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 56). 
In AT we have encountered an equivalent concept of inner-contradiction formulated 
after the Marxian notion of commodity as the contradictory element in capitalism. 
Thus, AT makes a homology between the capitalist mode of production and the 
activity system, and the Marxian commodity and the relations between the compo-
nents (e.g., subject, object, rules, division of labor, etc.) of the system. However, AT 
does not develop the notion of internal contradictions beyond this level of homology. 
In DCR, the concept of internal contradiction is also differentiated from external 
contradiction. First, Bhaskar (2008b) points out that external contradictions may 
be generated by structures that are "internally related". In CR terminology, two 
structures are internally related (e.g., aRb, a is internally related to b) if there exists 
a necessary condition for one of the structures (e.g., a) to exist, whether the relation 
between such structures is symmetrical or not (e.g., the relationship between slave 
and master). 
External contradictions are introduced as follows: 
External contradictions—constraints—would appear to be pervasive—
indeed, exemplified by the laws and constraints of nature (such as the 
speed of light), to be established by the mere fact of determinate spatio-
temporal being. (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 57). 
AT has a conception of external contradictions; however, these are not articulated in 
terms of the Bhaskarian master-slave relation; rather they occur when elements out-
side of the system—for instance, a new object, instruments, rules, or other subjects—
enter into the existing working (activity) system to perturb its "normal" working 
dynamics. At this point this new element can be re-integrated into the system or 
rejected. The problem with the activity-theoretical idea of external contradictions 
is that it is not reflexive, i.e., it assumes that the original activity system has a 
"normal" way of functioning (which is internally contradictory by definition). Thus, 
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since the activity system is contradictory in the first place, as evidenced by internal 
contradictions, it needs to transcend these contradictions; otherwise it is unsustain-
able. 
It is important to note, as Bhaskar (2008b) suggests, that the term contradiction 
does not imply that every S (structure or agent) is ultimately constrained or that 
constraints are eternal or needed, but since S is constrained, then the possibility to 
change can emerge. Then the question arises as to how to change or how to remove 
constraints, so that the possibility for change arises from contradictions. If change 
is to be possible in S, then there is a degree of tendency or complicity, which may 
or may not be related to the identity of S that allows this change to occur. If S 
lacks this tendency, then we can say it is not prone to change. This understanding 
between change as having a tendency that allows it to be possible serves to introduce 
other types of contradictions: the existential, formal logical, and dialectical ones. 
Existential It refers to the "finitude" of some S. This condition may be seen as 
the thing that decays and perishes in the spatio-temporal dimension. Some 
examples of existential contradictions are the oppositions between mind and 
body, the problems between power and need, the dichotomy of master and 
slave, etc. 
Formal logical contradiction It is a type of self-constraint, double-bind, or in-
ternal contradiction. It is characterized by axiological indeterminacy: "A and 
,-,,A" (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 57). Here, A is a minimal grapheme unit and --,A the 
negation of A (not A). We can see examples of such axiological indeterminacy 
in the way S: agents act as free to choose their praxis, intentions, beliefs, etc., 
but under the normative aspects of social life, these are constraints. In social 
reality, these types of contradictions depend on both semantics and context. 
For example, we may assume that "A and r-A" are logically contradictory. 
Dialectical and logical contradictions It is another type of self-constraint, double-
bind, or internal contradiction. What differentiates dialectical contradictions 
from logical ones is that there is a connection between their elements (aspects 
or entities) that form a totality. This connection between such elements is 
such that elements are "distinct but inseparable" (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 59), in 
time or by circumstance. Such connections may have various features: 
dialectical connections, including contradictions, may hold between 
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absences and absenting as well as positive instances and processes, 
and the causal connections and existential dependencies may be 
transfactual or actual. (ibid., p. 58). 
To illustrate contradictions, we think of the double-bind between human beings and 
the continuous burning of fossil fuels together in the totality of the environment in 
which we live. The essence of contradictions is that we cannot follow two paths; 
that is, human beings cannot continue burning fossil fuels and expect to survive as 
if in an unchanged planet that does not involve human reality, actions, and their 
impact on their surroundings. 
From a DCR perspective, the concept of dialectical contradiction is grounded on 
reality, in human praxis, not just in human thought. There are material structures 
and situations, which could be described as contradictory, meaning that in those 
situations there is double-bind, i.e., two entities or situations cannot go on together. 
In dialectical contradictions we cannot have a situation in which there are two 
types of phenomena that occur together that also have a connectedness (dialectically 
connected). The connectedness means that for these entities to flourish they need 
the absence of certain environmental conditions. 
Now, DCR argues for the vital concept of contradictions for social science to 
apply it to real things in the world. If we have absences and constraints, then there 
is no a priori objection to explain the world in contradictory terms. From DCR, we 
can recall that the critique of ontological monovalence argues that we have absence 
and negativity in the world ontologically. 
Now, logical contradictions and dialectical contradictions are the same if both 
share the same grounding error (even if we can or cannot identify the grounding 
error). These two types of contradictions have different boundaries. When we iso-
late such a boundary, then we are able to describe logical contradictions in terms of 
dialectical contradictions (which is what, according to Bhaskar's (2008b) interpre-
tation, Hegel aims at, and sometimes achieves). 
In this manner, the definition of a dialectical contradiction, according to Bhaskar 
(2008b, p. 59), is: 
more or less antagonistic, in the sense of expressing or representing or 
even constituting the opposed interests of (or between agents or collec-
tives; and if antagonistic, they may be partial or latent or rhythmically 
dislocated, and manifested to a greater or lesser extent in conflict, which 
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in turn can be covert or overt, transfactual or actual, as well as conducted 
in a variety of different modes. 
The following schema helps us to make out the subtle differentiations that separate 
dialectical contradictions from pure conflicts. For example, whereas Marx uses the 
notions of contradiction, antagonism, and conflict interchangeably, in CR terms 
these concepts may be equal, but more appropriately they are seen sequentially 
contained in one another, as shown below. 
Table 7.6: Sequential containment of dialectical contra-
dictions 
Dialectical contradictions > antagonisms > conflicts > overt struggles 
Adopted from Bhaskar (2008b, p. 59). 
In fact, Bhaskar (2008b) warns us that it is a mistake to consider conflicts as "more" 
empirical forms of contradictions. While some contradictions appear as a visible 
conflicting struggle, others do not necessarily surface in practice. 
The CR notions of power'  and power2 help to further illustrate the character of 
dialectical contradictions. CR differentiates between power, which has the capacity 
for the transformation (power') of such antagonistic relations, and power that is 
expressed as dominant or controlling over relations (power2). This differentiation 
between the sense of power'  (as transformative capacity), which is at a different 
level than power2 (as in the Foucaultian term used to characterize a relation of 
oppression), allows us to further understand the antagonistic character of dialectical 
contradictions, but also to see their interconnected dependence. As an example, 
Bhaskar (2008b, p. 60) employs Hegelian terminology in what he calls master-slave 
(-type) relations. In this type of relation one of the terms is always subordinated to 
the dominant other, but this could also be reversed. Another classical example, this 
time employing Marxian terminology, is the contradiction between the subordinated 
proletarian and the dominant capitalist. These examples can help us distinguish the 
Marxian contradiction from the Hegelian one, as shown below. 
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7.8.2 Hegelian and Marxian contradictions 
The differentiation between logical and dialectical contradiction serves to differen-
tiate between the Hegelian and Marxian dialectics. On the one hand, the Hegelian 
dialectic is driven by the move of the elements from A and '-A, from a positive 
identification of contraries to a negative identification, in order to restore identifi-
cation of the initial elements. For example, Hegel aims to assert, in general terms, 
the following formula. 
Table 7.7: Hegel's formula 
A is A 
A is (i.e., passes over into) not A (or r•,) A 
A is B (the determinate result of the transition) 
A is after all A 
Adopted from Bhaskarm (1994, p. 120). 
We see that the Hegelian dialectic involves a continuous movement (e.g., from un-
derstanding to speculative reason, (see 7.3, p. 251). In this movement the elements 
are not dialectical oppositions, but they are contradictory. At the moment of pas-
sage, contradictory elements are permitted to exist, but only in a different space and 
time. This implies that both elements can never be simultaneously dialectical and 
contradictory. In this Hegelian transition (which effectively moves the coordinates 
so that elements remain connected) elements are no longer contradictory opposites 
but dialectical (see Table 7.8, p. 272 below), points 3. and 4.: logical contradiction 
transition — dialectical connection — reconciliatory theoretical result). 
On the other hand, Bhaskar (2008b) sees the Marxian dialectic as a dynamic and 
multi-dimensional logic. The Marxian dialectic can be simultaneously contradictory 
and dialectical. It allows for the ontological split between various opposites such 
as present and past, appearance and essence, present and absent, etc. Whereas 
Hegel describes the contradictions of his era by reconciliatory and non-contradictory 
means, Marx takes those contradictions as the means to explain the world with the 
meaning of capitalism: 
the period of capitalism, when social wealth becomes to an ever-increasing 
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degree the property of those who are in a position to appropriate con-
tinually and ever afresh the unpaid labor of others. (Marx, 1887/1992, 
p. 408). 
To sum up, the distinction between Hegelian dialectics (HD) and Marxian dialectics 
(MD), Bhaskar (2008b) gives the following Table 7.8, p. 272. 
Table 7.8: Hegelian and Marxian contradiction 
1. HD: Logical contradiction –+ dialectical connection -+ transfigurative re-
description [-4 analytical reinstatement] 
2. MD: Dialectical connection -+ dialectical contradiction --> transformist 
praxis --> practical resolution 
It needs to be noted that both MD and HD differ in their order of sequence. 
3. HD: Logical contradiction — transition — dialectical connection — recon-
ciliatory theoretical result. 
4. MD: Dialectical connection — dialectical contradiction — dialectical praxis 
— transformative negation — resolutionary practical result. 
Adopted from Bhaskar (2008b, pp. 64-65). 
According to Bhaskar (2008b), for Hegel, the resolution of a contradiction is 
always in theory and for Marx it is always in practice. This distinction is not to 
say that Marx went out to practically intervene in the resolution of conditions, 
but it was in his theoretical work that Marx highlighted that contradictions need 
to be resolved in practice. To explain, the resolution of contradictions requires a 
practical approach, i.e., the resolution needs to be based on practice (e.g., theory is 
substantively founded on practical actions of writing theory about the real world) 
and it starts by a transformative negation of the existing ills, contradictions, and 
absences. From a DCR viewpoint, all practice is "quasi-propositional", meaning 
that it depends on conceptions and expressions of beliefs, but they do not exhaust 
it. The important thing to notice here is the relation between theory and practice, 
which Bhaskar (2008b, p. 66) approaches with what he terms as "the duality of 
theory and practice". There are various consequences of such duality, which are tied 
to the already mentioned inner contradictions, the inconsistency between theory and 
practice. 
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The reading that Bhaskar (2008b) makes of Marx's explanation of the contra-
diction and the mode of production of a society is Marx's version of what Bhaskar 
calls immanent critique, which consists of the identification of contradictions that 
are immanent to the mode of production as the main source that generates them 
in capitalism. For instance, a contradiction exists in the twofold characterization of 
labor, as it is compared to a commodity—e.g., a good or service. Engestromian AT 
agrees with such an interpretation, as follows: 
Marx's analysis of capitalism includes invaluable analytical instruments, 
above all the concept of commodity as a contradictory unity of use value 
and exchange values. This dialectical concept is crucial for any seri-
ous analysis of the contradictory motives of human activity and human 
psyche in capitalist society. (Engestrom & Miettinen, 1999, p. 5) 
This contradiction surfaces when we make the distinction between the usefulness of 
a thing of utility without (monetary) value (e.g., use-value) and the value it obtains 
when we exchange or sell it (e.g., exchange-value). As denoted by Marx, in terms 
of "human labour, it follows as a matter of course, that value can only manifest 
itself in the social relation of commodity to commodity" (Marx, 1887/1992, p. 32). 
CRAT is also an example of immanent critique because it effectively identifies that 
AT fails to adequately engage with a critique of empiricism. For example, Marx 
did an immanent critique of the political economy, which involves the identifica-
tion of the contradictions, mechanisms, and causal tendencies of capitalist society 
in his Capital (1987/1992). What is important to note is that Marx's relational 
conception of society, which depends on the idea of the mode of production, already 
presupposes a hermeneutic stance that opens up that possibility for the union of 
practice and of theory in practice. Moreover, Marx did not just do an immanent 
critique, but of course, he also did an explanatory critique, although he did not use 
those CR terms. In his critique of the political economy, Marx not only explained 
the destructiveness of social and natural phenomena under capitalism, but he also 
explained why capitalism brought about many changes all over the world. A critique 
that is tied to not only identifying contradictions, but also to their source, is what in 
DCR is termed an explanatory critique, the key to explain the elements that cause 
contradictions in the first place. 
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7.9 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces DCR, assimilates AT via the Bhaskarian re-vindication of 
agency, and provides a better account of the historical development of AT through 
the Bhaskarian Hegel-Marx critique. Thus, we see how DCR provides important 
terms by which to understand and (re) interpret the extensive work of both Hegel 
and Marx, while at the same time it provides an original critique in its own right. 
What is unique about CR in its basic and dialectical forms, and what AT lacks, is 
a critique of Humean legacy, which follows in two parts. First, the important aspect 
to stress is that of the critique of empirical realism, i.e., epistemic fallacy, the implicit 
ontology of an undifferentiated, unstructured, unchanging world: Hume's theory of 
causal laws. This implicit ontology prohibited any discussion or explicit ontology 
but did not get rid of the implicit ontology itself, which AT inherits from Kant 
through Hume. The second is a distinct and most important critique of the Humean 
non-transitional path from facts to values. AT accepts the Humean prohibition on 
transition from facts to values. It is here that activity theorists consciously accept 
it, although they about it by aiming to overcome the fact-value dichotomy. The 
theory of the explanatory critique, which started by focusing on facts and values 
(by finding and explaining the fallacies that departed from Hume), is not the point 
of departure of AT. In this manner, although AT contains Hegelian and Marxian 
epistemologically grounded approaches, it remains ontologically implicitly grounded 
on a division between facts and values, promoted by Hume. In this manner, I have 
identified, not only isolated, that fact that the root of AT dualisms grounded on an 
absence of a critique of Humean theory. 
The following chapter is a reflection and conclusion of CRAT. This chapter con-
cludes with the understanding of the concept of contradiction, which very important 
for AT. DCR allow us to articulate it for a number of reasons (which are causes). 
• First, it has characteristics of being auto-overriding, performative, and self-
deconstructive phenomena. 
• Second, it is set against the background of what Bhaskar calls "hermeneutic—
hegemonic struggles" (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 66) over power2 (oppressive) rela-
tions. In other words, the agent (or community of agents) may reject (or 
accept) in their practice, what is then affirmed (or denied) in conceptualiza-
tions. For example, in the narrative struggle between "good" and "evil" , the 
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"good side" wants transformative capacity, which is powers to abolish power2 
relations. 
• Third, the inconsistencies of theory-practice are accumulative. This accumu-
lation is viewed in a series of phases, in which each phase is brought out by the 
"blind spot" that preceded other phases. In the case of Hegel, the sequence of 
pathological blind spots (dc=dr=dt) is constituted by what Bhaskar (2008b, 
p. 66) terms "the Achilles' Heel critique" of the Hegelian dialectic. 
• Fourth, the breaking of the theory-practice unity (what in CR terms is referred 
to as the axiological necessity: "epistemologically mediated natural necessity 
that assets itself in practice" [Bhaskar, 2009, p. 843]) generates a "vector" 
that is the one-dimensional reductionist perspective of ontology (being) to 
epistemology (knowledge) that in CR terms is known as the epistemic fallacy. 
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Reflection and conclusion 
Now, HERE, you see, it takes all the running YOU can do, to keep in 
the same place'. 
8.1 Introduction 
Reflexivity entails theory-practice consistency. From a Critical Realist (CR) per-
spective, a reflective act denotes the "capacity of a philosopher (or of a philosophy) 
to sustain his or her own content and conditions of production" (Bhaskar, 2002a, 
p. 54). The development of a Critical Realist Activity Theory (CRAT) necessi-
tates to question reality and the conditions under which transformation is possible, 
and including the interrogation of one's own conditions of sustainability as part of 
a "meta-reflexively totalizing situation' (Bhaskar, 2008b, p. 125). The failure to 
engage with such reflexive act is the failure to conceptualize being that generates 
splits, and then absurd compromises to sustain a false theory in practice. CRAT is 
self-reflexive from the moment it actively seeks to identify and resolve dichotomies 
via a sublation of Activity Theory (AT) by means of the philosophy of CR, and 
in this manner, it is able to sustain its own practice via ontological realism. The 
'Said the Red Queen in Carroll's Through the looking-glass (1871, p. 39). 
2Bhaskar (2008b, p. 125) develops the concept of "meta-reflexively totalizing situation" as a 
three-part argument: (1) the agent, as a stratified being, is engaged in his or her practice and 
understands that this engagement depends on questioning reality, i.e., in the need ask ontological 
questions, to keep re-vindicating the what-does-it-mean struggle, (2) the agent minds the gap; in 
other words, in the agent's production there is a detachment from the realm of the social (linguistic) 
transitive and the intransitive realm, (3) agents "can escape the fate of being prisoners of the past", 
via creation that mobilizes the past and exploits all the resources at their availability. 
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Bhaskarian notion of reflexivity takes CRAT from an explicit theorization of being 
via basic CR neatly to avoid ontological monovalence via dialectical CR with its 
explicit re-vindication of absence. As a consequence of conceptualizing a realist on-
tology and the understanding of the critical realist categories of reality, CRAT is 
serious and thus capable of sustaining its own grounds in the Bhaskarian dialectic 
and argue for it with the passage through from 1M to 4D, as follows: 1M: learning as 
product (non-identity), 2E: learning as process (negativity), 3L: learning as process-
in-product (open totality) and 4D: learning as product-in-process (transformative 
praxis). Thus, it is fitting for CRAT to end at this precise level, i.e., 5A in the CR 
philosophy because it is the level of reflexivity. 
This chapter recapitulates the overall account of learning as a passage through 
the Bhaskarian dialectic and it adds a level of reflexivity in terms of what I call 
5A: learning as an emancipatory intentionality. This addition means that CRAT 
thematizes the 5A: learning as emancipatory intentionality via Bhaskar's Educat-
ing the Educators-Or, Empowering Teachers (2002b, p. 140). Then CRAT employs 
Bhaskar's five creative cycles of learning as a self-reflexive passage through the di-
alectic itself with the particular intention to highlight what each level means for 
education. To include, CRAT identifies what has been left out from this initial en-
gagement with the philosophy of Meta-Reality in terms of two other possible levels 
for learning. Last, the conclusion provides the summarizing argument of this thesis. 
8.2 Reflection 5A: learning as emancipatory in-
tentionality 
CRAT, as it has been developed up to now, makes use of the fact that dialectical CR 
uncovers the Hegelian rational kernel, the idea that the passage through the dialectic 
is a "general theory of all learning processes" (Bhaskar, 2002a, p. 56). The key 
to its conceptualization is transcendence of absence that generates incompleteness. 
Thus, the ultimate goal of learning is to transcend such incompleteness, i.e., to 
reincorporate the element that is left implicit into the totality of learning to move 
to a greater, more complete totality. This absent element is real and part of the 
totalization of reality. In this manner, one is then compelled to situate the researcher 
herself or himself as part of an absent element, which is what self-reflexivity means. 
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Metaphorically, we can think that the absent element of CRAT is the Bhaskarian 
5A-stratum of reflexivity that just like a spark that is capable of initiating a fire. 
This level is an intrinsic part of the learner, i.e., the researcher herself or himself as 
learner has an intrinsic capacity to initiate such fire that is the dialectical process 
of learning. 
To illustrate dialectical learning, it is necessary to proceed through the Bhaskar-
ian logic of emancipation from 4D > 3L> 2E and 1M, which requires a reflexive 
level in order to satisfy what Bhaskar (2002c, p. 100) calls "the five creative cycles 
of learning", as tabularized with Table 8.1, p. 278. 
Table 8.1: CRAT argument: learning as a passage 
through the dialectic 
Causal-axiological chain 
5-fold polysemy Creative learning cycles 
1M: 
Non-identity 
product calling 
2E: 
Negativity 
process creation (or becoming) 
3L: 
Open totality 
process-in-product binding (formation, or elabora-
tion) 
4D: Transfor- 
mative agency 
product-in-process making (or what is transformed) 
5A: 
Reflexivity 
inwardness fulfillment of intentionality 
The understanding of our world 
1M as being 
2E as a process, of creation of emergence, becoming and trans-
formation, of negating (absenting) and- or presenting; 
3L as totalizing or shaping or binding into a whole (holistically); 
and 
Continued on next page 
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Table 8.1 – Continued from previous page 
4D 
as incorporating human agency or making—an agency which 
is capable of coming to self-consciousness and finding it is 
capable of coming to self-consciousness and finding itself; 
5A 
as reflected or fulfilled in the objective physical world of work, 
and its products, constituted in the space of four-planar social 
being. 
Adopted from Bhaskar (2002c, p. 108). 
Before going into the cycle as a self-reflexive passage through the five levels, it is 
necessary to stress two important points. The first point is that learning, as Bhaskar 
(2002b) argues, like emancipation cannot be imposed on any individual. The key 
idea is that education (or emancipation) is not some phenomena that can be forced 
on people because at the heart of it, we have that individuals, pupils themselves need 
to learn. In this precise sense, education is about those "Oh, I see it!" moments. It 
is a spark or calling, to use Bhaskarian terms, from which something completely new 
and different can emerge in our creation, which requires that, for example, unless 
the pupil does see it, there is no education. What this "Oh, I see it!" or eureka 
moment suggests is that education involves a process, which Bhaskar (2002c, p. 99) 
calls "unfolding" or the bringing out of something that is already "enfolded", i.e., 
as a possibility of something that is implicit. 
Although for Plato, the unfolding aspect of learning is unworldly, for Bhaskar 
(2002c), it is different. To illustrate such differentiation Bhaskar makes references to 
Chomsky, who sees that we cannot learn to speak unless (unlike stones) we have the 
capacity to learn to speak, e.g., our language capacity is an innate potentiality, and 
Rousseau who states that we are born free, but we encounter many chains. From a 
CR viewpoint, this enfolded property denotes our potentials as something that we 
must have ourselves, before any learning can occur. In that sense, Bhaskar refers to 
1M-stratum of being as the platonic doctrine of anamnesis which is remembering; it 
means that all education happens because we bring about its realization, something 
that is implicit, tacitly there, or enfolded, even if this metaphorical spark is not 
actualized but remains as a potential. The actualization of learning means that 
there is a universal assumption of the potential with the individual to bring about 
change. In terms of learning, it is better to think in terms of bringing out a potential 
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or actualizing a potential. In this manner, this first cycle of the dialectic is realization 
that emancipation is not an outside injunction, but self-injunction. 
Second, we have a 2E-stratum of becoming, where we can ask how do we learn 
best? It is better to go in a state of emptiness, not thinking about anything because 
otherwise what happens is that pre-conceptions get in the way. This level of becom-
ing is an in-between space of our present, a place where a moment of "eureka" or 
discovery can also occur. 
Third, there is a 3L-stratum of a process of in-building knowledge, what Bhaskar 
(2002c, p.101) calls "formation" (or "binding"), in which knowledge becomes part 
of the learning by exploring all the potentials of what the learning means. In other 
words, this stage requires awareness in practice of the knowledge boundaries, its 
application to new contexts, and so on. For example, we can imagine that this level 
is similar to learning how to ride a bicycle for the first time. Then there comes a 
magical point, when learning becomes a Bhaskarian basic act, in the case that we do 
not have to think about it, we just do it, we no longer need to consciously test the 
boundaries of our knowledge. This Bhaskarian notion of a basic act is equivalent 
to the Leont'evian notion of operations (or automatic acts, e.g., tying our shoes, 
that we can do without thinking about making a plan of how to do these acts, as 
they are spontaneously done). The hallmark of this phase of learning is that we can 
transition to do things in the world, we can use our knowledge, we can make things. 
Fourth, we have a 4D-stratum of creation. This phase is what Bhaskar (2002c, 
p. 103) calls making because we are able to produce things in the world; In other 
words, when we can make things successfully, then we can see our intentionality 
fulfilled (as 5A). The fulfillment of intentionality is a capacity of what Bhaskar call 
our ground state. 
In Bhaskar's The Zen of Creativity and the Critique of the Discursive Intellect 
(2002c, p. 140) argues that the logic of learning actually goes through five phases 
or stages, which mirrors of all human action in "the cycles of creativity" with 5A: 
capacity to fulfill intentionality as absent element in CRAT up to now. Following 
Bhaskar, we incorporate this level of reflexivity, when we can see our intentionality 
reflected and objectified in the world in the unity of our theory and practice—
our intentionality and result. In a transcendental self-reflexive act that aims to 
reincorporate the absent element 5A into CRAT in order to move to a greater 
totality, I now illustrate the passage through the Bhaskarian five creative cycles of 
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learning. 
Following Bhaskar (2002c), 1M denotes a basic urge or the state of calling. At 
this point we want something to happen. For example, we can imagine the universe 
before the Big Bang in which everything is ready to happen. Imagine the learner 
with a mind in a "blank state", but alert there is nothing prior to language or there 
is no society-preceding agency. 
Then, 2E: the stage of creativity) or creation occurs as a result of which to all the 
circumstances of learning all the conditions that, for example, Brown (2009) talks 
about in his learning environment, as a result you have the "Oh, I see it!"-moment 
or the moment when the learner finally has grasped whatever she is trying to learn. 
This is the stage of creativity itself, which applies not just to the learner, but also to 
the scientific discovery because when we are trying to solve a problem in any kind of 
discipline, we suddenly (or gradually) experience that there is a moment in which we 
see "it", the thing that is the breakthrough, in retrospect, brought into light. This 
moment of eureka is a moment of lucidity that does not come form the boundaries 
of the past, nor the future, but forms the in-between space of our present 
Nothing new ever comes form thought (or from the past or future), it 
always comes from un-thought (now), from the space between, behind 
or beyond thought (in the present). It always comes from a suspension 
of thinking, or a moment of supramental consciousness erupted into a 
space in the discursive process of thought. (Bhaskar, 2002c, p. 105) 
The problem is that we tend to live our lives, in what Bhaskar terms axiological 
contradiction, either worrying about a future that we do not know or nostalgic (or 
under bitter memories) about a past that left us; when in fact, as Bhaskar suggests, 
it is wiser to live and also to act from the unplanned, uncertainly level of our ground 
state, and to be open to possibilities and adjustments of change. The 2E level is 
something extraordinary because such moments of lucidity is a breakthrough that 
tends to be a very simple flash, and what follows in 3L is that this simple flash 
needs to set in. What might be difficult to do is to retain such finding, to retain it 
or "hang on to it", as it were, and to develop it. This instant moment of lucidity 
needs to be practiced; it needs to become a Bhaskarian basic act. In particular, 
thought plays an important role here because we have to continuously remember 
1The reader is referred to Bhaskar's quote in section 1.1, p. 5. 
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and produce knowledge that we already have, and thus we are investigating how 
this new knowledge fits together with pre-existing knowledge. 
For example, in section 3.7, p. 62 of this thesis, I show that at this level, some of 
the ideas of AT would be very relevant here, for example the AT notion of zone of 
proximal development (ZPD), which is drafted from the thesis of Vygotsky (1978). 
In terms of education, Engestrom (1996, p. 168) argues that what differentiates his 
expansive learning via ZPD from learning theories is that: 
The expansive learning approach exploits the actual existing conflicts 
and dissatisfactions among teachers, students, parents and others in-
volved in or affected by school, inviting them to join in a concrete trans-
formation of the current practice... It is built on facing the current con-
tradictions and draws strength from their joint analysis. 
To paraphrase the above quote, the AT focuses on ZPD as a dimension or space 
in which collectives, e.g., relations between individuals, can explore and dwell in 
to resolve their conflicts, contradictions, and so on, and from a CR perspective we 
are now able to go a further level to re-vindicate agency in as self-emancipatory 
learning, and thus sublating the original ZPD thesis via CR. 
2E is followed by 3L, the stage of formation or binding. At this 3L-level, we test 
the boundaries and consciously apply our knowledge to different contexts. At the 
same time, we are engage in a process of making as a result of this application of what 
is learned. Sometimes in this process of production we may find our intentionality 
reflected in the outcome. Although we may see a part of our intentionality expressed 
in the product, the general characteristic of 3L is that knowledge is not yet part of 
our being. In other words, we have to consciously try, apply, and test what we 
know in order to master it. In contrast, the 4D level of making characterizes itself 
when knowledge is part of our being, i.e., in the process of production there is an 
unconscious generation of knowledge as spontaneous creation, and in 5A, we have 
mastered this knowledge that reflects our intentionality. For example, although CR 
philosophy is not yet a basic act for me, it is still allows me to bind it, to gradually 
appropriate it (at 3L), to make this argument and have my reflection reflected on it 
to create this argument (at 4D) and have my intentionality reflected on it (at 5A). 
Another example of the 3L level is in the case that a student needs to revise for an 
exam because she or he has not reached a point of immediate access to knowledge, 
which is a Bhaskarian paradoxical feature of exams. Let us suppose that a teacher 
282 
8. Reflection and conclusion 
suggests to a student that she should not revise, and to be fresh for an examination, 
but such student always revises because she needs to practice. Here the teacher 
might be assuming that the student is at a stage where she does not need to revise 
(at 4D), which possesses knowledge that can be spontaneously generated under time 
constraints. What this example is trying to illustrate is that creation, recreation, 
and discovery are essential to learning, which are united in 4D: making, as our 
need for the objectification and transformative praxis of our knowledge. From a CR 
viewpoint, learning should be something very exciting, process of discovery. It is at 
this point working at the frontiers of discovery. It requires cycles and processes that 
can be proposed to be very similar to what a student is going through. 
In a first reflexive move, CRAT accounts for 5A: the stage of fulfillment of 
intentionality. This is the level of unification of theory and practice, which is reflec-
tive in the learner's intentionality. Thus, it is my intentionality to end CRAT by 
summarizing some of the most import concepts already covered in this thesis eight 
key principles of the Bhaskarian philosophy of Meta-Reality, as shown following 
Table 8.2, p. 283. 
Table 8.2: Eight principles of meta-reality for learning 
The principle concerning: 
(1) absence because it is essential to change, particularly elaborated in section 
7.4, p. 224 
(2) the ontological necessity (and apriority) of absence to presence, and of 
negative to positive being, in section 7.4, p. 224 and Appendix B, p. 289 
(3) the dialectic, in Chapter 7, p. 220 
the centrality of transcendence of dualisms, in Chapter 5.1, p. 116 
(4) the deepening of ontology to include being processually, in section 5.2, 
p. 119, section 6.3, p. 191 and section 7.3, p. 222 
(5) the irreducibility of emergence with Table 5.4, p. 131 
(6) creativity in all being, section 1.1, p. 5 and this section 
(7) the critique of discursive intellect and the subject predicate form, section 
6.1, p. 217 
Continued on next page 
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Table 8.2 — Continued from previous page 
The principle concerning: 
(8) ontological bivalence and polyvalence. (This principle is already im-
plicit with principles (1) and (2), however, Bhaskar (2002c) explicitly puts this 
level in order to stress that it underpins the previous ones because from prin-
ciple 1. we know that learning always involves change of perspective, and to 
understand change we need to have 2. absence as real. Therefore, we must 
critical of a totally positive account of the world, i.e., ontological monovalence, 
and we need to have ontological bivalence from the start). 
Adopted from Bhaskar (2002c, pp. 124-131). 
In a second reflexive move, CRAT acknowledges an element that has been left out 
from this conceptualization of learning. This element is denoted with two other levels 
of the Bhaskarian philosophy of Meta-Reality (PMR), i.e., 6R: (re-) enchantment 
and 7Z/A: non-duality. For this conception of learning 6R is important because 
it thematizes the notions of value and meaning into an otherwise Kantian-inspired 
conceptualized reality where these crucial ideas are imposed on it, rather than being 
part of reality itself. The last level 7Z/A is important for the resolution of conflicts 
because it thematizes being as involving the priority of identity over difference, unity 
over split, which is what non-duality means. Thus, the absent element is in fact a 
new re-starting point to continue with the emancipatory dialectical logic of learning 
or CRAT as the passage through understanding being, as shown below. 
Table 8.3: Transcendental dialectical critical realist 
Understanding being as: 
(1M) such 
(2E) process 
(3L) a whole or a totality 
(4D) transformative praxis 
(5A) reflexivity and inwardness 
(6R) re-enchanted, valuable and meaningful in itself 
(7Z/A) incorporating the priority of identity over difference, unity over split, 
and as non-duality 
284 
8. Reflection and conclusion 
Adopted from Bhaskar (2010, p. 123-124). 
Bhaskar (2002c) argues that the key concepts of 7Z/A can be shown to be at 
work in every day life. Whereas an orthodox theorization of non-duality assumes 
that it is possible to obtain it in a very rare state, e.g., a religious nirvana state in 
order to achieve unity. In fact, the Bhaskarian argument is that this state of unity is 
achievable in everyday life. For instance, we are in a state of unity when sustaining 
daily communication, which is what "transcendental identification", is, in terms of 
the philosophy of Meta-Reality. When unity is at work in order when we perform 
daily basic acts in what Bhaskar (2002c, p. 5) calls our "transcendental agency" and 
when we engage in solidarity with the other such as in the case of playing a game or 
in an orchestra, then we are putting to work or "transcendental holism or teamwork" 
(ibid., p. 6). These states, together with our "transcendental self' (op., cit. 6), i.e., 
our very self that reports the fracture and split or contradiction when there is no 
unity, form the Bhaskarian argument by which the Philosophy and Meta-Reality can 
become significant for, for example, the resolution of conflicts since it is grounded 
in our very ordinarily experience. 
In a third reflexive move, CRAT acknowledges that self-conscious entails two 
levels of responsibility. Objectively, as conscious beings we are responsible for the 
intended consequences of our actions, and subjectively we are also responsible for 
the un-intended consequences of our actions too. In The Little Prince, Antoine de 
Saint-Exupery (1943/1995) exemplifies this idea with the following excerpt: 
"Now here is my secret. It is very simple. It is only with one's heart that 
one can see clearly. [1] What is essential is invisible to the eye." . . . "It 
is the time you lavished on your rose which makes your rose so impor-
tant."... "Men have forgotten this basic truth", said the fox. [2]"But 
you must not forget it. For what you have tamed, you become responsible 
forever. You are responsible for your rose." (p. 82, emphasis added) 
In the above quote, [1] the priority of the negative over the positive and [2] this dou-
ble objective-subjective responsibility are crucial because it "enables us to be more 
creative than we would otherwise been" (Bhaskar, 2002c, p. 111). Creativity, in this 
sense, is not the end but the beginning. It is a vital introduction the understanding 
of reality and of our own intellect and its limitations. 
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8.3 Final conclusion 
My thesis, a Critical Realist Activity Theory, is that learning is a passage 
through the dialectic, the logic of emancipation and for self-emancipation. It em-
ploys the Bhaskarian dialectic to show how various contemporary learning theories—
collaborative learning, cooperative learning, supplemental instruction, and AT—
function in a pluralist sense to account for the four main critical realist categories 
of reality-1M: learning as product (non-identity), 2E: learning as process (neg-
ativity), 3L: learning as process-in-product (totality), 4D: learning as product-in-
process (transformative agency), and 5A: learning as emancipatory intentionality 
(reflexivity), as a complete passage through the five Bhaskarian cycles of creativity. 
The Bhaskarian dialectic allows us to be Hegelian without the Hegelian closure in 
thought. In particular, CRAT engages with a proto-explanatory critique of AT by 
showing the theoretical dichotomies that are evident within this research commu-
nity, thereby laying the ground for an omissive critique. Then, CRAT identifies that 
AT fails to adequately engage with a critique of empiricism, i.e., a lack of a critique 
the philosophy of Hume. In order to properly articulate an omissive critique, i.e., 
to show how this absence generates the theoretical dichotomies within AT, CRAT 
makes use of a superior theory, and in this manner, it engages with some of the ele-
ments for an explanatory critique via dialectical CR. A result of this investigation is, 
in part, the explanation, up to a certain degree, of why the activity-theoretical ap-
proach is dichotomous in the first place, leads this theory of learning, in accordance 
with the philosophy of CR, to sustain agency and with it self-emancipation as an 
implicit element of what I consider is Marx's phrase for the phrase of what remains 
an open problem of investigation—i.e., "From each according to his abilities, to each 
according to his needs!' 
8.3.1 Summary of the original argument of CRAT 
In this thesis , (a) I am using CR as it has been developed in its most cogent form 
in order to illuminate and resolve the contradictions within AT and thus to explain 
them, which is what an explanatory critique is. In particular, (,3) I am using DCR 
to provide a new conceptualization of learning as a passage through the dialectic. 
'In Marx's Critique of the Gotha Program (1891/1972a, p. 531). 
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The following list of oppositions in philosophy is taken from Bhaskar's Plato etc 
(1994, pp. 184-186). 
co-inclusion any of the three modes we have discussed [i.e., dialectics of co-inclusion: 
(a) as dialectical contradiction in the modes of ontological stratification, ab-
sence, intra-activity and agentive agency; (b) as social conflicts in the modes 
of power2 struggles, constituted by or grounded in dialectical contradictions; 
and (c) as dialectical transitions over distanciated space-time. 
dilemma either-or (or reject of bivalence or excluded middle of both). 
antimony both (or rejection of non-contradiction).The presence of the past and 
outside, especially in the form of existential constitution by geo-historical pro-
cesses of formation. Existential constitution, permeation or connection of one 
internally related element by another. 
inversion reversal of hierarchy. 
chiasmus juxtaposition of the terms of a polarity. 
aporiai interminably insoluble indeterminacy. 
ambivalence tendency to both of two or more incompatible positions. 
anomaly incompatibility with an established pattern. 
ambiguity vague indeterminacy of positions. 
denegation denial in theory, affirmation in practice. 
unseriousness the inversion of de-negation. 
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split-off e.g., in the form of projection or retrojection. 
duplicity equivocation between incompatible positions. 
paradox incompatibility between established (e.g., epistemological cannons and 
perceived reality. 
complicity acceptance of or dependence upon an incompatible position. 
domination in any of a number of modes including suppression, exclusion, and 
fragmentation. 
plasticity susceptibility to a multiplicity of incompatible positions. 
alienation estrangement from self. 
theory-practice inconsistency e.g., immanent critique. 
theory-practice incompleteness e.g., lack of dialectical universalizability. 
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The following list of oppositions in philosophy is taken from Hartwig's Dictionary 
of critical realism (2007, pp. 376-377). The primary term is in bold-faced type. 
absenting (change) over absence (non-being) 
absence over presence (negativity over positivity) 
constraints on human action over enablements and the realization of possibility: 
there are many more things we cannot or could not do than we can. This is 
the axiological asymmetry, offsetable to some extent by emancipatory praxis 
(made possible by the asymmetry of emancipation) 
dialectics over analytics within the dialectic of dialectical and analytical reason 
totality over its aspects, relations over relata (or the shaping of the part by the 
whole) (the ecological asymmetry) 
our transcendentally real selves over master-slave-type structures of oppression, 
and action flowing from our essential selves over exploitative and oppres-
sive action (the asymmetry of emancipation or of axiology and emancipation) 
entropy over negentropy 
the epistemic over the ontic within the expressive-referential duality of truth, and 
the ontological and alethic moment over the other moments in the truth 
tetrapoly 
explanation over prediction in science (entailed by the unfolding openness of the 
world) 
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internal over external relations within the dialectics of internal and external rela-
tion 
non-identity (alterity) over identity within the dialectics of internal and external 
relations 
objectivity over subject-object within subjectivity, or ontology over epistemology 
the past over the present (the temporal asymmetry) 
the political over the ethical in the EA of the transitive dimension TD (explana-
tory primacy), and the ethical over the political in the IA of the TD (nor-
mative primacy), constituting a fluid constellational unity within the political 
practice over discourse and theory in the constitution of subjectivity 
reason (belief) over desire (want, intention) in human action—belief does not have 
to wait on anything else to issue in action, want must wait on belief (the 
psychological asymmetry) 
science over philosophy 
social structure over human agency (the social asymmetry) 
master over slave in power2-stricken society (the relative structural asymmetry of 
dialectical contradictions, connected with directionality) 
structures over events, hence the possible (dispositionality) over the actual. 
the asymmetry of time and space in regard to causality-causal powers must be 
possessed and exercise in time but do not necessarily have position in space 
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